RoccoR
Gold Member
- Sep 15, 2010
- 11,933
- 3,549
P F Tinmore, et al,
You can't win if you don't play. (The axiom of a Lottery or any Sport.)
The Jewish Agency was legitimized no matter what the position the Arabs might have taken. It was a prerequisite behind the decisions made by the Allied Powers in San Remo; and the establishment of the Jewish National Home. From a political standpoint, the Jewish People were overjoyed by the decision of the Arabs not to exercise a voice through a counterpart Agency.
Remembering that the Arab Voice could have altered the outcomes in many of the disputes.
And that is an essential understanding of the time.
Most Respectfully,
R
You can't win if you don't play. (The axiom of a Lottery or any Sport.)
(COMMENT)RoccoR said:22. Later in 1923, a third attempt was made to establish an institution through which the Arab population of Palestine could be brought into cooperation with the government. The mandatory Power now proposed “the establishment of an Arab Agency in Palestine which will occupy a position exactly analogous to that accorded to the Jewish Agency”.
That would legitimize the foreign Jewish Agency.
The Palestinians were not going to play that game.
The Jewish Agency was legitimized no matter what the position the Arabs might have taken. It was a prerequisite behind the decisions made by the Allied Powers in San Remo; and the establishment of the Jewish National Home. From a political standpoint, the Jewish People were overjoyed by the decision of the Arabs not to exercise a voice through a counterpart Agency.
Remembering that the Arab Voice could have altered the outcomes in many of the disputes.
A/AC.14/8 2 October 1947 18. Replying to these observations, the Colonial Officer pointed out that paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the League Covenant had been interpreted by the Principal Allied Powers in the unratified Treaty of Sevres, where Syria and Iraq, but not Palestine, were explicitly said to have been “provisionally recognised” as independent States.
“There is no question,” the Colonial Officer continued, “of treating the people of Palestine as less advanced than their neighbours in Iraq and Syria; the position is that His Majesty’s Government are bound by a pledge which is antecedent to the Covenant of the League of Nations, and they cannot allow a constitutional position to develop in a country for which they have accepted responsibility to the Principal Allied Powers, which may make it impracticable to carry into effect a solemn undertaking given by themselves and their Allies…..If your Delegation really represents the present attitude of the majority of the Arab population of Palestine, and Mr. Churchill (then Colonial Secretary) Has no grounds for suggesting that this is not the case, it is quite clear that the creation at this stage of a national government would preclude the fulfilment of the pledge made by the British government to the Jewish people. It follows that the principal Allied Powers, concerned as they were to ensure the fulfilment of a policy adopted before the Covenant was drafted, were ell advised in applying to Palestine a somewhat different interpretation of Paragraph 4 of Article 22 of the covenant than was applied to the neighbouring countries of Iraq and Syria.”
19. This passage in the letter of the colonial Office was characterised by the Arab Delegation as
“the strongest proof that the Jewish National Home undertaking is the cause of depriving us of our natural right of establishing an independent government the same as Mesopotamia and the Hedjaz.”
They also concluded from it that
“self-government will be granted as soon as the Jewish people in Palestine are sufficiently able through numbers and powers to benefit to the full by self-government, and not before.”
And that is an essential understanding of the time.
Most Respectfully,
R