The Nature of Fascism
'I am concerned basically with two questions. First, is it possible to identify through an examination of the economics of fascist regimes, sufficiently distinct features ti speak of a fascist economic system? This question requires not merely an examination of economic policies, but an assessment of whether the effect of these policies was, or seemed likely to be, sufficiently incisive to modify, more or less radically, the existing economic structure, and so justify its description of a new economic system. Secondly, it it is possible to speak of a fascist economic system, can this concept be employed usefully as a conceptual tool to identify whether a regime may correctly be described as fascist?'
(Woolf, The Nature of Fascism, Ch. 8 Did a Fascist Economic System Exist?)
A Japanese connection to militarism also links to fascism and economics. This assemblage resonates with the coming U.S. Millenials vote in 2020, where inexperience and gullability will be the stick-and-carrot that inculcates an emotive ideological mimesis of Mussolini's movement to temp them into a socialist trap. Millenials are the economically suppressed voting population that we think are most susceptible. The carrot is divided into sections, at least one being universal health care. Here is what Woolf has to say about Japanese connections to fascism:
'If regimes can be defined as fascist according to the concepts of sociologists and political scientists, can they not also be so defined in terms of their economic systems? To test this hypothesis, I have chosen for my enquiry five regimes of a politically authoritarian character. Two of these -- fascist Italy and nazi Germany -- would be accepted as fascist according to most criteria; the third -- the Japanese military regime of the 1930s -- offers considerable evidence of the description of fascist, not least in economic terms; the final two -- Brazil under Vargas and Argentina under Peron -- represent a trest case of the extent to which the concept of a fascist economic system might be applicable. Because of the particular characteristics of the two South American states, I shall reserve discussion of their economic problems and policies until I have completed my examination of the three former countries.
Italy, Germany, Japan: the problems confronting the regimes
When Mussolini, Hitler and the Japanese militarists seized power, they were faced by economic problems created partly by the specific character of the previous economic development of the individual countries, and partly by the unsettled conditions of the international economy after the first world war. In other words, they inherited structural problems peculiar to their own countries, and were confronted by conjunctural problems common to all countries between the wars.
....
All three countries were subject to pressure from rising populations. The increase in agricultural production failed to keep pace with the rise in population, except in Japan until the 1920s. In consequence, Germany and Italy, as later Japan, were forced to import growing quantities of foodstuff. The rate increase of employment also grew more slowly than that of the population in Italy and Japan, although the problem only really affected Germany in the 1920s. Emigration had formed a major outlet for this excess population, particularly in Italy, but also in Germany in the late nineteenth century. Only in Japan was emigration of no importance before the late 1930s. But in the 1920s and 1930s this outlet was checked by the United States' restriction on immigration and by the effects of the depression.'
(Woolf, pp. 120-1)
'I am concerned basically with two questions. First, is it possible to identify through an examination of the economics of fascist regimes, sufficiently distinct features ti speak of a fascist economic system? This question requires not merely an examination of economic policies, but an assessment of whether the effect of these policies was, or seemed likely to be, sufficiently incisive to modify, more or less radically, the existing economic structure, and so justify its description of a new economic system. Secondly, it it is possible to speak of a fascist economic system, can this concept be employed usefully as a conceptual tool to identify whether a regime may correctly be described as fascist?'
(Woolf, The Nature of Fascism, Ch. 8 Did a Fascist Economic System Exist?)
A Japanese connection to militarism also links to fascism and economics. This assemblage resonates with the coming U.S. Millenials vote in 2020, where inexperience and gullability will be the stick-and-carrot that inculcates an emotive ideological mimesis of Mussolini's movement to temp them into a socialist trap. Millenials are the economically suppressed voting population that we think are most susceptible. The carrot is divided into sections, at least one being universal health care. Here is what Woolf has to say about Japanese connections to fascism:
'If regimes can be defined as fascist according to the concepts of sociologists and political scientists, can they not also be so defined in terms of their economic systems? To test this hypothesis, I have chosen for my enquiry five regimes of a politically authoritarian character. Two of these -- fascist Italy and nazi Germany -- would be accepted as fascist according to most criteria; the third -- the Japanese military regime of the 1930s -- offers considerable evidence of the description of fascist, not least in economic terms; the final two -- Brazil under Vargas and Argentina under Peron -- represent a trest case of the extent to which the concept of a fascist economic system might be applicable. Because of the particular characteristics of the two South American states, I shall reserve discussion of their economic problems and policies until I have completed my examination of the three former countries.
Italy, Germany, Japan: the problems confronting the regimes
When Mussolini, Hitler and the Japanese militarists seized power, they were faced by economic problems created partly by the specific character of the previous economic development of the individual countries, and partly by the unsettled conditions of the international economy after the first world war. In other words, they inherited structural problems peculiar to their own countries, and were confronted by conjunctural problems common to all countries between the wars.
....
All three countries were subject to pressure from rising populations. The increase in agricultural production failed to keep pace with the rise in population, except in Japan until the 1920s. In consequence, Germany and Italy, as later Japan, were forced to import growing quantities of foodstuff. The rate increase of employment also grew more slowly than that of the population in Italy and Japan, although the problem only really affected Germany in the 1920s. Emigration had formed a major outlet for this excess population, particularly in Italy, but also in Germany in the late nineteenth century. Only in Japan was emigration of no importance before the late 1930s. But in the 1920s and 1930s this outlet was checked by the United States' restriction on immigration and by the effects of the depression.'
(Woolf, pp. 120-1)
