The truth about Truman’s bombing Japan

I recently finished reading three books that question the need for and the morality of Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Steven Walker's Shockwave: Countdown to Hiroshima, Paul Ham's Hiroshima Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath, and Gar Alperovitz's The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb.

One reason this is such a tough issue is that the Japanese of World War II, especially their leaders, are hardly sympathetic characters. One is strongly tempted to say, "Even if there were other ways to end the war without an invasion, the Japanese deserved what they got." Another factor is that we *did* give Japan's leaders assurances, in the Potsdam Declaration, that "unconditional surrender" did not mean endless occupation, nor the destruction of Japan as a nation, and that we would ensure that the Japanese people would be able to elect their own leaders.

I think one fact that has been established rather firmly is that by June 1945 the vast majority of our civilian and military leaders realized there was no need to invade Japan because Japan was already clearly defeated and devastated. So there were other options besides dropping the A-bomb and invading.

Another fact that seems pretty well documented is that, whether intentionally or unintentionally, Truman's statements and posturing played into the hands of Japan's hardline military leaders and made it much harder for Japan's moderate civilian leaders to make the case for surrender.

I was surprised to read of the considerable, indeed overwhelming, evidence that it was the Soviet invasion, not the use of the A-bomb, that finally enabled the moderates to overcome the hardliners and to bring about Japan's surrender. I was not aware that the vast majority of historians who have studied the subject have recognized this fact.

Was Truman a war criminal? Sadly, I think the answer to that question is yes. He seemingly did all he could to ensure that Japan did *not* surrender before the atomic bomb was ready for use, and he ignored the repeated advice that if he would just notify the Japanese, privately or publicly, that "unconditional surrender" did not mean deposing the emperor, the Japanese likely would surrender on terms that were acceptable to us. Even more disturbing, we now know that Truman knew from multiple sources, including decrypted Japanese diplomatic cables, that at least two weeks before we nuked Hiroshima, Japan's emperor was ready to end the war and that the only real sticking point was whether "unconditional surrender" included harming the emperor.
Revisionist clap trap, even after 2 BOMBS the Government REFUSED to surrender and attempted a Coup when the Emperor did surrender.
 
I recently finished reading three books that question the need for and the morality of Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Steven Walker's Shockwave: Countdown to Hiroshima, Paul Ham's Hiroshima Nagasaki: The Real Story of the Atomic Bombings and Their Aftermath, and Gar Alperovitz's The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb.

One reason this is such a tough issue is that the Japanese of World War II, especially their leaders, are hardly sympathetic characters. One is strongly tempted to say, "Even if there were other ways to end the war without an invasion, the Japanese deserved what they got." Another factor is that we *did* give Japan's leaders assurances, in the Potsdam Declaration, that "unconditional surrender" did not mean endless occupation, nor the destruction of Japan as a nation, and that we would ensure that the Japanese people would be able to elect their own leaders.

I think one fact that has been established rather firmly is that by June 1945 the vast majority of our civilian and military leaders realized there was no need to invade Japan because Japan was already clearly defeated and devastated. So there were other options besides dropping the A-bomb and invading.

Another fact that seems pretty well documented is that, whether intentionally or unintentionally, Truman's statements and posturing played into the hands of Japan's hardline military leaders and made it much harder for Japan's moderate civilian leaders to make the case for surrender.

I was surprised to read of the considerable, indeed overwhelming, evidence that it was the Soviet invasion, not the use of the A-bomb, that finally enabled the moderates to overcome the hardliners and to bring about Japan's surrender. I was not aware that the vast majority of historians who have studied the subject have recognized this fact.

Was Truman a war criminal? Sadly, I think the answer to that question is yes. He seemingly did all he could to ensure that Japan did *not* surrender before the atomic bomb was ready for use, and he ignored the repeated advice that if he would just notify the Japanese, privately or publicly, that "unconditional surrender" did not mean deposing the emperor, the Japanese likely would surrender on terms that were acceptable to us. Even more disturbing, we now know that Truman knew from multiple sources, including decrypted Japanese diplomatic cables, that at least two weeks before we nuked Hiroshima, Japan's emperor was ready to end the war and that the only real sticking point was whether "unconditional surrender" included harming the emperor.
Revisionist clap trap, even after 2 BOMBS the Government REFUSED to surrender and attempted a Coup when the Emperor did surrender.


You cling to your security blanket like a child.
 
Facts are not your friend it is HISTORICAL FACT that the Japanese Government refused to surrender even after 2 atomic bombs and that the Emperor had to intervene and order the surrender and THEN it is HISTORICAL FACT that the Army which ran the Government tried a Coup to stop the Emperor.
 
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MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The following information, a sequel to a memorandum dated 13 July ... has been received from Mr. Allen Dulles in Wiesbaden. ...

Jacobsson reports that between 10 and 13 July he had a series of conferences with Yoshimura, a Japanese official attached to the Bank for International Settlements, and Kojiro Kitamura, a director of the Bank, representative of the Yokohama Specie Bank, and former financial attache in Berlin. Yoshimura and Kitamura claim to be acting in consultation with the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, Shunichi Kase, and Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto, former Japanese military attache in Bern, who now is believed to be chief of Japanese Intelligence in Europe. Yoshimura and Kitamura claim further that Kase and Okamoto have direct and secret means of communicating with the Japanese Chief of Staff. Yosbimura also claims that the peace group which he represents includes General Ushijiro Umezu, Army Chief of Staff;16 Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, Minister of Navy; and Shigenori Togo, Foreign Minister.

Yoshimura and Kitamura appeared to Jacobsson no longer to question the principle of unconditional surrender, though at one point they asked whether unconditional military and naval surrender might not be sufficient. On his own initiative Jacobsson replied that such a proposal would not be acceptable to the Allies but would be considered merely a quibble.17Both Japanese officials raised the question of maintaining Japanese territorial integrity, but they apparently did not mean to include Manchukuo, Korea or Formosa.

Throughout discussions with Jacobsson, the Japanese officials stressed only two points: (a) the preservation of the Emperor, and (b) the possibility of returning to the constitution promulgated in 1889. Kitamura prepared and presented to Jacobsson a memorandum asking him to sound out Mr. Dulles' opinion on the two points.

(Mr. Dulles feels that these two Japanese are insisting on the retention of the Emperor because they feel that he alone can take effective action with respect to surrender and that some hope of survival must be held out to him in order to gain his support for unconditional surrender.)

Later Yoshimura and Kitamura prepared a second memorandum in which they asked how, if Tokyo were ready to proceed, conversations could be arranged with Allied representatives and what form of authorization would be required."
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LOL again for the slow stupid and misinformed , the Government of Japan during the end days of World War II was run by the Army. There was a MINORITY of members that were predisposed to peace. They tried several times to bring it up and were shot down EVERY time by the Army. No matter how many times you trot out some peace proposal from the peace faction it does not negate change nor mitigate the fact that the ARMY controlled the Government and HAD NO INTENTION of surrendering. The Government of Japan REFUSED to surrender even after 2 atomic BOMBS it REFUSED, even after the Emperor ordered the surrender the Army attempted a COUP to stop the surrender. At NO TIME did the Army , which ran the Government, EVER propose peace. On several occasions they did offer a cease fire return to 41 start lines except in China and no occupation.
 
"
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

* * *

Immediately following is a summary of a report by Per Jacobsson, a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, transmitted to Mr. Dulles through an intermediary:

The Japanese Chief of Staff has acknowledged without comment a long cable which Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto sent from Switzerland on 19 July. Okamoto's telegram reportedly stated that Japan has lost the war and must promptly accept the consequences. ...

The Japanese Foreign Minister has also acknowledged a detailed report from Shunichi Kase, Japanese Minister in Bern. Kase's report, sent on or about 21 July, included (a) Mr. Grew's statement of 10 July, (b) a memorandum from Kojiro Kitamura, director of the Bank for International Settlements and former financial attache in Berlin, who has been active in the current Japanese approaches to Mr. Dulles, and (c) a statement of Kase's own position. The Foreign Minister's reply to Kase's message contained the following query: "Is that all you have to say?" Kase interprets this query as an invitation to continue peace approaches.

The recent tripartite ultimatum to Japan21 has been the chief topic of discussion among Japanese groups in Switzerland. Their first reaction, on the basis of excerpts published in the Swiss press, was that (a) the proclamation showed a lack of understanding of Japanese character, (b) the document should have not been framed on a basis of "take it or leave it," (c) the inclusion of China as a signatory represented an "added element of humiliation," and (d) the document should have been sent through private channels rather than publicly. After receiving the full English text through Jacobsson, and after further study, the attitude of the group changed, and the proclamation was accepted as an "astute document which left a possible way out." The group was particularly impressed by "unconditional surrender" in connection with the "Japanese armed forces" and to the reference to revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. As a result, a telegram stressing these points was to be sent to Tokyo on 30 July.

The following is a summary of a memorandum to Mr. Dulles from the Japanese group in contact with Per Jacobsson. Jacobsson transmitted this memo along with his own report summarized above.

The Japanese group emphasizes that it is hoping for some decision within a week unless "resistance is too great." The Allies should not take "too seriously" what was said over the Tokyo radio about the tripartite proclamation.22 This radio comment was merely "propaganda to maintain morale in Japan." The real reply will be given through some "official channel," possibly by Minister Kase or General Okamoto, if an official Government reply is not made over the Tokyo radio.

Mr. Dulles also has been informed, by a German authority on the Far East living in Switzerland who is one of his regular contacts, that Yosikazu23 Fujimura, a Japanese Navy representative in Bern, has sent seven long cables to his superiors in Tokyo during the past two months urging immediate cessation of hostilities. His superiors cabled in reply that the Japanese Navy no longer is able to "act alone," and instructed Fujimura not to take the initiative without orders from Tokyo, but to maintain his "most valuable contacts.""
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"
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

* * *

Immediately following is a summary of a report by Per Jacobsson, a Swedish national and economic adviser to the Bank for International Settlements, transmitted to Mr. Dulles through an intermediary:

The Japanese Chief of Staff has acknowledged without comment a long cable which Brigadier General Kiyotomi Okamoto sent from Switzerland on 19 July. Okamoto's telegram reportedly stated that Japan has lost the war and must promptly accept the consequences. ...

The Japanese Foreign Minister has also acknowledged a detailed report from Shunichi Kase, Japanese Minister in Bern. Kase's report, sent on or about 21 July, included (a) Mr. Grew's statement of 10 July, (b) a memorandum from Kojiro Kitamura, director of the Bank for International Settlements and former financial attache in Berlin, who has been active in the current Japanese approaches to Mr. Dulles, and (c) a statement of Kase's own position. The Foreign Minister's reply to Kase's message contained the following query: "Is that all you have to say?" Kase interprets this query as an invitation to continue peace approaches.

The recent tripartite ultimatum to Japan21 has been the chief topic of discussion among Japanese groups in Switzerland. Their first reaction, on the basis of excerpts published in the Swiss press, was that (a) the proclamation showed a lack of understanding of Japanese character, (b) the document should have not been framed on a basis of "take it or leave it," (c) the inclusion of China as a signatory represented an "added element of humiliation," and (d) the document should have been sent through private channels rather than publicly. After receiving the full English text through Jacobsson, and after further study, the attitude of the group changed, and the proclamation was accepted as an "astute document which left a possible way out." The group was particularly impressed by "unconditional surrender" in connection with the "Japanese armed forces" and to the reference to revival and strengthening of democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. As a result, a telegram stressing these points was to be sent to Tokyo on 30 July.

The following is a summary of a memorandum to Mr. Dulles from the Japanese group in contact with Per Jacobsson. Jacobsson transmitted this memo along with his own report summarized above.

The Japanese group emphasizes that it is hoping for some decision within a week unless "resistance is too great." The Allies should not take "too seriously" what was said over the Tokyo radio about the tripartite proclamation.22 This radio comment was merely "propaganda to maintain morale in Japan." The real reply will be given through some "official channel," possibly by Minister Kase or General Okamoto, if an official Government reply is not made over the Tokyo radio.

Mr. Dulles also has been informed, by a German authority on the Far East living in Switzerland who is one of his regular contacts, that Yosikazu23 Fujimura, a Japanese Navy representative in Bern, has sent seven long cables to his superiors in Tokyo during the past two months urging immediate cessation of hostilities. His superiors cabled in reply that the Japanese Navy no longer is able to "act alone," and instructed Fujimura not to take the initiative without orders from Tokyo, but to maintain his "most valuable contacts.""
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You can post that all you want it is NOT then nor now from the Government of Japan. it even states i your quote where the Navy made the offer, again DUMB FUCK the ARMY controlled the Government, further your OWN link STATES they actually were NOT to make the offer with OUT Government authority.
 
so the plan is to --------wait?? not use the bombs and ---wait???!!
till when??
out of about 20,000 Japanese on Iwo Jima, only about 300 taken prisoner/etc
they are NOT surrendering
they put up an even tougher defense on Okinawa--with OVER 10,000 American dead
I say again --ten THOUSAND American dead--over FORTY THOUSAND casualties



Neither one of those battles necessarily had to happen at all if the scumbag FDR hadn’t completely ignored the overtures for surrender the general MacArthur and forward it to him before the scum bag and left for Yalta. He glanced at the extensive report MacArthur had sent and dismissed it. Did not even take or mention the offer of surrender at Yalta.
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so the plan is to --------wait?? not use the bombs and ---wait???!!
till when??
out of about 20,000 Japanese on Iwo Jima, only about 300 taken prisoner/etc
they are NOT surrendering
they put up an even tougher defense on Okinawa--with OVER 10,000 American dead
I say again --ten THOUSAND American dead--over FORTY THOUSAND casualties



Neither one of those battles necessarily had to happen at all if the scumbag FDR hadn’t completely ignored the overtures for surrender the general MacArthur and forward it to him before the scum bag and left for Yalta. He glanced at the extensive report MacArthur had sent and dismissed it. Did not even take or mention the offer of surrender at Yalta.
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if if if if if if if if if you have a lot of ifs
the Japanese were NOT surrendering--period
 
so the plan is to --------wait?? not use the bombs and ---wait???!!
till when??
out of about 20,000 Japanese on Iwo Jima, only about 300 taken prisoner/etc
they are NOT surrendering
they put up an even tougher defense on Okinawa--with OVER 10,000 American dead
I say again --ten THOUSAND American dead--over FORTY THOUSAND casualties



Neither one of those battles necessarily had to happen at all if the scumbag FDR hadn’t completely ignored the overtures for surrender the general MacArthur and forward it to him before the scum bag and left for Yalta. He glanced at the extensive report MacArthur had sent and dismissed it. Did not even take or mention the offer of surrender at Yalta.
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if if if if if if if if if you have a lot of ifs
the Japanese were NOT surrendering--period




Of course FDR had no interest in peace, the bloodthirsty scum bag.
 
What if you found out that Japan was desperately seeking to negotiate terms of surrender? Would it change your mind about the use of nuclear weapons against Japanese civilians? My guess is ...no.

No "what if" about it. Japan refused to surrender, the two bombs were dropped and millions of lives were saved. IF you'd have done differently, then you are a cruel, unthinking person.

Wings-S.jpg
 
The best American value is that many Americans didn't die in the invasion of Japan.
Yeah...mass murder civilians of a defenseless nation ready to surrender, based on inaccurate information.

Ike said don’t drop those bombs. Admiral Leahy said don’t drop those bombs.
They were not ready to surrender. They didn't even surrender after we dropped an atomic bomb on them. It took two to bring them to their knees.
 
All this talk about the servicemen who might have died in a hypothetical invasion, but where is the outrage over the servicemen who DID die on Iwo and Okinawa? Both of those battles took place after the scumbag fdr ignored rather than explored the overtures for surrender that MacArthur had informed him of.
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Japan knew of & expected serious retaliation for Pearl Harbor and I surely wouldn't call them defenseless.



I just don't think anyone expected such destruction

If a nation destroys an enemy's naval base for starters what destruction would be appropriate? Maybe if the Japanese cut off the heads of our fliers the destruction would have seemed more appropriate? What do you think?
Japan did a lot of cutting off heads during the war to POWs and civilian POW. Then there was the death marches. Starvation and about every other bad deaths. I had not problems with total bombing of the whole Nation.
 
The best American value is that many Americans didn't die in the invasion of Japan.
Yeah...mass murder civilians of a defenseless nation ready to surrender, based on inaccurate information.

Ike said don’t drop those bombs. Admiral Leahy said don’t drop those bombs.

Ike did not even KNOW about the bombs....
IKE was not in the area he was in Europe, better read some history on this part of the war.
 
All this talk about the servicemen who might have died in a hypothetical invasion, but where is the outrage over the servicemen who DID die on Iwo and Okinawa? Both of those battles took place after the scumbag fdr ignored rather than explored the overtures for surrender that MacArthur had informed him of.
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Again for the STUPIDLY SLOW and MORONIC the Army controlled the Government and NEVER once offered to surrender. And when the Emperor DID surrender the Army tried to stage a Coup.
 
so the plan is to --------wait?? not use the bombs and ---wait???!!
till when??
out of about 20,000 Japanese on Iwo Jima, only about 300 taken prisoner/etc
they are NOT surrendering
they put up an even tougher defense on Okinawa--with OVER 10,000 American dead
I say again --ten THOUSAND American dead--over FORTY THOUSAND casualties



Neither one of those battles necessarily had to happen at all if the scumbag FDR hadn’t completely ignored the overtures for surrender the general MacArthur and forward it to him before the scum bag and left for Yalta. He glanced at the extensive report MacArthur had sent and dismissed it. Did not even take or mention the offer of surrender at Yalta.
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if if if if if if if if if you have a lot of ifs
the Japanese were NOT surrendering--period




Of course FDR had no interest in peace, the bloodthirsty scum bag.
if if if if if if if
you think in fairytale terms, not reality
 
The best American value is that many Americans didn't die in the invasion of Japan.
Yeah...mass murder civilians of a defenseless nation ready to surrender, based on inaccurate information.

Ike said don’t drop those bombs. Admiral Leahy said don’t drop those bombs.

Ike did not even KNOW about the bombs....
IKE was not in the area he was in Europe, better read some history on this part of the war.
LOL. You both proved you don’t know WTF you are posting.

Please learn...

Key Issues: Nuclear Weapons: History: Pre Cold War: Hiroshima and Nagasaki: Eisenhower's Opinion on the Atomic Bomb
 

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