6th Circuit Federal Appeals Court Gives Thumb's Up to States' Choice on Gay Marriage

Should the definition of marriage be up to the states?

  • Yes

    Votes: 11 57.9%
  • No

    Votes: 8 42.1%

  • Total voters
    19
Yes gays can marry in every state of the union.
What we object to is the state treating gay unions on the same footing as straight unions. Straight unions deserve special status for all the reasons we've laid out. Gay unions are matters of private life.
Your objection has been overruled. Now what?

Overruled by Judge Sutton of the 6th? Have you read the title of this thread lately? Sutton UPHELD four states' rights to deny gay marriage. Are you coming late into this topic Paint and just assumed it was another "activist judge victory thread"?
 
Yes gays can marry in every state of the union.
What we object to is the state treating gay unions on the same footing as straight unions. Straight unions deserve special status for all the reasons we've laid out. Gay unions are matters of private life.
Your objection has been overruled. Now what?

Overruled by Judge Sutton of the 6th? Have you read the title of this thread lately? Sutton UPHELD four states' rights to deny gay marriage. Are you coming late into this topic Paint and just assumed it was another "activist judge victory thread"?
You lost this fight so long ago I don't even know where to begin. Go back to defending Elvis for fucking underage girls.
 
You lost this fight so long ago I don't even know where to begin. Go back to defending Elvis for fucking underage girls.

Why are the four states in the ward of the 6th circuit allowed to deny gay marriage and other non-man/woman marriages? Do you consider that a "loss" for traditional marriage? How certain are you that Sutton is wrong about the procedural missteps in the other circuits that render their judgments not worth the paper they're written on?
 
You lost this fight so long ago I don't even know where to begin. Go back to defending Elvis for fucking underage girls.

Why are the four states in the ward of the 6th circuit allowed to deny gay marriage and other non-man/woman marriages? Do you consider that a "loss" for traditional marriage? How certain are you that Sutton is wrong about the procedural missteps in the other circuits that render their judgments not worth the paper they're written on?
The 6th is the only circuit to rule the wrong way. The SC knows this. They can either let it stand, which is doubtful at this point, or rule for the nation, which is already 2/3rds finished with the gay marriage debate so it will be no big deal at all, very un-Row like. It's logic, you lost. Just suck it up and deal.
 
The 6th is the only circuit to rule the wrong way. The SC knows this. They can either let it stand, which is doubtful at this point, or rule for the nation, which is already 2/3rds finished with the gay marriage debate so it will be no big deal at all, very un-Row like. It's logic, you lost. Just suck it up and deal.

That's what you say. What I say is that the 6th is the first one to have the balls to point out that the others tried to overrule Baker and Windsor from underneath, which is forbidden procedurally. Ergo, their decisions though to your liking, aren't worth the paper they're written on. Can't have it both ways Painty my boy. You cannot use procedure to club the defenders of Prop 8 in Cali over the head for your "victory" while at the same time pretend like procedural flaws don't matter when it comes to the other circuits overstepping their authority.

In fact the procedural flaws pointed out in the Prop 8 case were very wobbly. It could be truthfully argued well that any single registered voter in CA could sue the state for repressing their civil right to have their vote count on Prop 8....and they would win. Since the people defending Prop 8 in that appeal were I presume, registered California voters who voted for Prop 8, they had a case...or rather if they framed it differently they have a case. And SCOTUS knew that at the time but for political reasons each different on the different leanings in that Court, decided to screw CA voters illegally.

There's going to be some house cleaning now that the new GOP congress has the reins.

The procedural flaw in lower courts trying to overrule SCOTUS from underneath is far, FAR worse. It is sedition. Those guys had better start filling out new resume's because they're going to be looking for new jobs methinks. Obama may not get impeached. But the GOP would get a lot of applause and kudos for squashing those no-name-who-cares judges out of the rebellious circuits... I've heard whispers that there may even be a Supreme Court Justice who should be a little worried about job security..
 
The 6th is the only circuit to rule the wrong way. The SC knows this. They can either let it stand, which is doubtful at this point, or rule for the nation, which is already 2/3rds finished with the gay marriage debate so it will be no big deal at all, very un-Row like. It's logic, you lost. Just suck it up and deal.

That's what you say.
It is what I say, because I'm right and you've lost.
 
You poor thing. You get so pissy when your steamroller-fascism runs up against a granite mountain... :crybaby:

:itsok:
35 states out of 50 little one. The steamroller long ago passed out of view, dragging your homophobic chances of winning back America to your bigotry with it.
Most of those states have legal bans on gay and polygamy marriage. You will see them waking up to this fact very soon.

Check here for details: Gay Marriages in States Forced by Circuit Courts to Allow Them Are Not Legal US Message Board - Political Discussion Forum
 
You poor thing. You get so pissy when your steamroller-fascism runs up against a granite mountain... :crybaby:

:itsok:
35 states out of 50 little one. The steamroller long ago passed out of view, dragging your homophobic chances of winning back America to your bigotry with it.
Most of those states have legal bans on gay and polygamy marriage. You will see them waking up to this fact very soon.

Check here for details: Gay Marriages in States Forced by Circuit Courts to Allow Them Are Not Legal US Message Board - Political Discussion Forum
Your opinion is wrong, and of no impotence.
 
Most of those states have legal bans on gay and polygamy marriage. You will see them waking up to this fact very soon.

Check here for details: Gay Marriages in States Forced by Circuit Courts to Allow Them Are Not Legal US Message Board - Political Discussion Forum
Your opinion is wrong, and of no impotence.
It's Sutton's opinion that matters. Read the OP again. :popcorn:
Couldn't care less as that doesn't matter either.
 
It matters to the tens of millions of registered voters and their civil rights to have their vote count in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee..
Their votes don't count, and never did. It's not up for a vote.
Actually their votes DO count and are upheld as such to this very minute...do you think just saying black is white will convince people. Either judge Sutton wrote the majority opinion for the 6th upholding the power of Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky & Tennessee's defining marriage as only man/woman or he didn't.

Which is it? Read the OP if you're unsure..
 
It matters to the tens of millions of registered voters and their civil rights to have their vote count in Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky and Tennessee..
Their votes don't count, and never did. It's not up for a vote.
Actually their votes DO count and are upheld as such to this very minute...do you think just saying black is white will convince people. Either judge Sutton wrote the majority opinion for the 6th upholding the power of Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky & Tennessee's defining marriage as only man/woman or he didn't.

Which is it? Read the OP if you're unsure..
It doesn't matter what he said, it rolls to the SC and they have let GM stand. It's over.
 
It doesn't matter what he said, it rolls to the SC and they have let GM stand. It's over.

Let me highlight in red the bit below from Sutton's Opinion at the 6th that tells why your conclusion is invalid..

**********
And now, claimants insist, must account for United States v. Windsor , 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), which invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, a law that refused for purposes of federal statutory benefits to respect gay marriages authorized by state law. Yet Windsor
does not answer today’s question. The decision never mentions Baker , much less overrules it. And the outcomes of the cases do not clash.
Windsor invalidated a federal law that refused to respect state laws permitting gay marriage, while Baker upheld the right of the people of a State to define marriage as they see it. To respect one decision does not slight the other
. Nor does Windsor's reasoning clash with Baker. Windsor
hinges on the Defense of Marriage Act’s unprecedented intrusion into the States’ authority over domestic relations. Id.at 2691–92. Before the Act’s passage in 1996, the federal government had traditionally relied on state definitions of marriage instead of purporting to define marriage itself.
Id.at 2691.

That premise does not work—it runs the other way—in a case involving a challenge in federal court to state laws defining marriage. The point of
Windsor was to prevent the Federal Government from “divest[ing]” gay couples of “a dignity and status of immense import” that New York’s extension of the definition of marriage gave them, an extension that “without doubt” any State could provide
... Windsor made explicit that it does not answer today’s question, telling us that the “opinion and its holding are confined to . . . lawful marriages” already protected by some of the States. Id. at 2696. Bringing the matter to a close, the Court held minutes after releasing Windsor that procedural obstacles in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), prevented it from considering the validity of state marriage laws. Saying that the Court declined in Hollingsworth to overrule Baker openly but decided in Windsor to overrule it by stealth makes an unflattering and unfair estimate of the Justices’ candor.

Even if Windsor did not overrule Baker by name,the claimants point out, lower courts still may rely on “doctrinal developments” in the aftermath of a summary disposition as a ground for not following the decision. Hicks,422 U.S. at 344. And Windsor , they say, together with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), permit us to cast Baker aside. But this reading of “doctrinal developments” would be a groundbreaking development of its own. From the perspective of a lower court, summary dispositions remain “controlling precedent, unless and until re-examined by [the Supreme] Court. Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 74 (1976); see Hicks, 422 U.S. at 343–45. And the Court has told us to treat the two types of decisions, whether summary dispositions or full-merits decisions, the same, “prevent[ing] lower courts” in both settings “from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.” Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).

Lest doubt remain, the Court has also told us not to ignore its decisions even when they are in tension with a new line of cases. “If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997).

Just two scenarios, then, permit us to ignore a Supreme Court decision, whatever its form: when the Court has overruled the decision by name (if, say, Windsor had directly overruled Baker ) or when the Court has overruled the decision by outcome (if, say, Hollingsworth had invalidated the California law without mentioning Baker ). Any other approach returns us to a world in which the lower courts may anticipatorily overrule all manner of Supreme Court decisions based on counting-to-five predictions, perceived trajectories in the caselaw, or, worst of all, new appointments to the Court. In the end, neither of the two preconditions for ignoring Supreme Court precedent applies here. Windsor as shown does not mention
Baker , and it clarifies that its “opinion and holding” do not govern the States’ authority to define marriage. Hollingsworth was dismissed. And neither Lawrence nor Romer mentions Baker ,and neither is inconsistent with its outcome. The one invalidates a State’s criminal antisodomy law and explains that the case “does not involve . . . formal recognition” of same-sex relationships. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578....

...don’t these denials of certiorari signal that, from the Court’s perspective, the right to same-sex marriage is inevitable? Maybe; maybe not. Even if we grant the premise and assume that same-sex marriage will be recognized one day in all fifty States, that does not tell us how— whether through the courts or through democracy. And, if through the courts, that does not tell us why—whether through one theory of constitutional invalidity or another. Four courts of appeals thus far have recognized a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. They agree on one thing: the result. But they reach that outcome in many ways, often more than one way in the same decision...The Court’s certiorari denials tell us nothing about the democracy-versus-litigation path to same-sex marriage, and they tell us nothing about the validity of any of these theories. If a federal court denies the people suffrage over an issue long thought to be within their power, they deserve an explanation. We, for our part, cannot find one, as several other judges have concluded as well....

...There are many ways, as these lower court decisions confirm, to look at this question: originalism; rational basis review; animus; fundamental rights; suspect classifications; evolving meaning. The parties in one way or another have invoked them all. Not one of the plaintiffs’ theories, however, makes the case for constitutionalizing the definition of marriage and for removing the issue from the place it has been since the founding: in the hands of state voters.
 
It doesn't matter what he said, it rolls to the SC and they have let GM stand. It's over.

Let me highlight in red the bit below from Sutton's Opinion at the 6th that tells why your conclusion is invalid..

**********
And now, claimants insist, must account for United States v. Windsor , 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013), which invalidated the Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, a law that refused for purposes of federal statutory benefits to respect gay marriages authorized by state law. Yet Windsor
does not answer today’s question. The decision never mentions Baker , much less overrules it. And the outcomes of the cases do not clash.
Windsor invalidated a federal law that refused to respect state laws permitting gay marriage, while Baker upheld the right of the people of a State to define marriage as they see it. To respect one decision does not slight the other
. Nor does Windsor's reasoning clash with Baker. Windsor
hinges on the Defense of Marriage Act’s unprecedented intrusion into the States’ authority over domestic relations. Id.at 2691–92. Before the Act’s passage in 1996, the federal government had traditionally relied on state definitions of marriage instead of purporting to define marriage itself.
Id.at 2691.

That premise does not work—it runs the other way—in a case involving a challenge in federal court to state laws defining marriage. The point of
Windsor was to prevent the Federal Government from “divest[ing]” gay couples of “a dignity and status of immense import” that New York’s extension of the definition of marriage gave them, an extension that “without doubt” any State could provide
... Windsor made explicit that it does not answer today’s question, telling us that the “opinion and its holding are confined to . . . lawful marriages” already protected by some of the States. Id. at 2696. Bringing the matter to a close, the Court held minutes after releasing Windsor that procedural obstacles in Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013), prevented it from considering the validity of state marriage laws. Saying that the Court declined in Hollingsworth to overrule Baker openly but decided in Windsor to overrule it by stealth makes an unflattering and unfair estimate of the Justices’ candor.

Even if Windsor did not overrule Baker by name,the claimants point out, lower courts still may rely on “doctrinal developments” in the aftermath of a summary disposition as a ground for not following the decision. Hicks,422 U.S. at 344. And Windsor , they say, together with Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), and Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), permit us to cast Baker aside. But this reading of “doctrinal developments” would be a groundbreaking development of its own. From the perspective of a lower court, summary dispositions remain “controlling precedent, unless and until re-examined by [the Supreme] Court. Tully v. Griffin, Inc., 429 U.S. 68, 74 (1976); see Hicks, 422 U.S. at 343–45. And the Court has told us to treat the two types of decisions, whether summary dispositions or full-merits decisions, the same, “prevent[ing] lower courts” in both settings “from coming to opposite conclusions on the precise issues presented and necessarily decided by those actions.” Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173, 176 (1977).

Lest doubt remain, the Court has also told us not to ignore its decisions even when they are in tension with a new line of cases. “If a precedent of this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.” Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 237 (1997).

Just two scenarios, then, permit us to ignore a Supreme Court decision, whatever its form: when the Court has overruled the decision by name (if, say, Windsor had directly overruled Baker ) or when the Court has overruled the decision by outcome (if, say, Hollingsworth had invalidated the California law without mentioning Baker ). Any other approach returns us to a world in which the lower courts may anticipatorily overrule all manner of Supreme Court decisions based on counting-to-five predictions, perceived trajectories in the caselaw, or, worst of all, new appointments to the Court. In the end, neither of the two preconditions for ignoring Supreme Court precedent applies here. Windsor as shown does not mention
Baker , and it clarifies that its “opinion and holding” do not govern the States’ authority to define marriage. Hollingsworth was dismissed. And neither Lawrence nor Romer mentions Baker ,and neither is inconsistent with its outcome. The one invalidates a State’s criminal antisodomy law and explains that the case “does not involve . . . formal recognition” of same-sex relationships. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578....

...don’t these denials of certiorari signal that, from the Court’s perspective, the right to same-sex marriage is inevitable? Maybe; maybe not. Even if we grant the premise and assume that same-sex marriage will be recognized one day in all fifty States, that does not tell us how— whether through the courts or through democracy. And, if through the courts, that does not tell us why—whether through one theory of constitutional invalidity or another. Four courts of appeals thus far have recognized a constitutional right to same-sex marriage. They agree on one thing: the result. But they reach that outcome in many ways, often more than one way in the same decision...The Court’s certiorari denials tell us nothing about the democracy-versus-litigation path to same-sex marriage, and they tell us nothing about the validity of any of these theories. If a federal court denies the people suffrage over an issue long thought to be within their power, they deserve an explanation. We, for our part, cannot find one, as several other judges have concluded as well....

...There are many ways, as these lower court decisions confirm, to look at this question: originalism; rational basis review; animus; fundamental rights; suspect classifications; evolving meaning. The parties in one way or another have invoked them all. Not one of the plaintiffs’ theories, however, makes the case for constitutionalizing the definition of marriage and for removing the issue from the place it has been since the founding: in the hands of state voters.
Simple, the people do not get to vote on the civil rights of others for it they did soon no one would have any.
 

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