http://www.dodig.mil/IGInformation/archives/OUSDP-OSP%20Brief.pdf6. Did the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy prepare and present briefing charts concerning the relationship between lraq and a1 Qaeda that went beyond available intelligence by asserting that an alleged meeting between lead 9/11 hijacker Mohammed Atta and lraqi intelligence officer al-Ani in Prague in April 2001 was a 'known' contact?'
Yes. The OUSD(P) produced a briefing, "Assessing the Relationship between lraq and al-Qaida," in which one slide discussed the alleged meeting in Prague between Mohammed Atta and lraqi Intelligence officer al-Ani as a "known contact."
7. Did the staff of the OUSDP present a briefing on the Iraq-a1 Qaeda relationship to the White House in September 2002 unbeknownst to the Director of Central Intelligence, containing information that was different from the briefing presented to the DCI, not vetted by the lntelligence Community, and that was not supported by the available intelligence (for example, concerning the alleged Atta meeting), without providing the IC notice of the briefing or an opportunity to comment?
Yes. The OUSD(P) presented three different versions of the same briefing, of which some of the information was supported by available intelligence, to the Secretary of Defense, the DCI, the Deputy National Security Advisor and the Chief of Staff, OVP.
8. Did the staff of the OUSDP undercut the lntelligence Community (IC) in its briefing to the White House staff with a slide that said there were 'fundamental problems' with the way the IC was assessing information concerning the relationship between Iraq and al-Qaeda, and inaccurately suggesting that the IC was requiring 'juridical evidence to support a finding,' while not providing the IC notice of the briefing or an opportunity to comment.
Yes. We believe that the slide undercuts the Intelligence Community by indicating to the recipient of the briefing that there are "fundamental problems" with the way that the Intelligence Community was assessing information.
9. Did the OSD Policy briefing to the White House draw conclusions (or 'findings') that were not supported by the available intelligence, such as the 'intelligence indicates cooperation in all categories; mature, symbiotic relationship', or that there were 'multiple areas of cooperation,' and shared interest and pursuit of WMD, ' and 'some indications of possible Iraqi coordination with a1 Qaida specifically related to 9/11 '
Yes. The briefing did draw conclusions that were not fully supported by the available intelligence.
This is the transcript from congressional report by the inspector general DOD, reporting on the activity of Douglas Feith, Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Policy). This is where the intelligence was manipulated by Feith.
And Bush admin used this manipulated non-intelligence that was not even being shown to the real intelligence community to tell the American public there was a relationship between Iraq and Al Qaeda, such as by VP Cheney on Meet the Press, which I posted the link to his actual words. And that is why I say the Bush admin lied to the american public leading up to the war, in the marketing and selling of the war.