Did We Need The USSR????

[PoliticalChic]

It seems that the primary position of the FDR apologists who need to explain,and mark as correct FDR's bowing to Stalin's wishes, and turning a blind eye to Soviet infiltration is that the USSR was a necessary and indispensable part of winning the War.

Seems so.

After all, that was the view of military and geopolitical experts....
...or was it....



Although gone from the scene over 20 years, Hanson Baldwin is remembered for both his courage and his perspicacity. Here, his run-in with JFK:

1. "Hanson Baldwin, military analyst for The New York Times since 1937, winner of thePulitzer Prize for his dispatches from Guadalcanal and the western Pacific in 1943, a dependably pro-military reporter. He had infuriated the president with an article on the Soviets’ efforts to protect their intercontinental ballistic missile launch sites with concrete bunkers. His reporting accurately stated the conclusions of the C.I.A.’s most recent national intelligence estimate."
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/01/weekinreview/01word.html?_r=0

2. But if one wishes to understand the current geopolitical scene, his 1949 book, "Great Mistakes of the War," is de rigueur! Hanson, more than our elected leaders, understood the psychology of US-USSR relations.
He wrote of the "four great- and false- premises" of the war.

a. That the Soviet Union had abandoned its policy of world revolution.
b. That "Uncle Joe" Stalin was a 'good fellow,' someone we could 'get along with.'
c. That the USSR might make a separate peace with Germany.
d. That the Soviet Union's entry into the war against Japan was essential to victory or necessary to save thousands of American lives.






3. The explanation for the acceptance of what was essentially Soviet disinformation is the same one that explains much of today' accepted 'truths:' America was subverted from within by numerous agents loyal to a foreign power, or, today, to one-world-government, and supported by exponentially more fellow travelers and useful idiots.

a. The radicals of the sixties did not remain within the universities…They realized that the apocalypse never materialized. “…they were dropping off into environmentalism and consumerism and fatalism…I watched many of my old comrades apply to graduate school in universities they had failed to burn down, so they could get advanced degrees and spread the ideas that had been discredited in the streets under an academic cover.” Collier and Horowitz, “Destructive Generation: Second Thoughts About The Sixties,” p. 294-295.

b. “The radicals were not likely to go into business or the conventional practice of the professions. They were part of the chattering class, talkers interested in policy, politics, culture. They went into politics, print and electronic journalism, church bureaucracies, foundation staffs, Hollywood careers, public interest organizations, anywhere attitudes and opinions could be influenced. And they are exerting influence.” Robert H. Bork, “Slouching Toward Gomorrah,” p. 51






4. "A study of Marxian literature and of the speeches and writings of its high apostles, Lenin and Stalin, coupled with the expert knowledge of numerous American specialists, should have convinced an unbiased mind that international Communism had not altered its ultimate aim; the wolf had merely donned a sheep's skin."
Baldwin, "Great Mistakes of the War," p.9

a. Baldwin says we became "victims of our own propaganda," but, more correctly, we were victims of Soviet propaganda disseminated by Soviet agents within our Soviet-infiltrated government.
(Read as 'the FDR administration.....')



5. But weren't there good Americans in the government? Sure were.

"Not only did FDR overlook the external evidence; FDR ignored the counsel of key experts at the State Department, which, at the time, was home...to an educated and experienced cadre of anti-Communists....who would be neutralized and purged....

n 1937...the Russian research library at the State Department was broken up, the files on Communists, foreign and domestic, ordered destroyed. The second, in 1943. Both purges took place under Soviet pressure and even direction as when in March 1943 Foreign Minister Litvinov, incredibly, handed over a list of American diplomats the Soviets wanted fired....a "guilt offering to Stalin from Roosevelt"...
West, "American Betrayal," p.193.



a. The reason for guilt? Some advisers had had the gall to suggest not only that the democracies could survive a Nazi conquest of the USSR...but that, in such an event, the United States should not recognize a soviet government in exile.
George Kennan echoed those feelings.
Weil, "A Pretty Good Club," p. 106.

Know who George Kennan was?

b. Roosevelt took office March 4, 1933. It should be recalled that one of his first official acts was the United States recognizing the Soviet Union, November 16th, 1933.
If the experts were correct, democracies could survive a Nazi conquest of the USSR, realize what we got for the recognition, for saving the USSR,....


So, not only did FDR ignore the advice of experts who were not pro-Soviet, as he was, but he excluded them and destroyed files that supported them.

Why?


And....what guilt does he bear for the consequences?


To put it another way....what does it say about individuals who refuse to consider these two questions?

 

[Moonglow]

SO I am guessing that the author your using to slander FDR once again is saying that the communist were much worse than the Romanov dynasty which ruled for 300 years.

1.

The decision to recognize the Soviet Union in 1933 reflected an attempt to balance to the irreconcilable between the United States and Russia: conflicting national interests and ideologies—a response perhaps analogous to defining the rationale for change in the nineteenth century as the industrial revolution and the railroad. As the global depression grew, factions within the United States (for consensus did not exist within the government or among corporate and business interests), viewed recognition as a means of helping the American economy through stabilizing trade relations with the Soviet Union. On the political front, Japan had begun aggressive expansion throughout Asia. To many Americans and Russians, diplomatic recognition appeared as a viable response to the growing threat of Japanese hegemony to Russia’s border.

2.

Throughout the 1920s, and throughout four presidencies, Washington lifted overseas trade and investment opportunities for American business in Russia. Russia became a major American market, and by 1930, American exports to Russia exceeded in value those of every other country and American businesses relied on this export market. According to most authors, this commercial and economic relationship strongly influenced formal recognition.

During the first Soviet Five Year Plan, 1929-1933, Americans provided concessions, technical assistance and trade with the Soviet Union; that is, American companies consulted, shared patents and personnel to assist in the economic development of Russia. . By the mid-1920s, American business and industry supplied more than 25 percent of all of Russia’s imports—a figure which declined as the depression increased. In 1929, more than 2,000 American industrial and agricultural experts, engineers and mechanics worked in the Soviet Union. During the 1930s, hundreds of Soviet students and engineers studied in America and returned to the Soviet Union

Two strong groups polarized the recognition debate: an anti-Soviet, anti-trade group within Congress and the business community and an equally vociferous pro-trade group of politicians, industrialists and exporters who urged the government to remove financial and commercial restrictions and to recognize Russia so that commercial treaties could be negotiated. Pro-traders saw increased trade with Russia as an aid to the economy. Ideological concerns seemed to dominate the antitrading stance. Russia’s first Five Year Plan was yielding some successes. As the Depression continued to ravage America communist success appeared as an indictment of American democracy and capitalism. Certainly there were shades of disagreement inside each broader faction—those favoring commercial treaties did not always favor recognition, for example, but only greater opportunity to deal with Russia.

Joan Hoff-Wilson, Ideology and Economics: US Relations with the Soviet Union, 1918-1933, discusses the dichotomy between business and government during this period. She places Cold War historiography in two distinct camps: liberal realists and radical revisionists. The liberal realists—George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau—were concerned with the general lack of appreciation of diplomatic theory, an incompetence to make good judgments. Radical revisionists—William Appleman Williams, for example—revived an economic critique of diplomacy, based on the conviction that Washington knew exactly what had to be done abroad to serve the interests of the liberal corporate state at home—in other words, political economy directs foreign policy. (138) Ideology and Economics is an effort to bridge the two extremes.

3.

According to one Roosevelt biographer, Frankl Friedel, both countries ignored the agreements or misconstrued them according to their purposes (176). (Franklin D. Roosevelt: a Rendezvous with Destiny . Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1990) Agreements concerning debt repayment, Russian sponsorship of organizations dedicated to overthrowing America, religious freedom for Americans in the Soviet Union— all faded by 1934, even as the Japanese threat to Russia began to disappear. Roosevelt moved into a period of benign indifference to the reality of events in Russia during the latter part of the 1930s—an indifference that almost cost him the resignations of key advisory personnel including the iconic George Kennan—perhaps America’s foremost Russian specialist from the turn of the century through the Cold War era and among those who continued to handle Russian relations on a daily basis. Both Gaddis and Friedel emphasize the importance of American public opinion as an influence during this time. We remained an isolationist country, occupied with the critical economic concerns of the Depression. Roosevelt emphasized the national interest—in fact, during his early presidency, domestic economic concerns always outweighed international concerns; his foreign policy work focused, of necessity, on negotiations designed to develop international security as European upheaval threatened

Because the foreign office of the Soviet Union, in charge of negotiating the agreements, did not actually dictate policy, the fact that the recognition agreement with the Soviet Union did not contain airtight terminology would have provided, at best, a legal advantage, “to be able to point to firm agreements being ignored or violated.” (Friedel, 177) The greatest benefit was perhaps that recognition enabled the United States to field a diplomatic presence in Moscow that could gather information and grow in experience that would prove invaluable during World War II and subsequent decades.Lee Ann Ghajar, fall 2005

http://chnm.gmu.edu/courses/schrag/wiki/index.php?title=Recognition_of_the_Soviet_Union

 

[regent]

Germany declared war on the US, but suppose the US did not to declare war on Germany? Think of it, Germany and the USSR fighting it out to the end, with only one victor, or no victor, maybe they would have destroyed each other. In that case Britain would then own the continent. By that time the US would have destroyed Japan, so Britain and America would own the world. And with the bomb the US would have owned the world. Why didn't FDR do that?

 

[Moonglow]

When a nation declares war on you, the worst thing you can do is ignore the threat, and in the axiom of military strategy, you need to destroy your enemy.

 

[rightwinger]

Germany declared war on the US, but suppose the US did not to declare war on Germany? Think of it, Germany and the USSR fighting it out to the end, with only one victor, or no victor, maybe they would have destroyed each other. In that case Britain would then own the continent. By that time the US would have destroyed Japan, so Britain and America would own the world. And with the bomb the US would have owned the world. Why didn't FDR do that?

I would say because Britain was still under attack and FDR wanted to liberate France, Belgium, Netherlands and Norway

Without US involvement, what stops the USSR from swarming into Western Europe once they have defeated Germany?

 

[Moonglow]

The Germans were already retreating when we made the landings in Normandy, Italy, Southern France

 

[Book of Jeremiah]

Then please explain why we Obama gave the Russians a grand tour of NORAD. Why he gave away our military defense secrets to them. Why he allowed Hillary Clinton to give the Russians a tour of our nuclear sites whereas before they didn't have those locations much less the grand tour inside! Why we are permitting Akula Class II nuclear submarines off the coast of Texas and Fla - do you really believe the Russians are our friends?

Why are we ignoring the greatest threat of our lifetime right now? Any idea?

 

[PoliticalChic]

SO I am guessing that the author your using to slander FDR once again is saying that the communist were much worse than the Romanov dynasty which ruled for 300 years.

1.

The decision to recognize the Soviet Union in 1933 reflected an attempt to balance to the irreconcilable between the United States and Russia: conflicting national interests and ideologies—a response perhaps analogous to defining the rationale for change in the nineteenth century as the industrial revolution and the railroad. As the global depression grew, factions within the United States (for consensus did not exist within the government or among corporate and business interests), viewed recognition as a means of helping the American economy through stabilizing trade relations with the Soviet Union. On the political front, Japan had begun aggressive expansion throughout Asia. To many Americans and Russians, diplomatic recognition appeared as a viable response to the growing threat of Japanese hegemony to Russia’s border.

2.

Throughout the 1920s, and throughout four presidencies, Washington lifted overseas trade and investment opportunities for American business in Russia. Russia became a major American market, and by 1930, American exports to Russia exceeded in value those of every other country and American businesses relied on this export market. According to most authors, this commercial and economic relationship strongly influenced formal recognition.

During the first Soviet Five Year Plan, 1929-1933, Americans provided concessions, technical assistance and trade with the Soviet Union; that is, American companies consulted, shared patents and personnel to assist in the economic development of Russia. . By the mid-1920s, American business and industry supplied more than 25 percent of all of Russia’s imports—a figure which declined as the depression increased. In 1929, more than 2,000 American industrial and agricultural experts, engineers and mechanics worked in the Soviet Union. During the 1930s, hundreds of Soviet students and engineers studied in America and returned to the Soviet Union

Two strong groups polarized the recognition debate: an anti-Soviet, anti-trade group within Congress and the business community and an equally vociferous pro-trade group of politicians, industrialists and exporters who urged the government to remove financial and commercial restrictions and to recognize Russia so that commercial treaties could be negotiated. Pro-traders saw increased trade with Russia as an aid to the economy. Ideological concerns seemed to dominate the antitrading stance. Russia’s first Five Year Plan was yielding some successes. As the Depression continued to ravage America communist success appeared as an indictment of American democracy and capitalism. Certainly there were shades of disagreement inside each broader faction—those favoring commercial treaties did not always favor recognition, for example, but only greater opportunity to deal with Russia.

Joan Hoff-Wilson, Ideology and Economics: US Relations with the Soviet Union, 1918-1933, discusses the dichotomy between business and government during this period. She places Cold War historiography in two distinct camps: liberal realists and radical revisionists. The liberal realists—George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau—were concerned with the general lack of appreciation of diplomatic theory, an incompetence to make good judgments. Radical revisionists—William Appleman Williams, for example—revived an economic critique of diplomacy, based on the conviction that Washington knew exactly what had to be done abroad to serve the interests of the liberal corporate state at home—in other words, political economy directs foreign policy. (138) Ideology and Economics is an effort to bridge the two extremes.

3.

According to one Roosevelt biographer, Frankl Friedel, both countries ignored the agreements or misconstrued them according to their purposes (176). (Franklin D. Roosevelt: a Rendezvous with Destiny . Boston: Little Brown and Company, 1990) Agreements concerning debt repayment, Russian sponsorship of organizations dedicated to overthrowing America, religious freedom for Americans in the Soviet Union— all faded by 1934, even as the Japanese threat to Russia began to disappear. Roosevelt moved into a period of benign indifference to the reality of events in Russia during the latter part of the 1930s—an indifference that almost cost him the resignations of key advisory personnel including the iconic George Kennan—perhaps America’s foremost Russian specialist from the turn of the century through the Cold War era and among those who continued to handle Russian relations on a daily basis. Both Gaddis and Friedel emphasize the importance of American public opinion as an influence during this time. We remained an isolationist country, occupied with the critical economic concerns of the Depression. Roosevelt emphasized the national interest—in fact, during his early presidency, domestic economic concerns always outweighed international concerns; his foreign policy work focused, of necessity, on negotiations designed to develop international security as European upheaval threatened

Because the foreign office of the Soviet Union, in charge of negotiating the agreements, did not actually dictate policy, the fact that the recognition agreement with the Soviet Union did not contain airtight terminology would have provided, at best, a legal advantage, “to be able to point to firm agreements being ignored or violated.” (Friedel, 177) The greatest benefit was perhaps that recognition enabled the United States to field a diplomatic presence in Moscow that could gather information and grow in experience that would prove invaluable during World War II and subsequent decades.Lee Ann Ghajar, fall 2005

Recognition of the Soviet Union - The Mason Historiographiki

Drop-draws!

I'm really proud of you! This was a serious attempt at rebuttal.

Two probs.

1. You didn't address the OP other than in general term: "... slander FDR once again..."

and

2. Your link is wrong is several glaring pronouncements....

".. agreement with the Soviet Union did not contain airtight terminology..."


and this, particularly slip-shod:
"...both countries ignored the agreements or misconstrued them according to their purposes "
That's like saying one side called second one names, but the second one shot and killed the first.

But....you have given me an idea for another OP...one that includes the Litvinov/Roosevevelt sell-out.....er, agreement.
Maybe tomorrow.



And...you should have read more carefully:
3. Of course, this makes the very point of the OP:
" The liberal realists—George Kennan and Hans Morgenthau—were concerned with the general lack of appreciation of diplomatic theory, an incompetence to make good judgments."

and

"Roosevelt moved into a period of benign indifference to the reality of events in Russia during the latter part of the 1930s—an indifference that almost cost him the resignations of key advisory personnel including the iconic George Kennan—"



I would have given you another rep for this attempt....but you never have the manners to say thank you.....

Keep it up just the same!

 

[PoliticalChic]

Germany declared war on the US, but suppose the US did not to declare war on Germany? Think of it, Germany and the USSR fighting it out to the end, with only one victor, or no victor, maybe they would have destroyed each other. In that case Britain would then own the continent. By that time the US would have destroyed Japan, so Britain and America would own the world. And with the bomb the US would have owned the world. Why didn't FDR do that?

1. " maybe they would have destroyed each other"

Fits right into the OP!


2. " US would have owned the world. Why didn't FDR do that?"
Reggie!!!!

I've converted you!!!!


Welcome to the light!

 

[Moonglow]

Rarely is anytime spent on rebuttal of intellect on this forum is really not worthy of time spent on hallow minds with wind whisping 'tween ears., I might make one exception and allow you that recognition but for your sophistic nature.

 

[PoliticalChic]

When a nation declares war on you, the worst thing you can do is ignore the threat, and in the axiom of military strategy, you need to destroy your enemy.

Oh YEAH?????


"The Mouse That Roared is a 1955 Cold War satirical novel by Irish-American writer Leonard Wibberley, which launched a series of satirical books about an imaginary country in Europe called the Duchy of Grand Fenwick. Wibberley went beyond the merely comic, using the premise to make still-quoted commentaries about modern politics and world situations, including the nuclear arms race, nuclear weapons in general, and the politics of the United States.

The prime minister decides that their only course of action is to declare war on the United States. Expecting a quick and total defeat (since their standing army is tiny and equipped with bows and arrows), the country confidently expects to rebuild itself through the generous largesse that the United States bestows on all its vanquished enemies (as it did for Germany through the Marshall Plan at the end of World War II)."
The Mouse That Roared - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

 

[PoliticalChic]

Rarely is anytime spent on rebuttal of intellect on this forum is really not worthy of time spent on hallow minds with wind whisping 'tween ears., I might make one exception and allow you that recognition but for your sophistic nature.

Ya' gettin' mighty close to that rep......

 

[rightwinger]

When a nation declares war on you, the worst thing you can do is ignore the threat, and in the axiom of military strategy, you need to destroy your enemy.

Oh YEAH?????


"The Mouse That Roared is a 1955 Cold War satirical novel by Irish-American writer Leonard Wibberley, which launched a series of satirical books about an imaginary country in Europe called the Duchy of Grand Fenwick. Wibberley went beyond the merely comic, using the premise to make still-quoted commentaries about modern politics and world situations, including the nuclear arms race, nuclear weapons in general, and the politics of the United States.

The prime minister decides that their only course of action is to declare war on the United States. Expecting a quick and total defeat (since their standing army is tiny and equipped with bows and arrows), the country confidently expects to rebuild itself through the generous largesse that the United States bestows on all its vanquished enemies (as it did for Germany through the Marshall Plan at the end of World War II)."
The Mouse That Roared - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

In the Mouse that Roared, the mouse was ignored and ended up winning the war

 

[Moonglow]

When a nation declares war on you, the worst thing you can do is ignore the threat, and in the axiom of military strategy, you need to destroy your enemy.

Oh YEAH?????


"The Mouse That Roared is a 1955 Cold War satirical novel by Irish-American writer Leonard Wibberley, which launched a series of satirical books about an imaginary country in Europe called the Duchy of Grand Fenwick. Wibberley went beyond the merely comic, using the premise to make still-quoted commentaries about modern politics and world situations, including the nuclear arms race, nuclear weapons in general, and the politics of the United States.

The prime minister decides that their only course of action is to declare war on the United States. Expecting a quick and total defeat (since their standing army is tiny and equipped with bows and arrows), the country confidently expects to rebuild itself through the generous largesse that the United States bestows on all its vanquished enemies (as it did for Germany through the Marshall Plan at the end of World War II)."
The Mouse That Roared - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

That was a rolling gag in the 1950's about generous American reciprocation of US funds to those defeated in war with us.
Stan Freeburge used in a line during a sketch on the album, "History of America". During which during the battle of Yorktown the generals aide told him to surrender and "you know how splendidly generous the Americans are" reap the benefits of defeat.

 

[regent]

Germany declared war on the US, but suppose the US did not to declare war on Germany? Think of it, Germany and the USSR fighting it out to the end, with only one victor, or no victor, maybe they would have destroyed each other. In that case Britain would then own the continent. By that time the US would have destroyed Japan, so Britain and America would own the world. And with the bomb the US would have owned the world. Why didn't FDR do that?

1. " maybe they would have destroyed each other"

Fits right into the OP!


2. " US would have owned the world. Why didn't FDR do that?"
Reggie!!!!

I've converted you!!!!


Welcome to the light!

It's so easy, I mean I'm already working on the French and Indian War, and then on to Star Wars. Oh, and one football game needs to be straightened out, Iowa v Michigan. But my biggie will be the crusades.

 

[rightwinger]

The USSR defeated the Nazis

We could not have done it without them

 

[gipper]

The USSR defeated the Nazis

We could not have done it without them

Yeah we helped the USSR defeat the Nazis so we could give E. Europe to them and then make them a superpower leading to four decades of cold war.

Well done!

 

[PrometheusBound]

Truman, in order to feed the MI Complex with huge government grants for the next 50 years, purposely let the Soviet Union and China get big enough to become a viable threat. The US had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and could have used it to force the Soviets out of Eastern Europe. For the same mercenary reasons, Truman, who had been part of the crooked Pendergast machine in Missouri, prevented MacArthur from greatly weakening Red China.

 

[rightwinger]

Truman, in order to feed the MI Complex with huge government grants for the next 50 years, purposely let the Soviet Union and China get big enough to become a viable threat. The US had a monopoly on nuclear weapons and could have used it to force the Soviets out of Eastern Europe. For the same mercenary reasons, Truman, who had been part of the crooked Pendergast machine in Missouri, prevented MacArthur from greatly weakening Red China.

 

[PoliticalChic]

The USSR defeated the Nazis

We could not have done it without them

Now, see....I'm faced with one of those momentous decisions.....

Research says:


"Not only did FDR overlook the external evidence; FDR ignored the counsel of key experts at the State Department, which, at the time, was home...to an educated and experienced cadre of anti-Communists....who would be neutralized and purged....

n 1937...the Russian research library at the State Department was broken up, the files on Communists, foreign and domestic, ordered destroyed. The second, in 1943. Both purges took place under Soviet pressure and even direction as when in March 1943 Foreign Minister Litvinov, incredibly, handed over a list of American diplomats the Soviets wanted fired....a "guilt offering to Stalin from Roosevelt"...
West, "American Betrayal," p.193.



a. The reason for guilt? Some advisers had had the gall to suggest not only that the democracies could survive a Nazi conquest of the USSR...but that, in such an event, the United States should not recognize a soviet government in exile.
George Kennan echoed those feelings.
Weil, "A Pretty Good Club," p. 106.

Know who George Kennan was?




But sewer-boy says "The USSR defeated the Nazis

We could not have done it without them."


Guess you figure that fighting the Russians, win or lose, wouldn't have had much of an
effect on the Nazis....




Gee....who do I go with......????



Had we not given enormous Lend-Lease to Communist Russia...including the atomic bomb....how would history be different?
No Korean War, Mao loses to Chiang.....terrible, huh?



Did you actually cast the Tin Hat aspersion at SOMEONE ELSE?????

Do you know the word 'irony'?