The italics are historical and tell-tale for revealing the strive for pure form, circa 1933, and note in comparison how blm's destruction introduces the sad effects of spectrality (it "apparitions" or "ghosts"). And then the grafitti appears: "Together we will make a better...."
where blm begins to speak and think for the onlookers.
'Derrida takes great interest in Schmitt because he "offers a (pure and rigorous [italics]) conceptual theory of the political, of the specific region of that which is properly and without polemical rhetoric called the 'political,' the politicity of the political. Derrida reads this pure concept of the political against itself in order to formalize what he calls " a principle of ruin or spectrality" at the core of Schmitt's discourse on the political....the logic of decision that informs this deconstruction leads to a new logic of the political, which can be described in terms of essential corruptibility.
....
For example, Schmitt argues that the political identification of friend and enemy is no de jure tied to moral, aesthetic, or economic values, even though the political de facto is bound up with these domains. For example, proper identification of the enemy should not rely on the idea that the enemy is evil or worthy of hatred. Neither should it rely on racial, ethnic, or religious criteria. Such sentiments and valuations belong to the "private" sphere, which should not contaminate the "public" sphere of the political....As Derrida writes, Schmitt's essential distinctions between friend and enemy are "a priori doomed to failure" (Politics of Friendship 116/135) since "every time, a concept bears the phantom of the other."'
(Haegglund, Radical Atheism, op cit)
We write the post # so that the prisoner-reader can go back to the concept in it.
where blm begins to speak and think for the onlookers.
'Derrida takes great interest in Schmitt because he "offers a (pure and rigorous [italics]) conceptual theory of the political, of the specific region of that which is properly and without polemical rhetoric called the 'political,' the politicity of the political. Derrida reads this pure concept of the political against itself in order to formalize what he calls " a principle of ruin or spectrality" at the core of Schmitt's discourse on the political....the logic of decision that informs this deconstruction leads to a new logic of the political, which can be described in terms of essential corruptibility.
....
For example, Schmitt argues that the political identification of friend and enemy is no de jure tied to moral, aesthetic, or economic values, even though the political de facto is bound up with these domains. For example, proper identification of the enemy should not rely on the idea that the enemy is evil or worthy of hatred. Neither should it rely on racial, ethnic, or religious criteria. Such sentiments and valuations belong to the "private" sphere, which should not contaminate the "public" sphere of the political....As Derrida writes, Schmitt's essential distinctions between friend and enemy are "a priori doomed to failure" (Politics of Friendship 116/135) since "every time, a concept bears the phantom of the other."'
(Haegglund, Radical Atheism, op cit)
We write the post # so that the prisoner-reader can go back to the concept in it.
