1 in 5 US Renters Risk Eviction by 9/30/2020

So Trump was personally going to make millions of test kits in a few weeks?
All Trump had to do was get out of the way and stop lying about the MAGA virus last spring.
Trump-sped-spread-coronavirus.png

Top 12 Things Trump Did to Speed the Pandemic - Public Citizen
 
Post #417: Yes, that Chodorov.

A harbinger of future evictions was the sights around the state capital of Wisconsin on Sunday morning. Blacks lying face-down on the concrete, amidst pools of unidentified liquid, trash strewn, after a Saturday night of drugs and drink.

We excerpt from Stockman on Citigroup:

'In fact, none of the bailouts were necessary because the meltdown was strictly a matter confined to the canyons of Wall Street. It would have burned out there on its own had Washington allowed the free market to have its way with a handful of insolvent institutions that needed to be taken out: Morgan Stanley, Goldman, and Citigroup, among others.
(Stockman DA, The Great Deformation)
 
Post #417: Yes, that Chodorov.

A harbinger of future evictions was the sights around the state capital of Wisconsin on Sunday morning. Blacks lying face-down on the concrete, amidst pools of unidentified liquid, trash strewn, after a Saturday night of drugs and drink.

We excerpt from Stockman on Citigroup:

'In fact, none of the bailouts were necessary because the meltdown was strictly a matter confined to the canyons of Wall Street. It would have burned out there on its own had Washington allowed the free market to have its way with a handful of insolvent institutions that needed to be taken out: Morgan Stanley, Goldman, and Citigroup, among others.
(Stockman DA, The Great Deformation)
Oh the Bail Outs........watch closely.



America are you watching while they launder money at the back door of the Fed.
 
'Instead, the Washington bailouts rescued the perpetrators, not the victims; that is, the bailout benefits were captured almost exclusively by the Wall Street insiders and fund managers who owned the common stock and long-term bonds of these two firms (Goldman and Morgan Stanley). Yet it was these punters who deserved to take punishing losses. It was they who enabled Goldman and Morgan Stanley -- along with Bear Sterns, Lehman, and the investment banks embedded inside Citigroup and JP Morgan -- to grow into giant, reckless predators.
....
When the great Wall Street investment houses -- including Bear Stearns, Lehman, Goldman and Morgan Stanley, along with the wholesale banking departments of JPMorgan, Citigroup, and Deutsche Bank -- became aggressively involved in financing the local mortgage bankers, brokers, and boiler rooms, the planking for the subprime mortgage fiasco was laid. The Wall Street houses were able to access nearly unlimited amounts of low-cost wholesale funding by means of the commercial paper and repo markets and recycle it through their "warehouse lines" to local mortgage bankers and brokers. Unfortunately, the sudden availability of these multibillion-dollar warehouse lines proved to be a financial poison in the world of home finance, not the socially beneficent "innovation" claimed by investment bankers.'
(Stockman, op cit)
 
..you can't stop people from being stupid
People who are stupid enough to put Trump in the White House, you mean?
No, people as stupid as OPs who can't even stick to their own topics for ten posts and have to resort to memes with demeaning stereoptypes to raionalize why THEY lost 2016 and will likely lose again in 2020.
 
TP was talking about a good-sized outfit:

'Sandy Weill not only got in on the ground floor, but over the next thirty years proceeded to build a financial trading colossus out of Salomon, Citibank, and dozens of others. In no small measure due to the financial futures markets pioneered by Melamed, Citigroup sported a balance sheet by 2006 which was larger than the entire US banking system had been the day Sandy Weill escorted Melamed into the office of his Wall Street chum.'
(Stockman, op cit)
 
'Instead, the Washington bailouts rescued the perpetrators, not the victims; that is, the bailout benefits were captured almost exclusively by the Wall Street insiders and fund managers who owned the common stock and long-term bonds of these two firms (Goldman and Morgan Stanley). Yet it was these punters who deserved to take punishing losses. It was they who enabled Goldman and Morgan Stanley -- along with Bear Sterns, Lehman, and the investment banks embedded inside Citigroup and JP Morgan -- to grow into giant, reckless predators.
....
When the great Wall Street investment houses -- including Bear Stearns, Lehman, Goldman and Morgan Stanley, along with the wholesale banking departments of JPMorgan, Citigroup, and Deutsche Bank -- became aggressively involved in financing the local mortgage bankers, brokers, and boiler rooms, the planking for the subprime mortgage fiasco was laid. The Wall Street houses were able to access nearly unlimited amounts of low-cost wholesale funding by means of the commercial paper and repo markets and recycle it through their "warehouse lines" to local mortgage bankers and brokers. Unfortunately, the sudden availability of these multibillion-dollar warehouse lines proved to be a financial poison in the world of home finance, not the socially beneficent "innovation" claimed by investment bankers.'
(Stockman, op cit)

Instead, the Washington bailouts rescued the perpetrators, not the victims;

Exactly! The common people never benefit when the banking system is rescued.
We needed 30% of the banks to fail, like in the 1930s.

(Goldman and Morgan Stanley). Yet it was these punters who deserved to take punishing losses.

The banks, and their shareholders, lost hundreds of billions.

Unfortunately, the sudden availability of these multibillion-dollar warehouse lines proved to be a financial poison in the world of home finance, not the socially beneficent "innovation" claimed by investment bankers.'

I wonder if Stockman held that position from 1997-2007?
 
One would say yes, Stockman still held that position, otherwise he might have edited it out of the text, published in 2013.
 
One would say yes, Stockman still held that position, otherwise he might have edited it out of the text, published in 2013.

If you have any evidence that Stockman spoke against sub-prime mortgages before 2007, please post it. I've never seen him speaking out against them.
 
We continue to delve into the "warehouse lines" question with more of the excerpt:

'....claimed by investment bankers. Needless to say, the new army of mortgage bankers put into business by these Wall Street credit lines had not spent decades building up a franchise in local home mortgage markets, thereby acquiring the skills in prudent underwriting and borrower selection on which long-term survival in the home mortgage business inherently depends. But they did know how to organize turbo-charged boiler rooms which cranked out prodigious numbers of new mortgages.

These new mortgage brokers also had the capacity to grow by leaps and bounds. They had quickly discovered that salesmen currently pitching Amway products, aluminum siding, and used cars could become fully functioning mortgage bankers in a matter of days or weeks. This was especially the case after the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and thee big Wall Street banks introduced online computerized underwriting.

Like the operators of McDonald's drive-through windows, brokers simply tapped the screen and another serving of home mortgage loans would instantly appear. Brokers then obtained the money for loan disbursements to homeowners simply by drawing down their warehouse lines until enough volume was achieved to facilitate a block sale of freshly minted mortgages to their Wall Street partners. The latter then completed the securitization and distribution process, harvesting generous fees and markups at each step of the way.'
(Stockman, op cit)
 
This was especially the case after the government-sponsored enterprises Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac and thee big Wall Street banks introduced online computerized underwriting.

Sure. After Clinton mandated that Fannie and Freddie buy 50% subprime mortgages and Bush raised the mandate to 55%, we were off to the races.
 
We can confidently link the State in Stockman's text parallel to Chodorov's exceprt:

'As it went peddling privilege for grants of power, not after constitutionalism the state could not restrict its clientele to a specially selected group; that is, not after constitutionalism effected a diffusion of its strength. Feudalism had kept everything running smoothly by limiting privilege and political power to a well-circumscribed group. When the growing class of industrialists broke through this crust they demanded a share in the political power. Their economic strength made it impossible to hold them in subjection, and by use of such shibboleths as "no taxation without representation" and "the rights of man" they managed to wangle their way into a partnership with the rulers. There the (nouveaux riches [italics]) held on, emulating their feudal predecessors by using politcal power to their advantage. They instituted the mercantilist system of creating scarcities so that the worker would have to give up more to them for the needs of life. To the privileges of the feudal landowners were added the privileges of the industrialists. Both classes, knowing how they came by their affluence, were intent on depriving the clamoring crowd of access to that power. But the crowd could not be denied forever, and when lat long last it became a participant in power, by way of the vote, it soon learned its economic possibilities.'
(Chodorov, Why We Have Socialism: The "Crime" of the Capitalists)

The incongruous manner in which Citigroup spent the last few years of its pre-bailout life drifting toward the iceberg speaks volumes about the financial deformations that had settled on Wall Street. It goes without saying that no one saw any danger in its creation. It was literally voted through by officialdom, since Chairman Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Rubin, his deputy Larry Summers, and the banking committees of both houses had all supported the Glass-Steagal repeal which enabled the Citibank-Travelers merger.

Then when troubles were already mounting down below, regulators allowed Citigroup to consume $100 billion in cash through stock buybacks and dividend payouts during 2004 through Sept 2008. This was turning a blind eye with a vengeance, but also perhaps explains why Ben Bernanke, Hank Paulson, and the rest of the bailout crew had no explanation for the thundering financial crisis of Sept 2008.'
Stockman, op cit p. 398-9)
 
We can confidently link the State in Stockman's text parallel to Chodorov's exceprt:

'As it went peddling privilege for grants of power, not after constitutionalism the state could not restrict its clientele to a specially selected group; that is, not after constitutionalism effected a diffusion of its strength. Feudalism had kept everything running smoothly by limiting privilege and political power to a well-circumscribed group. When the growing class of industrialists broke through this crust they demanded a share in the political power. Their economic strength made it impossible to hold them in subjection, and by use of such shibboleths as "no taxation without representation" and "the rights of man" they managed to wangle their way into a partnership with the rulers. There the (nouveaux riches [italics]) held on, emulating their feudal predecessors by using politcal power to their advantage. They instituted the mercantilist system of creating scarcities so that the worker would have to give up more to them for the needs of life. To the privileges of the feudal landowners were added the privileges of the industrialists. Both classes, knowing how they came by their affluence, were intent on depriving the clamoring crowd of access to that power. But the crowd could not be denied forever, and when lat long last it became a participant in power, by way of the vote, it soon learned its economic possibilities.'
(Chodorov, Why We Have Socialism: The "Crime" of the Capitalists)

The incongruous manner in which Citigroup spent the last few years of its pre-bailout life drifting toward the iceberg speaks volumes about the financial deformations that had settled on Wall Street. It goes without saying that no one saw any danger in its creation. It was literally voted through by officialdom, since Chairman Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Rubin, his deputy Larry Summers, and the banking committees of both houses had all supported the Glass-Steagal repeal which enabled the Citibank-Travelers merger.

Then when troubles were already mounting down below, regulators allowed Citigroup to consume $100 billion in cash through stock buybacks and dividend payouts during 2004 through Sept 2008. This was turning a blind eye with a vengeance, but also perhaps explains why Ben Bernanke, Hank Paulson, and the rest of the bailout crew had no explanation for the thundering financial crisis of Sept 2008.'
Stockman, op cit p. 398-9)

It goes without saying that no one saw any danger in its creation.

Not even Stockman.

It was literally voted through by officialdom, since Chairman Greenspan, Treasury Secretary Rubin, his deputy Larry Summers, and the banking committees of both houses had all supported the Glass-Steagal repeal which enabled the Citibank-Travelers merger.

There was nothing wrong with either the repeal or the merger.

Then when troubles were already mounting down below, regulators allowed Citigroup to consume $100 billion in cash through stock buybacks and dividend payouts during 2004 through Sept 2008.

Profitable companies usually pay dividends and buy back stock.
 
Continuing post #434:

'By their lights, it was all due to a mysterious "contagion" which had arrived unexpectedly, perhaps on a comet from deep space. The possibility that totally misguided public policies -- including interest rate repression, the Greenspan Put, and the green light for bank merger mania -- had brought down Citigroup and other mega-banks did not cross their minds.
....
Accordingly, during the five years after the LTCM bailout, the balance sheet footings of these five mega-banks had grown $3.8 trillion, or by 50 percent. Moreover, after 2003 growth actually accelerated as these newly consolidated depositories tapped heavily into the same wholesale funding market which had fueled the explosive growth of the investment banking houses. The footings of the five mega-banks thus nearly doubled again to nearly $7 trillion by 2007.

The 1999 repeal of Glass-Steagall had been a mere formality: the real point was that the whole prudential banking regime that had been established by Glass-Steagall was gone, too. What had actually swept it away was a decade of merger mania that the Fed had blessed every step along the way, and which the maestro had actually heralded as another triumph of capitalist innovation and energy.

Deposit Banks are Wards of the State

Yet there was more, and it was worse. As wards of the state, chartered deposit banks needed to be strictly regulated in order to prevent abuse of their fractional reserve banking privileges, to say nothing of the moral hazard implicit in taxpayer-supported de[posit insurance and in their right to access the Fed's discount window for emergency loans.'
(Stockman, op cit p.p. 400-1)
 
Previous excerpts were mostly taken from Chapter 18 of The Great Deformation, and Chapter 19 is titled, From Washington to Wall Street: Roots of the Great Housing Deformation, which content should align nicely with this thread's topic. Our last excerpt from Chapter18
'Not surprisingly, therefore, by 2008 all five mega-banks were soon knee-deep in equity trading and underwriting, prime brokering, options and futures trading, commodities, swaps and derivatives, private equity, internal hedge funds, and much more. They had, in substance, become European-style "universal banks" and had a massive presence in all the traditional Wall Street dealer and investment banking markets.

Not surprisingly, therefore, by 2008 the five mega-banks, which had emerged from a decade and a half of merger mania, banking deregulation, and relentless penetration into nondepository markets, had reached colossal size by every historic standard. In fact, their balance sheet footings were now (a hundred times larger [italics]) than that of their predecessors in August 1987 when Greenspan arrived at the Fed.....As these aberrations gathered force the Fed took no notice whatsoever. It had no clue that the $7 trillion of combined balance sheets assembled by these five mega-banks in barely a decade were essentially helter-skelter agglomerations, not managed banking portfolios in any traditional sense.'
(Stockman, op cit p. 401)
 

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