Zone1 Islam- Arab Imperialism

[rylah]

 

[rylah]

 

[surada]

I did not go to private school-----just the same grammar school in which EVERY KID
in my semi-rural hick town learned ABC and arithmetic----you studied WHAT in your
FANCY WANCY "private school" ???

The Greek plays.

 

[rylah]

 

[rylah]

 

[surada]

If you hate Arabs so much why move to Morocco , North Africa, Persia, Damascus?

 

[irosie91]

The Greek plays.

That's it ? Euripides and Aeschylus and ---whatshisname
SOPOCKLES ----uhm does MOURNING BECOME ELECTRA?

 

[irosie91]

If you hate Arabs so much why move to Morocco , North Africa, Persia, Damascus?

what does "arabs" have to do with native people of North Africa, Persia
and Damascus? Especially Persia----I never met a muslim Iranian who did
not DESPISE arabs, News for you---neither Cleopatra nor King Tut were "arabs"
Damascus?

 

[rylah]

If you hate Arabs so much why move to Morocco , North Africa, Persia, Damascus?

This reaction tells me of 2 things:

your problem is not the genocide of Hindus by the millions,
but bringing this fact to the discussion about Arab imperialism.

When you frame the discussion about Arab imperialism as hate speech,
means hate speech is how you intend talking about Western imperialism.

And as for Morocco, North Africa, Persia, Damascus,
Jewish communities lived there for millenias
before Arab imperialists invaded.

In fact -

 

[rylah]

This reaction tells me of 2 things:

your problem is not the genocide of Hindus by the millions,
but bringing this fact to the discussion about Arab imperialism.

When you frame the discussion about Arab imperialism as hate speech,
means hate speech is how you intend talking about Western imperialism.

And as for Morocco, North Africa, Persia, Damascus,
Jewish communities lived there for millenias
before Arab imperialists invaded.

In fact -

 

[rylah]

 

[rylah]

 

[irosie91]

I am a graduate of the semi-rural K-12 USA educational system---1950s - 1960s.
As to the history of islamic imperialism----NOT SCINTILLA of information. I did
learn that friday is "their" sunday---and that was about it. BUT 1950s - 1960s
saw a FLOOD of muslims and a lesser flood of hindus into my semi-rural area.
I learned lots from them, especially from muslims. At age 14 I learned the term
MUSLIM LAND---which seems to include more than half the world and certainly all
of the Levant (that was from a pakistani kid whose dad was a UN diplomat?) Later
on--age 19, I encountered a whole concentration of persons from South East Asia--
and Iran. From them I learned that all of South East Asia is MUSLIM LAND and from
Picthal's koran I learned that Muhummad and his minions invented human
civilization. From an Indian Shiite I learned that muslims invented Chappatis and rice.
Circa 1965 I learned, from an Iraqi emissary----that PITA (a yeasted flatbread) and felafel
(chick peas---the legume which sustained the whole mediterranean area for the past
> 5000 years) is ARRRAAABBBB. My conclusion---The "holy" Roman empire was
a malignant attack on mankind----but a mild passing discomfort compared to the
TSUNAMI of plague which is ISLAM

 

[rylah]

 

[rylah]

 

[rylah]

Islamic Imperialism: A History​

Many scholars tend to see the West acting upon indigenous people in other parts of the world, without paying much attention to the agency of those people themselves. Efraim Karsh attempts to counter-act this trend with this book. It is a serious attempt to understand Middle Eastern geopolitics from the perspective of the inhabitants, through an analysis of the role of Islam within the region's political culture. The author's thesis is that an appreciation of the millenarian imperatives of Islam is essential to understand the geopolitical dynamic of the region, as well as the region's relationship with the larger world. The result is a compelling, albeit incomplete, portrait of politics in a region of long-standing strategic importance.

Of the major world religions, three have been distinguished by ambitious proselytizing: Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. All of these religions also periodically augmented their missionary agenda with military conquest and the rise of Islam is intimately connected with military and spiritual conquest. Mohammed himself served as a religious, political and military leader. This experience, Karsh argues, served to distinguish Islam from all other major religions in its imperialistic attitudes, as only Islam has its genesis in armed conflict.

With the conquest of Arabia, the armies of Islam swept forth and established the vast, but short-lived, Umayyad caliphate. For Karsh, the establishment of the new caliphate was an unabashedly imperialist venture, "in which Islam provided a moral sanction and a unifying battle cry rather than a driving force." (22) Karsh argues that the Umayyads' policy of religious toleration originated from selfish motives, as their empire was run strictly for the benefit of the Arab conquerors who were more interested in tribute than spreading the new faith.

Even subject peoples who converted to Islam were relegated to the status of second-class citizens, known as Mawali. So jealously guarded were the privileges of the new Arab elite, and so at odds with the egalitarian aspects of Islamic theology, that they eventually provoked a violent reaction from the Mawali, who overthrew the Umayyad caliphate and replaced it with the Abbasids. However, this victory unleashed centrifugal forces that were to rend the political landscape of the Middle East until the rise of the Ottoman Turks.

In the book, Karsh identifies a handful of archetypal Islamic leaders. These archetypal leaders are distinguished by their conscious and skillful manipulation of Islamic political culture. This political culture is schizophrenic in nature, characterized by a dichotomous blend of pan-Islamic unity and acute regional identities. Traversing the two concepts remains the high wire act of Middle Eastern politics. In this context, the modern nation-state functions as a dilapidated halfway house between the two antipodes of Islamic political culture.

The language of Islamic expansionism subsequently provided the rationale for the last of the great Islamic empire-builders, the Ottomans. By the early 16th century, they had unified much of the Islamic world and had acquired the title of caliph. However, they ultimately succumbed to the intrinsic centrifugal forces of the region, becoming the "Sick Man of Europe" by the 19th century. However, Karsh argues vehemently against portraying the declining Ottoman Empire as a victim. Instead, he describes a clever and aggressive policy by the sultans to manipulate the Western powers to Ottoman advantage.

The fall of the Ottoman Empire restored the Arabs to political dominance in the Middle East. While much has been made of the "betrayal" of the Arabs at Versailles, the full extent of their territorial demands was extreme. However, it is in this context, Karsh argues, that one must understand the Arab rejection of the Jewish right to statehood. The competing territorial claims of the Zionists were being recognized by the Western powers just as the pan-Arabist claims were being rejected. Zionism was, in effect, a direct challenge to the Arabs' territorial ambitions. Accordingly, the rejection of the Jewish state on principle has consistently been of greater concern to Arab governments than the actual welfare of the Palestinian Arabs.

For Karsh, the archetypal modern Arab leader was Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser skillfully blended the competing demands of Egyptian nationalism and pan-Arabism. Egypt was portrayed as the savior of the Arab world, while other Arab countries were castigated as artificial "imperialist stooges" of the West. He attempted to supplant the religious aspect of regional political culture with its secular twin, socialism. The formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958, a nominal political union between Egypt and Syria, was Nasser's high-water mark.

There are three significant events in recent Middle Eastern history, according to Karsh, which represent the dawn of a new era in pan-Islamicism. The first was the triumph of radical Islam in Iran in 1979. The second was the demise of pan-Arab secularism with the defeat of Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War. The third event was the failure of the Oslo peace accords. For Karsh, the Oslo agreement is perhaps most symbolic of the relationship between the West and the Islamic world. Arafat's speeches before, during and after the peace made it abundantly clear that he had no intention of honoring any peace with Israel. However, Western leaders chose to ignore this, preferring to cling to their own idealized vision of diplomacy. For the West, the Palestinian issue is a "root cause" of the Middle East's problems, whereas it is merely one symptom of the larger struggle between Islam and non-believers to most Arab observers.

In a certain sense, Karsh's thesis presents very little that is new. Nonetheless, that should not distract from the elegant simplicity and clarity of Karsh's argument. The problem with Karsh's book is that its evidentiary base is simply too narrow to sustain his thesis. Karsh overwhelmingly relies on diplomatic history to make its case without presenting a more thorough investigation of Islamic theology, its "honor culture," or an explanation of the failure of secular thought in the Islamic world.

Karsh's book is timely, and it represents a valuable addition to our understanding of the Islamic world. It provides a succinct model of Islamic political culture in its geopolitical context. Most importantly, however, the book restores agency to the peoples of the Middle East. Contrary to popular belief, non-Western peoples are not simply an inert mass, responding only to external pressures from the rapacious West. Instead, they are active participants in forging their own political destinies. In this vein, Karsh persuasively argues that the see-saw of Middle Eastern politics has tilted decisively towards a very aggressive pan-Islamicism.

Islamic Imperialism: A History | Origins

Many scholars tend to see the West acting upon indigenous people in other parts of the world, without paying much attention to the agency of those people themselves. Efraim Karsh attempts to counter-act this trend with this book. It is a serious attempt to understand Middle Eastern geopolitics...

origins.osu.edu

 

[rylah]

 

[rylah]

 

[rylah]

Islamic Imperialism: A History​

Many scholars tend to see the West acting upon indigenous people in other parts of the world, without paying much attention to the agency of those people themselves. Efraim Karsh attempts to counter-act this trend with this book. It is a serious attempt to understand Middle Eastern geopolitics from the perspective of the inhabitants, through an analysis of the role of Islam within the region's political culture. The author's thesis is that an appreciation of the millenarian imperatives of Islam is essential to understand the geopolitical dynamic of the region, as well as the region's relationship with the larger world. The result is a compelling, albeit incomplete, portrait of politics in a region of long-standing strategic importance.

Of the major world religions, three have been distinguished by ambitious proselytizing: Buddhism, Christianity and Islam. All of these religions also periodically augmented their missionary agenda with military conquest and the rise of Islam is intimately connected with military and spiritual conquest. Mohammed himself served as a religious, political and military leader. This experience, Karsh argues, served to distinguish Islam from all other major religions in its imperialistic attitudes, as only Islam has its genesis in armed conflict.

With the conquest of Arabia, the armies of Islam swept forth and established the vast, but short-lived, Umayyad caliphate. For Karsh, the establishment of the new caliphate was an unabashedly imperialist venture, "in which Islam provided a moral sanction and a unifying battle cry rather than a driving force." (22) Karsh argues that the Umayyads' policy of religious toleration originated from selfish motives, as their empire was run strictly for the benefit of the Arab conquerors who were more interested in tribute than spreading the new faith.

Even subject peoples who converted to Islam were relegated to the status of second-class citizens, known as Mawali. So jealously guarded were the privileges of the new Arab elite, and so at odds with the egalitarian aspects of Islamic theology, that they eventually provoked a violent reaction from the Mawali, who overthrew the Umayyad caliphate and replaced it with the Abbasids. However, this victory unleashed centrifugal forces that were to rend the political landscape of the Middle East until the rise of the Ottoman Turks.

In the book, Karsh identifies a handful of archetypal Islamic leaders. These archetypal leaders are distinguished by their conscious and skillful manipulation of Islamic political culture. This political culture is schizophrenic in nature, characterized by a dichotomous blend of pan-Islamic unity and acute regional identities. Traversing the two concepts remains the high wire act of Middle Eastern politics. In this context, the modern nation-state functions as a dilapidated halfway house between the two antipodes of Islamic political culture.

The language of Islamic expansionism subsequently provided the rationale for the last of the great Islamic empire-builders, the Ottomans. By the early 16th century, they had unified much of the Islamic world and had acquired the title of caliph. However, they ultimately succumbed to the intrinsic centrifugal forces of the region, becoming the "Sick Man of Europe" by the 19th century. However, Karsh argues vehemently against portraying the declining Ottoman Empire as a victim. Instead, he describes a clever and aggressive policy by the sultans to manipulate the Western powers to Ottoman advantage.

The fall of the Ottoman Empire restored the Arabs to political dominance in the Middle East. While much has been made of the "betrayal" of the Arabs at Versailles, the full extent of their territorial demands was extreme. However, it is in this context, Karsh argues, that one must understand the Arab rejection of the Jewish right to statehood. The competing territorial claims of the Zionists were being recognized by the Western powers just as the pan-Arabist claims were being rejected. Zionism was, in effect, a direct challenge to the Arabs' territorial ambitions. Accordingly, the rejection of the Jewish state on principle has consistently been of greater concern to Arab governments than the actual welfare of the Palestinian Arabs.

For Karsh, the archetypal modern Arab leader was Gamal Abdel Nasser. Nasser skillfully blended the competing demands of Egyptian nationalism and pan-Arabism. Egypt was portrayed as the savior of the Arab world, while other Arab countries were castigated as artificial "imperialist stooges" of the West. He attempted to supplant the religious aspect of regional political culture with its secular twin, socialism. The formation of the United Arab Republic in 1958, a nominal political union between Egypt and Syria, was Nasser's high-water mark.

There are three significant events in recent Middle Eastern history, according to Karsh, which represent the dawn of a new era in pan-Islamicism. The first was the triumph of radical Islam in Iran in 1979. The second was the demise of pan-Arab secularism with the defeat of Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War. The third event was the failure of the Oslo peace accords. For Karsh, the Oslo agreement is perhaps most symbolic of the relationship between the West and the Islamic world. Arafat's speeches before, during and after the peace made it abundantly clear that he had no intention of honoring any peace with Israel. However, Western leaders chose to ignore this, preferring to cling to their own idealized vision of diplomacy. For the West, the Palestinian issue is a "root cause" of the Middle East's problems, whereas it is merely one symptom of the larger struggle between Islam and non-believers to most Arab observers.

In a certain sense, Karsh's thesis presents very little that is new. Nonetheless, that should not distract from the elegant simplicity and clarity of Karsh's argument. The problem with Karsh's book is that its evidentiary base is simply too narrow to sustain his thesis. Karsh overwhelmingly relies on diplomatic history to make its case without presenting a more thorough investigation of Islamic theology, its "honor culture," or an explanation of the failure of secular thought in the Islamic world.

Karsh's book is timely, and it represents a valuable addition to our understanding of the Islamic world. It provides a succinct model of Islamic political culture in its geopolitical context. Most importantly, however, the book restores agency to the peoples of the Middle East. Contrary to popular belief, non-Western peoples are not simply an inert mass, responding only to external pressures from the rapacious West. Instead, they are active participants in forging their own political destinies. In this vein, Karsh persuasively argues that the see-saw of Middle Eastern politics has tilted decisively towards a very aggressive pan-Islamicism.

Islamic Imperialism: A History | Origins

Many scholars tend to see the West acting upon indigenous people in other parts of the world, without paying much attention to the agency of those people themselves. Efraim Karsh attempts to counter-act this trend with this book. It is a serious attempt to understand Middle Eastern geopolitics...

origins.osu.edu

The Arab world needs literacy programmes more than ever​

The illiteracy rate among females in Arab countries is estimated at 26%, the highest in the world.

Statistics on illiteracy in the Arab world indicate that traditional reading and writing programmes are needed even if finding better literacy approaches has become necessary to sweep ignorance off people’s minds in Arab countries.

Data from the Arab League Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organisation (ALECSO) states that the illiteracy rate in Arab countries is around 21%, much higher than the global average of about 13%.

What is even more alarming than this disparity between rates is ALECSO’s warning that illiteracy in the Arab world is likely to increase because of poor educational conditions in countries facing crises and wars. ALECSO estimated that, because of those conditions, more than 13 million Arab children are failing to get an education.

Many regard literacy programmes in the Arab world as useful only because of their propaganda value for outdated regimes with their outdated policies and plans. It is true that literacy programmes in the Arab world were often political tools in the hands of backward Arab regimes and that condemned those programmes to fail.

However, the poor results cannot deny the importance of literacy programmes and the need by large segments of Arab populations for them, especially among the elderly who were never schooled and young people who stumbled in their academic journeys because of social, economic or security reasons or even because of their own weak potential.

When discussing literacy programmes in the Arab world, many pertinent questions rise and place the onus of giving convincing answers on the shoulders of the programmes’ critics.

What alternatives can be offered if literacy programmes are eliminated? How could the gaps of ignorance be filled, even in their simplest and most primitive manifestations, let alone gaps created by scientific and technological progress? In what ways can the consequences of not sitting in the classroom, even for a few years, be repaired at the basic level of learning the elementary use of the mother tongue?

In this era of technological advancements, illiteracy has taken a new dimension and now refers to not acquiring the basic skills of using software for computers, applications and devices that have become an essential element of everyday life.

However, before we can talk about that type of illiteracy in the Arab world, we must not forget that many Arabs cannot decipher basic codes of our mother tongue or read notices and warnings on medicines or road signs or carry out simple everyday tasks that require reading and writing.

On the other hand, the large numbers of early school dropouts each year in the Arab world make it necessary to review literacy programmes to meet the needs of those groups, which, if neglected, may turn to crime or become a burden to the state and society because of marginalisation.

Despite the differences between past and present, the Arab world has been living with the same challenges for years. The fact that we celebrate Arab Literacy Day, which ALECSO adopted in 1970 to generalise basic education and combat illiteracy, gives the best proof that we are facing the same challenges in the Arab world.

In the not so distant past, Arab countries struggled to spread education among all segments of society and launched many fronts to win the battle for girls’ education. Today, many countries in the Middle East and North Africa are fighting early school dropout rates.

The illiteracy rate among females in Arab countries is estimated at 26%, the highest in the world. Of course, cultural and social factors are the main reasons behind this, including the dominance of conservative and masculine culture, early marriage, poverty and parental low levels of education.

ALECSO estimated that 7-20% of children in the Arab world are dropping out of primary school and that in some countries of the region that figure exceeds 30%.

After absorbing these statistics about illiteracy in the Arab world, it doesn’t make sense to argue that literacy programmes are not important or useless. Such a view lacks legitimacy and is detached from reality.

THE ARAB WEEKLY

 

[surada]

what does "arabs" have to do with native people of North Africa, Persia
and Damascus? Especially Persia----I never met a muslim Iranian who did
not DESPISE arabs, News for you---neither Cleopatra nor King Tut were "arabs"
Damascus?

Everyone knows Cleopatra and Tut weren't Arabs. You've never been to North Africa or Iran, have you? Syrians are Arabs. See Akkadian Empire.