The potential blessings of being an “outsider.”

American_Jihad

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Outsider = good - insider = not so much...
What Does Rex Tillerson Need To Know?
The potential blessings of being an “outsider.”
February 17, 2017
Bruce Thornton
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But the history of U.S. foreign policy since World War II is replete with failures to correctly understand the international landscape, suggesting that technical skills and knowledge may not be enough for managing foreign affairs. In 1956 Dwight Eisenhower and his advisors misinterpreted Egyptian president Gamal Abdul Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal as an act of anticolonial nationalist self-assertion rather than a bid for regional primacy. Nor did they foresee its malign consequences, such as greater Soviet influence in the region at the expense of the United States and Israel. Even more telling, a whole academic discipline, Sovietology, along with the State Department failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, or to imagine that a foreign policy “amateur” like Ronald Reagan could craft a policy––“we win, they lose” –– that hastened its destruction.

Just as consequential for today is the misunderstanding of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, which emboldened a new aggressive phase of Islamic terrorism still roiling the world nearly forty years later. Likewise, the Arab-Israel conflict has been misinterpreted by scholars of international relations, many of whom, despite all evidence to the contrary, continue to believe that Palestinian “national aspirations” and Israeli “settlements,” rather than Islamist doctrines, are the prime driver of not just that conflict, but the rise of jihadist violence elsewhere. Finally, in the last eight years, we have witnessed foreign policy decisions based on faulty or politicized analyses and unexamined assumptions, resulting in the eclipse of our prestige and effectiveness by rivals like Russia and Iran.

These failures reflect the problem of large institutions like government agencies and university disciplines––what the French social critic Alexis Carrel called “professional deformation.” Assured of steady funding and hence unaccountable to the market and, apart from political appointees, to the voters when they fail, such institutions can repeat received wisdom year after year while ignoring contrary evidence or alternative arguments that challenge the institutional paradigm.

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So what, then, should a Secretary of State know? Technical knowledge is not as important as wisdom, common sense, and experience acquired beyond the institutions of government or the university. History, the record of human nature’s consistent behavior in similar circumstances, is more useful than the mastery of abstract theories. Human motives and actions cannot be predicted or managed with the same assurance of success as engineering or science. Mastery of data and facts is not as important as an empathetic understanding of people’s motives and goals, however alien or repugnant they may be to our own. Our goods, like human rights and peace, are not as important to those who believe that faith in a god, national honor, or domination of their neighbors is a greater good. Perceptions of weakness invite aggression by damaging the deterrent value of national prestige founded on our proven willingness to stand by our friends and punish aggressors. The capacity and willingness to wield lethal force is indispensable for protecting our security and interests. And most important, humans are by nature tragically flawed. As Immanuel Kant wrote, “from the crooked timber of humanity nothing straight can be made”—including foreign policy.

Being an “outsider,” then, like Donald Trump or Rex Tillerson, does not condemn a leader to failure. Tillerson’s practical experience with the global economy may in fact be an asset. Unfortunately, the Senate confirmation hearings for the most part focused on what Tillerson might do rather than on why he would do it. Whether the new Secretary of State is successful at helping to restore America’s global prestige and influence, or whether he fails will depend on his wisdom and philosophy of interstate relations, not his lack of technical know-how or a record of service in government institutions.

What Does Rex Tillerson Need To Know?
 
Interesting article. TY for sharing.

Technical knowledge is not as important as wisdom, common sense, and experience acquired beyond the institutions of government or the university.

Thornton is basically saying one needs to basically very intelligent in a general sense. I'm in agreement. Specialization is, as we say, for insects. That's so for pretty much anything at the executive level, which is to say jobs that reward one for innovation, for aggregating and accurately weighting ideas gathered from multiple past observations and experiences. That's basically the definition of an adept problem solver. That's what most senior executives are, but not all of them face the extent of dynamism that turns a decent problem solver into a world class one.

That's not necessarily a bad thing. Companies always need problem solvers, but they don't always need their CEO to be a "star" problem solver. Thus, merely having been a CEO of a public corporation doesn't mean one is a first rate "fixer," as it were, but it does mean one is very intelligent. That's already a good start. The question, as always, is s/he the kind of intelligent needed "right here, right now?"

History, the record of human nature’s consistent behavior in similar circumstances, is more useful than the mastery of abstract theories. Human motives and actions cannot be predicted or managed with the same assurance of success as engineering or science. Mastery of data and facts is not as important as an empathetic understanding of people’s motives and goals, however alien or repugnant they may be to our own.

Agreed.

Being an “outsider,” then, like Donald Trump or Rex Tillerson, does not condemn a leader to failure.

Agreed, for the most part.
  • "Outsider"
    • Being an outsider like Tillerson -- that is, simply not having gov't experience -- is not a problem. He is a level headed guy who's confident in himself and isn't out to prove anything other than by his own accomplishments. People like this are objective and focused on what they have to do.
    • Being an outsider like Trump -- that is, having his egoist traits -- is a problem. He's seemingly confident, but it's all show. He's always "climbing," that is seeking others' approbation of himself as a person. People like him are emotional and focused on what they are.
I don't really have anything against Tillerson and his abilities. The one thing that leads me to oppose his appointment is that he's part of the "insider" class that all CEOs of major public companies are part of. Thus my issue accrues from Trump having advanced progressive notions of being for "the people" and Tillerson is not that kind of guy. Thus the problem has everything to do with Tillerson's not aligning with Trump's stated aims and approach and nothing to do with Rex himself.

Unfortunately, the Senate confirmation hearings for the most part focused on what Tillerson might do rather than on why he would do it.

What, how and why all are important. It seems to me that no matter the "what," the only way to determine whether the individual in question is the right person right now is by finding out what be their answer to "why." So, yes, to the extent Senators didn't adequately quiz Rex about all three, they and the general public have a gap in their understanding of the man and is suitability for the job. In my mind, there's certainly "a" time when Rex'd be the right guy for SoS. Is now, that time? Well, he's got the job, so we'll see. It's a too late to wonder now.
 
From the article:
many believe that creating policy is a professional activity requiring skills and knowledge developed in institutions of higher learning and think tanks.

I think a person does need that kind of intellectual background. I don't think one needs to have worked in those places. I think developing very good critical thinking skills along with obtaining an advanced degree of some sort will provide one part of it. Being well read on history and foreign policy will cover the rest. I think in many cases the reading can be done in the days/weeks/months prior to a given "event" where one is called to articulate policy so long as one is a quick study, which is one of the things that during the process of obtaining an advanced degree one is supposed to learn how to be.

The reason those skills are necessary, both sides believe, is because they’ll help the Secretary of State anticipate developments abroad and respond appropriately.

I don't think that's a bad supposition. I don't think the formal learning will provide the answer in every situation, nor do I think it must control the solution choices one makes. Formal learning is intended to inform one's analytical process and give rigor to it, not define its outcomes.

a whole academic discipline, Sovietology, along with the State Department failed to anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991
I don't want to get too far into this point as I don't have that deep a background in Soviet Studies or USSR economics. In the interest of full disclosure, seeing as Thornton has oversimplified the matter, at least as I understand it....

I do know something about why economists failed to foresee the USSR's economic collapse. Using Soviet figures, as most did -- the exception being intel community economists, and they couldn't disclose their work (it's still not been released as far as I know -- I didn't check just to write this post) in any case -- Western economists were bound to arrive at overly optimistic conclusions about the USSR's potential, for these figures both hid the degree of the Soviet slowdown and seriously overestimated the actual capacity of the economy. In fact, according to figures released by Moscow after 1989, the Soviet economy was not merely smaller than that of the United States but only one-third its size.

Non-government/intel economists didn't fail because the discipline's principles were wrong. They overestimated the solvency of the USSR's economy because they used bad information, very bad. But there wasn't other information to which they had access.

Throughout the 1980s there had been fierce infighting between those in the United States who promoted a strategy of confrontation and others who simply wanted to manage the Soviet Union in a stable bipolar environment. The former, naturally enough, sought to justify their approach by stressing the critical condition of the Soviet economy. Guess where those economists had come from and whom they had or were advising.
 
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