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By her logic, people should be able to buy Pinto's if they wish
The right?s most loathsome Obamacare lie yet - Salon.com
Now, Rep. Blackburn and her ilk might argue that people should have been free to buy the Pinto if they wanted, without government intrusion into personal choices or private business practice just like they seem to want to argue that Americans should be free to hold onto their inadequate, costly and reckless insurance policies that throw them off at the slightest sign of illness while forcing costs up for the rest of us. But, arguably, most Americans want to buy cars that are safe. Auto companies didnt want to install seat belts and airbags, just like Ford didnt want to fix the Pinto. That was government regulation at work, making us all more safe even if, in some cases, it made cars more expensive. We ultimately save, in every way imaginable, when the number of traffic deaths is dramatically cut.
By her logic, people should be able to buy Pinto's if they wish
The right?s most loathsome Obamacare lie yet - Salon.com
Now, Rep. Blackburn and her ilk might argue that people should have been free to buy the Pinto if they wanted, without government intrusion into personal choices or private business practice just like they seem to want to argue that Americans should be free to hold onto their inadequate, costly and reckless insurance policies that throw them off at the slightest sign of illness while forcing costs up for the rest of us. But, arguably, most Americans want to buy cars that are safe. Auto companies didnt want to install seat belts and airbags, just like Ford didnt want to fix the Pinto. That was government regulation at work, making us all more safe even if, in some cases, it made cars more expensive. We ultimately save, in every way imaginable, when the number of traffic deaths is dramatically cut.
Safety
The Insurance Institute of Highway Safety (IIHS)[9] is a nonprofit organization, which receives funding from auto insurers, with the intent to reduce the number of accidents, extent of damage, and rate of personal injury. Recognizing that the state-imposed regulations of the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) did not adequately reflect customers' and insurers' goals, IIHS formulated several unique safety tests.
In addition to the NHTSA mandated frontal-impact test, the frontal-offset-impact test was developed by IIHS to better represent real-life impacts. Most frontal impacts are offset, meaning the impact is borne by only a portion of the front of the automobile, and not evenly distributed over the entire front. The IIHS side-impact test also differs from NHTSA version, to simulate the more dangerous and increasingly common occurrence of a taller, sport-utility vehicle impacting the side of an automobile. In 2009, IIHS began roof crush testing sport-utility vehicles, which are prone to rollover accidents, to a stricter standard than NHTSA mandates.[10]
IIHS purchases and tests new and redesigned models, with the detailed results published to the automakers and insurers, and summary reports released to the general public.[11] The net benefit to consumers is safer vehicles and lower insurance premiums, which stem from the insurers' benefit of less and lower payouts. Auto manufacturers also benefit from testing that better represents real-life conditions and thus reduces the risk of litigation.
These desires would remain in a true free market, and therefore an IIHS or competitor adding similar value would maintain its important role. Safety features with questionable value, such as airbags, would receive the close scrutiny they deserve in a true free market, and consumers would benefit from the transparency and frankness that our current system lacks.
There was, and still is, disagreement within the federal government as to whether the law grants NHTSA the authority to hold cars with potential safety problems to a higher standard than the federal minimum. Based on all the evidence (and Dowie's article), Strickland's work group decided that Pinto was "unsafe" even though it met the minimum standard. The decision was then made to increase the speed of the crash tests to at least 35 miles per hour - beyond the Pinto's "fire threshold" (and beyond the federal minimum) - so that fuel-tank integrity would be compromised and sufficient leakage would occur to justify the application of the label "safety defect." To accomplish this goal, NHTSA selected a large and particularly rigid car as the "bullet car" (the moving vehicle in the collision) for the Pinto crash test, rather than the moving barrier that was normally used [U.S. DOT, 1988]. Both the Pinto and the bullet car gas tanks were filled with gas, rather than the non-flammable fluid normally used. The nose of the bullet car was weighted down so that it would slide under the Pinto upon impact and maximize the chance of contact with the gas tank. The bullet car's headlights were also turned on to provide a ready source of ignition. All of these steps, Strickland felt, could be justified on grounds that they approximated "real-world" worst-case circumstances, although most other cars were not subject to these test conditions. For NHTSA, the test was an unqualified success; the Pinto burst into flames upon impact. In the summer of 1978, NHTSA concluded that the Pinto gas tank represented a safety defect, and Ford agreed to "voluntarily" recall the 1971-1976 Pintos, even though they were built before the federal standard took effect [Strickland, 1996; Cullen, Maakestad, and Cavender, 1987, p. 165; NHTSA, 1978].
Thus like all federal intervention, the regulation of auto safety has been the result of conflict and compromise. Federalism, the legal culture, the problem of causation, and the industry's hegemony have limited efforts to increase auto safety. At the heart of the auto safety problem is the very idea of regulation, because "regulation implies a toleration of conduct that causes, or possesses the potential for harm, not the eradication of existing harmful acts" [Hawkins and Thomas, 1984, p. 8]. As we have discussed, the personal freedom and mobility provided by the automobile has become a "deeply held social value" that even weak regulations threaten. Regulatory efforts can only attempt to strike a balance between competing values.
The Ford Pinto case shows how ideology influences these attempts. Industry ideology justified the use of cost/benefit analysis to fight what insiders perceived to be unreasonable regulations, while the ideology of regulators supported the broad use of discretion as an adaptation to industry regulation-stalling tactics.
Thanks for the thread-bump people 8-|
By her logic, people should be able to buy Pinto's if they wish
The right?s most loathsome Obamacare lie yet - Salon.com
Now, Rep. Blackburn and her ilk might argue that people should have been free to buy the Pinto if they wanted, without government intrusion into personal choices or private business practice just like they seem to want to argue that Americans should be free to hold onto their inadequate, costly and reckless insurance policies that throw them off at the slightest sign of illness while forcing costs up for the rest of us. But, arguably, most Americans want to buy cars that are safe. Auto companies didnt want to install seat belts and airbags, just like Ford didnt want to fix the Pinto. That was government regulation at work, making us all more safe even if, in some cases, it made cars more expensive. We ultimately save, in every way imaginable, when the number of traffic deaths is dramatically cut.
We are Oborgama. We shall call the healthcare plans you like inadequate, costly and reckless while assimilating you into an inadequate, costly and reckless healthcare plan. Resistance is futile. We do this for your own good. Those who want to keep their doctor can keep their doctor.We would not lie to you. We are Oborgama. Suck it.
[ame=http://youtu.be/WZEJ4OJTgg8]We are The Borg - YouTube[/ame]
