Why did Britain go to War over Poland in 1939?
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martybegan
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He didn't have the forces then to resist anything. It was a calculated gamble, and he won, because he knew the French had not stomach for fighting back.
If he had failed in the Rhineland, the Wehrmacht would have deposed him, they still had the power to do that, before figure early 1939.
Dante
"The Libido for the Ugly"
What was there to resist? Hitler was the antagonist whose power was growing. He was building out and poking/testing neighbors. War was coming. Hitler was playing people. Closest thing to that shit is how I see Putin. Making pacts with the full intention of breaking words/agreements.
People (after the fact) go on and on about how "the Wehrmacht" would oppose and get rid of Hitler. right
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The reason the British and French let the Germans take back the Rhineland was because of the growing acknowledgement that the terms of the Versailles treaty were fundamentally unfair and unsustainable, thus perpetuating German hostility towards those countries. Hitler might have been removed from power if he had failed, but his successes solidified his support among the German people.
Dante
"The Libido for the Ugly"
from a source that was linked to:
the Wehrmacht Hitler and the German Officer Corps
Under these circumstances there wasn’t the slightest reason for the Officer Corps of the Wehrmacht to view the new state leadership with antipathy or even with mistrust. Quite the contrary. The officers viewed with genuine satisfaction Hitler’s new program of freeing the Wehrmacht from the fetters of the Treaty of Versailles and of making it once again a power corresponding to the greatness of the Reich. The fulfillment of such a program would add a new importance to their chosen careers. Even though some of the older officers may have taken exception to the unruly spirit which governed the Nazi movement and to the brutal methods which it brought to bear in the struggle for power against the other parties, such apprehension was of minor importance to the great mass of the Officer Corps for part of the traditional training of the German officer was not to concern himself with politics.
The Wehrmacht had retained the same unpolitical character during the period of the Weimar Republic (that is, since 1919) which it had had during the Kaiser’s Reich. The creator of the Reichswehr,[2] General von Seeckt, one of the strongest personalities of his time, had laid particular stress on this point and had deemed it his primary task to again make the Wehrmacht what it had been in the Kaiser’s Reich: the strongest support of the government in power.
---
Under these circumstances there wasn’t the slightest reason for the Officer Corps of the Wehrmacht to view the new state leadership with antipathy or even with mistrust. Quite the contrary. The officers viewed with genuine satisfaction Hitler’s new program of freeing the Wehrmacht from the fetters of the Treaty of Versailles and of making it once again a power corresponding to the greatness of the Reich. The fulfillment of such a program would add a new importance to their chosen careers.
Even though some of the older officers may have taken exception to the unruly spirit which governed the Nazi movement and to the brutal methods which it brought to bear in the struggle for power against the other parties, such apprehension was of minor importance to the great mass of the Officer Corps for part of the traditional training of the German officer was not to concern himself with politics.
The Wehrmacht had retained the same unpolitical character during the period of the Weimar Republic (that is, since 1919) which it had had during the Kaiser’s Reich. The creator of the Reichswehr,[2] General von Seeckt, one of the strongest personalities of his time, had laid particular stress on this point and had deemed it his primary task to again make the Wehrmacht what it had been in the Kaiser’s Reich: the strongest support of the government in power.
---
It is easy to understand that the Party as the sole political power in the state should endeavor to bring the Wehrmacht, in particular the Army as the strongest of the three armed services, under its sway. It is just as easy to understand that the Army in order to maintain its integrity resisted demands which threatened to undermine the spirit and traditional character of the Wehrmacht, even though it willingly adopted certain necessary innovations resulting from the new order of the state.
Hitler stood between Party and Wehrmacht; his heart was with the Party, but his reason, at least during the years of his development, was on the side of the Wehrmacht. Often enough during this period he protected the Wehrmacht from the machinations of the Party and the SS.
When in the fall of 1934 the SS launched a bitter attack on the Wehrmacht in what appeared to be preparatory to another putsch, Hitler addressed the leaders of the Party and many of the higher officers in the Berlin Opera House and made a unique avowal of his faith in the Army and its high command; thereupon the SS lowered its sights. However, it was inevitable that discord would develop from Hitler’s relations to the Army.
The latter was constantly defending itself against encroachments with which Hitler continued more or less in sympathy.
the Wehrmacht Hitler and the German Officer Corps
Under these circumstances there wasn’t the slightest reason for the Officer Corps of the Wehrmacht to view the new state leadership with antipathy or even with mistrust. Quite the contrary. The officers viewed with genuine satisfaction Hitler’s new program of freeing the Wehrmacht from the fetters of the Treaty of Versailles and of making it once again a power corresponding to the greatness of the Reich. The fulfillment of such a program would add a new importance to their chosen careers. Even though some of the older officers may have taken exception to the unruly spirit which governed the Nazi movement and to the brutal methods which it brought to bear in the struggle for power against the other parties, such apprehension was of minor importance to the great mass of the Officer Corps for part of the traditional training of the German officer was not to concern himself with politics.
The Wehrmacht had retained the same unpolitical character during the period of the Weimar Republic (that is, since 1919) which it had had during the Kaiser’s Reich. The creator of the Reichswehr,[2] General von Seeckt, one of the strongest personalities of his time, had laid particular stress on this point and had deemed it his primary task to again make the Wehrmacht what it had been in the Kaiser’s Reich: the strongest support of the government in power.
---
Under these circumstances there wasn’t the slightest reason for the Officer Corps of the Wehrmacht to view the new state leadership with antipathy or even with mistrust. Quite the contrary. The officers viewed with genuine satisfaction Hitler’s new program of freeing the Wehrmacht from the fetters of the Treaty of Versailles and of making it once again a power corresponding to the greatness of the Reich. The fulfillment of such a program would add a new importance to their chosen careers.
Even though some of the older officers may have taken exception to the unruly spirit which governed the Nazi movement and to the brutal methods which it brought to bear in the struggle for power against the other parties, such apprehension was of minor importance to the great mass of the Officer Corps for part of the traditional training of the German officer was not to concern himself with politics.
The Wehrmacht had retained the same unpolitical character during the period of the Weimar Republic (that is, since 1919) which it had had during the Kaiser’s Reich. The creator of the Reichswehr,[2] General von Seeckt, one of the strongest personalities of his time, had laid particular stress on this point and had deemed it his primary task to again make the Wehrmacht what it had been in the Kaiser’s Reich: the strongest support of the government in power.
---
It is easy to understand that the Party as the sole political power in the state should endeavor to bring the Wehrmacht, in particular the Army as the strongest of the three armed services, under its sway. It is just as easy to understand that the Army in order to maintain its integrity resisted demands which threatened to undermine the spirit and traditional character of the Wehrmacht, even though it willingly adopted certain necessary innovations resulting from the new order of the state.
Hitler stood between Party and Wehrmacht; his heart was with the Party, but his reason, at least during the years of his development, was on the side of the Wehrmacht. Often enough during this period he protected the Wehrmacht from the machinations of the Party and the SS.
When in the fall of 1934 the SS launched a bitter attack on the Wehrmacht in what appeared to be preparatory to another putsch, Hitler addressed the leaders of the Party and many of the higher officers in the Berlin Opera House and made a unique avowal of his faith in the Army and its high command; thereupon the SS lowered its sights. However, it was inevitable that discord would develop from Hitler’s relations to the Army.
The latter was constantly defending itself against encroachments with which Hitler continued more or less in sympathy.
Dante
"The Libido for the Ugly"
I keep seeing this nonsense of "Hitler...removed from power" In what world? An imaginary one, where events go another way and maybe, just maybe, maybe...
Hitler played them all. He was not alone. He had quite a crew of individuals from every aspect of German society helping him.
War was inevitable. Hitler had his long game strategy:
Mein Kampf (German: [maɪn ˈkampf]; lit. 'My Struggle') is a 1925 autobiographical manifesto by Nazi Party leader Adolf Hitler. The book outlines many of Hitler's political beliefs, his political ideology and future plans for Germany and the world. Volume 1 of Mein Kampf was published in 1925 and Volume 2 in 1926.[1] The book was edited first by Emil Maurice, then by Hitler's deputy Rudolf Hess.
Dante
"The Libido for the Ugly"
great snippets:
There were, however, no serious differences between the Officer Corps and Hitler during the years 1933 to 1937, especially since Hitler’s foreign political successes strongly inspired the Officer Corps to have confidence in his leadership. The announcement of the sovereign right to arm (March 16, 1935), which set aside a degrading part of the Treaty of Versailles, was welcomed by the German Officer Corps; the reoccupation of the Rhineland (early March, 1936) was indeed considered extremely daring but absolutely necessary as a strategic defensive measure. In between these events was the conclusion of the Anglo- German Naval Treaty (June 18, 1935) which replaced the dictatorial terms of Versailles with a voluntary agreement.
On November 5, 1937, Hitler called the Reich War Minister (von Blomberg) the three Commanders in Chief of the Wehrmacht, and the Reich Foreign Minister (von Neurath) to a conference which proved to be highly significant and ominous in its effects. Hitler revealed for the first time his foreign political objectives which could not be attained by peaceable means. Hossbach, Hitler’s Wehrmacht Adjutant for years, later testified that Hitler had not up to this time harbored warlike intentions. In the subsequent discussion which was at times quite animated, von Blomberg and the Commander-in-Chief Army, General Baron von Fritsch, as well as the Foreign Minister, von Neurath, strongly opposed any and all war plans. Three months later, none of the three above-named men remained in office.
Soon after this conference wherein they had displayed their “unsuitability” for future projects, von Blomberg and von Fritsch were dropped from their top positions, both on farcical or trumped-up charges. Von Neurath was also dismissed.
Oddly enough, von Blomberg himself suggested to Hitler that he (the Fuehrer) himself assume the position as Commander in Chief of the Wehrmacht. That Hitler did, and the implications of the move were scarcely recognized at the time.
Dante
"The Libido for the Ugly"
an amusing aside: "Valkyrie: The Anti-Nazi Underground in the Wehrmacht, 1938–1945"
(we see: General Ludwig Beck) - reminds me of a certain Never Trumper
and...
encyclopedia.ushmm.org
(we see: General Ludwig Beck) - reminds me of a certain Never Trumper
Summary
Most Germans supported Adolf Hitler’s dictatorship between 1933 and 1945. Yet, a small group of officers and politicians who did not support Hitler formed a clandestine anti-Nazi underground. Retrospectively known as the German Resistance Movement, it began its activity in 1938 with a desperate attempt to prevent war in Europe and culminated in the coup d’état and failed assassination attempt on Hitler of July 20, 1944.and...
German Resistance to Hitler
Despite Hitler’s popularity, there was also opposition. Learn more about German resistance, which ranged from non-compliance to assassination attempts.
martybegan
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What was there to resist? Hitler was the antagonist whose power was growing. He was building out and poking/testing neighbors. War was coming. Hitler was playing people. Closest thing to that shit is how I see Putin. Making pacts with the full intention of breaking words/agreements.
People (after the fact) go on and on about how "the Wehrmacht" would oppose and get rid of Hitler. right
The 1936 Wehrmacht wasn't the pushover it became by 1940 politically. Hitler had to decimate the SS and kill one of his best friends in 1934 to keep him happy.
What was the strength of the new Wehrmacht in 1936? Even if it had 1M supposed soldiers, their equipment was mostly WWI leftovers, and training had just begun. Their best soldiers had been civilians for 2 decades and were in their 30's and 40's. They still had no panzers of any worth, and the economy was still just ramping up for war level production.
Dante
"The Libido for the Ugly"
War was coming. If the little test in question failed for Hitler, you believe he would've gone home and packed his bags or been deposed?
read this (fully):
martybegan
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War was coming. If the little test in question failed for Hitler, you believe he would've gone home and packed his bags or been deposed?
read this (fully):
He would have been deposed, before 1938 or so the Army still had the power to do so.
They just didn't want to because 1)He did what they wanted him to do, return the army to prominence and 2) he kept being right.
No response to rearmament, no response to an air force, no response to having tanks, no response to the Rhineland, No response to Anschluss.
Dante
"The Libido for the Ugly"
From USMB's Mister "mikegriffith1" Peabody's own source/link:
Since dawn of March seventh, detachments of German infantry and artillery had been repossessing their former Rhineland garrisons. The German Rhinelanders greeted the troops with great enthusiasm. Reports vary as to the strength, but reliable accounts indicate that by March ninth there were some nineteen infantry and thirteen artillery battalions, totalling about 35,000 men, the equivalent of two divisions. A few squadrons of the Luftwafe flew over the area on March seventh. Hitler’s caution may be reflected in that only three battalions crossed to the west of the Rhine river, and a strip about eight miles from the French and Belgian borders was declared by the Nazi military command as absolutely off limits to German troops. The size of this force was not particularly formidable nor were its actions belligerent.
However, the German force was not of such token size that it could be ejected summarily. Indeed, the choice of this force appears to have been an excellent one, because it was not large enough to be an aggressive threat to France and Beligum, yet it was not so small that those two nations could force its withdrawal without considerable effort and risk of war.
Inasmuch as only German territory had been occupied, the challenge to the interested powers was cleverly contrived indeed. However, the “symbolic” mask that heralded the occupation was removed by the immediate absorption into the army of 30,000 or more German state police (Landespolizei), and of the Labor Corps, the S.S., and other paramilitary organizations. The total force was something like 100,000 within a few weeks.
Dante bringing a fuller context:
Since dawn of March seventh, detachments of German infantry and artillery had been repossessing their former Rhineland garrisons. The German Rhinelanders greeted the troops with great enthusiasm. Reports vary as to the strength, but reliable accounts indicate that by March ninth there were some nineteen infantry and thirteen artillery battalions, totalling about 35,000 men, the equivalent of two divisions. A few squadrons of the Luftwafe flew over the area on March seventh. Hitler’s caution may be reflected in that only three battalions crossed to the west of the Rhine river, and a strip about eight miles from the French and Belgian borders was declared by the Nazi military command as absolutely off limits to German troops. The size of this force was not particularly formidable nor were its actions belligerent.
However, the German force was not of such token size that it could be ejected summarily. Indeed, the choice of this force appears to have been an excellent one, because it was not large enough to be an aggressive threat to France and Beligum, yet it was not so small that those two nations could force its withdrawal without considerable effort and risk of war.
Inasmuch as only German territory had been occupied, the challenge to the interested powers was cleverly contrived indeed. However, the “symbolic” mask that heralded the occupation was removed by the immediate absorption into the army of 30,000 or more German state police (Landespolizei), and of the Labor Corps, the S.S., and other paramilitary organizations. The total force was something like 100,000 within a few weeks.
Dante bringing a fuller context:
Dante
"The Libido for the Ugly"
The Military was not looking to "depose" Hitler. The idea that Hitler would have been deposed, as if that is a given is just plain nonsense.
read links above from the U.S. Naval Institute
This is your "reply" to my points? This is it? If anyone is "inventing lots of things," it is you. I'm just repeating the long-standing scholarly consensus on Hitler's remilitarization of the Rhineland. You just won't admit it because you don't want to admit that you horribly and embarrassingly blundered.
For your education:
Historian R. A. C. Parker:
On March 7, 1936, German troops entered the demilitarized zone of the Rhineland. . . .
It is virtually agreed that France was wrong not to reply forcibly to Hitler's coup of 1936. It seems likely that March 1936 was the last time Hitler could have been stopped without a major conflict. And even if French action had led to a major conflict then, it seems plan that it would have been less disastrous for France and for Europe than the battle of 1940. ("The First Capitulation: France and the Rhineland Crisis of 1936," World Politics, John Hopkins University Press, Vol. 8, No. 3, April 1956, p. 355, https://www.jstor.org/stable/2008855)
David Carlin:
In 1936, Hitler brazenly remilitarized Germany’s Rhineland border with France. Remilitarization directly threatened French national security. After World War I, the Rhineland had been left demilitarized to deter German aggression against France. With this border undefended, the French could pour into Germany. Only 3,000 Nazi troops entered the Rhineland. Hundreds of thousands of French troops stood just miles away. Germany’s generals trembled with fear, certain that a French invasion would end the Third Reich. However, facing bad economic conditions and finding few allies willing to offer support, the French government decided that military intervention was too expensive. Once again, a weak and divided West allowed the Nazi threat to increase. (World War II: How Western Leaders Failed To Stop the Nazi Rise)
Dr. Richard Langworth:
In March 1936, a few thousand German troops marched into the Rhineland while the populace waved swastika flags. The soldiers had orders to “turn back and not to resist” if challenged by the all-dominant French Army. Hitler later said that the forty-eight hours following his action were the tensest of his life. (Churchill and the Rhineland: “Terrible Circumstances” - Richard M. Langworth)
Dr. Nicholas Hederson:
Much evidence points to the strong impact that a firm military riposte would have made. General Alfred Jodl, Chief of Operations in the Army High Command, said at Nuremburg that had the French marched in they would have blown away his forces. These, a mixed bag of regular troops and para-military units suddenly brought together, would hardly have offered a coordinated resistance.
Paul Schmidt, Hitler's interpreter, has reported, as Speer has done, on how frequently Hitler recalled the risks he had run over the Rhineland which he described as 'the most nerve-wracking' time of his life because 'the military resources at our disposal would have been quite inadequate for even a moderate resistance'. He spoke in the same vein to Schuschnigg, the Austrian Chancellor. Such statements are typical of Hitler's warnings and bombast.
Nevertheless, we can be sure that the fears of the military were real. A few days after the troops had moved in,Blomberg, the Minister for War, recommended the immediate evacuation of the frontier towns and withdrawal across the Rhine. He was influenced by disturbing reports on the attitude of the Western powers, particularly by a message received from the three Service Attaches in London about the dangers described as 'extremely serious'. Alas, nothing was done by Paris or London to demonstrate seriousness to the point of action. So Hitler triumphed in what General Geyr von Schweppenburg, German Military Attache in London, described as 'a pure gamble'. ("Hitler and the Rhineland, 1936: A Decisive Turning-Point," History Today, October 1992, https://presidentscounciltravel.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Hitler-and-the-Rhineland.pdf)
The Loyal Edmonton Regiment Military Museum:
Given the horrors of the First World War, European leaders were very reluctant to confront Hitler. Moreover, many of them felt somewhat guilty regarding their treatment of Germany following the war. . . .
Hitler was skilled in exploiting this reluctance and guilt. For example, in March 1936, German troops reoccupied the Rhineland, a territory that was supposed to be a demilitarized zone. Many historians cite the failure of Britain and France to react here as a decisive moment. These scholars argue that intervention at this point could have prevented war since Germany had just started to rebuild its army. ("Appeasement," Appeasement)
History Is Now Magazine:
Hitler ordered the redeployment of troops to the Rhineland, a strip between Germany and France that had been demilitarized, consisting of the western bank of the Rhine River to France, and 25 miles from the eastern bank.
The army leaders opposed the German entry into this area because it would provoke France, especially since the German army was not ready because the rearmament process was not yet complete, but Hitler was determined to put the army to the French border because he thought that any move without military action was evidence of weakness for him. . . .
On February 12, 1936, Hitler authorized the ‘Operation Winter Exercise’ to remilitarize the Rhineland.
On March 7, 1936, 19 German battalions crossed the Rhine River; fearing war with France, Hitler ordered them to withdraw if they opposed it. ("Adolf Hitler and the Build-up to World War 2 - The Rhineland and Austria," Adolf Hitler and the Build-up to World War 2 - The Rhineland and Austria — History is Now Magazine, Podcasts, Blog and Books | Modern International and American history)
Spartacus Educational:
Adolf Hitler knew that both France and Britain were militarily stronger than Germany. However, he became convinced that they were unwilling to go to war. He therefore decided to break another aspect of the Treaty of Versailles by sending German troops into the Rhineland.
The German generals were very much against the plan, claiming that the French Army would win a victory in the military conflict that was bound to follow this action. Hitler ignored their advice and on 1st March, 1936, three German battalions marched into the Rhineland.
The French government was horrified to find German troops on their border but were unwilling to take action without the support of the British. ("Rhineland," Remilitarisation of the Rhineland)
LOL! You are a total clown. The fact that the German military was poised to depose Hitler at the time of the Munich Conference has been discussed in a zillion scholarly books. Holy cow.
I'm starting to suspect that you are JoeB131 posting under a different name.
martybegan
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IF (and it's a big if) they had to pull their troops out of the Rhineland due to French and/or British response via sending their own troops in, I doubt the new Wehrmacht would want a full war at their level of preparedness.
People often think Germany instantly Nazified, those first few years, while brutal, still had the old institutions around, they had only begun to be suborned.
Dante
"The Libido for the Ugly"
"It seems likely that March 1936 was the last time Hitler could have been stopped without a major conflict." - opinion
Hitler played them all. He was right. He had their number. They were unwilling to go to war for a variety of reasons. Hitler won that test.
link above:
However, the German force was not of such token size that it could be ejected summarily. Indeed, the choice of this force appears to have been an excellent one, because it was not large enough to be an aggressive threat to France and Beligum, yet it was not so small that those two nations could force its withdrawal without considerable effort and risk of war.
Inasmuch as only German territory had been occupied, the challenge to the interested powers was cleverly contrived indeed. However, the “symbolic” mask that heralded the occupation was removed by the immediate absorption into the army of 30,000 or more German state police (Landespolizei), and of the Labor Corps, the S.S., and other paramilitary organizations. The total force was something like 100,000 within a few weeks.
Which brigs us back to your original nonsense: "The time to stop Hitler was when he sent troops into the Rhineland in 1936. France alone could have smashed Hitler's army at that point and easily deposed Hitler."
However, the German force was not of such token size that it could be ejected summarily. Indeed, the choice of this force appears to have been an excellent one, because it was not large enough to be an aggressive threat to France and Beligum, yet it was not so small that those two nations could force its withdrawal without considerable effort and risk of war.
versus
"The time to stop Hitler was when he sent troops into the Rhineland in 1936. France alone could have smashed Hitler's army at that point and easily deposed Hitler."
Last edited:
Dante
"The Libido for the Ugly"
"there was a massive German resistance conspiracy to kill Hitler?" - you post like Trump
previously posted:
Summary:
Most Germans supported Adolf Hitler’s dictatorship between 1933 and 1945. Yet, a small group of officers and politicians who did not support Hitler formed a clandestine anti-Nazi underground. Retrospectively known as the German Resistance Movement, it began its activity in 1938 with a desperate attempt to prevent war in Europe and culminated in the coup d’état and failed assassination attempt on Hitler of July 20, 1944.
The resistance was led by General Ludwig Beck
Well, of course it's "opinion"! And it happens to be the scholarly consensus.
I notice you snipped and ignored all the other citations.
That's not the point, and you know it. Nobody is arguing with those statements. I said nothing related to them. You're only making these statements to divert attention from your embarrassing gaffe.
Nonsense! France's army dwarfed the German army at that point. Hitler had just started conscription the year before. The Luftwaffe had only been formed the year before. Hitler's own generals warned him that the army was no match for France's army. What about all the citations I presented on this very point? You've ignored them and cherry-picked one lone statement.
Yeah, and that untrained, hastily thrown-together force would have been crushed by the French army if France's leaders had been willing to act. Hitler's ground force would have been virtually naked from the air, because his air force was just getting started. The French air force would have bombed Hitler's troops at will.
LOL! You must be kidding! My "original nonsense" stands unrefuted by your amateurish ignorance and your two outlier cherry-picked quotations. So you are still denying that France could have crushed the Germany army in March 1936 and still denying that Hitler gave orders that his troops were to immediately withdraw from the Rhineland if the French army responded to the incursion!Which brigs us back to your original nonsense.:
I mean, okay, no one can force you to acknowledge the documented fact and the scholarly consensus. Just be advised that you are rejecting the views of the vast majority of WWII scholars/historians. Again, you're the first person I've ever seen dispute this stuff.
And I see now you're attacking my perfectly factual statement that Hitler was hesitant about invading Poland. Sheesh, is there no end to your ignorance about basic WWII history?!
I know you seem to dislike mainstream WWII scholarship, but you might read Shirer's section on the invasion of Poland and how Hitler vacillated and fretted about whether to give final approval for the invasion. I mean, I don't understand how you can see this as controversial, much less as "nonsense."
Leaving aside Dante's amusing denials on this point, you are of course correct. We've known for decades now that there was a massive plot to kill Hitler in September 1938. The plot, known as the Oster Conspiracy or the September Conspiracy, involved numerous high-ranking military officers and civilian officials. It had an excellent chance of succeeding. However, when Chamberlain shamefully bowed to Hitler at Munich, the plot fell apart because Hitler's popularity soared and many of the plotters gave up on deposing Hitler.
No one who has done any serious research on WWII would get on a public board and claim "the military was not looking to 'depose' Hitler."
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