Was Rommel all that?

[SavannahMann]

Rommel was wrong also. He never had to fight without at least parity in the air. He totally underestimated the effect of allied tactical and strategic air.

Not exactly.

Rommel argued that German Armor should be right down on the beach to oppose any landing. His argument was that Allied Air would destroy any Tanks as they approached the shore.

Guderian insisted this was madness. Allied Naval power would easily destroy the tanks if they were down on the beach and the only hope they had was to have the tanks ready to move from secure laagers to the point of the invasion.

Both clearly understood that the Allies had gotten control of both the Sea and Air. Their disagreement was based upon which they believed was the biggest threat.

 

[DudleySmith]

I doubt Hitler would have bothered with North Africa at all if it weren't for the Italian failures in Africa. Germany simply didn't have the men to cover as wide a front as they needed.

 

[SavannahMann]

I doubt Hitler would have bothered with North Africa at all if it weren't for the Italian failures in Africa. Germany simply didn't have the men to cover as wide a front as they needed.

Reasonably true, as far as it goes. German units went there to reinforce the Italians. But the entire region was one that gained importance quickly. For more than the simple truth that Italy was there. Vichy French forces in North Africa needed to be watched. The warships were given just enough fuel to run the generators. British fortifications on Malta were an intolerable thorn in the side. And the presence of Allied, originally just the British and Commonwealth troops, constituted a threat to the Southern limits of the Axis controlled Europe.

At the same time, the British forces seemed weak and ill supported. The opposite was also true. Germany did not have the sealift capacity to really support their forces in North Africa. While British had the ships, and supplies, but no direct access. The safe route called on Britain to send ships around Africa and up to Suez. The Mediterranean was contested.

Once Hitler understood that Churchill viewed North Africa as vital, Winston often called it the platform to strike the soft underbelly of Europe, then resistance there was equally vital.

 

[luiza]

Didn't the Jewish Rommel do well ?

Wikipedia tries to misdirect by listing Rommel's mother's maiden name as von Lutz, but the name was von Luz.
Luz is the Hebrew word for almond tree. It is easy to prove Luz is a Jewish name, since Karl von Luz's mother was also Jewish, being a Kissling and a Dietmeier. Any search online will show you both names are Jewish.

Strange how so many of the German Military and Pro Holocaust faction were Jewish .

Rommel also married a Jew, Lucia Mollin, who they admit was not of German ancestry. She was Polish and Italian, which should have bothered Hitler, but didn't.
Strange though that Rommel was instrumental in the invasion of Poland, with a Polish Jewish wife

 

[SavannahMann]

Didn't the Jewish Rommel do well ?

Wikipedia tries to misdirect by listing Rommel's mother's maiden name as von Lutz, but the name was von Luz.
Luz is the Hebrew word for almond tree. It is easy to prove Luz is a Jewish name, since Karl von Luz's mother was also Jewish, being a Kissling and a Dietmeier. Any search online will show you both names are Jewish.

Strange how so many of the German Military and Pro Holocaust faction were Jewish .

Rommel also married a Jew, Lucia Mollin, who they admit was not of German ancestry. She was Polish and Italian, which should have bothered Hitler, but didn't.
Strange though that Rommel was instrumental in the invasion of Poland, with a Polish Jewish wife

Stuck to rewriting Russian History.

 

[DudleySmith]

North Africa was the path to Cairo and driving the Brits out of Egypt, and soon after the Med would be Axis controlled. FDR and the Navy puled off a miracle landing and suddenly it became an even more important theater.

Some of the more interesting 'what ifs' I've read is what if Hitler had simply driven through Turkey and seized the Iranian oil fields and then the Russian fields instead of the drive through southern Russia; the Turks were already friendly with Germany and probably wouldn't put up much resistance if any; they could have cut off Soviet oil and shut down an Allied supply route to the Soviets at the same time, if successful. The Brits were already spread pretty thin there and Hitler was very popular in the region.

Forgotten Fights: The Battle of Deir ez-Zor, July 1941 | The National WWII Museum | New Orleans

Syria became a battleground in July 1941, when British forces launched an invasion to secure their hold on the Middle East. General "Bill" Slim's strike at Deir-ez-Zor was a critical victory.

www.nationalww2museum.org

 

[CrusaderFrank]

Rommel lost in North Africa. People say he failed because he wasn't supported, but a good general would've taken the lack of support in count.

Then Rommel was given the job of fortifying the European coast against invasion. D-Day happened and the allies invaded. Rommel failed in that too.

The Allies knew the exact time and location of Rommel's N Africa supply ships and sunk them

 

[westwall]

North Africa was always a sideshow for the Germans. When Rommel commanded it, it consisted of two armored divisions (the 15th and 21st Panzers) and the Ramke Brigade which was a paratroop unit with little anti-armor and no integral motor transport.

You forgot the 5th Light as well.

 

[AZrailwhale]

I doubt that. He surely wanted additional aircraft but they were in Germany attacking bombers or on the Eastern front.

His plan depended on Panzer units being able to move unhindered during daylight. Allied TACAIR made that impossible and naval gunfire would have slaughtered his units within ten miles of the beaches. Naval gunfire was another thing he never had to deal with in the Western Desert.

 

[AZrailwhale]

You forgot the 5th Light as well.

5th Light was converted to the 21st Panzer.

 

[westwall]

5th Light was converted to the 21st Panzer.

Not until much later.

 

[SavannahMann]

Rommel had a failure, the same one every German General had. No experience with amphibious landings. Their experience was mainly in trying to resist them. To that end they had reason to be cautiously confident, the raid that ended in disastrous failure. Dieppe.

It taught the Germans they could defend a Port from an amphibious assault. It taught the Allie’s that assaulting a port directly was madness.

German planning expected a port to be taken. They understood logistics enough to know a port would be needed to support the invasion. This was a vulnerability that the Germans hoped to take advantage of.

But because Rommel had no experience with amphibious landings, he assumed various things that were not true. For example, Rommel expected the attack to come at High Tide. This would allow the boats to cover more distance to the vitally important Shelf which was all the cover the Soldiers could get on the beach. The Allies went ashore at low tide. All the Obstacles that were intended to stop the attack at high tide were out of the water, able to be cleared by dedicated Engineer teams.

There were a lot of factors that led to the mistakes the Germans made. One was misinformation we made sure they got. Everyone knew Patton was our Best Tank Commander. So obviously we would have Patton leading the assault. But we couldn’t really use tanks effectively to stage a breakout in the hedgerows. So he would be the wrong tool for the job. You really wanted Infantry Commanders until you pushed inland far enough to give the tanks room to maneuver.

So we put Patton directly across from Calais. It was a short crossing from Dover, where Patton’s fake army was located. Radio signals from this army filled the airwaves. Mocked up trucks and tanks were moved every day so recon flights would see the gathering forces for Patton’s First US Army. Or FUSA.

Obviously the Americans would use their best Commander. And just as Obviously they were coming to Calais.

The Germans didn’t know about the Mulberry Harbors.

There were a lot of factors that led to the fortunate errors that the Germans made.

Nobody could have done better than Rommel did. Not with the intelligence information he had to work with. Not with the handicap of all decisions being micromanaged by the megalomaniac Corporal.

The German Army of 1944 was not the Wehrmacht of 1939 and 1940. Too many had been chewed up in campaigns to date. Too many were tied down manning the Atlantic Wall. Too many were trying to stop the Russians.

The men manning the Wall in Normandy were called Stew. Old meat and green vegetables. Old soldiers who were supposed to be put out of the army for medical reasons. Young kids who were drafted and given minimal training to stand to on the Atlantic Wall.

 

[alang1216]

His plan depended on Panzer units being able to move unhindered during daylight.

What other options did he have?

Allied TACAIR made that impossible and naval gunfire would have slaughtered his units within ten miles of the beaches. Naval gunfire was another thing he never had to deal with in the Western Desert.

Again, what other options did he have?

 

[Mushroom]

As far as the Atlantic Wall is concerned, Rommel was tasked with building static defenses in the age of mobile combined arms warfare

What is really ironic to most of us who studied the war, is that at the start of it the Germans rather quickly and easily showed how ineffective static defenses were against a determined invader.

Then tried to do the exact same thing, which had already been proven a failure multiple times by then. Including in Europe and Asia. In fact, the most effective technique against beach landings is actually what the Japanese did in 1944 and 1945. Stop even trying to fight on the beaches themselves, allow them to move inland then hit them hard. They still lost the battles, but took a lot more round-eyes with them than they did at the earlier battles where they fought tooth and nail for the beaches.

 

[AZrailwhale]

What is really ironic to most of us who studied the war, is that at the start of it the Germans rather quickly and easily showed how ineffective static defenses were against a determined invader.

Then tried to do the exact same thing, which had already been proven a failure multiple times by then. Including in Europe and Asia. In fact, the most effective technique against beach landings is actually what the Japanese did in 1944 and 1945. Stop even trying to fight on the beaches themselves, allow them to move inland then hit them hard. They still lost the battles, but took a lot more round-eyes with them than they did at the earlier battles where they fought tooth and nail for the beaches.

What you are ignoring is that the Japanese we're still fighting from fixed defenses. To make things worse, on most islands there wasn ‘t room for maneuver warfare. So every position had to be assaulted frontally into overlapping fields of fire.

if the Germans had set up defenses twenty or thirty miles inland, out of range of naval gunfire, the allies would simply have maneuvered around them. Like it or not, the only chance the germans had was to stop the invasion on the beach. With their inferiority in numbers, equipment, logistics and without even parity in the air the Germans in France were screwed no matter how they tried to defend. Once the Allies got a foothold in Normandy, they could have just initiated Dragoon and see-sawed the Germans back and forth between the two invasions. Make the Germans waste fuel and resources pulling units away from Overlord to face Dragoon, then hold there and advance Overlord forcing the Germans to waste even more fuel and resources moving back to Normandy. Remember, the Germans weren’t using Sherman’s, their Panzer IVs and Panthers couldn’t travel long distances on their own tracks, they needed vulnerable trains to haul their tanks back and forth. The Germans didn’t have the strategic mobility the Allies had.

Fixed fortifications are a force multiplier and that is what the Germans used them for.

 

[DudleySmith]

It was the Soviets' 'fixed defenses' that shut down the blitzkriegs; 17 to 25 mile deep mine fields and concrete bunkers packed with anti-tank guns kept them from encirclement by the time their offensives reached the main north-south rail routes. No gaps in the defenses as was the case in the West, via Belgium. It still took the Soviets a couple of years to mount the Kursk offensive, though, and Hitler had to strip the eastern front of aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons due to the massive bombing raids over Germany. Mine warfare isn't exciting, so they don't make movies focused on that. Even most history books barely give them any mention, despite their critical role against the German offensives. They denied Hitler the quick victory he needed to succeed.

Stalin also abandoned static defenses in depth. since he thought he would be invading Germany first and considered it a waste of time and resources. Stalin opted for an offensive stance.

Stalin and Molotov Lines in Combat

www.globalsecurity.org

 

[SavannahMann]

What is really ironic to most of us who studied the war, is that at the start of it the Germans rather quickly and easily showed how ineffective static defenses were against a determined invader.

Then tried to do the exact same thing, which had already been proven a failure multiple times by then. Including in Europe and Asia. In fact, the most effective technique against beach landings is actually what the Japanese did in 1944 and 1945. Stop even trying to fight on the beaches themselves, allow them to move inland then hit them hard. They still lost the battles, but took a lot more round-eyes with them than they did at the earlier battles where they fought tooth and nail for the beaches.

I was a Combat Engineer in the Army. Defensive Fortifications and constructions are still taught today. Because they do work, within reason.

Let me explain. If your purpose is to delay, or deter the enemy, the fortifications can and do work. If it is to prevent any enemy from getting through. They do not work.

You hope to deter the enemy. Let them see the assault will be very expensive and potentially fail. It will cost a lot of troops and equipment for an outcome that is in doubt. Delaying is the time it takes the enemy to clear paths through the obstacles.

While they are trying to clear the obstacles, you want them under sustained direct and indirect fire. Rifle, Machine Gun, Mortar, Artillery, and Aircraft all firing on the enemy. More troops responding to the defense location to help create a defense in depth.

The fixed defenses were never intended, by themselves, to stop the Invaders on the beach. They needed additional forces to come and reinforce the defense. Infantry to plug any gaps before they can be exploited. Artillery to drop death on the troops. Aircraft to destroy the vessels bringing supplies to the beach. Tanks to destroy the lightly armed troops coming ashore.

The problem with D-Day is that those troops were never sent, or were sent too late to do any good.

I mentioned above, it was also a problem with intelligence. The best thinkers of the era believed you must have a port. You must take Calais. Or another Port to support the invasion. Read up on the German planning for Sea Lion, and the ideas the Germans had for invading England.

German planners realized that to Invade England they must control the Sea and Air of the Channel. They needed to invade on a wide front otherwise defensive forces could and would surround and overwhelm the invasion forces.

For our part, mistakes made on our side made it confusing and screwed up the Germans until we had a good foothold. An example. If the Airborne and Glider troops had dropped as intended and planned. The enemy could have had a good picture of what was happening shortly after dawn. While the first waves were coming ashore. But the Airborne drops were screwed up. Troops scattered to hell and gone. Units intermixed and well out of their areas. Units becoming pick up squads and platoons all rushing to seize a road junction or bridge. Mass confusion for German Intelligence Officers to try and make sense of, and report to their Generals.

Without that information reacting properly to the attack is impossible.

The Germans would capture a Paratrooper. His objective is some twenty miles from where he was found. No way can that be the plan. Dropping paratroopers twenty miles from his objective. It must be a ruse. A raid designed to draw troops from Calais which is the obvious objective for a true military mind.

By the time the German High Command realized Normandy was the real objective, we were building the Mulberry Harbors and troops were at least a mile inland and pushing hard to take more territory. Every road junction was held by at least a squad a paratroopers.

You say that it proves fixed defenses don’t work. Tour Normandy today. The structures are still there. The cost in casualties was enormous. Years of planning and preparation resulted in a victory at an incredible cost.

Let’s be honest. The first wave was intended to remove the beach obstacles and get ammo and material ashore. The second wave could be more lightly weighed down, as ammo and material would be there on the bodies of the first wave.

Every officer down to the youngest Lieutenant was told to inland. Fast. The Sergeants were told go inland. Fast.

Eisenhower even said. Before the battle the plan is everything. Once it starts. The plan is worthless. The battle is in the hands of junior officers and sergeants.

If Rommel had gotten the troops he needed. If the Tanks had been sent immediately. If the infantry units had rolled out immediately. It is possible, and perhaps even likely that the invasion would have failed.

 

[westwall]

I was a Combat Engineer in the Army. Defensive Fortifications and constructions are still taught today. Because they do work, within reason.

Let me explain. If your purpose is to delay, or deter the enemy, the fortifications can and do work. If it is to prevent any enemy from getting through. They do not work.

You hope to deter the enemy. Let them see the assault will be very expensive and potentially fail. It will cost a lot of troops and equipment for an outcome that is in doubt. Delaying is the time it takes the enemy to clear paths through the obstacles.

While they are trying to clear the obstacles, you want them under sustained direct and indirect fire. Rifle, Machine Gun, Mortar, Artillery, and Aircraft all firing on the enemy. More troops responding to the defense location to help create a defense in depth.

The fixed defenses were never intended, by themselves, to stop the Invaders on the beach. They needed additional forces to come and reinforce the defense. Infantry to plug any gaps before they can be exploited. Artillery to drop death on the troops. Aircraft to destroy the vessels bringing supplies to the beach. Tanks to destroy the lightly armed troops coming ashore.

The problem with D-Day is that those troops were never sent, or were sent too late to do any good.

I mentioned above, it was also a problem with intelligence. The best thinkers of the era believed you must have a port. You must take Calais. Or another Port to support the invasion. Read up on the German planning for Sea Lion, and the ideas the Germans had for invading England.

German planners realized that to Invade England they must control the Sea and Air of the Channel. They needed to invade on a wide front otherwise defensive forces could and would surround and overwhelm the invasion forces.

For our part, mistakes made on our side made it confusing and screwed up the Germans until we had a good foothold. An example. If the Airborne and Glider troops had dropped as intended and planned. The enemy could have had a good picture of what was happening shortly after dawn. While the first waves were coming ashore. But the Airborne drops were screwed up. Troops scattered to hell and gone. Units intermixed and well out of their areas. Units becoming pick up squads and platoons all rushing to seize a road junction or bridge. Mass confusion for German Intelligence Officers to try and make sense of, and report to their Generals.

Without that information reacting properly to the attack is impossible.

The Germans would capture a Paratrooper. His objective is some twenty miles from where he was found. No way can that be the plan. Dropping paratroopers twenty miles from his objective. It must be a ruse. A raid designed to draw troops from Calais which is the obvious objective for a true military mind.

By the time the German High Command realized Normandy was the real objective, we were building the Mulberry Harbors and troops were at least a mile inland and pushing hard to take more territory. Every road junction was held by at least a squad a paratroopers.

You say that it proves fixed defenses don’t work. Tour Normandy today. The structures are still there. The cost in casualties was enormous. Years of planning and preparation resulted in a victory at an incredible cost.

Let’s be honest. The first wave was intended to remove the beach obstacles and get ammo and material ashore. The second wave could be more lightly weighed down, as ammo and material would be there on the bodies of the first wave.

Every officer down to the youngest Lieutenant was told to inland. Fast. The Sergeants were told go inland. Fast.

Eisenhower even said. Before the battle the plan is everything. Once it starts. The plan is worthless. The battle is in the hands of junior officers and sergeants.

If Rommel had gotten the troops he needed. If the Tanks had been sent immediately. If the infantry units had rolled out immediately. It is possible, and perhaps even likely that the invasion would have failed.

The Mulberry's only lasted a few days till the storms took them out. The US landed more supply direct to the beaches then the British did while the Mulberry's were operating.

 

[SavannahMann]

The Mulberry's only lasted a few days till the storms took them out. The US landed more supply direct to the beaches then the British did while the Mulberry's were operating.

Sort of.

Mulberry harbour - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

The Mulberry B harbour at Gold Beach was used for 10 months after D-Day, and over 2.5 million men, 500,000 vehicles, and 4 million tons of supplies were landed before it was fully decommissioned.

Did they work as well as was hoped? No. Did they answer the logistic needs at least on paper? Yes. It was good enough, at least on paper, to allow the SHAEF command planners to avoid the Port Cities.

 

[westwall]

Sort of.

Mulberry harbour - Wikipedia

en.m.wikipedia.org

The Mulberry B harbour at Gold Beach was used for 10 months after D-Day, and over 2.5 million men, 500,000 vehicles, and 4 million tons of supplies were landed before it was fully decommissioned.

Did they work as well as was hoped? No. Did they answer the logistic needs at least on paper? Yes. It was good enough, at least on paper, to allow the SHAEF command planners to avoid the Port Cities.

True, but like I said, the Americans were able to deliver more to the beaches, directly, than was off loaded via the Mulberry's