Kimmel and Short were guilty at Pearl Harbor

[harmonica]

..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spying

 

[Hossfly]

..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spying

Gordon Prange wrote some excellent books worth reading about Pearl Harbor and the Pacific theater. Here's a short summation from Wikipedia. IMO Pearl Harbor should not have happened.




Gordon Prange

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from At Dawn We Slept)
Jump to navigationJump to search

Professor Prange teaching his history class at the University of Maryland in 1964​

Gordon William Prange (July 16, 1910 – May 15, 1980) was the author of several World War II historical manuscripts which were published by his co-workers after his death in 1980. Prange was a Professor of History at the University of Maryland from 1937 to 1980 with a break of nine years (1942–1951) of military service overseas, and in the postwar era of military occupation of Japan, when he was the Chief Historian in General Douglas MacArthur's staff.[1] It was during this time that Prange collected material from and interviewed many Japanese military officers, enlisted men, and civilians, with the information later being used in the writing of his books. Several became New York Times bestsellers, including At Dawn We Slept and Miracle at Midway.
Prange's 1963 Tora! Tora! Tora!, published in the November and December issues of Reader's Digest, and later expanded into At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story Of Pearl Harbor, portrayed the attack on Pearl Harbor, and is credited as the basis for the screenplay of the film Tora! Tora! Tora!, which was produced in 1970, while Prange took a leave of absence from the University of Maryland to serve as the technical consultant during its filming. His extensive research into the attack on Pearl Harbor was the subject of a Public Broadcasting Service television program in 2000, Prange and Pearl Harbor: A Magnificent Obsession, and was acclaimed "a definitive book on the event" by The Washington Post.[2]

 

[Ringel05]

..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spying

Despite the fact that so many in positions of command anticipated a Japanese attack, especially given the failure of diplomacy (Japan refused U.S. demands to withdraw from both the Axis pact and occupied territories in China and Indochina), no one expected Hawaii as the target.

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-war-warning-is-sent-to-commanders-in-the-pacific

It was a failure from the top down, everyone believed Hawaii was too far away and too strong to be attacked.
Kimmel and Short were scapegoats.

Now one commander that was guilty as hell was MacArthur, he was told of the Japanese attack on Pearl and ordered to prepare his air forces accordingly and expect an attack from the Japanese. He acknowledged those orders then did nothing, the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground the same way (and in the same parked configurations) as in Hawaii but obviously he did not suffer the same fate as Kimmel and Short.
Also, specifically in Africa the main ground commander, Fredendall was still "stuck" in WWI with his thinking and also tended to play his subordinate commanders off against each other while making no real decisions. Things obviously changed when Patton replaced him.
We were litterally "An Army at Dawn" as Atkinson wrote about in an excellent book with the same title.
We also had a lot of learning to do in the pacific in all branches of service specifically with moribund attitudes and ideas at the upper echelons of military command and control.

 

[Ringel05]

..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spying

Gordon Prange wrote some excellent books worth reading about Pearl Harbor and the Pacific theater. Here's a short summation from Wikipedia. IMO Pearl Harbor should not have happened.




Gordon Prange

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from At Dawn We Slept)
Jump to navigationJump to search

​

Professor Prange teaching his history class at the University of Maryland in 1964​

Gordon William Prange (July 16, 1910 – May 15, 1980) was the author of several World War II historical manuscripts which were published by his co-workers after his death in 1980. Prange was a Professor of History at the University of Maryland from 1937 to 1980 with a break of nine years (1942–1951) of military service overseas, and in the postwar era of military occupation of Japan, when he was the Chief Historian in General Douglas MacArthur's staff.[1] It was during this time that Prange collected material from and interviewed many Japanese military officers, enlisted men, and civilians, with the information later being used in the writing of his books. Several became New York Times bestsellers, including At Dawn We Slept and Miracle at Midway.
Prange's 1963 Tora! Tora! Tora!, published in the November and December issues of Reader's Digest, and later expanded into At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story Of Pearl Harbor, portrayed the attack on Pearl Harbor, and is credited as the basis for the screenplay of the film Tora! Tora! Tora!, which was produced in 1970, while Prange took a leave of absence from the University of Maryland to serve as the technical consultant during its filming. His extensive research into the attack on Pearl Harbor was the subject of a Public Broadcasting Service television program in 2000, Prange and Pearl Harbor: A Magnificent Obsession, and was acclaimed "a definitive book on the event" by The Washington Post.[2]

Things are always 20/20 in retrospect.........

 

[rightwinger]

Both Kimmel and Short believed sabotage to be the greatest threat to Hawaii. A carrier based air attack of the magnitude of Pearl Harbor had never been executed

It was American hero Gen MacArthur who was caught unprepared. He had 20 hours notice yet still was caught with his aircraft on the ground

 

[harmonica]

..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spying

Despite the fact that so many in positions of command anticipated a Japanese attack, especially given the failure of diplomacy (Japan refused U.S. demands to withdraw from both the Axis pact and occupied territories in China and Indochina), no one expected Hawaii as the target.

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-war-warning-is-sent-to-commanders-in-the-pacific

It was a failure from the top down, everyone believed Hawaii was too far away and too strong to be attacked.
Kimmel and Short were scapegoats.

Now one commander that was guilty as hell was MacArthur, he was told of the Japanese attack on Pearl and ordered to prepare his air forces accordingly and expect an attack from the Japanese. He acknowledged those orders then did nothing, the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground the same way (and in the same parked configurations) as in Hawaii but obviously he did not suffer the same fate as Kimmel and Short.
Also, specifically in Africa the main ground commander, Fredendall was still "stuck" in WWI with his thinking and also tended to play his subordinate commanders off against each other while making no real decisions. Things obviously changed when Patton replaced him.
We were litterally "An Army at Dawn" as Atkinson wrote about in an excellent book with the same title.
We also had a lot of learning to do in the pacific in all branches of service specifically with moribund attitudes and ideas at the upper echelons of military command and control.

they had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Taranto
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable

 

[harmonica]

Both Kimmel and Short believed sabotage to be the greatest threat to Hawaii. A carrier based air attack of the magnitude of Pearl Harbor had never been executed

It was American hero Gen MacArthur who was caught unprepared. He had 20 hours notice yet still was caught with his aircraft on the ground

AFTER Taranto !!!! they should've known--see my post above

 

[rightwinger]

..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spying

Despite the fact that so many in positions of command anticipated a Japanese attack, especially given the failure of diplomacy (Japan refused U.S. demands to withdraw from both the Axis pact and occupied territories in China and Indochina), no one expected Hawaii as the target.

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-war-warning-is-sent-to-commanders-in-the-pacific

It was a failure from the top down, everyone believed Hawaii was too far away and too strong to be attacked.
Kimmel and Short were scapegoats.

Now one commander that was guilty as hell was MacArthur, he was told of the Japanese attack on Pearl and ordered to prepare his air forces accordingly and expect an attack from the Japanese. He acknowledged those orders then did nothing, the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground the same way (and in the same parked configurations) as in Hawaii but obviously he did not suffer the same fate as Kimmel and Short.
Also, specifically in Africa the main ground commander, Fredendall was still "stuck" in WWI with his thinking and also tended to play his subordinate commanders off against each other while making no real decisions. Things obviously changed when Patton replaced him.
We were litterally "An Army at Dawn" as Atkinson wrote about in an excellent book with the same title.
We also had a lot of learning to do in the pacific in all branches of service specifically with moribund attitudes and ideas at the upper echelons of military command and control.

they had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Taranto
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable

Monday morning quarterbacking

 

[harmonica]

..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spying

Gordon Prange wrote some excellent books worth reading about Pearl Harbor and the Pacific theater. Here's a short summation from Wikipedia. IMO Pearl Harbor should not have happened.




Gordon Prange

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
(Redirected from At Dawn We Slept)
Jump to navigationJump to search

​

Professor Prange teaching his history class at the University of Maryland in 1964​

Gordon William Prange (July 16, 1910 – May 15, 1980) was the author of several World War II historical manuscripts which were published by his co-workers after his death in 1980. Prange was a Professor of History at the University of Maryland from 1937 to 1980 with a break of nine years (1942–1951) of military service overseas, and in the postwar era of military occupation of Japan, when he was the Chief Historian in General Douglas MacArthur's staff.[1] It was during this time that Prange collected material from and interviewed many Japanese military officers, enlisted men, and civilians, with the information later being used in the writing of his books. Several became New York Times bestsellers, including At Dawn We Slept and Miracle at Midway.
Prange's 1963 Tora! Tora! Tora!, published in the November and December issues of Reader's Digest, and later expanded into At Dawn We Slept: The Untold Story Of Pearl Harbor, portrayed the attack on Pearl Harbor, and is credited as the basis for the screenplay of the film Tora! Tora! Tora!, which was produced in 1970, while Prange took a leave of absence from the University of Maryland to serve as the technical consultant during its filming. His extensive research into the attack on Pearl Harbor was the subject of a Public Broadcasting Service television program in 2000, Prange and Pearl Harbor: A Magnificent Obsession, and was acclaimed "a definitive book on the event" by The Washington Post.[2]

I've read both--many years ago

 

[harmonica]

..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spying

Despite the fact that so many in positions of command anticipated a Japanese attack, especially given the failure of diplomacy (Japan refused U.S. demands to withdraw from both the Axis pact and occupied territories in China and Indochina), no one expected Hawaii as the target.

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-war-warning-is-sent-to-commanders-in-the-pacific

It was a failure from the top down, everyone believed Hawaii was too far away and too strong to be attacked.
Kimmel and Short were scapegoats.

Now one commander that was guilty as hell was MacArthur, he was told of the Japanese attack on Pearl and ordered to prepare his air forces accordingly and expect an attack from the Japanese. He acknowledged those orders then did nothing, the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground the same way (and in the same parked configurations) as in Hawaii but obviously he did not suffer the same fate as Kimmel and Short.
Also, specifically in Africa the main ground commander, Fredendall was still "stuck" in WWI with his thinking and also tended to play his subordinate commanders off against each other while making no real decisions. Things obviously changed when Patton replaced him.
We were litterally "An Army at Dawn" as Atkinson wrote about in an excellent book with the same title.
We also had a lot of learning to do in the pacific in all branches of service specifically with moribund attitudes and ideas at the upper echelons of military command and control.

they had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Taranto
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable

Monday morning quarterbacking

goes both ways--doesn't it

 

[task0778]

I'm no expert, but I think Kimmel and Short got numerous warning in the months leading up to the actual attack, and the troops were getting pretty tired of going on alert when nothing happened. And at the time the prevailing opinion was probably that the Japanese wouldn't dare attack us without at least a formal warning. U.S. officials doubted Pearl Harbor would be the first target; instead, they expected the Philippines would be attacked first. This presumption was due to the threat that the air bases throughout the country and the naval base at Manila posed to sea lanes, as well as to the shipment of supplies to Japan from territory to the south. It was a misjudgement on the part of a whole bunch of people in the Army and Navy and the Roosevelt Administration.

 

[fncceo]

I don't even think they were alive when Pearl Harbor happened.

 

[rightwinger]

..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spying

Despite the fact that so many in positions of command anticipated a Japanese attack, especially given the failure of diplomacy (Japan refused U.S. demands to withdraw from both the Axis pact and occupied territories in China and Indochina), no one expected Hawaii as the target.

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-war-warning-is-sent-to-commanders-in-the-pacific

It was a failure from the top down, everyone believed Hawaii was too far away and too strong to be attacked.
Kimmel and Short were scapegoats.

Now one commander that was guilty as hell was MacArthur, he was told of the Japanese attack on Pearl and ordered to prepare his air forces accordingly and expect an attack from the Japanese. He acknowledged those orders then did nothing, the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground the same way (and in the same parked configurations) as in Hawaii but obviously he did not suffer the same fate as Kimmel and Short.
Also, specifically in Africa the main ground commander, Fredendall was still "stuck" in WWI with his thinking and also tended to play his subordinate commanders off against each other while making no real decisions. Things obviously changed when Patton replaced him.
We were litterally "An Army at Dawn" as Atkinson wrote about in an excellent book with the same title.
We also had a lot of learning to do in the pacific in all branches of service specifically with moribund attitudes and ideas at the upper echelons of military command and control.

they had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Taranto
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable

Monday morning quarterbacking

goes both ways--doesn't it

How so?

 

[rightwinger]

I'm no expert, but I think Kimmel and Short got numerous warning in the months leading up to the actual attack, and the troops were getting pretty tired of going on alert when nothing happened. And at the time the prevailing opinion was probably that the Japanese wouldn't dare attack us without at least a formal warning. U.S. officials doubted Pearl Harbor would be the first target; instead, they expected the Philippines would be attacked first. This presumption was due to the threat that the air bases throughout the country and the naval base at Manila posed to sea lanes, as well as to the shipment of supplies to Japan from territory to the south. It was a misjudgement on the part of a whole bunch of people in the Army and Navy and the Roosevelt Administration.

Agree

In retrospect, you ask..what were you thinking?
But a massive air attack did not rank high as a threat

Kimmel and Short took the blame, but nobody was advising them differently

 

[Sunsettommy]

..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spying

Despite the fact that so many in positions of command anticipated a Japanese attack, especially given the failure of diplomacy (Japan refused U.S. demands to withdraw from both the Axis pact and occupied territories in China and Indochina), no one expected Hawaii as the target.

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-war-warning-is-sent-to-commanders-in-the-pacific

It was a failure from the top down, everyone believed Hawaii was too far away and too strong to be attacked.
Kimmel and Short were scapegoats.

Now one commander that was guilty as hell was MacArthur, he was told of the Japanese attack on Pearl and ordered to prepare his air forces accordingly and expect an attack from the Japanese. He acknowledged those orders then did nothing, the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground the same way (and in the same parked configurations) as in Hawaii but obviously he did not suffer the same fate as Kimmel and Short.
Also, specifically in Africa the main ground commander, Fredendall was still "stuck" in WWI with his thinking and also tended to play his subordinate commanders off against each other while making no real decisions. Things obviously changed when Patton replaced him.
We were litterally "An Army at Dawn" as Atkinson wrote about in an excellent book with the same title.
We also had a lot of learning to do in the pacific in all branches of service specifically with moribund attitudes and ideas at the upper echelons of military command and control.

they had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Taranto
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable

Kimmel and his Predecessor knew all about the problems of Pear Harbor, but were let down in several ways, they were not given access to the Ultra information, were given vague even contradictory statements from Washington on how to determine threat assessment. They were pushed into FULL alert a number of times with ZERO results.

Admiral James Richardson was removed by President Roosevelt because he didn't like what Richardson was saying about Pear Harbor and more, from WIKIPEDIA:

"He held this position during a stressful period marked by Presidential orders to deploy the Pacific part of the fleet to Pearl Harbor from its traditional naval base in San Diego, California. Richardson noted that:

... In 1940, the policy-making branch of the Government in foreign affairs – the President and the Secretary of State – thought that stationing the Fleet in Hawaii would restrain the Japanese. They did not ask their senior military advisors whether it would accomplish such an end.[2]

Richardson protested this redeployment to President Franklin D. Roosevelt and to others in Washington. He did believe that advanced bases like Guam and Hawaii were necessary but that insufficient funding and efforts had been made to prepare them for use in wartime. He also believed future battles in the Pacific would involve aircraft carriers and more scouting forces would be needed to locate them. Richardson recognized how vulnerable the Fleet was in such an exposed and remote position, a logistical nightmare only made worse by the slim resources, and lack of preparation and organization.[3] Richardson argued such a forward defense was not practical or useful, despite Japan's attack on China and whatever promises had been made to Britain to come to their aid if attacked. According to journalist John T. Flynn:[1] The fleet had little in the way of housing, materials, or defensive mechanisms at Pearl Harbor. Richardson wanted to return to the West Coast, prepare the fleet, and then perhaps return to Pearl Harbor.

It was Richardson's belief – and indeed generally supported by the Navy – that the Fleet should never be berthed inside Pearl Harbor where it would be a mark for attack. This was particularly true in such troubled times when the airways of the East were hot with rumors of approaching conflict. What is more, Richardson held the belief that Pearl Harbor was the logical first point of attack for the Japanese High Command, wedded as it was to the theory of undeclared and surprise warfare. For ten years the U.S. Navy held "attacks" on the Army defenses at Pearl Harbor, and were always successful. Defending the base was rather hopeless, in his mind."

=========================================================================================================

Ooops you were wrong since Richardson and Kimmel KNEW it was not an ideal base for the fleet, that Richardson tried to convince the President to keep the fleet at San Diego, was fired eventually. Kimmel and Richardson knew about Taranto too, they knew that even with the shallow bay, the ships were sitting ducks and they knew it, but the President and other government officials ignored it.

The movie TORA, TORA, TORA, accurately showed how the two men Kimmel and Short were never given important intelligence reports from ULTRA. The base was poorly sited for the Fleet where they become sitting ducks when the attacks came.

Kimmel and Short were scapegoated.

 

[Ringel05]

..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spying

Despite the fact that so many in positions of command anticipated a Japanese attack, especially given the failure of diplomacy (Japan refused U.S. demands to withdraw from both the Axis pact and occupied territories in China and Indochina), no one expected Hawaii as the target.

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-war-warning-is-sent-to-commanders-in-the-pacific

It was a failure from the top down, everyone believed Hawaii was too far away and too strong to be attacked.
Kimmel and Short were scapegoats.

Now one commander that was guilty as hell was MacArthur, he was told of the Japanese attack on Pearl and ordered to prepare his air forces accordingly and expect an attack from the Japanese. He acknowledged those orders then did nothing, the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground the same way (and in the same parked configurations) as in Hawaii but obviously he did not suffer the same fate as Kimmel and Short.
Also, specifically in Africa the main ground commander, Fredendall was still "stuck" in WWI with his thinking and also tended to play his subordinate commanders off against each other while making no real decisions. Things obviously changed when Patton replaced him.
We were litterally "An Army at Dawn" as Atkinson wrote about in an excellent book with the same title.
We also had a lot of learning to do in the pacific in all branches of service specifically with moribund attitudes and ideas at the upper echelons of military command and control.

they had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Taranto
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable

Typically military thinking follows previous wars and as rightwinger said no one on our side expected a carrier attack, carrier use and tactics were still in their infancy and our Navy was still stuck on battleship war tactics. The Japanese attack on Pearl opened everyone's eyes.

 

[Picaro]

Our intelligence network was tiny to non-existent, consisting almost entirely of volunteer reports form a good old boy' network of businessmen and wealthy international travelers, with a smattering of FBI liaisons in a few embassies. Our intelligence agencies had to grow up during war on three fronts and during the Cold War, hardly ideal breathing room for secure and thorough development. 'Mistakes were made', WAHHHH WAHHHH!!! WE"RE EVUUULLLLL!!!! and all that, now move on. The fact is, Republicans and the anti-Roosevelt Democrats did everything possible to sabotage American readiness and pre-war defense spending, and we know whose intelligence was far more defective: The Nazis and the Japanese had their countries reduced to rubble in less than four years; kind of ridiculous to whine about our relatively minor failures.

 

[Ridgerunner]

Our intelligence network was tiny to non-existent, consisting almost entirely of volunteer reports form a good old boy' network of businessmen and wealthy international travelers, with a smattering of FBI liaisons in a few embassies. Our intelligence agencies had to grow up during war on three fronts and during the Cold War, hardly ideal breathing room for secure and thorough development. 'Mistakes were made', WAHHHH WAHHHH!!! WE"RE EVUUULLLLL!!!! and all that, now move on. The fact is, Republicans and the anti-Roosevelt Democrats did everything possible to sabotage American readiness and pre-war defense spending, and we know whose intelligence was far more defective: The Nazis and the Japanese had their countries reduced to rubble in less than four years; kind of ridiculous to whine about our relatively minor failures.

Your spot on re: any intelligence network especially here on Oahu... My Father-in-law was in the Army Air Corp stationed at Wheeler Airfield in Wahiawa... He was selected to do some surveillance on some civilians who had fallen under suspicion... For 3 months he watched 3 different German families... Nothing ever came out of the surveillance and was discontinued after 12/07/41... Wheeler Airfield was the first place the Japanese attacked... F I L had an older brother that was stationed at Wheeler also... Neither was hurt during the attack. They were separated for a few days but finally run into each other...
Point to the story is Germans were selected to surveil when the threat was actually the Japanese... Tiny to non-existent...

 

[harmonica]

..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spying

Despite the fact that so many in positions of command anticipated a Japanese attack, especially given the failure of diplomacy (Japan refused U.S. demands to withdraw from both the Axis pact and occupied territories in China and Indochina), no one expected Hawaii as the target.

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-war-warning-is-sent-to-commanders-in-the-pacific

It was a failure from the top down, everyone believed Hawaii was too far away and too strong to be attacked.
Kimmel and Short were scapegoats.

Now one commander that was guilty as hell was MacArthur, he was told of the Japanese attack on Pearl and ordered to prepare his air forces accordingly and expect an attack from the Japanese. He acknowledged those orders then did nothing, the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground the same way (and in the same parked configurations) as in Hawaii but obviously he did not suffer the same fate as Kimmel and Short.
Also, specifically in Africa the main ground commander, Fredendall was still "stuck" in WWI with his thinking and also tended to play his subordinate commanders off against each other while making no real decisions. Things obviously changed when Patton replaced him.
We were litterally "An Army at Dawn" as Atkinson wrote about in an excellent book with the same title.
We also had a lot of learning to do in the pacific in all branches of service specifically with moribund attitudes and ideas at the upper echelons of military command and control.

they had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Taranto
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable

Typically military thinking follows previous wars and as rightwinger said no one on our side expected a carrier attack, carrier use and tactics were still in their infancy and our Navy was still stuck on battleship war tactics. The Japanese attack on Pearl opened everyone's eyes.

exactly--but Taranto and the war warning ----- they should know military history--that's their job:

commencement of the Russo-Japanese War. It began with a surprise night attack by a squadron of Japanese destroyers

Battle of Port Arthur - Wikipedia

In this connection it should be noted that Vice Admiral Bellinger, who on 7 December 1941 was commanding officer of Task Force 9, comprising the patrol planes of the Pacific Fleet, testified that he was unaware of the war warning until after the attack on Pearl Harbor (p. 498).

Admiral Smith said that following the 27 November war warning the establishment of aircraft patrols from Oahu would have been an appropriate defensive deployment to carry out the initial tasks assigned by the Pacific Fleet war plans (p. 372). However, he did not remember any discussions with Admiral Kimmel or Captain McMorris regarding the failure to direct such measures

XXII. ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL—EXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE
and this is a way to keep them from being sabotaged = put them in the air

to take defensive deployment, Admiral McMorris said that they understood that Washington wanted to avoid any overt acts and that they were not so uncertain about this as to ask the Department for a clarification.

recon is not overt acts
XXII. ACTION TAKEN BY ADMIRAL KIMMEL—EXTENT OF RECONNAISSANCE

 

[harmonica]

..they were given a war warning, but they did not act like it.........
.....they acted as if they were in peacetime --all major ships in the harbor/no long range--[ any sort ] of air recon ....no type of air detection/alarm/warning system like they had in England
.....Sunday--a real military man [ someone with military sense ] would think Sunday a perfect day for an attack--especially after given a war warning
.....one military axiom is you don't act on what you think the enemy will do, but what he is capable of --so if you are stationed at Pearl, you should think ''can the Japanese attack Pearl?'' YES
...but many professional police/military/CIA/etc are not ''street'' smart---prime example is the Camp Chapman attack where the CIA brought a ''good'' foreigner into the circle---which is one of the most basic no-nos of spying

Despite the fact that so many in positions of command anticipated a Japanese attack, especially given the failure of diplomacy (Japan refused U.S. demands to withdraw from both the Axis pact and occupied territories in China and Indochina), no one expected Hawaii as the target.

https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/a-war-warning-is-sent-to-commanders-in-the-pacific

It was a failure from the top down, everyone believed Hawaii was too far away and too strong to be attacked.
Kimmel and Short were scapegoats.

Now one commander that was guilty as hell was MacArthur, he was told of the Japanese attack on Pearl and ordered to prepare his air forces accordingly and expect an attack from the Japanese. He acknowledged those orders then did nothing, the Army Air Corps in the Philippines was caught on the ground the same way (and in the same parked configurations) as in Hawaii but obviously he did not suffer the same fate as Kimmel and Short.
Also, specifically in Africa the main ground commander, Fredendall was still "stuck" in WWI with his thinking and also tended to play his subordinate commanders off against each other while making no real decisions. Things obviously changed when Patton replaced him.
We were litterally "An Army at Dawn" as Atkinson wrote about in an excellent book with the same title.
We also had a lot of learning to do in the pacific in all branches of service specifically with moribund attitudes and ideas at the upper echelons of military command and control.

they had ''peacetime'' mindset--after a war warning --after Taranto
.....--I remember reading in the mid 80's about how the Israelis defended against airplanes used as weapons ......but then after 9-11, many professionals never even thought of it ---well, I knew about them in the mid 80's as an mere E2 in the military....the professionals should've been thinking about that--just as Short and Kimmel should have known about Taranto = and know Pearl was vulnerable

Monday morning quarterbacking

goes both ways--doesn't it

How so?

see post # 19