Quantum Windbag
Gold Member
- May 9, 2010
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I know police can lie to suspects to get confessions, but this blew my mind. The part I do not understand is why this got to the appeals court at all, the trial judge should have known better. Not only does this make no sense legally, it makes even less sense when you consider that the guy actually had an attorney. Last time I checked, that means the cops have to stop asking him questions unless he voluntarily waives the right to an attorney. Tricking a suspect into thinking you are his attorney is not a voluntary decision to not talk to an attorney.
Tennessee Cops Posed as a Defense Attorney to Get Suspect To Incriminate Himself | The Agitator
The appeals court got this one right.
It seems that in 2008, Monroe County Sheriffs Detectives Doug Brannon and Pat Henry actually posed as a federal defense attorney in an attempt to get incriminating information out of suspect John Edward Dawson, who was in jail on a host of charges, including theft and drug distribution. Not only that, but in doing so, they also talked Dawson into refusing to cooperate with his public defender and to plead guilty to the charges against him. They communicated with Dawson via a jailhouse informant.
Dawsons public defender was so taken aback by his assurances to her that he had a federal lawyer who had worked out all of his charges, that she actually asked for a psychiatric evaluation. When all this came to light, Dawsons (real) attorney asked for a continuance in his case so she could assess the damage. Remarkably, Tennessee Tenth Judicial Judge Amy Reedy refused the request, ruling that Dawson made a real dumb decision and that he had picked his poison.
Tennessee Cops Posed as a Defense Attorney to Get Suspect To Incriminate Himself | The Agitator
The appeals court got this one right.
[T]he conduct of the law enforcement officers in this case, and in particular Detective Henry, is so egregious that it simply cannot go unchecked. That Detective Henry would illegally pose as an attorney and arrange the circumstances of the defendants case to make it appear as though he had successfully undertaken legal representation of the defendant is abhorrent. That the detective would specifically instruct the defendant not to communicate the relationship to his appointed counsel, in what we can only assume was an effort to enlarge the time for the detective to gain incriminating information from the defendant, renders completely reprehensible the state action in this case. Given the unconscionable behavior of the state actors in this case and the fact that the defendant was essentially prevented from proving prejudice through no fault of his own, we have no trouble concluding that the only appropriate remedy in this case is the dismissal of all the indictments.