williepete
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Two people killed. Millions to follow:
A Century Ago In Sarajevo: A Plot, A Farce And A Fateful Shot : NPR
A Century Ago In Sarajevo: A Plot, A Farce And A Fateful Shot : NPR
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I'm surprised that there has been no coverage of this anniversary on TV at all in the United States.
The flow of the book is logical, but it is not completely chronological. The first section discusses the outbreak of the war, giving extensive detail about what led to the war. He even gives a few details about the minor wars that happened in the years leading up to World War I, such as the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, and discusses what the world was like before the outbreak of the war. He uses all of this information to give insight into the thought processes and events that led to the almost inevitable conflagration that turned into one of the most horrific wars of our time. After this section, he discusses the widening of the war, the battles of 1915-1917, and then jumps back to cover other aspects of the war. This includes the home front, the political maneuverings in all of the belligerent governments, naval warfare, tactics, economics, and war aims, just to name some. He then moves on to the outcome of the war, how it ended, the politics of the ceasefire, and the collapse of the German army. Finally, he discusses the aftermath, and he doesn't just stop at the peace treaty. He goes all the way up to the end of World War II and beyond.
This is what I loved about Cataclysm. Stevenson doesn't just give us what happened. He discusses the purpose (or at least what the purpose was at the time, even if it doesn't seem to make any sense in modern times) of what happened, what the politicians were thinking, and what they were trying to accomplish. He delves into how the politicians managed to keep the civilians engaged in the fighting, and how limited any anti-war movements were until the war seemed to be an intractable stalemate. Stevenson even gives great detail about lesser-known campaigns, such as that in the Middle East which has produced much of the modern-day strife. He covers Austria-Hungary and their battles against both Russia and Italy, as well as the war with Serbia, most of which have been given short shrift in World War I books I have read.
The book re-affirms the reality of German war guilt. Previous historians had seen the interlocking system of alliances combined with both sides mobilisation plans as something which lessened the ability of individual politicians to make decisions about whether there would be war or not. In reality this was not the case and the German monarchy could have resisted but saw war as inevitable at some point.
I'm surprised that there has been no coverage of this anniversary on TV at all in the United States.
Former Princeton professor Woodie Wilson promised Americans that he would never send their sons to fight in a foreign war. We lost about 100,000 Americans saving France from the imperialist German Hun. What good did it do?
Regardless of other theories, it is this event on this date that indisputably set everything in motion.
June 28, 1914: leader of Austria Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife Sophie are murdered in Sarajevo.
July 28, 1914: Military forces of Austria Hungary fire Artillery into Belgrade from across the Danube River.
August 2, 1914: Germany invades and takes over Luxembourg.
August 4, 1914: Germany invades Belgium.
I'm surprised that there has been no coverage of this anniversary on TV at all in the United States.
Former Princeton professor Woodie Wilson promised Americans that he would never send their sons to fight in a foreign war. We lost about 100,000 Americans saving France from the imperialist German Hun. What good did it do?
It help to preserve important democracies in Europe and gave Europe and the United States a chance to avert a second war as well as defeat Communism in Russia. Unfortunately, these opportunities were squandered in the aftermath of World War I. The United States retreated again into Isolation and only half heartedly help the non-communist forces in the Russian Civil War. United States isolationism also left Europe to fend for itself which it failed to do as Hitler was allowed to rise in Germany, the treaty that ended World War I was not enforced in the 1930s which allowed Germany to re-arm.
Had the United States been apart of the European system of Alliances before the start of World War I and already had US forces stationed in Belgium and France, along with British troops being stationed in France and Belgium, the Germans would have never dared to invade Belgium and France and would have counseled Austria-Hungary against going to war with Serbia.
Regardless of other theories, it is this event on this date that indisputably set everything in motion.
June 28, 1914: leader of Austria Archduke Francis Ferdinand and his wife Sophie are murdered in Sarajevo.
July 28, 1914: Military forces of Austria Hungary fire Artillery into Belgrade from across the Danube River.
August 2, 1914: Germany invades and takes over Luxembourg.
August 4, 1914: Germany invades Belgium.
I'm surprised that there has been no coverage of this anniversary on TV at all in the United States.
I'm not.
The whole thing was started by a collection of people interfering in other countries' politics ad a set of amazingly stupid pacts.
That's exactly what's happening in the world today, but no in power one wants anyone to notice.
Why Conrad von Hötzendorf couldn't just let it go or settle for a smaller reprisal is what baffles me. The risk was far too great. See my highlight. I don't accept his either/or premise. Especially given the weak state of the dual Austria-Hungary state.
Wilhelm surrounded himself with staff that told him what he wanted to hear.
With Ferdinand dead, a major faction in the 'Peace' wing disappeared, with Tisza too politically weak to resist the War Lobby.
the theory that WW I was some sort of accident has been pretty much discredited.
For the latest research and the politics of the war before and during the war itself, this book is the best on the market:
Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy: Amazon.co.uk: David Stevenson: Books
From the reviews:
The flow of the book is logical, but it is not completely chronological. The first section discusses the outbreak of the war, giving extensive detail about what led to the war. He even gives a few details about the minor wars that happened in the years leading up to World War I, such as the Balkan Wars of 1912-13, and discusses what the world was like before the outbreak of the war. He uses all of this information to give insight into the thought processes and events that led to the almost inevitable conflagration that turned into one of the most horrific wars of our time. After this section, he discusses the widening of the war, the battles of 1915-1917, and then jumps back to cover other aspects of the war. This includes the home front, the political maneuverings in all of the belligerent governments, naval warfare, tactics, economics, and war aims, just to name some. He then moves on to the outcome of the war, how it ended, the politics of the ceasefire, and the collapse of the German army. Finally, he discusses the aftermath, and he doesn't just stop at the peace treaty. He goes all the way up to the end of World War II and beyond.
This is what I loved about Cataclysm. Stevenson doesn't just give us what happened. He discusses the purpose (or at least what the purpose was at the time, even if it doesn't seem to make any sense in modern times) of what happened, what the politicians were thinking, and what they were trying to accomplish. He delves into how the politicians managed to keep the civilians engaged in the fighting, and how limited any anti-war movements were until the war seemed to be an intractable stalemate. Stevenson even gives great detail about lesser-known campaigns, such as that in the Middle East which has produced much of the modern-day strife. He covers Austria-Hungary and their battles against both Russia and Italy, as well as the war with Serbia, most of which have been given short shrift in World War I books I have read.
...
The book re-affirms the reality of German war guilt. Previous historians had seen the interlocking system of alliances combined with both sides mobilisation plans as something which lessened the ability of individual politicians to make decisions about whether there would be war or not. In reality this was not the case and the German monarchy could have resisted but saw war as inevitable at some point.
Of particular interest are the sections on Wilhelm's General Staff determining he had about three year window to make good his dreams of an expanded Empire, and this is the catalyst. If the assassination had never happened, another pretext would have done just as well. Even Wilhelm's own appointed investigator absolved the Serbian government of complicity in the assassination, and his demands on the Serbians were willfully designed to start a war and thus bring in Russia, the real target. Excellent book on the topic, and thoroughly researched. also see Massey's Dreadnought; not as detailed as Cataclysm, but also good for the coverage of Wilhelm's provocations of nearly every country around him. The miracle is WW I didn't break out years earlier.
While the Kaiser's men may have had dreams of empire they certainly didn't plan on going to war with Russia, Britain, and France all at once. So in that sense, yes, the First World War was an accident. It certainly didn't unfold according to any planned strategy.
While the Kaiser's men may have had dreams of empire they certainly didn't plan on going to war with Russia, Britain, and France all at once. So in that sense, yes, the First World War was an accident. It certainly didn't unfold according to any planned strategy.
They had planning for just that for a long time, which was why they developed the Schefflin Plan and built their railheads right up to the borders of Belgium and in the East as well. They were well aware of the the various Treaties the nations around them had forged after the sack of Bismarck and the subsequent destabilization of European politics. His sabre rattling almost from the beginning of his reign touched off an arms race on all sides.
Sure, they would have loved it if the surrounding countries had just given them what they wanted without a war, but they certainly planned for the alternative; the Imperial General Staff had been warning Wilhelm that he had around a three year window before Russia's modernization program would be complete and his allies would be strong enough to slowly strangle Germany on all sides if he didn't move soon, so he took the Serbian problem as a pretext; the need to remove them was because of Russia's interest in that region, and he knew full well attacking Serbia would bring in Russia.
He also knew that also meant having to attack France; when France balked, he just faked an 'incident' and invaded anyway. The only 'wild card' was whether or not Britain would honor its defense pact with Belgium, but he hoped the initial invasion would go quickly and he would be in Paris before Britain would react.
A basic synopsis of their plans:
Schlieffen Plan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Lacks a lot of the details the Cataclysm book has, but close enough for hand grenades, at least as a base for further discussions on it.
While the Kaiser's men may have had dreams of empire they certainly didn't plan on going to war with Russia, Britain, and France all at once. So in that sense, yes, the First World War was an accident. It certainly didn't unfold according to any planned strategy.
They had planning for just that for a long time, which was why they developed the Schefflin Plan and built their railheads right up to the borders of Belgium and in the East as well. They were well aware of the the various Treaties the nations around them had forged after the sack of Bismarck and the subsequent destabilization of European politics. His sabre rattling almost from the beginning of his reign touched off an arms race on all sides.
Sure, they would have loved it if the surrounding countries had just given them what they wanted without a war, but they certainly planned for the alternative; the Imperial General Staff had been warning Wilhelm that he had around a three year window before Russia's modernization program would be complete and his allies would be strong enough to slowly strangle Germany on all sides if he didn't move soon, so he took the Serbian problem as a pretext; the need to remove them was because of Russia's interest in that region, and he knew full well attacking Serbia would bring in Russia.
He also knew that also meant having to attack France; when France balked, he just faked an 'incident' and invaded anyway. The only 'wild card' was whether or not Britain would honor its defense pact with Belgium, but he hoped the initial invasion would go quickly and he would be in Paris before Britain would react.
A basic synopsis of their plans:
Schlieffen Plan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Lacks a lot of the details the Cataclysm book has, but close enough for hand grenades, at least as a base for further discussions on it.
The Germans didn't follow the Schlieffen Plan, probably one reason why they didn't succeed in France. They were improvising because fighting Russia, France, and Britain all at once was never part of their strategic planning.
They had planning for just that for a long time, which was why they developed the Schefflin Plan and built their railheads right up to the borders of Belgium and in the East as well. They were well aware of the the various Treaties the nations around them had forged after the sack of Bismarck and the subsequent destabilization of European politics. His sabre rattling almost from the beginning of his reign touched off an arms race on all sides.
Sure, they would have loved it if the surrounding countries had just given them what they wanted without a war, but they certainly planned for the alternative; the Imperial General Staff had been warning Wilhelm that he had around a three year window before Russia's modernization program would be complete and his allies would be strong enough to slowly strangle Germany on all sides if he didn't move soon, so he took the Serbian problem as a pretext; the need to remove them was because of Russia's interest in that region, and he knew full well attacking Serbia would bring in Russia.
He also knew that also meant having to attack France; when France balked, he just faked an 'incident' and invaded anyway. The only 'wild card' was whether or not Britain would honor its defense pact with Belgium, but he hoped the initial invasion would go quickly and he would be in Paris before Britain would react.
A basic synopsis of their plans:
Schlieffen Plan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Lacks a lot of the details the Cataclysm book has, but close enough for hand grenades, at least as a base for further discussions on it.
The Germans didn't follow the Schlieffen Plan, probably one reason why they didn't succeed in France. They were improvising because fighting Russia, France, and Britain all at once was never part of their strategic planning.
I guess when they launched the Schliefflin-Moltke Plan they were talking about another Schliefflin. The changes Moltke made were to not invade the Netherlands, and shifting divisions away from the assault through Belgium to the center; this latter weakened the invasion and left the German right flank wide open and left insufficient reserves to take Paris, hence the failure. On the eastern front it went pretty well comparatively. They overestimated the ability of the Dual Monarchy to win quickly over the Serbs, though, and that front bogged down pretty fast, leaving their Ottoman allies to fend for themselves.
They weren't improvising, they had been planning on a two-front war for a long time; all they were waiting for was the pretext. The other countries' arms buildup made it necessary to force the issues as soon as possible.