Iran's Nuclear Bomb Not If But When

[irosie91]

you don't send people to jail who lack
the MENS REA thing (spelling?)

But you should send terrorists and subversives to GITMO.

calm yourself-----two years----just two years----and he will be harmless-------doing harmless things ---like graduation speeches

Think of what hitler did in two years.

Obama is not hitler-----Obama is more like Carter

I didn't suggest he was like hitler. I pointed out with hitler how much damage can be done by people in power in only two years.
Obama has way surpassed Carter.

I see them as like TWO PEAS IN A POD

 

[dannyboys]

What an asshole president thing we have. Shithead.
Ayatollah obama. Send him to GITMO. Jerk.

calm down mark-----he is doing the best he can-----poor guy

That's the problem. He's doing his best.
Send him to GITMO.

you don't send people to jail who lack
the MENS REA thing (spelling?)

But you should send terrorists and subversives to GITMO.

calm yourself-----two years----just two years----and he will be harmless-------doing harmless things ---like graduation speeches

And living in the apartment above 'Boystown' after MU and the girls move to France.

 

[irosie91]

calm down mark-----he is doing the best he can-----poor guy

That's the problem. He's doing his best.
Send him to GITMO.

you don't send people to jail who lack
the MENS REA thing (spelling?)

But you should send terrorists and subversives to GITMO.

calm yourself-----two years----just two years----and he will be harmless-------doing harmless things ---like graduation speeches

And living in the apartment above 'Boystown' after MU and the girls move to France.

yes.....all good

 

[RoshawnMarkwees]

But you should send terrorists and subversives to GITMO.

calm yourself-----two years----just two years----and he will be harmless-------doing harmless things ---like graduation speeches

Think of what hitler did in two years.

Obama is not hitler-----Obama is more like Carter

I didn't suggest he was like hitler. I pointed out with hitler how much damage can be done by people in power in only two years.
Obama has way surpassed Carter.

I see them as like TWO PEAS IN A POD

Carter allowed for the creation of islimic Iran and Obama has been feeding it.

 

[Freemason9]

True.

To be fair, Iran wants to do what every other major power has done . . . create a nuclear weapons program to supplant its national defense. It's insane that the U.S. thinks that Iran can be isolated in this way.

Nobody ever questions Israel's noncompliance with international law. They have always spat in the face of the international nonproliferation treaties.

there are no "INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION
TREATIES" ----upon which to spit. Either a country has signed such a treaty or it is not. Israel has not.-----why do you engage such idiotic deceit? You just HOPE that uninformed persons will be impressed?

Oh, I see. Then if Iran simply doesn't sign the treaty, it is exempt--correct?

As I see it, the U.S. cannot continue the hypocrisy of looking the other way with Israel and condemning the same activity in Iran. It is illogical, and is only supportable when the vast Israeli lobbying effort (and political payola system) is understood in American politics.

try again Mason------Iran DID sign. I see from your lingo that you are an aficionado of islamo Nazi propaganda. I read your shit ----way back in time-----circa 1960----while I was still a child-----quite a young child------For me it is like the nursery rhymes I learned at age three-------I will never forget.........kinda like "hey diddle diddle---the cat and the fiddle----the cow jumped
over the moon....." ----the major gist of your propaganda for more than 100 years (some of the stuff I read more than 50 years ago was OLD even then) has been DA JOOOOS CONTROL EVERYTHING WITH MONEY-----plus the old standby----DA JOOOS CONTROL THE MEDIA -------------you people have no creative ability---your crap never changes

Iran does not have the same government that it did in 1960--at that time, they were a U.S. puppet state.

Iran was never a US puppet state. You are AGAIN quoting islamo Nazi bullshit propaganda. I have no doubt that the USA preferred the rule by DA SHAH-----
then again-------I have encountered lots and lots of Iranians who also preferred his rule over that of the AYATOILETS. If you are old enough----you might be able to remember that SHAH whatshisname-----often
defied the USA re policies------etc Why do you insist
on advertising your ------proclivities

Your rhetoric is childish.

 

[irosie91]

there are no "INTERNATIONAL NONPROLIFERATION
TREATIES" ----upon which to spit. Either a country has signed such a treaty or it is not. Israel has not.-----why do you engage such idiotic deceit? You just HOPE that uninformed persons will be impressed?

Oh, I see. Then if Iran simply doesn't sign the treaty, it is exempt--correct?

As I see it, the U.S. cannot continue the hypocrisy of looking the other way with Israel and condemning the same activity in Iran. It is illogical, and is only supportable when the vast Israeli lobbying effort (and political payola system) is understood in American politics.

try again Mason------Iran DID sign. I see from your lingo that you are an aficionado of islamo Nazi propaganda. I read your shit ----way back in time-----circa 1960----while I was still a child-----quite a young child------For me it is like the nursery rhymes I learned at age three-------I will never forget.........kinda like "hey diddle diddle---the cat and the fiddle----the cow jumped
over the moon....." ----the major gist of your propaganda for more than 100 years (some of the stuff I read more than 50 years ago was OLD even then) has been DA JOOOOS CONTROL EVERYTHING WITH MONEY-----plus the old standby----DA JOOOS CONTROL THE MEDIA -------------you people have no creative ability---your crap never changes

Iran does not have the same government that it did in 1960--at that time, they were a U.S. puppet state.

Iran was never a US puppet state. You are AGAIN quoting islamo Nazi bullshit propaganda. I have no doubt that the USA preferred the rule by DA SHAH-----
then again-------I have encountered lots and lots of Iranians who also preferred his rule over that of the AYATOILETS. If you are old enough----you might be able to remember that SHAH whatshisname-----often
defied the USA re policies------etc Why do you insist
on advertising your ------proclivities

Your rhetoric is childish.

your response is jibberish

 

[Katzndogz]

Iran has promised to only bomb Christians and Jews so the left is okay with Iran having nuclear bombs.

 

[hangover]

calm yourself-----two years----just two years----and he will be harmless-------doing harmless things ---like graduation speeches

Think of what hitler did in two years.

Obama is not hitler-----Obama is more like Carter

I didn't suggest he was like hitler. I pointed out with hitler how much damage can be done by people in power in only two years.
Obama has way surpassed Carter.

I see them as like TWO PEAS IN A POD

Carter allowed for the creation of islimic Iran and Obama has been feeding it.

The Ayatollah took over Iran before Carter, moron.

 

[RoshawnMarkwees]

Think of what hitler did in two years.

Obama is not hitler-----Obama is more like Carter

I didn't suggest he was like hitler. I pointed out with hitler how much damage can be done by people in power in only two years.
Obama has way surpassed Carter.

I see them as like TWO PEAS IN A POD

Carter allowed for the creation of islimic Iran and Obama has been feeding it.

The Ayatollah took over Iran before Carter, moron.

You're the moron, moron. The revolution occurred under Carter's watch. 1979. Carter allowed asylum for the shah. That pissed off the islimic Iranian psychos even more.
Those criminals have been holding that country hostage ever since and now our ayatollah obama is making sure that criminal gang gets nukes.
Obama needs to be incarcerated at GITMO.

 

[HenryBHough]

As I understood it, Muslims are not supposed to gamble.

But since negotiation with Obama was destined, from the start, to be a slam-dunk then it's hard to call what He thought to be playing "poker".

Now tell me, really, did anyone not expect today's cave-in?

 

[irosie91]

Obama is not hitler-----Obama is more like Carter

I didn't suggest he was like hitler. I pointed out with hitler how much damage can be done by people in power in only two years.
Obama has way surpassed Carter.

I see them as like TWO PEAS IN A POD

Carter allowed for the creation of islimic Iran and Obama has been feeding it.

The Ayatollah took over Iran before Carter, moron.

You're the moron, moron. The revolution occurred under Carter's watch. 1979. Carter allowed asylum for the shah. That pissed off the islimic Iranian psychos even more.
Those criminals have been holding that country hostage ever since and now our ayatollah obama is making sure that criminal gang gets nukes.
Obama needs to be incarcerated at GITMO.

Obama = Carter

 

[bucs90]

It's actually worth considering if allowing massive nuclear proliferation's actually a good thing. Nuclear powers don't engage in hot shooting wars with other nuclear powers. Thus if everyone who wants nukes had nukes wars might be less likely.

Where are you from? Uranus?
Yes many countries have nuclear weapons.
None of them have ever threatened/promised to annihilate an entire country like the Mullahs keep doing. THAT is the critical difference and THAT is the #1 reason all the major countries in the world are trying to stop Iran building the nuclear bombs.
The Mullahs will NEVER agree to Israel's right to exist. They want to "drive the Jews into the sea" the first chance they get.
Is that a simple enough explanation for you?

Pakistan and india have nukes and both have threatened each other....The USA and the USSR has threatened annihilation with nukes several times...

Good example and proof of concept. India and Pakistan both have nukes pointed at each other. Consequently neither goes all out in open war. They limit their conflicts to the metaphorical equivilent of a schoolyard dustup.

US and USSR never went at it to any degree.

Rhetoric isn't a bomb.

Its almost like that idea in society that says....more concealed gun owners means less crime? No. That cant be right.

 

[RoshawnMarkwees]

I didn't suggest he was like hitler. I pointed out with hitler how much damage can be done by people in power in only two years.
Obama has way surpassed Carter.

I see them as like TWO PEAS IN A POD

Carter allowed for the creation of islimic Iran and Obama has been feeding it.

The Ayatollah took over Iran before Carter, moron.

You're the moron, moron. The revolution occurred under Carter's watch. 1979. Carter allowed asylum for the shah. That pissed off the islimic Iranian psychos even more.
Those criminals have been holding that country hostage ever since and now our ayatollah obama is making sure that criminal gang gets nukes.
Obama needs to be incarcerated at GITMO.

Obama = Carter

Carter + Nixon/obama < .001

 

[hangover]

Obama is not hitler-----Obama is more like Carter

I didn't suggest he was like hitler. I pointed out with hitler how much damage can be done by people in power in only two years.
Obama has way surpassed Carter.

I see them as like TWO PEAS IN A POD

Carter allowed for the creation of islimic Iran and Obama has been feeding it.

The Ayatollah took over Iran before Carter, moron.

You're the moron, moron. The revolution occurred under Carter's watch. 1979. Carter allowed asylum for the shah. That pissed off the islimic Iranian psychos even more.
Those criminals have been holding that country hostage ever since and now our ayatollah obama is making sure that criminal gang gets nukes.
Obama needs to be incarcerated at GITMO.

In a January 1973 telephone conversation made public in 2009, U.S. President Richard Nixon told CIA Director Richard Helms, who was awaiting Senate confirmation to become the new U.S. Ambassador to Iran, that Nixon wanted Helms to be a "regional ambassador" to Persian Gulf oil states, and noted that Helms had been a schoolmate of Shah Reza Pahlavi.[96]

In August 2013, at the sixtieth anniversary of the coup, the CIA released documents showing they were involved in staging the coup. The documents also describe the motivations behind the coup and the strategies used to stage it.[5] The documents also showed that the UK tried to censor information regarding its role in the coup. The Foreign Office said "it could neither confirm nor deny Britain's involvement in the coup". Nonetheless, many CIA documents about the coup still remain classified.[12]

United States motives
Historians disagree on what motivated the United States to change its policy towards Iran and stage the coup. Middle East historian Ervand Abrahamian identified the coup d'état as "a classic case of nationalism clashing with imperialism in the Third World". He states that Secretary of State Dean Acheson admitted the "'Communist threat' was a smokescreen" in responding to President Eisenhower's claim that the Tudeh party was about to assume power.[97]

Throughout the crisis, the "communist danger" was more of a rhetorical device than a real issue—i.e. it was part of the cold-war discourse ...The Tudeh was no match for the armed tribes and the 129,000-man military. What is more, the British and Americans had enough inside information to be confident that the party had no plans to initiate armed insurrection. At the beginning of the crisis, when the Truman administration was under the impression a compromise was possible, Acheson had stressed the communist danger, and warned if Mosaddegh was not helped, the Tudeh would take over. The (British) Foreign Office had retorted that the Tudeh was no real threat. But, in August 1953, when the Foreign Office echoed the Eisenhower administration's claim that the Tudeh was about to take over, Acheson now retorted that there was no such communist danger. Acheson was honest enough to admit that the issue of the Tudeh was a smokescreen.[97]

Abrahamian states that Iran's oil was the central focus of the coup, for both the British and the Americans, though "much of the discourse at the time linked it to the Cold War".[98] Abrahamian wrote, "If Mosaddegh had succeeded in nationalizing the British oil industry in Iran, that would have set an example and was seen at that time by the Americans as a threat to U.S. oil interests throughout the world, because other countries would do the same."[98] Mosaddegh did not want any compromise solution that allowed a degree of foreign control. Abrahamian said that Mosaddegh "wanted real nationalization, both in theory and practice".[98]

Tirman points out that agricultural land owners were politically dominant in Iran, well into the 1960s and the monarch, Reza Shah's aggressive land expropriation policies—to the benefit of himself and his supporters—resulted in the Iranian government being Iran's largest land owner. "The landlords and oil producers had new backing, moreover, as American interests were for the first time exerted in Iran. The Cold War was starting, and Soviet challenges were seen in every leftist movement. But the reformers were at root nationalists, not communists, and the issue that galvanized them above all others was the control of oil."[99] The belief that oil was the central motivator behind the coup has been echoed in the popular media by authors such as Robert Byrd,[100] Alan Greenspan,[101] and Ted Koppel.[102]

However, Middle East political scientist Mark Gasiorowski states that while, on the face of it, there is considerable merit to the argument that U.S. policymakers helped U.S. oil companies gain a share in Iranian oil production after the coup, "it seems more plausible to argue that U.S. policymakers were motivated mainly by fears of a communist takeover in Iran, and that the involvement of U.S. companies was sought mainly to prevent this from occurring. The Cold War was at its height in the early 1950s, and the Soviet Union was viewed as an expansionist power seeking world domination. Eisenhower had made the Soviet threat a key issue in the 1952 elections, accusing the Democrats of being soft on communism and of having 'lost China.' Once in power, the new administration quickly sought to put its views into practice."[50]

Gasiorowski further states "the major U.S. oil companies were not interested in Iran at this time. A glut existed in the world oil market. The U.S. majors had increased their production in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1951 in order to make up for the loss of Iranian production; operating in Iran would force them to cut back production in these countries which would create tensions with Saudi and Kuwaiti leaders. Furthermore, if nationalist sentiments remained high in Iran, production there would be risky. U.S. oil companies had shown no interest in Iran in 1951 and 1952. By late 1952, the Truman administration had come to believe that participation by U.S. companies in the production of Iranian oil was essential to maintain stability in Iran and keep Iran out of Soviet hands. In order to gain the participation of the major U.S. oil companies, Truman offered to scale back a large anti-trust case then being brought against them. The Eisenhower administration shared Truman's views on the participation of U.S. companies in Iran and also agreed to scale back the anti-trust case. Thus, not only did U.S. majors not want to participate in Iran at this time, it took a major effort by U.S. policymakers to persuade them to become involved."[50]

In 2004, Gasiorowski edited a book on the coup[103] arguing that "the climate of intense cold war rivalry between the superpowers, together with Iran's strategic vital location between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf oil fields, led U.S. officials to believe that they had to take whatever steps were necessary to prevent Iran from falling into Soviet hands."[103] While "these concerns seem vastly overblown today"[103] the pattern of "the 1945–46 Azerbaijan crisis, the consolidation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, the communist triumph in China, and the Korean War—and with the Red Scare at its height in the United States"[103] would not allow U.S. officials to risk allowing the Tudeh Party to gain power in Iran.[103] Furthermore, "U.S. officials believed that resolving the oil dispute was essential for restoring stability in Iran, and after March 1953 it appeared that the dispute could be resolved only at the expense either of Britain or of Mosaddeq."[103] He concludes "it was geostrategic considerations, rather than a desire to destroy Mosaddeq's movement, to establish a dictatorship in Iran or to gain control over Iran's oil, that persuaded U.S. officials to undertake the coup."[103]

Faced with choosing between British interests and Iran, the U.S. chose Britain, Gasiorowski said. "Britain was the closest ally of the United States, and the two countries were working as partners on a wide range of vitally important matters throughout the world at this time. Preserving this close relationship was more important to U.S. officials than saving Mosaddeq's tottering regime." A year earlier, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used Britain's support for the U.S. in the Cold War to insist the United States not undermine his campaign to isolate Mosaddegh. "Britain was supporting the Americans in Korea, he reminded Truman, and had a right to expect 'Anglo-American unity' on Iran."[104]

The two main winners of World War II, who had been Allies during the war, became superpowers and competitors as soon as the war ended, each with their own spheres of influence and client states. After the 1953 coup, Iran became one of the client states of the United States. In his earlier book, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran, Gasiorowski identifies the client states of the United States and of the Soviet Union during 1954–1977. Gasiorowski identified Cambodia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Laos, Nicaragua, Panama, the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, and Taiwan as strong client states of the United States and identified those that were moderately important to the U.S. as Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Liberia, Pakistan, Paraguay, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Zaire. He named Argentina, Chile, Ethiopia, Japan, and Peru as "weak" client states of the United States.[105]

Gasiorowski identified Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, North Vietnam, and Rumania as "strong client states" of the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan, Egypt, Guinea, North Korea, Somalia, and Syria as moderately important client states. Mali and South Yemen were classified as weak client states of the Soviet Union.

According to Kinzer, for most Americans, the crisis in Iran became just part of the conflict between Communism and "the Free world".[106] "A great sense of fear, particularly the fear of encirclement, shaped American consciousness during this period. ... Soviet power had already subdued Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Communist governments were imposed on Bulgaria and Romania in 1946, Hungary and Poland in 1947, and Czechoslovakia in 1948. Albania and Yugoslavia also turned to communism. Greek communists made a violent bid for power. Soviet soldiers blocked land routes to Berlin for sixteen months. In 1949, the Soviet Union successfully tested a nuclear weapon. That same year, pro-Western forces in China lost their civil war to communists led by Mao Zedong. From Washington, it seemed that enemies were on the march everywhere."[106] Consequently, "the United States, challenged by what most Americans saw as a relentless communist advance, slowly ceased to view Iran as a country with a unique history that faced a unique political challenge."[107] Some historians, including Douglas Little,[108] Abbas Milani[109] and George Lenczowski[110] have echoed the view that fears of a communist takeover or Soviet influence motivated the U.S. to intervene.

Shortly before the overthrow of Mossadegh, Adolf A. Berle warned the U.S. State Department that U.S. "control of the Middle East was at stake, which, with its Persian Gulf oil, meant 'substantial control of the world.'"[111]


When the Shah returned to Iran after the coup, he was greeted by a cheering crowd. He wrote in his memoirs that while he had been a king for over a decade, for the first time he felt that the people had "elected" and "approved" of him, and that he had a "legitimate" popular mandate in order to carry out his reforms (although some in the crowd may have been bribed). The Shah however, never was able to remove the reputation of being a "foreign imposed" ruler among non-royalist Iranians. However the Shah throughout his rule continued to assume that he was supported by virtually everybody in Iran, and sank into deep dejection when in 1978 massive mobs demanded his ouster. The incident left him in awe of American power, while it also gave him a deep hatred of the British.[9] When the Shah attempted during the 1970s to once again control the oil prices (through OPEC), and cancel the same oil consortium agreement that caused the 1953 coup, it resulted in a massive decline in US support for the Shah, helping to ironically hasten his downfall.[29]

An immediate consequence of the coup d'état was the suppression of all republicanist[9] political dissent, especially the liberal and nationalist opposition umbrella group National Front as well as the (Communist) Tudeh party, and concentration of political power in the Shah and his courtiers.[126]

The minister of Foreign Affairs and the closest associate of Mosaddegh, Hossein Fatemi, was executed by order of the Shah's military court by firing squad on 10 November 1954.[127] According to Kinzer, "The triumphant Shah [Pahlavi] ordered the execution of several dozen military officers and student leaders who had been closely associated with Mohammad Mossadegh"[128]

As part of the post-coup d'état political repression between 1953 and 1958, the Shah outlawed the National Front, and arrested most of its leaders.[129] The Shah personally spared Mossadegh the death penalty, and he was given 3 years in prison, followed by house arrest for life.[9]

The Communist Tudeh, however, bore the main brunt of the crackdown.[130] The Shah's security forces arrested 4,121 Tudeh political activists including 386 civil servants, 201 college students, 165 teachers, 125 skilled workers, 80 textile workers, 60 cobblers, and 11 housewives[clarification needed].[131] Forty were executed (primarily for murder, such as Khosrow Roozbeh),[8][9] another 14 died under torture and over 200 were sentenced to life imprisonment.[129] The Shah's post-coup dragnet also captured 477 Tudeh members ("22 colonels, 69 majors, 100 captains, 193 lieutenants, 19 noncommissioned officers, and 63 military cadets") who were in the Iranian armed forces.[132] After their presence was revealed, some National Front supporters complained that this Communist Tudeh military network could have saved Mosaddegh. However, few Tudeh officers commanded powerful field units, especially tank divisions that might have countered the coup. Most of the captured Tudeh officers came from the military academies, police and medical corps.[132][133] At least eleven of the captured army officers were tortured to death between 1953 and 1958.[131] Nevertheless, the Shah's response was exceedingly mild compared to the typical reaction that the future Islamic Republic would usually give to its opponents, or even other contemporary autocracies.[9][134][135][136][137]

After the 1953 coup, the Shah's government formed the SAVAK (secret police), many of whose agents were trained in the United States. The SAVAK monitored dissidents, and carried out censorship. After the 1971 Siahkal Incident, it was given a "loose leash" to torture suspected dissidents with "brute force" that, over the years, "increased dramatically", and nearly 100 people were executed for political reasons during the last 20 years of the Shah's rule.[135][138] Nevertheless, the Shah generally dealt with dissent in a relatively mild manner compared to most autocratic leaders.[9][134] After the revolution, SAVAK was officially abolished, but was in reality "drastically expanded" into a new organization that killed over 8,000-12,000 prisoners between 1981-1985 alone, and 20,000-30,000 in total, with one prisoner who served time under both the Shah and the Islamic Republic declaring that "four months under (Islamic Republic's) warden Asadollah Lajevardi took the toll of four years under SAVAK".[135][136][137]

Another effect was sharp improvement of Iran's economy; the British-led oil embargo against Iran ended, and oil revenue increased significantly beyond the pre-nationalisation level. Despite Iran not controlling its national oil, the Shah agreed to replacing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with a consortium—British Petroleum and eight European and American oil companies; in result, oil revenues increased from $34 million in 1954–1955 to $181 million in 1956–1957, and continued increasing,[139] and the United States sent development aid and advisers. The Shah's government attempted to solve the issue of oil nationalization through this method, and Iran began to develop rapidly under his rule. The Shah later in his memoirs declared that Mossadegh was a "dictator" that was "damaging" Iran through his "stubbornness", while he (the Shah) "followed" the smarter option.[9] By the 1970s, Iran was wealthier than all of its surrounding neighbors, and economists frequently predicted that it would become a major global economic power, and a developed country.[9]

In the 1970s the Shah's government increased taxes that foreign companies were obliged to pay from 50% to 80% and royalty payments from 12.5% to 20%. At the same time the price of oil reverted to Iranian control. Oil companies now only earned 22 cents per barrel of oil.[140] By 1973, the Shah helped engineer an oil crisis which resulted in a massive influx of oil revenue and rapid socio-economic expansion of the country. The Shah even declared that he would not renew the 1954 oil consortium at all when it expired in 1979. The Shah was becoming increasingly independent of the United States. By the mid 1970s the United States, the Shah's "ally" became increasingly wary of him, and President Jimmy Carter withdrew American support of him almost completely when Khomeini's mobs raged throughout Iran in 1978, helping to seal the Shah's and Iran's fate. The rapid expansion of the country's economy created unexpected tensions as the social fabric was being changed, resulting in the Iranian Revolution.[9][29]

Historical viewpoint in the Islamic Republic
Men associated with Mossadegh and his ideals dominated Iran's first post-revolutionary government. The first prime minister after the Iranian revolution was Mehdi Bazargan, a close associate of Mossadegh. But with the subsequent rift between the conservative Islamic establishment and the secular liberal forces, Mossadegh's work and legacy has been largely ignored by the Islamic Republic establishment.[148] However, Mosaddegh remains a popular historical figure among Iranian opposition factions. Mosaddegh's image is one of the symbols of Iran's opposition movement, also known as the Green Movement.[149] Kinzer writes that Mosaddegh "for most Iranians" is "the most vivid symbol of Iran's long struggle for democracy" and that modern protesters carrying a picture of Mosaddegh is the equivalent of saying "We want democracy" and "No foreign intervention".[149]

In the Islamic Republic, remembrance of the coup is quite different from that of history books published in the West, and follows the precepts of Ayatollah Khomeini that Islamic jurists must guide the country to prevent "the influence of foreign powers".[150] According to historian Ervand Abrahamian, the government tries to ignore Mosaddegh as much as possible and allocates him only two pages in high school textbooks. "The mass media elevate Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani as the real leader of the oil nationalization campaign, depicting Mosaddegh as merely the ayatollah's hanger-on." This is despite the fact that Kashani came out against Mosaddegh by mid-1953 and "told a foreign correspondent that Mosaddegh had fallen because he had forgotten that the shah enjoyed extensive popular support."[151] A month later, Kashani "went even further and declared that Mosaddegh deserved to be executed because he had committed the ultimate offense: rebelling against the shah, 'betraying' the country, and repeatedly violating the sacred law."[152]

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kinzer's book All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror has been censored of descriptions of Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani's activities during the Anglo-American coup d'état. Mahmood Kashani, the son of Abol-Ghasem Kashani, "one of the top members of the current, ruling élite"[153] whom the Iranian Council of Guardians has twice approved to run for the presidency, denies there was a coup d'état in 1953, saying Mosaddegh was obeying British plans to undermine the role of Shia clerics.[153]

This allegation also is posited in the book Khaterat-e Arteshbod-e Baznesheshteh Hossein Fardoust (The Memoirs of Retired General Hossein Fardoust), published in the Islamic Republic and allegedly written by Hossein Fardoust, a former SAVAK officer. It claims that rather than being a mortal enemy of the British, Mohammad Mosaddegh always favored them, and his nationalisation campaign of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was inspired by "the British themselves".[154] Scholar Ervand Abrahamian suggests that the fact that Fardoust's death was announced before publication of the book may be significant, as the Islamic Republic authorities may have forced him into writing such statements under duress.[154]

1953 Iranian coup d tat - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia

 

[RoshawnMarkwees]

I didn't suggest he was like hitler. I pointed out with hitler how much damage can be done by people in power in only two years.
Obama has way surpassed Carter.

I see them as like TWO PEAS IN A POD

Carter allowed for the creation of islimic Iran and Obama has been feeding it.

The Ayatollah took over Iran before Carter, moron.

You're the moron, moron. The revolution occurred under Carter's watch. 1979. Carter allowed asylum for the shah. That pissed off the islimic Iranian psychos even more.
Those criminals have been holding that country hostage ever since and now our ayatollah obama is making sure that criminal gang gets nukes.
Obama needs to be incarcerated at GITMO.

In a January 1973 telephone conversation made public in 2009, U.S. President Richard Nixon told CIA Director Richard Helms, who was awaiting Senate confirmation to become the new U.S. Ambassador to Iran, that Nixon wanted Helms to be a "regional ambassador" to Persian Gulf oil states, and noted that Helms had been a schoolmate of Shah Reza Pahlavi.[96]

In August 2013, at the sixtieth anniversary of the coup, the CIA released documents showing they were involved in staging the coup. The documents also describe the motivations behind the coup and the strategies used to stage it.[5] The documents also showed that the UK tried to censor information regarding its role in the coup. The Foreign Office said "it could neither confirm nor deny Britain's involvement in the coup". Nonetheless, many CIA documents about the coup still remain classified.[12]

United States motives
Historians disagree on what motivated the United States to change its policy towards Iran and stage the coup. Middle East historian Ervand Abrahamian identified the coup d'état as "a classic case of nationalism clashing with imperialism in the Third World". He states that Secretary of State Dean Acheson admitted the "'Communist threat' was a smokescreen" in responding to President Eisenhower's claim that the Tudeh party was about to assume power.[97]

Throughout the crisis, the "communist danger" was more of a rhetorical device than a real issue—i.e. it was part of the cold-war discourse ...The Tudeh was no match for the armed tribes and the 129,000-man military. What is more, the British and Americans had enough inside information to be confident that the party had no plans to initiate armed insurrection. At the beginning of the crisis, when the Truman administration was under the impression a compromise was possible, Acheson had stressed the communist danger, and warned if Mosaddegh was not helped, the Tudeh would take over. The (British) Foreign Office had retorted that the Tudeh was no real threat. But, in August 1953, when the Foreign Office echoed the Eisenhower administration's claim that the Tudeh was about to take over, Acheson now retorted that there was no such communist danger. Acheson was honest enough to admit that the issue of the Tudeh was a smokescreen.[97]

Abrahamian states that Iran's oil was the central focus of the coup, for both the British and the Americans, though "much of the discourse at the time linked it to the Cold War".[98] Abrahamian wrote, "If Mosaddegh had succeeded in nationalizing the British oil industry in Iran, that would have set an example and was seen at that time by the Americans as a threat to U.S. oil interests throughout the world, because other countries would do the same."[98] Mosaddegh did not want any compromise solution that allowed a degree of foreign control. Abrahamian said that Mosaddegh "wanted real nationalization, both in theory and practice".[98]

Tirman points out that agricultural land owners were politically dominant in Iran, well into the 1960s and the monarch, Reza Shah's aggressive land expropriation policies—to the benefit of himself and his supporters—resulted in the Iranian government being Iran's largest land owner. "The landlords and oil producers had new backing, moreover, as American interests were for the first time exerted in Iran. The Cold War was starting, and Soviet challenges were seen in every leftist movement. But the reformers were at root nationalists, not communists, and the issue that galvanized them above all others was the control of oil."[99] The belief that oil was the central motivator behind the coup has been echoed in the popular media by authors such as Robert Byrd,[100] Alan Greenspan,[101] and Ted Koppel.[102]

However, Middle East political scientist Mark Gasiorowski states that while, on the face of it, there is considerable merit to the argument that U.S. policymakers helped U.S. oil companies gain a share in Iranian oil production after the coup, "it seems more plausible to argue that U.S. policymakers were motivated mainly by fears of a communist takeover in Iran, and that the involvement of U.S. companies was sought mainly to prevent this from occurring. The Cold War was at its height in the early 1950s, and the Soviet Union was viewed as an expansionist power seeking world domination. Eisenhower had made the Soviet threat a key issue in the 1952 elections, accusing the Democrats of being soft on communism and of having 'lost China.' Once in power, the new administration quickly sought to put its views into practice."[50]

Gasiorowski further states "the major U.S. oil companies were not interested in Iran at this time. A glut existed in the world oil market. The U.S. majors had increased their production in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in 1951 in order to make up for the loss of Iranian production; operating in Iran would force them to cut back production in these countries which would create tensions with Saudi and Kuwaiti leaders. Furthermore, if nationalist sentiments remained high in Iran, production there would be risky. U.S. oil companies had shown no interest in Iran in 1951 and 1952. By late 1952, the Truman administration had come to believe that participation by U.S. companies in the production of Iranian oil was essential to maintain stability in Iran and keep Iran out of Soviet hands. In order to gain the participation of the major U.S. oil companies, Truman offered to scale back a large anti-trust case then being brought against them. The Eisenhower administration shared Truman's views on the participation of U.S. companies in Iran and also agreed to scale back the anti-trust case. Thus, not only did U.S. majors not want to participate in Iran at this time, it took a major effort by U.S. policymakers to persuade them to become involved."[50]

In 2004, Gasiorowski edited a book on the coup[103] arguing that "the climate of intense cold war rivalry between the superpowers, together with Iran's strategic vital location between the Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf oil fields, led U.S. officials to believe that they had to take whatever steps were necessary to prevent Iran from falling into Soviet hands."[103] While "these concerns seem vastly overblown today"[103] the pattern of "the 1945–46 Azerbaijan crisis, the consolidation of Soviet control in Eastern Europe, the communist triumph in China, and the Korean War—and with the Red Scare at its height in the United States"[103] would not allow U.S. officials to risk allowing the Tudeh Party to gain power in Iran.[103] Furthermore, "U.S. officials believed that resolving the oil dispute was essential for restoring stability in Iran, and after March 1953 it appeared that the dispute could be resolved only at the expense either of Britain or of Mosaddeq."[103] He concludes "it was geostrategic considerations, rather than a desire to destroy Mosaddeq's movement, to establish a dictatorship in Iran or to gain control over Iran's oil, that persuaded U.S. officials to undertake the coup."[103]

Faced with choosing between British interests and Iran, the U.S. chose Britain, Gasiorowski said. "Britain was the closest ally of the United States, and the two countries were working as partners on a wide range of vitally important matters throughout the world at this time. Preserving this close relationship was more important to U.S. officials than saving Mosaddeq's tottering regime." A year earlier, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill used Britain's support for the U.S. in the Cold War to insist the United States not undermine his campaign to isolate Mosaddegh. "Britain was supporting the Americans in Korea, he reminded Truman, and had a right to expect 'Anglo-American unity' on Iran."[104]

The two main winners of World War II, who had been Allies during the war, became superpowers and competitors as soon as the war ended, each with their own spheres of influence and client states. After the 1953 coup, Iran became one of the client states of the United States. In his earlier book, U.S. Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client State in Iran, Gasiorowski identifies the client states of the United States and of the Soviet Union during 1954–1977. Gasiorowski identified Cambodia, Guatemala, Indonesia, Iran, Laos, Nicaragua, Panama, the Philippines, South Korea, South Vietnam, and Taiwan as strong client states of the United States and identified those that were moderately important to the U.S. as Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece, Haiti, Honduras, Israel, Jordan, Liberia, Pakistan, Paraguay, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, and Zaire. He named Argentina, Chile, Ethiopia, Japan, and Peru as "weak" client states of the United States.[105]

Gasiorowski identified Bulgaria, Cuba, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, North Vietnam, and Rumania as "strong client states" of the Soviet Union, and Afghanistan, Egypt, Guinea, North Korea, Somalia, and Syria as moderately important client states. Mali and South Yemen were classified as weak client states of the Soviet Union.

According to Kinzer, for most Americans, the crisis in Iran became just part of the conflict between Communism and "the Free world".[106] "A great sense of fear, particularly the fear of encirclement, shaped American consciousness during this period. ... Soviet power had already subdued Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. Communist governments were imposed on Bulgaria and Romania in 1946, Hungary and Poland in 1947, and Czechoslovakia in 1948. Albania and Yugoslavia also turned to communism. Greek communists made a violent bid for power. Soviet soldiers blocked land routes to Berlin for sixteen months. In 1949, the Soviet Union successfully tested a nuclear weapon. That same year, pro-Western forces in China lost their civil war to communists led by Mao Zedong. From Washington, it seemed that enemies were on the march everywhere."[106] Consequently, "the United States, challenged by what most Americans saw as a relentless communist advance, slowly ceased to view Iran as a country with a unique history that faced a unique political challenge."[107] Some historians, including Douglas Little,[108] Abbas Milani[109] and George Lenczowski[110] have echoed the view that fears of a communist takeover or Soviet influence motivated the U.S. to intervene.

Shortly before the overthrow of Mossadegh, Adolf A. Berle warned the U.S. State Department that U.S. "control of the Middle East was at stake, which, with its Persian Gulf oil, meant 'substantial control of the world.'"[111]


When the Shah returned to Iran after the coup, he was greeted by a cheering crowd. He wrote in his memoirs that while he had been a king for over a decade, for the first time he felt that the people had "elected" and "approved" of him, and that he had a "legitimate" popular mandate in order to carry out his reforms (although some in the crowd may have been bribed). The Shah however, never was able to remove the reputation of being a "foreign imposed" ruler among non-royalist Iranians. However the Shah throughout his rule continued to assume that he was supported by virtually everybody in Iran, and sank into deep dejection when in 1978 massive mobs demanded his ouster. The incident left him in awe of American power, while it also gave him a deep hatred of the British.[9] When the Shah attempted during the 1970s to once again control the oil prices (through OPEC), and cancel the same oil consortium agreement that caused the 1953 coup, it resulted in a massive decline in US support for the Shah, helping to ironically hasten his downfall.[29]

An immediate consequence of the coup d'état was the suppression of all republicanist[9] political dissent, especially the liberal and nationalist opposition umbrella group National Front as well as the (Communist) Tudeh party, and concentration of political power in the Shah and his courtiers.[126]

The minister of Foreign Affairs and the closest associate of Mosaddegh, Hossein Fatemi, was executed by order of the Shah's military court by firing squad on 10 November 1954.[127] According to Kinzer, "The triumphant Shah [Pahlavi] ordered the execution of several dozen military officers and student leaders who had been closely associated with Mohammad Mossadegh"[128]

As part of the post-coup d'état political repression between 1953 and 1958, the Shah outlawed the National Front, and arrested most of its leaders.[129] The Shah personally spared Mossadegh the death penalty, and he was given 3 years in prison, followed by house arrest for life.[9]

The Communist Tudeh, however, bore the main brunt of the crackdown.[130] The Shah's security forces arrested 4,121 Tudeh political activists including 386 civil servants, 201 college students, 165 teachers, 125 skilled workers, 80 textile workers, 60 cobblers, and 11 housewives[clarification needed].[131] Forty were executed (primarily for murder, such as Khosrow Roozbeh),[8][9] another 14 died under torture and over 200 were sentenced to life imprisonment.[129] The Shah's post-coup dragnet also captured 477 Tudeh members ("22 colonels, 69 majors, 100 captains, 193 lieutenants, 19 noncommissioned officers, and 63 military cadets") who were in the Iranian armed forces.[132] After their presence was revealed, some National Front supporters complained that this Communist Tudeh military network could have saved Mosaddegh. However, few Tudeh officers commanded powerful field units, especially tank divisions that might have countered the coup. Most of the captured Tudeh officers came from the military academies, police and medical corps.[132][133] At least eleven of the captured army officers were tortured to death between 1953 and 1958.[131] Nevertheless, the Shah's response was exceedingly mild compared to the typical reaction that the future Islamic Republic would usually give to its opponents, or even other contemporary autocracies.[9][134][135][136][137]

After the 1953 coup, the Shah's government formed the SAVAK (secret police), many of whose agents were trained in the United States. The SAVAK monitored dissidents, and carried out censorship. After the 1971 Siahkal Incident, it was given a "loose leash" to torture suspected dissidents with "brute force" that, over the years, "increased dramatically", and nearly 100 people were executed for political reasons during the last 20 years of the Shah's rule.[135][138] Nevertheless, the Shah generally dealt with dissent in a relatively mild manner compared to most autocratic leaders.[9][134] After the revolution, SAVAK was officially abolished, but was in reality "drastically expanded" into a new organization that killed over 8,000-12,000 prisoners between 1981-1985 alone, and 20,000-30,000 in total, with one prisoner who served time under both the Shah and the Islamic Republic declaring that "four months under (Islamic Republic's) warden Asadollah Lajevardi took the toll of four years under SAVAK".[135][136][137]

Another effect was sharp improvement of Iran's economy; the British-led oil embargo against Iran ended, and oil revenue increased significantly beyond the pre-nationalisation level. Despite Iran not controlling its national oil, the Shah agreed to replacing the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company with a consortium—British Petroleum and eight European and American oil companies; in result, oil revenues increased from $34 million in 1954–1955 to $181 million in 1956–1957, and continued increasing,[139] and the United States sent development aid and advisers. The Shah's government attempted to solve the issue of oil nationalization through this method, and Iran began to develop rapidly under his rule. The Shah later in his memoirs declared that Mossadegh was a "dictator" that was "damaging" Iran through his "stubbornness", while he (the Shah) "followed" the smarter option.[9] By the 1970s, Iran was wealthier than all of its surrounding neighbors, and economists frequently predicted that it would become a major global economic power, and a developed country.[9]

In the 1970s the Shah's government increased taxes that foreign companies were obliged to pay from 50% to 80% and royalty payments from 12.5% to 20%. At the same time the price of oil reverted to Iranian control. Oil companies now only earned 22 cents per barrel of oil.[140] By 1973, the Shah helped engineer an oil crisis which resulted in a massive influx of oil revenue and rapid socio-economic expansion of the country. The Shah even declared that he would not renew the 1954 oil consortium at all when it expired in 1979. The Shah was becoming increasingly independent of the United States. By the mid 1970s the United States, the Shah's "ally" became increasingly wary of him, and President Jimmy Carter withdrew American support of him almost completely when Khomeini's mobs raged throughout Iran in 1978, helping to seal the Shah's and Iran's fate. The rapid expansion of the country's economy created unexpected tensions as the social fabric was being changed, resulting in the Iranian Revolution.[9][29]

Historical viewpoint in the Islamic Republic
Men associated with Mossadegh and his ideals dominated Iran's first post-revolutionary government. The first prime minister after the Iranian revolution was Mehdi Bazargan, a close associate of Mossadegh. But with the subsequent rift between the conservative Islamic establishment and the secular liberal forces, Mossadegh's work and legacy has been largely ignored by the Islamic Republic establishment.[148] However, Mosaddegh remains a popular historical figure among Iranian opposition factions. Mosaddegh's image is one of the symbols of Iran's opposition movement, also known as the Green Movement.[149] Kinzer writes that Mosaddegh "for most Iranians" is "the most vivid symbol of Iran's long struggle for democracy" and that modern protesters carrying a picture of Mosaddegh is the equivalent of saying "We want democracy" and "No foreign intervention".[149]

In the Islamic Republic, remembrance of the coup is quite different from that of history books published in the West, and follows the precepts of Ayatollah Khomeini that Islamic jurists must guide the country to prevent "the influence of foreign powers".[150] According to historian Ervand Abrahamian, the government tries to ignore Mosaddegh as much as possible and allocates him only two pages in high school textbooks. "The mass media elevate Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani as the real leader of the oil nationalization campaign, depicting Mosaddegh as merely the ayatollah's hanger-on." This is despite the fact that Kashani came out against Mosaddegh by mid-1953 and "told a foreign correspondent that Mosaddegh had fallen because he had forgotten that the shah enjoyed extensive popular support."[151] A month later, Kashani "went even further and declared that Mosaddegh deserved to be executed because he had committed the ultimate offense: rebelling against the shah, 'betraying' the country, and repeatedly violating the sacred law."[152]

In the Islamic Republic of Iran, Kinzer's book All the Shah's Men: An American Coup and the Roots of Middle East Terror has been censored of descriptions of Ayatollah Abol-Ghasem Kashani's activities during the Anglo-American coup d'état. Mahmood Kashani, the son of Abol-Ghasem Kashani, "one of the top members of the current, ruling élite"[153] whom the Iranian Council of Guardians has twice approved to run for the presidency, denies there was a coup d'état in 1953, saying Mosaddegh was obeying British plans to undermine the role of Shia clerics.[153]

This allegation also is posited in the book Khaterat-e Arteshbod-e Baznesheshteh Hossein Fardoust (The Memoirs of Retired General Hossein Fardoust), published in the Islamic Republic and allegedly written by Hossein Fardoust, a former SAVAK officer. It claims that rather than being a mortal enemy of the British, Mohammad Mosaddegh always favored them, and his nationalisation campaign of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company was inspired by "the British themselves".[154] Scholar Ervand Abrahamian suggests that the fact that Fardoust's death was announced before publication of the book may be significant, as the Islamic Republic authorities may have forced him into writing such statements under duress.[154]

1953 Iranian coup d tat - Wikipedia the free encyclopedia

That's a waste of paranoid space just to try to not look foolish.