Bfgrn
Gold Member
- Apr 4, 2009
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Certainly not an economics text book written by an actual economist.You are a fool and a liar. You are no liberal and you are an economic retard. YOU don't understand the difference between deficits and debt. And you are totally oblivious to the fact that Reagan's military spending was textbook Keynesian..What do you call a fiscal policy that cuts taxes and increases spending to stimulate the economy? Keynesianism!
1. deficits and surpluses are what occur in any given budget year.
2. Debt is the summation of accumulated deficits.
3. Government spending can be considered Keynesian if the point of the spending is to stimulate the economy.
4. Government spending that produces value to the government may be Keynesian as a side product but is not intended as stimulation. In Reagan's case it was to rebuild the military infrastructure destroyed by earlier administrations.
5. Fiscal policy which cuts the taxes on the high end to spur investment and make consumer goods less expensive because of more supply is Supply Side policy.
6. Fiscal policy which cuts the taxes on the low end of the spectrum designed to put more money in the hands of consumers is Demand Side policy.
The fact is, you only know what your left wing propagandists tell you, and they lie therefore you are economics challenged; actually amazingly ignorant would be more like it. I am a liberal, I am just not a left wing extremist fool like you; thank God.Like I said, you believe in the left wing propagandists for all your "information." If you believe that JFK or any politician actually believed themselves, or if every word they speak is true, I have a bride over the Mississippi to sell you. Can you possibly be that stupid?.The people you call "left wing propagandists" are President John F. Kennedy and the people he chose for the New Frontier. They were the 'best and the brightest'. You putting down people who are 1,000,000,000 times smarter than you shows just how dogmatic and ignorant you really are..Don't you think the people who authored those programs knew what their philosophy was and what it wasn't? Or that they knew the intent of those programs?
They knew exactly what their philosophy was, and they knew the intent of their programs. But you forget they are politicians who need to get stuff approved by congress. JFK knew that when giving the biggest tax cuts to the rich and to corporations was supply side economics. Do you believe that a democrat in congress would have voted for it if he had told the truth? Are you that much of a gullible left wing extremist?
Beware of the half-truth. You may have gotten hold of the wrong half.
Seymour Essrog
Your dogmatic mind continues to fail you...
President John F. Kennedy and the 1964 Tax Cut
BY DAVID SHREVE
In the current political contest over President Bushs proposed federal income tax cut, we see the Kennedy presidency, once again, through a glass, darkly.
Featuring excerpts from Kennedys December 14, 1962, New York Economic Club address, a recent political radio ad advertises JFKs support for tax cutting and suggests implicitly that the 35th president would have supported the tax cuts proposed by the current administration. Our present tax system, Kennedy declares in the featured excerpt, developed as it was, in good part, during World War II to restrain growth, exerts too heavy a drag on growth in peacetime. Kennedy, the liberal politician and Democratic icon, has, it would appear, suddenly become a benefactor of supply-side economics and an exemplar for conservative politicians. Yet at the time of this address, Kennedy was engaged in a spirited battle against conservative politicians and much of the business community who then opposed his tax cut proposal. Against todays conventional wisdom, which lumps all tax cuts in the supply-side policy categorywhere marginal rates function only as a relative work or investment disincentivethis opposition seems either wholly inexplicable or a relic of an indecipherable and eccentric political confrontation.
How was it that all but a few prominent business leadersTom Watson of IBM, Frederick Kappel of AT&T, and Henry Ford II of the Ford Motor Company, for example opposed the Kennedy tax cut proposal when it was first announced in the summer of 1962? If President Kennedy was, indeed, a nascent supply-sider, why were most conservative politicians so staunchly opposed to the Kennedy proposal? Were they motivated simply by the historic mistrust of business community for FDRs Democratic successors? Or did the business community of that period simply respond more quickly and more fervently to a different political economy, one that had little place for the now much more familiar supply-side concerns? Kennedy, after all, wanted his tax cut to produce a fiscal deficit; perhaps this alone was too much for conservatives. Only by looking more fully at the political economy of both Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson (under whom the tax cut proposal won passage) can we begin to unravel this paradox. The commentary and writings of Kennedy-Johnson economic advisors, the complete text of the 1962 Economic Club speech, and material from recently released presidential recordings, provides us with at least some of the necessary clues.
To Kennedy and the liberal economists who advised him, most supply-side effects were simply derivative: the primary (although not singular) goal of the tax cut was to stimulate demand and thus to achieve full employment. In their way of thinking, this demand would serve as a precursor to a virtuous cycle within which productivity and investment would also respond positively. The tax cut is good for long run growth, Kennedy adviser James Tobin declared in 1965, only in the general sense that prosperity is good for investment.1 The effect of the 64 tax cut on the productive capacity of the nation was significant, to be sure, and very much anticipated in the Kennedy-Johnson political economy, but it was mostly incidental to rising demand and full employment.
The Revenue Act of 1964 was aimed at the demand, rather than the supply, side of the economy, Kennedy economist Arthur Okun recalled. Among business leaders in private, Kennedy seldom put it any other way: What you want is a deficit, he reminded a small group of business leaders at an August 9, 1962, White House meeting. You want more money being spent than is being taken out of the economy. Focusing naturally, then, on the propensity to consumethe tendency, that is, of individuals in various income brackets to spend additional incomethe administration sought a tax cut that showered most of its direct benefits upon working class and middle class Americans. The fundamental law upon which we are entitled to depend with great confidence, John Maynard Keynes remarked, describing this tendency, is that men are disposed, as a rule and on the average, to increase their consumption as their income increases, but not by as much as the increase in their income. Though it is widely ignored todayor cast aside by competing, but far less robust analysesthis consumption function was critical to the Kennedy-Johnson political economy.
It underscores, as well, the paramount goal of the Kennedy tax cut proposal: to put more money into the hands of people most inclined to spend it. This is not to say that the Kennedy administration dismissed a somewhat different kind of tax cut entirely or that it ignored the merit of other supply side policy, however subordinate it might have been. In the end, the Kennedy-Johnson tax cut offered some benefits for the wealthy and for corporations mostly because it was politically impractical not to do so. Too few members of key congressional committees, reflecting southern Democratic conservatism or a decidedly pro-business orientation, would have voted for the proposal in any other form. We can only applaud his political acumen, Tobin remarked in 1965, while regretting the misguided, but powerful, ideology which made his bargain necessary. Moreover, if supply-side initiatives were never counted on for any of the heavy lifting, Kennedy and his Keynesian cohorts still found them useful in a variety of circumstances. The seven percent Investment Tax Credit, accelerated depreciation schedules (effected by Executive Order), and a special tax credit for the DuPont Corporation were among these activities.
The Heller strategy of the 1960s, James Tobin remarked in 1982, was not a one-sided program of demand expansion. Yet, these initiatives, along with other efforts in the realms of international trade and currency, wage and price control, and domestic monetary policy, were never as basic to the Kennedy political economy as demand management. Although there is some merit in some of the supply side proposals so popular today, Tobin added, the danger is that they are considered a substitute for expanding demand. In short, Kennedy used the Economic Club speech to sell these ideas to a constituency who believed them heretical and whose friendship and forbearance Kennedy hoped to cultivate, if only well enough, in the short term, to pass favored legislation. At Yale in June 1962, he had characterized his relations with the business community as a bog of sterile acrimony. Only weeks before his Yale address, Kennedy told Ben Bradlee, We want the support of business on trade, we want them on the tax bill. Ive been breaking my ass trying to get along with these people. A heated confrontation in April 1962 with steel companies over steel pricing, the appearance of Help Kennedy Stamp Out Free Enterprise bumper stickers, and a subsequent stock market decline blamed on Kennedys anti-business attitude had marked the first two years of his presidency. A New York Times poll of 30,000 members of the business community, taken in June 1962, revealed that over 88 percent believed President Kennedy to be strongly or moderately anti-business. In December 1962, at the New York Economic Club, he hoped to turn the corner. He counseled his assistants to avoid using terms that raised the ire of business opponents, asked his anti-trust division to soft-pedal their investigations, and he adopted a rhetoric of conciliation with a sharpened focus on business concerns. The times did not permit him to speak directly or to wait until the economic intelligence gap had been closed, chief economic adviser Walter Heller recalled.
Reflecting on the Economic Club speech the morning after, Kennedy adviser and speechwriter Ted Sorensen remarked, It sounded like Hoover, but it was actually Heller. Yet, as Walter Heller would put it, because the arguments for the tax cut were poured into old molds, its success cracked, perhaps even shattered, those molds of ideology and error. Only the most selective reading of the Economic Club speech, therefore, would reveal genuine supply-side predilection.
Hoping to convey an appreciation for frugality and private enterprise while selling demand management and full employment, Kennedy was, nonetheless, pessimistic about his chances for a positive response. Lip service to free enterprise, Goodyear Tire executive Roy Dinsmore had warned him in May, is belied by the steady march to socialism. When he finished, the positive response cheered President Kennedy. I gave them straight Keynes and Heller, he boasted to Walter Heller afterward, and they loved it.