"lady" accuses cops of stopping her while walking black...tsk tsk....camera was rolling

[bucs90]

She was walking in the street and SOP is to ask for ID whenever a cop is engaged with a citizen. They want to know who the person and make sure there are no outstanding warrants and it also helps when they are writing their daily report.

If they person is not violating any law, and she was not, they have no right to detain her at all.

She violated the pedestrian in roadway law. They absolutely had the legal authority to.
She wasn't being detained.

So, then, she could just have walked away without providing ID? Either she was free to go or she was required to provide ID. Which was it?

Yes I suppose she could have. However, by refusing provide an ID when asked it may raise suspicion which would warrant detainment. It's really up to the officer's discretion.

Not without a reason to stop and detain her in the first place.

 

[Skylar]

She was walking in the street and SOP is to ask for ID whenever a cop is engaged with a citizen. They want to know who the person and make sure there are no outstanding warrants and it also helps when they are writing their daily report.

If they person is not violating any law, and she was not, they have no right to detain her at all.

She wasn't being detained.

So, then, she could just have walked away without providing ID? Either she was free to go or she was required to provide ID. Which was it?

Hiibel doesn't require someone be arrested in order to be required to identify yourself.

United States Supreme Court case Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), held that statutes requiring suspects to disclose their names during police investigations did not violate the Fourth Amendment if the statute first required reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal involvement. Under the rubric of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the minimal intrusion on a suspect's privacy, and the legitimate need of law enforcement officers to quickly dispel suspicion that an individual is engaged in criminal activity, justified requiring a suspect to disclose his or her name.

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The police can ask for ID. But you don't have to provide it. If such were the case then you would have an obligation to 'carry your papers' on the chance that the police asked you for them.

You do, however, have to identify yourself.

God damn you idiots don't understand the law. I'm tired of explaining it.

And what insight do you bring to the Hiibel decision....beyond random cursing?

 

[paddymurphy]

If they person is not violating any law, and she was not, they have no right to detain her at all.

She wasn't being detained.

So, then, she could just have walked away without providing ID? Either she was free to go or she was required to provide ID. Which was it?

Hiibel doesn't require someone be arrested in order to be required to identify yourself.

United States Supreme Court case Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), held that statutes requiring suspects to disclose their names during police investigations did not violate the Fourth Amendment if the statute first required reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal involvement. Under the rubric of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the minimal intrusion on a suspect's privacy, and the legitimate need of law enforcement officers to quickly dispel suspicion that an individual is engaged in criminal activity, justified requiring a suspect to disclose his or her name.

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The police can ask for ID. But you don't have to provide it. If such were the case then you would have an obligation to 'carry your papers' on the chance that the police asked you for them.

You do, however, have to identify yourself.

God damn you idiots don't understand the law. I'm tired of explaining it.

And what insight do you bring to the Hiibel decision....beyond random cursing?

None. But, it could be worse, he could be lying as he did on this thread: S.C. school brat told friends before cop encounter: "Get yall phones out". She did it purposely. | Page 116 | US Message Board - Political Discussion Forum

 

[Skylar]

She wasn't being detained.

So, then, she could just have walked away without providing ID? Either she was free to go or she was required to provide ID. Which was it?

Hiibel doesn't require someone be arrested in order to be required to identify yourself.

United States Supreme Court case Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), held that statutes requiring suspects to disclose their names during police investigations did not violate the Fourth Amendment if the statute first required reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal involvement. Under the rubric of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the minimal intrusion on a suspect's privacy, and the legitimate need of law enforcement officers to quickly dispel suspicion that an individual is engaged in criminal activity, justified requiring a suspect to disclose his or her name.

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The police can ask for ID. But you don't have to provide it. If such were the case then you would have an obligation to 'carry your papers' on the chance that the police asked you for them.

You do, however, have to identify yourself.

God damn you idiots don't understand the law. I'm tired of explaining it.

And what insight do you bring to the Hiibel decision....beyond random cursing?

None. But, it could be worse, he could be lying as he did on this thread: S.C. school brat told friends before cop encounter: "Get yall phones out". She did it purposely. | Page 116 | US Message Board - Political Discussion Forum

I'd say that the video displays all the requisites necessary for a valid Terry stop. And with such standards met, a cop can ask for ID or demand that an individual identify themselves.

 

[paddymurphy]

So, then, she could just have walked away without providing ID? Either she was free to go or she was required to provide ID. Which was it?

Hiibel doesn't require someone be arrested in order to be required to identify yourself.

United States Supreme Court case Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), held that statutes requiring suspects to disclose their names during police investigations did not violate the Fourth Amendment if the statute first required reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal involvement. Under the rubric of Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), the minimal intrusion on a suspect's privacy, and the legitimate need of law enforcement officers to quickly dispel suspicion that an individual is engaged in criminal activity, justified requiring a suspect to disclose his or her name.

Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial District Court of Nevada - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

The police can ask for ID. But you don't have to provide it. If such were the case then you would have an obligation to 'carry your papers' on the chance that the police asked you for them.

You do, however, have to identify yourself.

God damn you idiots don't understand the law. I'm tired of explaining it.

And what insight do you bring to the Hiibel decision....beyond random cursing?

None. But, it could be worse, he could be lying as he did on this thread: S.C. school brat told friends before cop encounter: "Get yall phones out". She did it purposely. | Page 116 | US Message Board - Political Discussion Forum

I'd say that the video displays all the requisites necessary for a valid Terry stop. And with such standards met, a cop can ask for ID or demand that an individual identify themselves.

No, it does not. What facts were they in possession of that warranted a reasonable belief that crime was afoot? They did not write her a citation. They had no intention to doing so. After telling her it would be safer to walk against the flow of traffic, they were done.

 

[Skylar]

Hiibel doesn't require someone be arrested in order to be required to identify yourself.

The police can ask for ID. But you don't have to provide it. If such were the case then you would have an obligation to 'carry your papers' on the chance that the police asked you for them.

You do, however, have to identify yourself.

God damn you idiots don't understand the law. I'm tired of explaining it.

And what insight do you bring to the Hiibel decision....beyond random cursing?

None. But, it could be worse, he could be lying as he did on this thread: S.C. school brat told friends before cop encounter: "Get yall phones out". She did it purposely. | Page 116 | US Message Board - Political Discussion Forum

I'd say that the video displays all the requisites necessary for a valid Terry stop. And with such standards met, a cop can ask for ID or demand that an individual identify themselves.

No, it does not. What facts were they in possession of that warranted a reasonable belief that crime was afoot? They did not write her a citation. They had no intention to doing so. After telling her it would be safer to walk against the flow of traffic, they were done.

She was walking in the middle of the street and impeding traffic. Though minor, it is a crime.

And police can ask to see anyone's identification, just as they can ask to come into anyone's home. You don't have to say yes to either.

 

[paddymurphy]

God damn you idiots don't understand the law. I'm tired of explaining it.

And what insight do you bring to the Hiibel decision....beyond random cursing?

None. But, it could be worse, he could be lying as he did on this thread: S.C. school brat told friends before cop encounter: "Get yall phones out". She did it purposely. | Page 116 | US Message Board - Political Discussion Forum

I'd say that the video displays all the requisites necessary for a valid Terry stop. And with such standards met, a cop can ask for ID or demand that an individual identify themselves.

No, it does not. What facts were they in possession of that warranted a reasonable belief that crime was afoot? They did not write her a citation. They had no intention to doing so. After telling her it would be safer to walk against the flow of traffic, they were done.

She was walking in the middle of the street and impeding traffic. Though minor, it is a crime.

And police can ask to see anyone's identification, just as they can ask to come into anyone's home. You don't have to say yes to either.

Ask? Sure. Detain you until you produce it? No.

 

[Lonestar_logic]

She was walking in the street and SOP is to ask for ID whenever a cop is engaged with a citizen. They want to know who the person and make sure there are no outstanding warrants and it also helps when they are writing their daily report.

If they person is not violating any law, and she was not, they have no right to detain her at all.

She wasn't being detained.

So, then, she could just have walked away without providing ID? Either she was free to go or she was required to provide ID. Which was it?

Yes I suppose she could have. However, by refusing provide an ID when asked it may raise suspicion which would warrant detainment. It's really up to the officer's discretion.

Not without a reason to stop and detain her in the first place.

She was violating a law and I showed you the statute.

 

[Lonestar_logic]

Paddy keeps getting his/hers ass handed to him/her. That shit is funny.

 

[jc456]

Lady Accuses Police Officers Of Stopping Her For "Walking While Black"... Then This Video Shows Up

Lying bitch.

She lied about nothing. She was walking on the side of the street. She was not impeding any traffic. Other than suggesting that she walk against the flow of traffic, they had no reason to ask for ID.

did you see her walk out in the middle of the street with her arms a flappen? I'd ask for her ID as well. She may have been impaired. hmmmmm walking on the wrong side of the street in a neighborhood with sidewalks and acting like a fool, well. it is what it is bro.

 

[jc456]

Lady Accuses Police Officers Of Stopping Her For "Walking While Black"... Then This Video Shows Up

Lying bitch.

She lied about nothing. She was walking on the side of the street. She was not impeding any traffic. Other than suggesting that she walk against the flow of traffic, they had no reason to ask for ID.

huh? LMFAO

 

[paddymurphy]

Paddy keeps getting his/hers ass handed to him/her. That shit is funny.

Read this "Law" dumb fuck.

"The State urges that because Appellant willingly answered Carrillo's questions and cooperated when asked to remove items from his pocket, their interaction was a mere encounter, not requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.3 We disagree. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized three distinct categories of interactions between police officers and citizens: encounters, investigative detentions, and arrests.4 State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).
891011Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d at 819. An investigative detention occurs when an individual is encountered by a police officer, yields to the officer's display of authority, and is temporarily detained for purposes of an investigation. Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d, 227, 235 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). A person “yields to an officer's display of authority” when a reasonable person would not feel free to continue walking or otherwise terminate the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); *785 State v. Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d at 234–35. An investigative detention is constitutionally permissible if, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer has reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). Whether reasonable suspicion exists is determined by considering the facts known to the officer at the moment of detention. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
12Franks v. State, 241 S.W.3d 135 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007, pet. ref'd). However, when a person stops in response to a patrol car's emergency lights rather than of his own accord, an investigatory detention has occurred and reasonable suspicion is required. In Garza v. State,771 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), in response to an officer turning on his patrol car flashing lights, the defendant stopped his vehicle at an auto parts store. The officer testified that when he observed the defendant's car, he believed the driver resembled a mug shot and contacted other officers by radio that he was about to stop the individual. Id. at 552. The State argued there was no stop or seizure because the defendant voluntarily stopped his car at the auto parts store pursuant to a predetermined plan. Id. at 556. The Court suggested, “it cannot be seriously maintained that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have believed that he was free to leave.” Id. at 557. See also Hernandez v. State, 963 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd) (activating emergency lights would cause a reasonable person to believe he is not free to leave). But see Franks v. State, 241 S.W.3d at 142 (activation of patrol car's overhead lights in an area that appeared dark and unoccupied except for a single car does not necessarily constitute a detention); Martin v. State, 104 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.) (citing a New Mexico Court of Appeals case holding that an officer's use of overhead lights alone does not necessarily cause an encounter to be a stop).
13Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In Tanner v. State, 228 S.W.3d 852 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007, no pet.), a police officer observed the defendant and a female companion walking from behind a bar at 3:00 a.m. and flashed his patrol car lights and signaled for them to stop. The female stopped, but the defendant continued to walk. Id. at 854. The officer drove towards the defendant, who then stopped. The officer searched the defendant and found methamphetamine. Id. at 855. Citing Garza, 771 S.W.2d at 558, the court found, “[t]here is no question that an investigative detention occurred when [the defendant] stoppedwalking in response to [the officer's] demand.” Tanner, 228 S.W.3d at 856 n. 3.
Officer Carrillo testified that he observed Appellant walking across a field and that as Appellant approached the curb, he activated his patrol car lights and called out to him. Appellant approached Carrillo and complied with his requests, including removing items from his pocket, which included marihuana. On cross-examination, Carrillo answered affirmatively when asked whether activation of his patrol car lights is a communication to a *786 person to stop. He also testified on cross-examination that had Appellant fled from him after activating his lights, he might have possibly charged him with evading. No evidence was presented that Carrillo believed Appellant was in distress, that the area was dark, or that safety reasons existed for activating the patrol car lights. Under these facts, we conclude that activation of the patrol car lights caused Appellant to yield to Officer Carrillo's show of authority. We further conclude that Appellant did not feel free to leave or decline Carrillo's requests. Thus, we find that a detention occurred requiring reasonable suspicion by Carrillo to stop Appellant.
Reasonable Suspicion
1415Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. See Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex.Crim.App.2007);Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d at 232–34; Martinez v. State, 72 S.W.3d 76, 81 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.). The reasonableness of an investigative detention is determined by a dual inquiry: (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
1617Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 768. These facts must amount to more than a mere inarticulable hunch or suspicion. Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). Reasonableness of a search is a question of law that is reviewed de novo and is evaluated by the totality of the circumstances. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
Officer Carrillo testified that he questioned Appellant because he was walking late at night and because there had been recent criminal mischief and burglaries in the vicinity. According to Carrillo, he was conducting “effective patrol” by stopping persons for walking during the hours of 12:30 a.m. and daylight. On cross-examination, however, he testified that the “recent” crime in the area had actually occurred some three months earlier and consisted of a brick being thrown through the back window of a pickup. He could not recall the type of burglary that occurred.
Carrillo testified that no criminal activity had been reported during his shift on the night he stopped Appellant. Additionally, when he observed Appellant walking across the field, he did not see him with a brick in his hand nor did he see him carrying any items common to burglaries. It was not until after Carrillo made contact with Appellant that he observed glassy eyes and shakiness which lead him to believe that Appellant might be under the influence of alcohol or narcotics.
185 and the level of criminal activity in an area may be factors to consider in determining reasonable suspicion, they are not suspicious in and of themselves. See Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 73–76 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). See also Scott v. *787 State, 549 S.W.2d 170, 172–73 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). Time of day and criminal activity in the area are facts which focus on the suspects surroundings, and not on the suspect himself. Klare, 76 S.W.3d at 75. Thus, an assessment of the surroundings must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. Id. at 75, citing U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Officer Carrillo did not offer any testimony to raise suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity prior to initiating contact with him. Additionally, there are no independent indicia of reasonable suspicion in the record before us. Under the totality of the circumstances, we find that the factors cited by Carrillo, i.e., time of day and “recent” crime in the area, were a mere pretext for stopping Appellant.
1920Welcome v. State, 865 S.W.2d 128, 133 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd); Reed v. State, 809 S.W.2d 940, 944–45 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, no pet.). The discovery of an outstanding warrant during an illegal detention may break the connection between the primary taint and subsequently discovered evidence. See Johnson v. State, 496 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex.Crim.App.1973). See also Fletcher v. State, 90 S.W.3d 419, 420–21 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
Officer Carrillo testified that he believed he ran a criminal history check after Appellant had already been arrested. He also testified that in his effort to identify Appellant, he discovered the warrant, and Appellant was “going to go to jail” for the warrant. The methamphetamine was not discovered until Appellant was searched incident to his arrest at the police department. The record supports admissibility of the methamphetamine as it was discovered subsequent to the outstanding warrant. The marihuana, however, would not have been admissible because it was discovered during an illegal detention and prior to discovery of the criminal trespass warrant. Appellant's sole issue is overruled.
Conclusion
We find that Officer Carrillo illegally detained Appellant without reasonable suspicion. Regardless, we conclude that discovery of the criminal trespass warrant for Appellant prior to discovery of the methamphetamine provided sufficient attenuation so as to render the methamphetamine admissible. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence. Consequently, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

 

[Sunni Man]

Why was the negress walking in the street and not on the sidewalk? .......


I figure that she grew up on the streets of an urban ghetto and really didn't understand the concept of using sidewalks while walking in an upscale suburban neighborhood. .......
.

 

[longknife]

Lady Accuses Police Officers Of Stopping Her For "Walking While Black"... Then This Video Shows Up

Lying bitch.

Black entitlement!

She's too good to use the damned sidewalk.

 

[Lonestar_logic]

Paddy keeps getting his/hers ass handed to him/her. That shit is funny.

Read this "Law" dumb fuck.

"The State urges that because Appellant willingly answered Carrillo's questions and cooperated when asked to remove items from his pocket, their interaction was a mere encounter, not requiring reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.3 We disagree. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized three distinct categories of interactions between police officers and citizens: encounters, investigative detentions, and arrests.4 State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d 817, 819 (Tex.Crim.App.2002).
891011Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 497–98, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 75 L.Ed.2d 229 (1983); State v. Perez, 85 S.W.3d at 819. An investigative detention occurs when an individual is encountered by a police officer, yields to the officer's display of authority, and is temporarily detained for purposes of an investigation. Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d, 227, 235 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). A person “yields to an officer's display of authority” when a reasonable person would not feel free to continue walking or otherwise terminate the encounter. Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 436, 111 S.Ct. 2382, 115 L.Ed.2d 389 (1991); *785 State v. Velasquez, 994 S.W.2d 676, 679 (Tex.Crim.App.1999); Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d at 234–35. An investigative detention is constitutionally permissible if, under the totality of the circumstances, the officer has reasonable suspicion supported by articulable facts that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968); Ford v. State, 158 S.W.3d 488, 492 (Tex.Crim.App.2005). Whether reasonable suspicion exists is determined by considering the facts known to the officer at the moment of detention. Davis v. State, 947 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
12Franks v. State, 241 S.W.3d 135 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007, pet. ref'd). However, when a person stops in response to a patrol car's emergency lights rather than of his own accord, an investigatory detention has occurred and reasonable suspicion is required. In Garza v. State,771 S.W.2d 549 (Tex.Crim.App.1989), in response to an officer turning on his patrol car flashing lights, the defendant stopped his vehicle at an auto parts store. The officer testified that when he observed the defendant's car, he believed the driver resembled a mug shot and contacted other officers by radio that he was about to stop the individual. Id. at 552. The State argued there was no stop or seizure because the defendant voluntarily stopped his car at the auto parts store pursuant to a predetermined plan. Id. at 556. The Court suggested, “it cannot be seriously maintained that a reasonable person under the circumstances would have believed that he was free to leave.” Id. at 557. See also Hernandez v. State, 963 S.W.2d 921, 924 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. ref'd) (activating emergency lights would cause a reasonable person to believe he is not free to leave). But see Franks v. State, 241 S.W.3d at 142 (activation of patrol car's overhead lights in an area that appeared dark and unoccupied except for a single car does not necessarily constitute a detention); Martin v. State, 104 S.W.3d 298, 301 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2003, no pet.) (citing a New Mexico Court of Appeals case holding that an officer's use of overhead lights alone does not necessarily cause an encounter to be a stop).
13Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). In Tanner v. State, 228 S.W.3d 852 (Tex.App.-Austin 2007, no pet.), a police officer observed the defendant and a female companion walking from behind a bar at 3:00 a.m. and flashed his patrol car lights and signaled for them to stop. The female stopped, but the defendant continued to walk. Id. at 854. The officer drove towards the defendant, who then stopped. The officer searched the defendant and found methamphetamine. Id. at 855. Citing Garza, 771 S.W.2d at 558, the court found, “[t]here is no question that an investigative detention occurred when [the defendant] stoppedwalking in response to [the officer's] demand.” Tanner, 228 S.W.3d at 856 n. 3.
Officer Carrillo testified that he observed Appellant walking across a field and that as Appellant approached the curb, he activated his patrol car lights and called out to him. Appellant approached Carrillo and complied with his requests, including removing items from his pocket, which included marihuana. On cross-examination, Carrillo answered affirmatively when asked whether activation of his patrol car lights is a communication to a *786 person to stop. He also testified on cross-examination that had Appellant fled from him after activating his lights, he might have possibly charged him with evading. No evidence was presented that Carrillo believed Appellant was in distress, that the area was dark, or that safety reasons existed for activating the patrol car lights. Under these facts, we conclude that activation of the patrol car lights caused Appellant to yield to Officer Carrillo's show of authority. We further conclude that Appellant did not feel free to leave or decline Carrillo's requests. Thus, we find that a detention occurred requiring reasonable suspicion by Carrillo to stop Appellant.
Reasonable Suspicion
1415Article I, § 9 of the Texas Constitution protect against unreasonable searches and seizures by government officials. See Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex.Crim.App.2007);Johnson v. State, 912 S.W.2d at 232–34; Martinez v. State, 72 S.W.3d 76, 81 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.). The reasonableness of an investigative detention is determined by a dual inquiry: (1) whether the officer's action was justified at its inception; and (2) whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place.Terry, 392 U.S. at 19–20, 88 S.Ct. 1868.
1617Id. at 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868; Balentine, 71 S.W.3d at 768. These facts must amount to more than a mere inarticulable hunch or suspicion. Williams v. State, 621 S.W.2d 609, 612 (Tex.Crim.App.1981). Reasonableness of a search is a question of law that is reviewed de novo and is evaluated by the totality of the circumstances. Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54, 62 (Tex.Crim.App.2004); Woods v. State, 956 S.W.2d 33, 38 (Tex.Crim.App.1997).
Officer Carrillo testified that he questioned Appellant because he was walking late at night and because there had been recent criminal mischief and burglaries in the vicinity. According to Carrillo, he was conducting “effective patrol” by stopping persons for walking during the hours of 12:30 a.m. and daylight. On cross-examination, however, he testified that the “recent” crime in the area had actually occurred some three months earlier and consisted of a brick being thrown through the back window of a pickup. He could not recall the type of burglary that occurred.
Carrillo testified that no criminal activity had been reported during his shift on the night he stopped Appellant. Additionally, when he observed Appellant walking across the field, he did not see him with a brick in his hand nor did he see him carrying any items common to burglaries. It was not until after Carrillo made contact with Appellant that he observed glassy eyes and shakiness which lead him to believe that Appellant might be under the influence of alcohol or narcotics.
185 and the level of criminal activity in an area may be factors to consider in determining reasonable suspicion, they are not suspicious in and of themselves. See Klare v. State, 76 S.W.3d 68, 73–76 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, pet. ref'd). See also Scott v. *787 State, 549 S.W.2d 170, 172–73 (Tex.Crim.App.1976). Time of day and criminal activity in the area are facts which focus on the suspects surroundings, and not on the suspect himself. Klare, 76 S.W.3d at 75. Thus, an assessment of the surroundings must raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is engaged in wrongdoing. Id. at 75, citing U.S. v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S.Ct. 690, 66 L.Ed.2d 621 (1981). Officer Carrillo did not offer any testimony to raise suspicion that Appellant was engaged in criminal activity prior to initiating contact with him. Additionally, there are no independent indicia of reasonable suspicion in the record before us. Under the totality of the circumstances, we find that the factors cited by Carrillo, i.e., time of day and “recent” crime in the area, were a mere pretext for stopping Appellant.
1920Welcome v. State, 865 S.W.2d 128, 133 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1993, pet. ref'd); Reed v. State, 809 S.W.2d 940, 944–45 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1991, no pet.). The discovery of an outstanding warrant during an illegal detention may break the connection between the primary taint and subsequently discovered evidence. See Johnson v. State, 496 S.W.2d 72, 74 (Tex.Crim.App.1973). See also Fletcher v. State, 90 S.W.3d 419, 420–21 (Tex.App.-Amarillo 2002, no pet.).
Officer Carrillo testified that he believed he ran a criminal history check after Appellant had already been arrested. He also testified that in his effort to identify Appellant, he discovered the warrant, and Appellant was “going to go to jail” for the warrant. The methamphetamine was not discovered until Appellant was searched incident to his arrest at the police department. The record supports admissibility of the methamphetamine as it was discovered subsequent to the outstanding warrant. The marihuana, however, would not have been admissible because it was discovered during an illegal detention and prior to discovery of the criminal trespass warrant. Appellant's sole issue is overruled.
Conclusion
We find that Officer Carrillo illegally detained Appellant without reasonable suspicion. Regardless, we conclude that discovery of the criminal trespass warrant for Appellant prior to discovery of the methamphetamine provided sufficient attenuation so as to render the methamphetamine admissible. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant's motion to suppress evidence. Consequently, the trial court's judgment is affirmed.

Interesting case but has nothing to do with what happened to Bland.