The Nuking of Nagasaki: Even More Immoral and Unnecessary than Hiroshima

[Open Bolt]

The Japanese GOVERNMENT wasn't trying to surrender.

Wrong.

Not wrong.

Japan made no attempt to surrender until after both atomic bombs had already been dropped.

Many people react badly when a comfortable narrative is shattered.

It's not like these falsehoods that you keep posting are shattering anything.

Or were you referring to your own reaction when I pointed out that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were military targets and Japan was refusing to surrender?

A real historian isn't so defensive and weak-minded.

There is nothing weak minded about denouncing lies.

A real historian will always challenge lies.

Real historians care about the truth.

People really should learn at least a basic level of information about the topics they get worked up about here.

Indeed. If you learned something about this subject you would not present so many falsehoods.

Just being insecure about long-held narratives that they have found comfortable since childhood is not serious discussion.

It is worth correcting your falsehoods regardless of how serious you are.

 

[Open Bolt]

Japan's condition was that Hirohito retain unlimited dictatorial power as Japan's living deity. We naturally refused and told them that Hirohito would be subordinate to MacArthur.

That is a lie.

No it isn't. We refused Japan's request and told them that Hirohito would be subordinate to MacArthur.

Since Hirohito was the religious leader for most of Japan, they just did not want him on trial or executed.

Yet what Japan asked was for Hirohito to retain unlimited dictatorial power as Japan's living deity.

And really he did nothing illegal.

Genocide and murder are generally regarded as being illegal.

So the US totally agreed,

No we didn't. We flatly refused their request and told them that Hirohito would be subordinate to MacArthur.

and could have agreed a year earlier and ended the war then.

We were not interested in guaranteeing that Hirohito retain unlimited dictatorial power a year earlier either.

But if we had done so, it would not have ended the war. August 10, 1945 was the first day that Japan was willing to contemplate surrender.

 

[Open Bolt]

Everything you said was wrong.

That is incorrect. Everything that I said is true.

Clearly the Japanese did not want to surrender in 1941 because they still had food, fuel, and ability to fight.

So much for the theory about the US having magical control over when Japan decided to surrender.

From then on, Japan was desperate to surrender,

That is incorrect. Japan only decided to surrender after both atomic bombs had already been dropped.

and it was only our reluctance to let them surrender, that kept the war going.

We did not have any magical control over when Japan decided to surrender. That decision was entirely up to Japan.

The atomic bombs had essentially no effect at all on the Japanese desire to surrender, and they were insignificant.
We killed far more with every conventional air attack than we did with any atomic attack.

What cause the Japanese to end the war was the mining of the waters to Asia in 1943.
{...

U.S. MINES INDOCHINA WATERS​

TODAY
Honolulu, Hawaii · October 29, 1943

In World War II’s Pacific Theater, sea mines—explosive underwater devices that damaged, sank, or deterred Japanese warships, submarines, and maritime commerce—were weapons that had difficulty gaining the same respect as guns, bombs, and torpedoes enjoyed in the U.S. arsenal. Over time, however, a small number of mining advocates in both the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Army Air Forces influenced their service bosses enough to ensure the growth of offensive mine-laying, equipment development, and combat experience.
On this date in 1943 U.S. submarines began mining the waters off French Indochina. The following March the U.S. Navy mounted a direct aerial mining attack on Japanese shipping on Palau Island in the Western Pacific, which stopped 32 Japanese ships from escaping Palau’s harbor. Combined with bombing and strafing attacks, the operation sank or damaged 36 ships.
The most successful mining operations were those conducted by the Allied air forces laying aerial minefields. Beginning with a very successful attack on the Yangon River in Burma (Myanmar) in February 1943, B‑24 Liberators, PBY Catalinas, and other available bomber aircraft took part in localized mining operations in the China Burma India (CBI) Theater and in the Southwest Pacific (Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, Borneo, New Guinea, and the western Solomon Islands). British and Royal Australian air forces carried out 60 percent of the sorties and the U.S. Army Air Forces and U.S. Navy carried out the balance. U.S. Adm. Thomas C. Kinkaid, who directed nearly all RAAF mining operations in the CBI, wrote in July 1944 that “aerial mining operations were of the order of 100 times as destructive to the enemy as an equal number of bombing missions against land targets.”
The U.S. mining effort against the Japanese Home Islands proved very successful, closing major ports like Hiroshima on Western Honshū, the largest Home Island, for days. At best, the Japanese succeeded in sweeping only about 50 percent of American acoustic mines (they measured sound of certain frequencies). Pressure mines, the most commonly used against Japan near the end of the war, were even more difficult to sweep. By war’s end, more than 25,000 U.S.-laid sea mines were still in place. Over the next 30 years, more than 500 minesweepers were damaged or sunk in continuing clearance efforts.
...}

Yet Japan chose to wait until August 10, 1945 before offering to surrender.

It is downright silly to claim there were military objectives in Hiroshima or Nagasaki, because there really were no more military objectives anywhere in Japan,

Hiroshima was a huge military center with tens of thousands of Japanese soldiers. It was Japan's primary military port, and the port that launched all their invasions of neighboring countries.

Hiroshima had more soldiers than any Japanese city other than Tokyo (which was much much larger). Hiroshima had the highest soldier/civilian ratio of any of Japan's major cities.

Hiroshima was also the headquarters in charge of repelling our coming invasion.

The second atomic bomb was intended for Kokura Arsenal, which was a massive (4100 feet by 2000 feet) factory complex that built all of Japan's light machine guns, heavy machine guns, 20mm antiaircraft guns, and the ammo for all those guns.

Unfortunately due to a lot of bad luck the second atomic bomb was diverted to the secondary target, Nagasaki, which was a shipbuilding town that made some of Japan's largest warships.

At Nagasaki, the second atomic bomb destroyed the torpedo factory that had made the specialized torpedoes designed for defeating Pearl Harbor's natural defenses.

as they had all already been obliterated,

Hiroshima had not been obliterated.

Kokura Arsenal had not been obliterated.

The Mitsubishi Shipyards had not been obliterated.

There were NO Japanese aircraft capable of trying to intercept a single bomber.
We had total free will to the air, anyway or place we wanted.

The state of their interceptor fleet is no reflection on the ten thousand kamikazes that they had waiting for us.

And trying to be deliberately obtuse does not make you seem very smart.
When OPEC sets prices, that is NOT "economic sanctions".
Economic sanctions are when you prohibit trade with others by the use of force,

That is incorrect. Sanctions are when you cut economic ties and stop selling and/or buying from whoever you are placing sanctions on.

like we did to Iraq in 2002, to Cuba, or recently to Russia.

We did no such thing.

The US is prohibiting others from civilian trade,

No we aren't.

and that is a totally illegal war crime.

It would be an act of war certainly. But not a crime in any way.

It was illegal to sink Japanese ships carrying civilian food back to Japan during WWII.

Not once war was declared it wasn't.

Your claim that there was constant deaths from Japanese occupation is totally false.

Your holocaust denial is repugnant and despicable.

A minimum of 100,000 people every month were dying under Japanese occupation.

It does not take a physicist to understand that 95% of atomic bomb deaths are from radiation.

But a physicist would know that it isn't true.

The blast effects were more extensive than the radiation effects.

It is essentially illegal chemical warfare, since they die in agony, months later, from radiation poisoning.

Nuclear weapons are not chemical weapons. They are two different things.

The point being that it was not the explosive shock wave that killed the majority.

The point is untrue. The shockwave was the primary means of damage.

It was a horrific death that violated the Geneva conventions.

No such violation. Atomic bombs are lawful weapons.

 

[Rigby5]

Not wrong.

Japan made no attempt to surrender until after both atomic bombs had already been dropped.



It's not like these falsehoods that you keep posting are shattering anything.

Or were you referring to your own reaction when I pointed out that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were military targets and Japan was refusing to surrender?



There is nothing weak minded about denouncing lies.

A real historian will always challenge lies.

Real historians care about the truth.



Indeed. If you learned something about this subject you would not present so many falsehoods.



It is worth correcting your falsehoods regardless of how serious you are.

Its obvious you are lying.
It is obvious Japan was starving to death since 1943, and desperate to surrender.
They continually tried, and the US would not respond.

Anything remotely military at Hiroshima or Nagasaki had been removed long ago, and there was zero justifiable targets there.

It is obvious that Japan was already trying to surrender because the atomic bombs killed FEWER people than a typical firestorm or conventional bombing attack on Japan.

{...
Japan's military and civil defenses were unable to stop the Allied attacks. The number of fighter aircraft and anti-aircraft guns assigned to defensive duties in the home islands was inadequate, and most of these aircraft and guns had difficulty reaching the high altitudes at which B-29s often operated. Fuel shortages, inadequate pilot training, and a lack of coordination between units also constrained the effectiveness of the fighter force. Despite the vulnerability of Japanese cities to firebombing attacks, the firefighting services lacked training and equipment, and few air raid shelters were constructed for civilians. As a result, the B-29s were able to inflict severe damage on urban areas while suffering few losses.

The Allied bombing campaign was one of the main factors which influenced the Japanese government's decision to surrender in mid-August 1945. However, there has been a long-running debate over the morality of the attacks on Japanese cities, and the use of atomic weapons is particularly controversial. The most commonly cited estimate of Japanese casualties from the raids is 333,000 killed and 473,000 wounded. There are a number of other estimates of total fatalities, however, which range from 241,000 to 900,000. In addition to the loss of mostly civilian life, the raids contributed to a large decline in industrial production.
...
By the end of these raids just over half (50.8 percent) of Tokyo had been destroyed and the city was removed from XXI Bomber Command's target list.[135]
...
During May and June the bombers had destroyed much of the country's six largest cities, killing between 112,000 and 126,762 people and rendering millions homeless. The widespread destruction and high number of casualties from these raids caused many Japanese to realize that their country's military was no longer able to defend the home islands. American losses were low compared to Japanese casualties; 136 B-29s were downed during the campaign.[141][142][143] In Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Yokohama, Kobe, and Kawasaki, "over 126,762 people were killed ... and a million and a half dwellings and over 105 square miles (270 km2) of urban space were destroyed."[144] In Tokyo, Osaka and Nagoya, "the areas leveled (almost 100 square miles (260 km2)) exceeded the areas destroyed in all German cities by both the American and British air forces (approximately 79 square miles (200 km2))."[144]
...}

Air raids on Japan - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Clearly there was no one left in Japan who did not want to surrender before the atomics were dropped.

 

[Rigby5]

We did no such thing.

Yes we did.
We threatened and used military force to prevent trade with Iraq, Cuba, and now Russia.
Finally after many years of an illegal economic blockade of Iraq, we allowed the OFF (Oil For Food) program in Iraq because so many counties were complaining about our illegal economic sanctions. We starved Iraq from 1991 to 1995.

 

[Rigby5]

No such violation. Atomic bombs are lawful weapons.

No nuclear weapons are not legal.
They clearly violate the existing Geneva conventions against weapons of mass destruction.

{...
After World War II, a new set of treaties concerning the laws of war—the Geneva Conventions—established the standards of international humanitarian law (IHL). Under Additional Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions, the nuclear bombing of Japan would have violated IHL. In fact, using nuclear weapons in any situation would likely violate international law. Due to its potential for utter destruction, nuclear weapons should not exist in our current world and should not be used in any circumstance.
...}

https://www.law.georgetown.edu/international-law-journal/wp-content/uploads/sites/21/2018/05/48-3-The-Legality-of-Nuclear-Weapons-for-Use-and-Deterrence.pdf#:~:text=In%20fact%2C%20using%20nuclear%20weapons%20in%20any%20situation,interna%C2%AD%20tional%20law%20does%20not%20ban%20nuclear%20weapons.

 

[GWV5903]

Whatever labored, embarrassing arguments one can make for the nuking of Hiroshima cannot be made for the nuking of Nagasaki just three days later. From my article "Did We Really Need to Use the Atomic Bomb Against Japan?":

On August 9, 1945, just three days after we nuked Hiroshima, and before Japan’s leaders had sufficient time to process and respond to our nuclear attack on Hiroshima, we dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki, which was home to Japan’s largest Christian population. The atomic bombing of Nagasaki was even more inexcusable than the nuking of Hiroshima. . . .​

​

On August 9, we nuked Nagasaki, just three days after Hiroshima, and hours after the Soviets began to maul the Japanese army in Manchuria,, and while Japan’s civilian leaders were understandably absorbed with trying to process what had happened to Hiroshima and with responding to the Soviet attack in Manchuria. Surely Truman and other high officials knew that three days was not enough time for Japan’s government to formulate a formal response to the unprecedented use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and to the Soviet invasion in Manchuria. Even McGeorge Bundy, who helped Henry Stimson write his defense of the atomic bombing of Japan, acknowledged that Truman was too quick to nuke Nagasaki:​

"It is hard to see that much could have been lost if there had been more time between the two bombs. . . . Such a delay would have been relatively easy, and I think right." (https://miketgriffith.com/files/immoraluse.pdf)​

​

The Japanese were not even able to get a scientific team to Hiroshima until August 7, the day after the attack. Meanwhile, Japan's leaders were getting conflicting, fragmentary information about what had happened in Hiroshima. Some Army officials were telling the government that the bombing of Hiroshima was merely a very large conventional bombing raid, and they were suppressing information about the kinds of wounds that had been inflicted. There was no Internet back then, no fax machines, no Skype.

Surely it was obscene for us to nuke Nagasaki just three days, 72 hours, after we had nuked Hiroshima.

Truman made the right decision, WW II had 82MM+ casualties, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed 226,000 and ultimately saved 2MM + more casualties from occurring. As harsh as this sounds, this was the best decision.

 

[Mushroom]

LOL right according to you the Embassy somehow knew what the Government wanted and its positions with absolutely no communications between them.

Oh, we actually know what was said between them because of MAGIC.

Naotake Sato was the Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and he himself was frustrated with what Japan was proposing to the Soviets. That is was not a surrender, but an ante bellium armistice, that he knew the Allies would never accept, and the Soviets would never pass along. The thing is, we were reading all of their transmissions to their own Ambassador, and he had his hands completely tied. The Japanese wanted no less than a return to the lines of December 1941. The Allies leave all Japanese territory prior to 1941 (Including Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa), and all territory be "demilitarized" under Japanese supervision.

That is what Japan wanted, and that is the farthest thing from a "surrender" than is possible.

But notice, not a single person screaming ad nauseum that the bombs were not needed will ever say that is what Japan proposed. Even their own Ambassador to the Soviet Union knew they had no interest in surrender, they only wanted to stall for time. Sure that the "Divine Wind" would save them as it had in the past.

 

[Mushroom]

Truman made the right decision, WW II had 82MM+ casualties, the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki killed 226,000 and ultimately saved 2MM + more casualties from occurring. As harsh as this sounds, this was the best decision.

Even more.

The Shockley Report estimated over 10 million Japanese fatalities, and up to 800,000 fatalities (among 1.7 million Allied casualties).

 

[Unkotare]

Many people react badly when a comfortable narrative is shattered. A real historian isn't so defensive and weak-minded.

^^^^^^^

 

[Unkotare]

"General Dwight Eisenhower, in his memoirs, recalled a visit from Secretary of War Henry Stimson in late July 1945: “I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face.’” Eisenhower reiterated the point years later in a Newsweek interview in 1963, saying that “the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.”1

In fact, seven out of eight top U.S. military commanders believed that it was unnecessary to use atomic bombs against Japan from a military-strategic vantage point, including Admirals Chester Nimitz, Ernest King, William Halsey, and William Leahy, and Generals Henry Arnold and Douglas MacArthur.2 According to Air Force historian Daniel Haulman, even General Curtis LeMay, the architect of the air war against Japan, believed “the new weapons were unnecessary, because his bombers were already destroying the Japanese cities.”3"

Was There a Diplomatic Alternative? The Atomic Bombing and Japan's Surrender - The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus

[…]

apjjf.org

"
One day after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, General MacArthur’s pilot, Weldon E. Rhoades, noted in his diary: “General MacArthur definitely is appalled and depressed by this ‘Frankenstein’ monster. I had a long talk with him today, necessitated by the impending trip to Okinawa.”4

Admiral Halsey, Commander of the U.S. Third Fleet, testified before Congress in September 1949, “I believe that bombing – especially atomic bombing – of civilians, is morally indefensible. . . . I know that the extermination theory has no place in a properly conducted war.”5

Admiral Leahy, Truman’s chief military advisor, wrote in his memoirs: “It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.”6

That the Japanese were on the verge of defeat was made clear to the president in a top-secret memorandum from Secretary of War Henry Stimson on July 2, 1945. Stimson noted that Japan “has no allies,” its “navy is nearly destroyed,” she is vulnerable to an economic blockade depriving her “of sufficient food and supplies for her population,” she is “terribly vulnerable to our concentrated air attack upon her crowded cities, industrial, and food resources,” she “has against her not only the Anglo-American forces but the rising forces of China and the ominous threat of Russia,” and the United States has “inexhaustible and untouched industrial resources to bring to bear against her diminishing potential.” "

^^^^^^^^

 

[Unkotare]

"The assertion that the atomic bombings forced Japan to surrender was not supported by a U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, published in July 1946, which noted that the decision of Japanese leaders “to abandon the war is tied up with other factors. The atomic bomb had more effect on the thinking of government leaders than on the morale of the rank and file of civilians outside the target areas. It cannot be said, however, that the atomic bomb convinced the leaders who effected the peace of the necessity of surrender.”17"

Admiral King, Commander in Chief of Naval Operations, stated in his memoirs that neither the atomic bombings nor a prospective U.S. invasion of the Japanese mainland was necessary, as “an effective naval blockade would, in the course of time, have starved the Japanese into submission through lack of oil, rice, medicines, and other essential materials.”18"

^^^^^^^

 

[Unkotare]

The Bomb Was Not Necessary

With the sixty-fifth anniversary of the dropping of the atomic bomb almost upon us, there is undoubtedly going to be a flood of commentary on the wisdom of its use by the United States during World War II. The justified scolding of Charles Pellegrino and his The Last Train From Hiroshima...

historynewsnetwork.org

^^^^^^^

 

[Unkotare]

"Two days before the late President Roosevelt left the last week in January for the Yalta conference with Prime Minister Churchill and Marshal Stalin he received a Japanese offer identical with the terms subsequently concluded by his successor, Harry S. Truman."

^^^^^^^

 

[Unkotare]

"Indeed, Japan had put out peace feelers. As reported in the New York Times on July 26, 1945, “The Tokyo Radio, in an English-language broadcast to North America, has urged that the United States adopt a more lenient attitude toward Japan with regard to peace.” The broadcast quoted an ancient Aesop Fable in which a powerful wind could not force a man to give up his coat, but a gentle warming sun succeeded in doing so.25

Japan’s appeal fell on deaf ears in Washington."

^^^^^^

 

[Moonglow]

Whatever labored, embarrassing arguments one can make for the nuking of Hiroshima cannot be made for the nuking of Nagasaki just three days later. From my article "Did We Really Need to Use the Atomic Bomb Against Japan?":

On August 9, 1945, just three days after we nuked Hiroshima, and before Japan’s leaders had sufficient time to process and respond to our nuclear attack on Hiroshima, we dropped an atomic bomb on the city of Nagasaki, which was home to Japan’s largest Christian population. The atomic bombing of Nagasaki was even more inexcusable than the nuking of Hiroshima. . . .​

​

On August 9, we nuked Nagasaki, just three days after Hiroshima, and hours after the Soviets began to maul the Japanese army in Manchuria,, and while Japan’s civilian leaders were understandably absorbed with trying to process what had happened to Hiroshima and with responding to the Soviet attack in Manchuria. Surely Truman and other high officials knew that three days was not enough time for Japan’s government to formulate a formal response to the unprecedented use of the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and to the Soviet invasion in Manchuria. Even McGeorge Bundy, who helped Henry Stimson write his defense of the atomic bombing of Japan, acknowledged that Truman was too quick to nuke Nagasaki:​

"It is hard to see that much could have been lost if there had been more time between the two bombs. . . . Such a delay would have been relatively easy, and I think right." (https://miketgriffith.com/files/immoraluse.pdf)​

​

The Japanese were not even able to get a scientific team to Hiroshima until August 7, the day after the attack. Meanwhile, Japan's leaders were getting conflicting, fragmentary information about what had happened in Hiroshima. Some Army officials were telling the government that the bombing of Hiroshima was merely a very large conventional bombing raid, and they were suppressing information about the kinds of wounds that had been inflicted. There was no Internet back then, no fax machines, no Skype.

Surely it was obscene for us to nuke Nagasaki just three days, 72 hours, after we had nuked Hiroshima.

War is immoral yet humans have spent the majority of their time on the planet engaged in war.

 

[Unkotare]

"This was not why Hiroshima was chosen. Rather, the city was selected because it was “the largest untouched target not on the 21st Bomber Command priority list,” according to the administration’s Target Committee.20 Hiroshima, in other words, did not have enough military production to justify an earlier conventional attack (as compared to other cities on the priority list), and the effects of the bomb had to be uncontaminated from previous bombings in order to properly assess their damage."

^^^^^^^^^

 

[Unkotare]

"The assertion that the atomic bombings forced Japan to surrender was not supported by a U.S. Strategic Bombing Survey, published in July 1946, which noted that the decision of Japanese leaders “to abandon the war is tied up with other factors. The atomic bomb had more effect on the thinking of government leaders than on the morale of the rank and file of civilians outside the target areas. It cannot be said, however, that the atomic bomb convinced the leaders who effected the peace of the necessity of surrender.”17"

Admiral King, Commander in Chief of Naval Operations, stated in his memoirs that neither the atomic bombings nor a prospective U.S. invasion of the Japanese mainland was necessary, as “an effective naval blockade would, in the course of time, have starved the Japanese into submission through lack of oil, rice, medicines, and other essential materials.”18"

^^^^^^^^^

 

[Unkotare]

"General Dwight Eisenhower, in his memoirs, recalled a visit from Secretary of War Henry Stimson in late July 1945: “I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of ‘face.’” Eisenhower reiterated the point years later in a Newsweek interview in 1963, saying that “the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn’t necessary to hit them with that awful thing.”1

In fact, seven out of eight top U.S. military commanders believed that it was unnecessary to use atomic bombs against Japan from a military-strategic vantage point, including Admirals Chester Nimitz, Ernest King, William Halsey, and William Leahy, and Generals Henry Arnold and Douglas MacArthur.2 According to Air Force historian Daniel Haulman, even General Curtis LeMay, the architect of the air war against Japan, believed “the new weapons were unnecessary, because his bombers were already destroying the Japanese cities.”3"

Was There a Diplomatic Alternative? The Atomic Bombing and Japan's Surrender - The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus

[…]

apjjf.org

"
One day after the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, General MacArthur’s pilot, Weldon E. Rhoades, noted in his diary: “General MacArthur definitely is appalled and depressed by this ‘Frankenstein’ monster. I had a long talk with him today, necessitated by the impending trip to Okinawa.”4

Admiral Halsey, Commander of the U.S. Third Fleet, testified before Congress in September 1949, “I believe that bombing – especially atomic bombing – of civilians, is morally indefensible. . . . I know that the extermination theory has no place in a properly conducted war.”5

Admiral Leahy, Truman’s chief military advisor, wrote in his memoirs: “It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender because of the effective sea blockade and the successful bombing with conventional weapons.”6

That the Japanese were on the verge of defeat was made clear to the president in a top-secret memorandum from Secretary of War Henry Stimson on July 2, 1945. Stimson noted that Japan “has no allies,” its “navy is nearly destroyed,” she is vulnerable to an economic blockade depriving her “of sufficient food and supplies for her population,” she is “terribly vulnerable to our concentrated air attack upon her crowded cities, industrial, and food resources,” she “has against her not only the Anglo-American forces but the rising forces of China and the ominous threat of Russia,” and the United States has “inexhaustible and untouched industrial resources to bring to bear against her diminishing potential.” "

^^^^^^^^

 

[RetiredGySgt]

^^^^^^^^

Padding your post count by replying to ignorant posts already debunked is stupid