Was Rommel all that?

[AZrailwhale]

I was a Combat Engineer in the Army. Defensive Fortifications and constructions are still taught today. Because they do work, within reason.

Let me explain. If your purpose is to delay, or deter the enemy, the fortifications can and do work. If it is to prevent any enemy from getting through. They do not work.

You hope to deter the enemy. Let them see the assault will be very expensive and potentially fail. It will cost a lot of troops and equipment for an outcome that is in doubt. Delaying is the time it takes the enemy to clear paths through the obstacles.

While they are trying to clear the obstacles, you want them under sustained direct and indirect fire. Rifle, Machine Gun, Mortar, Artillery, and Aircraft all firing on the enemy. More troops responding to the defense location to help create a defense in depth.

The fixed defenses were never intended, by themselves, to stop the Invaders on the beach. They needed additional forces to come and reinforce the defense. Infantry to plug any gaps before they can be exploited. Artillery to drop death on the troops. Aircraft to destroy the vessels bringing supplies to the beach. Tanks to destroy the lightly armed troops coming ashore.

The problem with D-Day is that those troops were never sent, or were sent too late to do any good.

I mentioned above, it was also a problem with intelligence. The best thinkers of the era believed you must have a port. You must take Calais. Or another Port to support the invasion. Read up on the German planning for Sea Lion, and the ideas the Germans had for invading England.

German planners realized that to Invade England they must control the Sea and Air of the Channel. They needed to invade on a wide front otherwise defensive forces could and would surround and overwhelm the invasion forces.

For our part, mistakes made on our side made it confusing and screwed up the Germans until we had a good foothold. An example. If the Airborne and Glider troops had dropped as intended and planned. The enemy could have had a good picture of what was happening shortly after dawn. While the first waves were coming ashore. But the Airborne drops were screwed up. Troops scattered to hell and gone. Units intermixed and well out of their areas. Units becoming pick up squads and platoons all rushing to seize a road junction or bridge. Mass confusion for German Intelligence Officers to try and make sense of, and report to their Generals.

Without that information reacting properly to the attack is impossible.

The Germans would capture a Paratrooper. His objective is some twenty miles from where he was found. No way can that be the plan. Dropping paratroopers twenty miles from his objective. It must be a ruse. A raid designed to draw troops from Calais which is the obvious objective for a true military mind.

By the time the German High Command realized Normandy was the real objective, we were building the Mulberry Harbors and troops were at least a mile inland and pushing hard to take more territory. Every road junction was held by at least a squad a paratroopers.

You say that it proves fixed defenses don’t work. Tour Normandy today. The structures are still there. The cost in casualties was enormous. Years of planning and preparation resulted in a victory at an incredible cost.

Let’s be honest. The first wave was intended to remove the beach obstacles and get ammo and material ashore. The second wave could be more lightly weighed down, as ammo and material would be there on the bodies of the first wave.

Every officer down to the youngest Lieutenant was told to inland. Fast. The Sergeants were told go inland. Fast.

Eisenhower even said. Before the battle the plan is everything. Once it starts. The plan is worthless. The battle is in the hands of junior officers and sergeants.

If Rommel had gotten the troops he needed. If the Tanks had been sent immediately. If the infantry units had rolled out immediately. It is possible, and perhaps even likely that the invasion would have failed.

Nope, naval gunfire and tacair would have destroyed the German formations on the move..

 

[AZrailwhale]

I was a Combat Engineer in the Army. Defensive Fortifications and constructions are still taught today. Because they do work, within reason.

Let me explain. If your purpose is to delay, or deter the enemy, the fortifications can and do work. If it is to prevent any enemy from getting through. They do not work.

You hope to deter the enemy. Let them see the assault will be very expensive and potentially fail. It will cost a lot of troops and equipment for an outcome that is in doubt. Delaying is the time it takes the enemy to clear paths through the obstacles.

While they are trying to clear the obstacles, you want them under sustained direct and indirect fire. Rifle, Machine Gun, Mortar, Artillery, and Aircraft all firing on the enemy. More troops responding to the defense location to help create a defense in depth.

The fixed defenses were never intended, by themselves, to stop the Invaders on the beach. They needed additional forces to come and reinforce the defense. Infantry to plug any gaps before they can be exploited. Artillery to drop death on the troops. Aircraft to destroy the vessels bringing supplies to the beach. Tanks to destroy the lightly armed troops coming ashore.

The problem with D-Day is that those troops were never sent, or were sent too late to do any good.

I mentioned above, it was also a problem with intelligence. The best thinkers of the era believed you must have a port. You must take Calais. Or another Port to support the invasion. Read up on the German planning for Sea Lion, and the ideas the Germans had for invading England.

German planners realized that to Invade England they must control the Sea and Air of the Channel. They needed to invade on a wide front otherwise defensive forces could and would surround and overwhelm the invasion forces.

For our part, mistakes made on our side made it confusing and screwed up the Germans until we had a good foothold. An example. If the Airborne and Glider troops had dropped as intended and planned. The enemy could have had a good picture of what was happening shortly after dawn. While the first waves were coming ashore. But the Airborne drops were screwed up. Troops scattered to hell and gone. Units intermixed and well out of their areas. Units becoming pick up squads and platoons all rushing to seize a road junction or bridge. Mass confusion for German Intelligence Officers to try and make sense of, and report to their Generals.

Without that information reacting properly to the attack is impossible.

The Germans would capture a Paratrooper. His objective is some twenty miles from where he was found. No way can that be the plan. Dropping paratroopers twenty miles from his objective. It must be a ruse. A raid designed to draw troops from Calais which is the obvious objective for a true military mind.

By the time the German High Command realized Normandy was the real objective, we were building the Mulberry Harbors and troops were at least a mile inland and pushing hard to take more territory. Every road junction was held by at least a squad a paratroopers.

You say that it proves fixed defenses don’t work. Tour Normandy today. The structures are still there. The cost in casualties was enormous. Years of planning and preparation resulted in a victory at an incredible cost.

Let’s be honest. The first wave was intended to remove the beach obstacles and get ammo and material ashore. The second wave could be more lightly weighed down, as ammo and material would be there on the bodies of the first wave.

Every officer down to the youngest Lieutenant was told to inland. Fast. The Sergeants were told go inland. Fast.

Eisenhower even said. Before the battle the plan is everything. Once it starts. The plan is worthless. The battle is in the hands of junior officers and sergeants.

If Rommel had gotten the troops he needed. If the Tanks had been sent immediately. If the infantry units had rolled out immediately. It is possible, and perhaps even likely that the invasion would have failed.

Among other things I was a twelve bravo as well, if likely before you were born. We were taught the same doctrine, but we were building improvised field fortifications not the massive permanent fortifications of the Maginot Line and Atlantic Wall. Those fortifications are still there because they can’t be destroyed. Permanent fortifications in places where they can’t be bypassed can stop assaulting troops. I believe there are fortifications in the Alps from WWI that blocked passes and were never taken and stopped offensives cold. Strategically fixed defenses can be made ineffective, but tactically they are always effective because they provide observation and fire to obstacle belts preventing them from being cleared. Why do you think the Warsaw Pact and NATO spent so much time and effort designing remote obstacle clearing devices?

 

[AZrailwhale]

Sort of.

Mulberry harbour - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

The Mulberry B harbour at Gold Beach was used for 10 months after D-Day, and over 2.5 million men, 500,000 vehicles, and 4 million tons of supplies were landed before it was fully decommissioned.

Did they work as well as was hoped? No. Did they answer the logistic needs at least on paper? Yes. It was good enough, at least on paper, to allow the SHAEF command planners to avoid the Port Cities.

The Brit Mulberries lasted longer than the American one because they were built much more slowly. The Americans quite correctly decided that the Mulberries had to be in place and operating as quickly as possible. They were expecting to take Cherbourg on, or reasonably close to schedule on D Day plus eight Instead US troops had to capture it on D Day plus twenty one. Long after the Germans had time to destroy the port as a functioning entity.

 

[SavannahMann]

Among other things I was a twelve bravo as well, if likely before you were born. We were taught the same doctrine, but we were building improvised field fortifications not the massive permanent fortifications of the Maginot Line and Atlantic Wall. Those fortifications are still there because they can’t be destroyed. Permanent fortifications in places where they can’t be bypassed can stop assaulting troops. I believe there are fortifications in the Alps from WWI that blocked passes and were never taken and stopped offensives cold. Strategically fixed defenses can be made ineffective, but tactically they are always effective because they provide observation and fire to obstacle belts preventing them from being cleared. Why do you think the Warsaw Pact and NATO spent so much time and effort designing remote obstacle clearing devices?

Fences, minefields, bunkers and the rest are useless without troops defending them. You have to have maneuver troops to move to any point being attacked.

Build a fence and if nobody is watching it then someone will cut it. Ranchers have to check their fences and repair them constantly. And that is without human intervention. Weather, and the animals, will break the fences too.

One of the reasons the Marginot Line failed was there was no maneuver force ready to respond to any attack. Once the Germans broke through, there was nobody left to contain the breakthrough.

 

[westwall]

Fences, minefields, bunkers and the rest are useless without troops defending them. You have to have maneuver troops to move to any point being attacked.

Build a fence and if nobody is watching it then someone will cut it. Ranchers have to check their fences and repair them constantly. And that is without human intervention. Weather, and the animals, will break the fences too.

One of the reasons the Marginot Line failed was there was no maneuver force ready to respond to any attack. Once the Germans broke through, there was nobody left to contain the breakthrough.

The biggest problem with the Maginot Line was the Germans simply went around it. There was no effort to actually pierce it until after paris fell. Then, and only then, as the French forces retreated, did the German army punch through the actual line. The French did manage to stop one attack at Wissembourg, on the 15th of June IIRC. But other than that, the defenders had left their positions for the most part.

 

[Mushroom]

What you are ignoring is that the Japanese we're still fighting from fixed defenses. To make things worse, on most islands there wasn ‘t room for maneuver warfare.

No, I am not missing that. Every defensive position is a "fixed defense", even if it is just foxholes. However, the Japanese by 1944 had opted more for "defense in depth", and not fighting tooth and nail for the first 100 meters or so of beachfront. They were conducting more of their defenses father inland, as well as staging counter-offenses from concealed positions and not from the positions themselves.

And there was plenty of room, especially in later battles. However, what worked against things like tanks was the terrain. Okinawa and Philippines were both pretty large, but the rugged terrain and jungles are what made tanks mostly impractical. But tanks were used in most of the battles in the Pacific, but only in limited numbers in limited areas because of terrain, not maneuver room.

And by 1944, the Japanese learned that they simply could not prevent a determined amphibious assault. They were spread too thin, over too many islands with not enough supplies and resources. So they decided on a strategy of causing as many casualties as they could, hoping that even as they lost battles they might win the war through attrition.

But even more important, those were islands and not their mainland. But their strategies were largely the same even on Japan itself as well as Hokkaido and Kyushu. To not meet force with force on the beaches, but to let them extend their supply lines then hit them where it was not expected. As well as a lot of "hit and run" tactics, along with suicide charges en masse. And Japan itself would have been worse, where they expected most of the civilians to take part as well.

But they had no expectation that they would "beat off" the invaders. That they would "throw them back into the sea". Their intent was to make invasions soo costly that the Allies would run out of forces, or get so sick of the fighting that they would settle for an armistice.

Which is very unlike Germany in 1944, which was still trying to fight from the idea of repelling them at the beach itself. Japan by that time had already learned in battles like Tarawa and Guadalcanal, as well as their own taking of the Philippines and other places. No matter how good the defenses are, they can be eliminated, gone around, or starved out. So trying to hold in that manner was simply not effective. Better to set up the defenses not for total defeat, but to make taking the land as costly as possible.

And they learned that actually very fast. Their high command was shocked at how quickly Tarawa fell. The General in charge had made a claim it would take "a million men a hundred years" to take the island. But the US did it in less than 4 days. And their own ability to do the same thing against "impregnable" defenses all up and down the Pacific from the Philippines to Singapore affirmed that trying to actually keep the invaders away was pretty much impossible.

There is a damned good reason why such defenses pretty much fell out of use after WWII. The two Koreas and Taiwan are really the only places defenses like that are still found. But even then, it is not with the idea of a "Fortress Europe" approach to throw the invaders back. It is with the more modern idea of slowing them and making an invasion costly, as they build up their forces inland. And destroying those defenses and pulling back themselves when they are close to being overrun. Not manning them until the last man and dying in place. As well as stalling for time, as they hope that others will come to their aid.

I am ignoring nothing, Japan simply realized faster than Germany did because of first hand experience that a total defense from beach assault was largely impossible against a determined enemy. They proved so themselves early in the war, then had it done to them in return later on. I think the last time such was even attempted would be all the defenses that Iraq threw up in Kuwait in 1990-1991. Which proved to be just as worthless, as the coalition attacked through their back door, then simply shelled most of the positions then avoided them by helo and airborne assaults.

 

[Mushroom]

Let me explain. If your purpose is to delay, or deter the enemy, the fortifications can and do work. If it is to prevent any enemy from getting through. They do not work.

I know, and that is pretty much what I was saying.

Early on in WWII, that was how all defenses were designed and intended to be used. A wall, to stop any attack cold and not allow it to succeed. But both Germany and Japan proved that did not work, by defeating defenses like that over and over again. And unlike Germany who never really did amphibious operations, Japan had a lot of experience in them by 1943. And they changed their tactics fairly quickly. Knowing that they could not stop the attacks, simply making them as expensive as possible.

Germany however still believed that they could prevent an invasion by defeating them on the shore at the point of invasion. And that was largely their tactic throughout the war on both fronts. Massive defenses, either fixed or improvised. Where as the Japanese had already adopted what we today call "defense in depth". Where withdrawing and having multiple layers was more effective than a single one where once penetrated there was nothing behind it to stop the attackers.

And that was actually the tactic used by NATO for most of the Cold War. If the Soviets ever invaded, to trade space for time, pulling back while trying to cause as much damage to their forces as possible. where by roughly the time the invasion reached the French-West German border, they would have amassed the forces needed for a counter-strike to push them back out of Germany. Not unlike the Korean War, they would have largely lost West Germany. But then been in a superior position to take it back, and possibly much of East Germany as well.

 

[westwall]

No, I am not missing that. Every defensive position is a "fixed defense", even if it is just foxholes. However, the Japanese by 1944 had opted more for "defense in depth", and not fighting tooth and nail for the first 100 meters or so of beachfront. They were conducting more of their defenses father inland, as well as staging counter-offenses from concealed positions and not from the positions themselves.

And there was plenty of room, especially in later battles. However, what worked against things like tanks was the terrain. Okinawa and Philippines were both pretty large, but the rugged terrain and jungles are what made tanks mostly impractical. But tanks were used in most of the battles in the Pacific, but only in limited numbers in limited areas because of terrain, not maneuver room.

And by 1944, the Japanese learned that they simply could not prevent a determined amphibious assault. They were spread too thin, over too many islands with not enough supplies and resources. So they decided on a strategy of causing as many casualties as they could, hoping that even as they lost battles they might win the war through attrition.

But even more important, those were islands and not their mainland. But their strategies were largely the same even on Japan itself as well as Hokkaido and Kyushu. To not meet force with force on the beaches, but to let them extend their supply lines then hit them where it was not expected. As well as a lot of "hit and run" tactics, along with suicide charges en masse. And Japan itself would have been worse, where they expected most of the civilians to take part as well.

But they had no expectation that they would "beat off" the invaders. That they would "throw them back into the sea". Their intent was to make invasions soo costly that the Allies would run out of forces, or get so sick of the fighting that they would settle for an armistice.

Which is very unlike Germany in 1944, which was still trying to fight from the idea of repelling them at the beach itself. Japan by that time had already learned in battles like Tarawa and Guadalcanal, as well as their own taking of the Philippines and other places. No matter how good the defenses are, they can be eliminated, gone around, or starved out. So trying to hold in that manner was simply not effective. Better to set up the defenses not for total defeat, but to make taking the land as costly as possible.

And they learned that actually very fast. Their high command was shocked at how quickly Tarawa fell. The General in charge had made a claim it would take "a million men a hundred years" to take the island. But the US did it in less than 4 days. And their own ability to do the same thing against "impregnable" defenses all up and down the Pacific from the Philippines to Singapore affirmed that trying to actually keep the invaders away was pretty much impossible.

There is a damned good reason why such defenses pretty much fell out of use after WWII. The two Koreas and Taiwan are really the only places defenses like that are still found. But even then, it is not with the idea of a "Fortress Europe" approach to throw the invaders back. It is with the more modern idea of slowing them and making an invasion costly, as they build up their forces inland. And destroying those defenses and pulling back themselves when they are close to being overrun. Not manning them until the last man and dying in place. As well as stalling for time, as they hope that others will come to their aid.

I am ignoring nothing, Japan simply realized faster than Germany did because of first hand experience that a total defense from beach assault was largely impossible against a determined enemy. They proved so themselves early in the war, then had it done to them in return later on. I think the last time such was even attempted would be all the defenses that Iraq threw up in Kuwait in 1990-1991. Which proved to be just as worthless, as the coalition attacked through their back door, then simply shelled most of the positions then avoided them by helo and airborne assaults.

Actually, the final plan for the defense of the Home islands was exactly the opposite of what you are saying. The Japanese were manufacturing "Pole Bayonets" which were to be used by the civilians to make spears and the tactic was to attack the marines on the beaches themselves to get under the firepower of our naval and air assets. They were prepared to use up the civilians to allow the actual soldiers to survive long enough to hopefully inflict catastrophic losses on the beach.

That's one of the reasons why we dropped the atomic bombs.

The Kyūjō Incident (Japanese "Pole Bayonet")

On the night of 14 August 1945, rogue Japanese officers made a last-minute attempt to stop the transmission of a surrender message by Emperor Hirohito. If they would have been successful in...

www.oldgunsguy.com

 

[Mushroom]

The Japanese were manufacturing "Pole Bayonets" which were to be used by the civilians to make spears and the tactic was to attack the marines on the beaches themselves to get under the firepower of our naval and air assets.

And exactly how were they going to get those civilians to the beaches? They were a home guard, please give some kind of references where they were going to transport civilians to the beaches and fight them there. Or how that would actually help them evade naval shore bombardments.

There is really only one way to avoid a naval shore bombardment. Be far enough inland that they can't reach you. As in 25 miles or more inland. That is the exact opposite of being on the beaches.

 

[westwall]

And exactly how were they going to get those civilians to the beaches? They were a home guard, please give some kind of references where they were going to transport civilians to the beaches and fight them there. Or how that would actually help them evade naval shore bombardments.

There is really only one way to avoid a naval shore bombardment. Be far enough inland that they can't reach you. As in 25 miles or more inland. That is the exact opposite of being on the beaches.

Like I said, that was their tactic. Not mine. It is talked about at length, with footnotes, in a MHQ from about 20 years ago.

The plan, as I remember it, was to have them in tunnels, out of sight, pre positioned. Millions of them, that way, when the landing beach was attacked, they would already have them set up. The only movement of personnel would be soldiers.

I never claimed it was a good tactic, but that is what they were planning.

And no, being 25 miles inland isn't the only tactic. Being intermingled with the enemy also works quite well.

 

[Mushroom]

Being intermingled with the enemy also works quite well.

Prior to an amphibious assault, there was typically 7-14 days of heavy off-shore bombardment. Which is one of the main reasons that later in the war Japan moved their forces inland instead of leaving them on the shore.

And I would wish luck any that thought hiding in dugouts would have helped much. For Operation Olympic, it was expected that there would have been 24 battleships, 30 cruisers, over 400 destroyers, pounding on the shores for a week and a half prior to the assault itself (as well as the aircraft from 42 carriers). As I said, the Japanese learned their lesson after multiple battles that trying to dig in near the shore only resulted in a large loss of life with little gain. And with Kyushu and the other home islands, the most effective strategy is keeping as many as possible far inland, out of reach of naval gunfire.

And as they got to Okinawa, the effectiveness of spider holes was lessened, as the Marines and Army simply started to burn anything that looked to be a threat with M2 flamethrowers and multiple tracked vehicles with flamethrowers like the M4A2 and LTV "Ronson". By the time of Okinawa that tactic lost a lot of its effectiveness because the US started to simply blast or burn anything that looked like it might have possibly held a defensive position. The Japanese knew that, so I have no idea why you still think they would have tried to stop them at the beach. They had actually pretty much stopped doing that by the end of 1943. That is why 1944 and 1945 were primarily tough battles in the interior, not on the beaches anymore.