320 Years of History
Gold Member
I don't know what Picaro wrote, so I'll take your word for it.
As for IEDs and other guerilla tactics, they are elements of an underdog's arsenal. Shame on the "top dog" that doesn't anticipate them. In this day whereby U.S. military might dwarfs that of all our actual combatant opponents, and our military peers know that full-on armed conflict with us can likely lead to an outcome that desireable for neither side no matter which "wins," it's all but a foregone conclusion that the U.S. will find itself fighting in asymmetric battles/wars. As William Cohen said, "the post-Cold War world of the 1990s was a 'paradox [where] American military superiority actually increase[d] the threat of... attack against [the U.S.] by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us asymmetrically.'"
- Strategic Asymmetric Deception and Its Role in the Current Threat Environment
Asymmetric warfare comprises attempts to circumvent or undermine an opposing force's strengths while exploiting his weaknesses and vulnerabilities. The weaker party does this using methods that differ significantly from the apparently stronger party; the weaker party typically employs innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons, or technologies that can be applied at all levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—and across the spectrum of military operations.
- How the Weak Win Wars
- The following typology of ideal-type strategies is a useful starting point for analysis:
- Attack (strong actor) strategies:
- direct attack
- barbarism
- Defense (weak actor) strategies:
- direct defense
- guerrilla warfare strategy
- Attack (strong actor) strategies:
- The following typology of ideal-type strategies is a useful starting point for analysis:
Guerrilla warfare strategy (GWS) is the organization of a portion of society for the purpose of imposing costs on an adversary using armed forces trained to avoid direct confrontation. These costs include the loss of soldiers, supplies, infrastructure, peace of mind, and most important, time. Although GWS primarily targets opposing armed forces and their support resources, its goal is to destroy not the capacity but the will of the attacker.
GWS requires two elements: (1) physical sanctuary (e.g., swamps, mountains, thick forest, or jungle) or political sanctuary (e.g., weakly defended border areas or border areas controlled by sympathetic states), and (2) a supportive population (to supply ghters with intelligence and logistical support, as well as replacements). The method of GWS is well summarized by perhaps its most famous practitioner, Mao Tse-tung:
GWS is not a strategy for obtaining a quick, decisive defeat of invading or occupying forces. Moreover, because guerrillas cannot hold or defend particular areas, they do not provide security for their families while on operations or when demobilized to await new missions. GWS is therefore a strategy that requires placing key values (e.g., farms, family, religious or cultural sites, and towns) directly in the hands of the adversary. Logically then, important costs of adopting a GWS depend on both the purpose and the restraint of the adversary. When invading or occupying forces do not exercise restraint in the use of force, or when their purpose is the destruction of a weak actor’s people, GWS can become a prohibitively expensive defensive strategy.
GWS requires two elements: (1) physical sanctuary (e.g., swamps, mountains, thick forest, or jungle) or political sanctuary (e.g., weakly defended border areas or border areas controlled by sympathetic states), and (2) a supportive population (to supply ghters with intelligence and logistical support, as well as replacements). The method of GWS is well summarized by perhaps its most famous practitioner, Mao Tse-tung:
“In guerrilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and attacking from the west; avoid the solid, attack the hollow; attack; withdraw; deliver a lightning blow, seek a lightning decision. When guerrillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws. In guerrilla strategy, the enemy’s rear, anks, and other vulnerable spots are his vital points, and there he must be harassed, attacked, dispersed, exhausted, and annihilated.”
GWS is not a strategy for obtaining a quick, decisive defeat of invading or occupying forces. Moreover, because guerrillas cannot hold or defend particular areas, they do not provide security for their families while on operations or when demobilized to await new missions. GWS is therefore a strategy that requires placing key values (e.g., farms, family, religious or cultural sites, and towns) directly in the hands of the adversary. Logically then, important costs of adopting a GWS depend on both the purpose and the restraint of the adversary. When invading or occupying forces do not exercise restraint in the use of force, or when their purpose is the destruction of a weak actor’s people, GWS can become a prohibitively expensive defensive strategy.
- GLOBALIZATION AND ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE
Globalization is having a tremendous effect on the ability of terrorist and criminal organizations to act on a global scale. These organizations are using asymmetrical means to target U.S. interests at home and abroad. The events of September 11th were the culminating effect of this trend that has played an increasingly greater role in the world in which we live.
Obama won the 2012 election by about 4 points nationally ... that translated into an electoral landslide.
