RoccoR
Gold Member
P F Tinmore, et al,
So it looks like I owe you two answers. Sorry for the tardy response, but I had to take care of a few things.
To understand this (and I don't know where your knowledge base is, so forgive me if I start with the basics), you have to start out understanding what an "insurgency" is. An insurgency uses subversion and extreme violence with the goal to either overthrow or force change of a governing authority; or to stop such governing institutions from developing or forming. An insurgency is both the group and its effort. In the case of the Mandate of Palestine, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam was an insurgent, his group (The Arab Black Hand) was an insurgency, and the insurgency was directed at both British Mandatory and the Zionist organizations in the northern Hejaz, Arab Levant Region (which encompasses almost all of the territory in conflict); timeframe circa 1920s and 1930s. This would be generalized as the at-risk nations or territories of strategic interest to the counterinsurgent.
Successful insurgencies are asymmetric actions that display a ruthlessness in its operations and a willingness to go to any lengths to achieve the objective of the insurgency. There are no taboo boundaries (martyrdom, kidnappings, indiscriminate murders, targeting the unarmed, use of women and children as fodder and shields, etc). The justification for the insurgency is based on the internal faith that it's cause is beyond criticism and it methods are not subject to any moral or legal accountability. (Both the Black Hand and Black September were in this field.)
The opposing military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions adopted by governments and aspiring or emerging governments to defeat insurgency are in the family of internal defense and development operations (IDAD). The specific class is counterinsurgency. These are action programs taken by the government and other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.
In most cases, there is no pure military solution to an insurgency. Once an insurgency reaches the stage in which its decision to strike are made in support of some high political cause, such strikes must be terrifying in nature. Many insurgency strikes operate on a theory that it is better to kill too many people than too few (shock value and to instill fear). Killing too few people will lessen the impact of the strike. In order to maximize the effectiveness of such a strike, it must then be publicized, without regret or excuse, so as to make it the best possible demonstration to the population of the consequences of not supporting an insurgency. In other words, the true objective of the strike is not to kill people; but rather, it is to display your ruthlessness and willingness to go to any lengths to achieve the objective. Many such strikes are just to demonstrate that the government or the developing government is incapable of protecting the population it is suppose to protect. As an example, the Gaza Strip fires rockets indiscriminately at civilian targets to demonstrate that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is incapable of defending against the insurgency which has the objective of undermining and the dismantling the State of Israel.
No insurgency operates in a vacuum. The Gaza Strip Insurgents (GSI) (as an example) must derive support from some benefactor. There are three counterinsurgency methods to undermine the GSI:
The main idea of a strategy called "Drain-the-Sea" is to prevent unmolested insurgent movement by identifying the sections of the local population that are likely to support the insurgency and then relocating them to places where they can be closely watched or controlled, and thus where any insurgent activity among them will be easy to spot. Those insurgents who remain after the supporting population has been relocated will be much easier to locate and deal with due to their isolation. (See Jeff Grey Australias Counterinsurgencies: A Brief History Australian Army Journal 5(2008)17-26. p. 21.)
I'm not sure I said that. This is taken out of context. The Israeli quarantine is for security purposes, not segregation.
Most Respectfully,
R
So it looks like I owe you two answers. Sorry for the tardy response, but I had to take care of a few things.
(COMMENT)RoccoR said:The purpose for the strategy (deterrence and retaliation) is very different from "Ethnic Cleansing" (violent elimination of an ethnic group: the violent elimination or removal of people from a country or area because of their ethnic backgrounds, by means of genocide or forced expulsion). What you have outlined is a counterinsurgency effort.
Could you elaborate? I am not sure I understand what you mean.
To understand this (and I don't know where your knowledge base is, so forgive me if I start with the basics), you have to start out understanding what an "insurgency" is. An insurgency uses subversion and extreme violence with the goal to either overthrow or force change of a governing authority; or to stop such governing institutions from developing or forming. An insurgency is both the group and its effort. In the case of the Mandate of Palestine, Izz ad-Din al-Qassam was an insurgent, his group (The Arab Black Hand) was an insurgency, and the insurgency was directed at both British Mandatory and the Zionist organizations in the northern Hejaz, Arab Levant Region (which encompasses almost all of the territory in conflict); timeframe circa 1920s and 1930s. This would be generalized as the at-risk nations or territories of strategic interest to the counterinsurgent.
![levantmap.jpg](/proxy.php?image=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.levanttech.com%2Fimages%2Flevantmap.jpg&hash=d9ae44b4b8507e127fc68113fd2c471e)
Successful insurgencies are asymmetric actions that display a ruthlessness in its operations and a willingness to go to any lengths to achieve the objective of the insurgency. There are no taboo boundaries (martyrdom, kidnappings, indiscriminate murders, targeting the unarmed, use of women and children as fodder and shields, etc). The justification for the insurgency is based on the internal faith that it's cause is beyond criticism and it methods are not subject to any moral or legal accountability. (Both the Black Hand and Black September were in this field.)
The opposing military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions adopted by governments and aspiring or emerging governments to defeat insurgency are in the family of internal defense and development operations (IDAD). The specific class is counterinsurgency. These are action programs taken by the government and other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, insurgency, terrorism, and other threats to its security.
In most cases, there is no pure military solution to an insurgency. Once an insurgency reaches the stage in which its decision to strike are made in support of some high political cause, such strikes must be terrifying in nature. Many insurgency strikes operate on a theory that it is better to kill too many people than too few (shock value and to instill fear). Killing too few people will lessen the impact of the strike. In order to maximize the effectiveness of such a strike, it must then be publicized, without regret or excuse, so as to make it the best possible demonstration to the population of the consequences of not supporting an insurgency. In other words, the true objective of the strike is not to kill people; but rather, it is to display your ruthlessness and willingness to go to any lengths to achieve the objective. Many such strikes are just to demonstrate that the government or the developing government is incapable of protecting the population it is suppose to protect. As an example, the Gaza Strip fires rockets indiscriminately at civilian targets to demonstrate that the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) is incapable of defending against the insurgency which has the objective of undermining and the dismantling the State of Israel.
No insurgency operates in a vacuum. The Gaza Strip Insurgents (GSI) (as an example) must derive support from some benefactor. There are three counterinsurgency methods to undermine the GSI:
- Cut-off foreign aid and assistance from external sources (IRGC-QF). This requires a quarantine.
- Counter Rocket & Mortar Fire (C-RAM) and retaliatory strikes.
- Apply pressure to the population that support and covers GSI operations and political activities.
- Target the face of the GSI, know leadership (GSI C3I).
- Identify, detect, exploit and nuetralize key personalities, logistic queues, and financial connections associated with the GSI.
The main idea of a strategy called "Drain-the-Sea" is to prevent unmolested insurgent movement by identifying the sections of the local population that are likely to support the insurgency and then relocating them to places where they can be closely watched or controlled, and thus where any insurgent activity among them will be easy to spot. Those insurgents who remain after the supporting population has been relocated will be much easier to locate and deal with due to their isolation. (See Jeff Grey Australias Counterinsurgencies: A Brief History Australian Army Journal 5(2008)17-26. p. 21.)
No, I don't think so. Who said that the Jews had no right to live in Palestine?
I'm not sure I said that. This is taken out of context. The Israeli quarantine is for security purposes, not segregation.
Most Respectfully,
R