The Nuking of Nagasaki: Even More Immoral and Unnecessary than Hiroshima

On July 26, 1945 the Allied forces issued the Potsdam declaration calling for Japan's unconditional surrender. The Japanese rejected the demand few days later. On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, followed by the second nuclear attack on Nagasaki three days later. On August 14, 1945, Japan declared its surrender.

Per Nimitz
“He said he was not attempting to minimize the ‘awful power’ of the new weapon, because it undoubtedly ‘hastened the end.’

Facts.....
 
On July 26, 1945 the Allied forces issued the Potsdam declaration calling for Japan's unconditional surrender. The Japanese rejected the demand few days later. On August 6, 1945, the United States dropped an atomic bomb on Hiroshima, followed by the second nuclear attack on Nagasaki three days later. On August 14, 1945, Japan declared its surrender.

Per Nimitz
“He said he was not attempting to minimize the ‘awful power’ of the new weapon, because it undoubtedly ‘hastened the end.’

Facts.....
Nuclear weapons will end any war. Yiu make the case to drop them on the first day of battle....to hasten the end of the war.

The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan.

— Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, [91]
 
More facts....

A key source in this contested history has been the evidence of individuals who were involved in the U.S. government’s development of and decision-making on nuclear weapons. Yet, many of these individuals, be they supporters or critics, somewhat rewrote their history in the aftermath of the August 1945 bombings.


Untangling postwar contentions from actual pre-Hiroshima actions is generally not a simple matter. It requires close attention to pre-Hiroshima archival sources, which account for well more than 100,000 pages in multiple libraries. In using these sources, the analyst should give much greater weight to the pre-Hiroshima sources than to the later, postwar claims in cases of significant discrepancies.


After the war, in memoirs and in related statements, three former wartime members of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff—Admiral William Leahy, the de facto chairman of the Joint Chiefs; General Henry Arnold, head of the Army Air Forces, and Admiral Ernest King, head of the Navy—publicly raised sharp questions about the military-political necessity of those atomic bombings and indicated there were other ways of ending the war. In his own widely reviewed memoir I Was There,1 Leahy passionately condemned the bombings as unethical and even barbarous. Yet, the available records, including his own diary, give no indication that he expressed this opinion to Truman or to any other government associate before the bombings.
 
Nuclear weapons will end any war. Yiu make the case to drop them on the first day of battle....to hasten the end of the war.

The Japanese had, in fact, already sued for peace. The atomic bomb played no decisive part, from a purely military point of view, in the defeat of Japan.

— Fleet Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, [91]
That question weighed on their minds when the Potsdam Declaration arrived (July 27-28), calling on them to surrender unconditionally or face immediate destruction. Yet they rejected the four-power ultimatum, feeling as former prime minister and navy"moderate," Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, said to his secretary on July 28,"There is no need to rush."

These people had many reasons to bring the lost war to an end short of Japan's further destruction and unconditional capitulation to the Anglo-Americans. But only the emperor had the sovereign power to resolve the issue. And during the entire month of June and well into July, when U.S. terror bombing of Japanese civilian targets peaked, he resisted and showed no determination to do so.

Emperor Hirohito and his chief political adviser, Kido Koichi, stuck with the militarists and insisted on continuing with preparations for final battles on the home islands even in late June, when all organized resistance on Okinawa had ended, and an estimated 120,000 Japanese combatants (including Koreans and Taiwanese) and 150,000 to 170,000 non-combatants lay dead. U.S. combat losses in the battle of Okinawa were approximately 12,520 killed and over 33,000 wounded. With time accelerating and their sense of the urgency of the situation deepening, Hirohito responded to this defeat by forcing the army and navy leaders to agree to the idea of an"early peace." But he still gave no indication that he was thinking in terms of an immediate surrender, let alone proposing peace to the nations he was actually fighting.

The decision to drop the bomb was far more complicated than your arrogant, ill informed anti-American screeds. I just gave you a fire hose of information. You have given nothing but revised historical opinions some of which are just not true.
 
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First of all, the bomb was not dropped on the first day of battle. Secondly, the Japanese refused to surrender at Potsdam.
So? Why not wait for the russian invasion? A three day wait. They surrendered after the invasion. Why couldn't we wait three days? We knew the exact date of the invasion
 
That question weighed on their minds when the Potsdam Declaration arrived (July 27-28), calling on them to surrender unconditionally or face immediate destruction. Yet they rejected the four-power ultimatum, feeling as former prime minister and navy"moderate," Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa, said to his secretary on July 28,"There is no need to rush."

These people had many reasons to bring the lost war to an end short of Japan's further destruction and unconditional capitulation to the Anglo-Americans. But only the emperor had the sovereign power to resolve the issue. And during the entire month of June and well into July, when U.S. terror bombing of Japanese civilian targets peaked, he resisted and showed no determination to do so.

Emperor Hirohito and his chief political adviser, Kido Koichi, stuck with the militarists and insisted on continuing with preparations for final battles on the home islands even in late June, when all organized resistance on Okinawa had ended, and an estimated 120,000 Japanese combatants (including Koreans and Taiwanese) and 150,000 to 170,000 non-combatants lay dead. U.S. combat losses in the battle of Okinawa were approximately 12,520 killed and over 33,000 wounded. With time accelerating and their sense of the urgency of the situation deepening, Hirohito responded to this defeat by forcing the army and navy leaders to agree to the idea of an"early peace." But he still gave no indication that he was thinking in terms of an immediate surrender, let alone proposing peace to the nations he was actually fighting.

The decision to drop the bomb was far more complicated than your arrogant, ill informed anti-American screeds. I just gave you a fire hose of information. You have given nothing but revised historical opinions some of which are just not true.
Well you certainly have an opinion.....one our military leaders did not agree with
 
So? Why not wait for the russian invasion? A three day wait. They surrendered after the invasion. Why couldn't we wait three days? We knew the exact date of the invasion
Because Hirohito was facing a military coup after his peace overtures to Moscow. The atomic bombs and the Soviet invasion gave Japanese decision-makers a good justification for ending the war.
 
Because Hirohito was facing a military coup after his peace overtures to Moscow. The atomic bombs and the Soviet invasion gave Japanese decision-makers a good justification for ending the war.
No the coup only happened when he offered surrender
 
There was a attempted coup when he did surrender


He did it anyway
No, dufus, a coup was threatned if he did surrender. The military did not want to surrender. Emperor Hirohito and his chief political adviser, Kido Koichi, stuck with the militarists and insisted on continuing with preparations for final battles on the home islands even in late June......As far as Hirohito: "But he still gave no indication that he was thinking in terms of an immediate surrender, let alone proposing peace to the nations he was actually fighting." I already gave you the link to this information, apparently you either can't read very well or comprehend what you read or just refuse to read any real history at all.
 

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