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This is clown material. We've had this same discussion at least twice, and you just keep repeating your drivel. Now, there are very good, scholarly books that provide detailed discussions on the Japanese peace feelers
Second column, under the photo.And once again, you make no significant reply when confronted with the simple facts that Japan was not trying to surrender.
They were only willing to consider an armistice. One that even their own ambassador said was a joke nobody would listen to.
An armistice is not a surrender.
www.newspapers.com
^^^^^^^Gosh, this is idiotic. The moderates were trying to offer to surrender before and after the first bomb, but the militarists were able to block them because they were able to harp on the fact that there was no guarantee that the emperor would not be deposed in a surrender.
And let's review the facts about Japan's peace feelers--again:
-- In April 1945, none other than Mamoru Shigemitsu, Japan’s Foreign Minister at the time, approached the Swedish minister to Japan and asked if Sweden would be willing to mediate a surrender agreement with the U.S. Now, I would say that a peace feeler done by Japan’s Foreign Minister was both official and very high level.
Shigemitsu’s effort did not succeed, but that was only because his successor, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, believed that a more powerful intermediary should be approached. Togo did not object to the approach on principle, but only to the proposed intermediary. Togo suggested that the Soviets be approached to mediate a surrender with the U.S.
-- Another peace feeler was carried out in Berne, Switzerland, by Yoshiro Fujimura, the Japanese naval attache in Berne, and had the backing of Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, the Navy Minister; General Shuichi Miyazaki, the Chief of Operations; and Admiral Sokichi Takagi, who even offered to fly to Switzerland to open formal negotiations. On May 3, three months before Hiroshima, Dr. Heck, the German intermediary in the approach, was informed by the office of Allen Dulles that the U.S. State Department had authorized direct negotiations with the Fujimura group. Allen Dulles was the head of the OSS office in Switzerland and had numerous high connections, including in the White House.
Fujimura contacted the Navy Ministry and made them aware of his negotiations with the Dulles people. On May 23, the Navy Ministry sent Fujimura a reply, signed by the Navy Minister: the ministry advised him to be cautious but did *not* shut down the approach.
Yonai then informed Foreign Minister Togo of the negotiations, and Togo authorized Yonai to have the Fujimura group explore the Dulles proposal more thoroughly.
So the claim that the approach to Dulles was some meaningless low-level effort that had no backing in Tokyo is demonstrably incorrect. The hardliners eventually succeeded in killing the Fujimura approach to Dulles, but it was not a meaningless effort with no high-level support.
And why were the militarists able to shut down this peace feeler? And why were they able to repeatedly block the moderates' efforts to bring about a surrender? Because they were able to stress that there was no guarantee that the emperor would not be deposed in a surrender. This was militarists' trump card, and they were able to play it over and over again against the moderates, thanks to Truman's foolish, disastrous refusal to simply give a private assurance that the emperor would not be deposed if Japan surrendered.
We know that on June 4, two months before Hiroshima, Truman received a report on this peace feeler. The report stated that the Fujimura people “particularly stress” the need to maintain the emperor in any surrender in order “to avoid Communism and chaos.” The report added that Fujimura had emphasized the fact that Japan could no longer supply herself with “essential foodstuffs,” i.e., the people were beginning to starve.
On June 22, Truman received another memo on the Fujimura-Dulles peace talks. The memo advised him that “Fujimura insists that the Japanese, before surrendering, would require assurances that the Emperor would be retained.”
So Truman knew, long before Hiroshima, that the only real obstacle to a surrender was his refusal to assure the Japanese that the emperor would not be deposed if they surrendered.
-- The second peace feeler in Switzerland involved General Seigo Okamoto, the Japanese military attache in Berne, and two Japanese officials at the International Bank of Settlements in Basel. Not only was Okamoto a general and the head of the Japanese attache office in Berne, he was a close friend of General Yoshijiru Omezu, the Japanese Army Chief of Staff. This feeler also involved Per Jacobsson, a Swiss bank director. This was not Jacobsson’s first involvement with back-door peace negotiations: he had persuaded De Valera to negotiate with the British in 1935.
This approach was made to Gero Gaevernitz, Dulles’s second-in-command, and to Dulles himself. Gaevernitz was no stranger to back-door negotiations either: he had recently masterminded the surrender of all German forces in Italy.
When Jacobsson met with Dulles and Gaevernitz, he told them that the Japanese moderates were doing their best to bring about a surrender but that the Allied demand for unconditional surrender was greatly helping the hardliners. Jacobsson further told Dulles that the only real Japanese condition for surrender was that the emperor not be deposed. Following this meeting, Dulles placed a call to Potsdam.
We also know that on July 13, nearly a month before Hiroshima, Dulles sent a message about his contact with Jacobsson to Potsdam in which he advised that it had been indicated to him that “the only condition on which Japan would insist with respect to surrender would be some consideration for the Japanese Imperial family.”
William Donovan, the head of the OSS, sent a follow-up message to Truman on July 16 about the Dulles-Jacobsson meeting and stated that Jacobsson advised that Japanese officials had stressed only two conditions for surrender, namely, that the emperor be retained and that there be the “possibility” of retaining the Meiji Constitution.
-- Furthermore, Emperor Hirohito himself authorized the effort to get the Soviets to mediate a surrender with the U.S., and Truman was aware of this fact from Foreign Minister Togo’s July 12 cable. Hirohito even wanted to send Prince Konoye to Moscow as a special envoy to get the Soviets to mediate a surrender deal with the U.S. I’d say that a peace feeler pushed by the Foreign Minister and strongly backed by Emperor Hirohito was about as substantial, official, and high ranking as you could get.
These peace feelers, and others, are discussed in detail by John Toland in The Rising Sun, by Lester Brooks in Behind Japan’s Surrender, and by Gar Alperovitz in The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb.
Incidentally, the U.S. State Department’s Office of the Historian website includes an article on the Japanese peace feelers, and it documents that American high officials were aware of these efforts:
The contents of certain of these papers [Japanese messages and memos about the peace feelers] were known to United States officials in Washington, however, as early as July 13 (see Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York, 1951), page 74; cf. pages 75–76) and information on Japanese peace maneuvers was received by Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson at Babelsberg on July 16 (see volume II, document No. 1236, footnote 4). It has also been determined that a series of messages of Japanese origin on this subject was received by the United States Delegation during the course of the Berlin Conference and that these messages were circulated at Babelsberg to some members of the President’s party. Furthermore, in a conference on January 24, 1956, between Truman and members of his staff and Department of State historians, Truman supplied the information that he was familiar with the contents of the first Japanese peace feeler (i. e., the proposal contained in document No. 582) before Stalin mentioned it to him at Babelsberg (see volume II, page 87) and that he was familiar with the contents of the second Japanese peace feeler (i. e., the approach reported in document No. 1234) before Stalin brought it to the attention of Truman and Attlee at the Tenth Plenary Meeting of the Berlin Conference on July 28 (see volume II, page 460).
Are you ever going to start telling the truth about this stuff?
I disagree.
No one ever attacked whole civilian cities before.
For example, when Germany bombed London, they actually only attacked industrial targets, with fairly precise bomb raids.
Only the allies did indiscriminate bombing or deliberate firestorms to wipe out whole cities, like Dresden, Hamburg, Tokyo, etc.
Just like there are international laws we adhere to, like against poison gas and chemical warfare, nuclear weapons have always been illegal.
Atomic weapons are both poisons and chemical weapons that slowly and painfully kill by illness, not fast kinetic energy weapons.
They are and always will be illegal really.
The fact we used them only meant we did not care, because we did not think ahead to the future when they will be used on us.
A lot of people keep saying that, but no one has denied or disputed it....
You are obviously ignorant about the viciousness and atrocities committed by Japan when they invaded China. ...
Second column, under the photo.
Article clipped from Chicago Tribune
Clipping found in Chicago Tribune published in Chicago, Illinois on 8/14/1965.
But the idiots didn't lay down their arms. Instead the sonofabitches were assholes and fought to the last man and they paid the price.
A lot of people keep saying that, but no one has denied or disputed it.
That doesn't say what you wish it said. It says that they were unofficial offers and part of 45 pages which we never see. In addition, it is an article written twenty years after the event.Second column, under the photo.
Article clipped from Chicago Tribune
Clipping found in Chicago Tribune published in Chicago, Illinois on 8/14/1965.
* thanks to dropping nukesand its just speculation that no invasion was necessary to begin with
The exact same terms we eventually accepted anyway. Are you having a hard time grasping this?That doesn't say what you wish it said. It says that they were unofficial offers and part of 45 pages which we never see. In addition, it is an article written twenty years after the event.
One out of five supposed proposals is shown. I read just this one and there is not a word spoken about the Emperor. That is one of the most important issues in the surrender. Do you disagree that there is no mention of the Emperor of Japan? If you do, please point it out for all of us.
If that’s the case, why did combat with the Soviets go on for long after the peace treaty was signed?Except that the bombs didn't end the war. The entry of the USSR into the Pacific War did.
Soviet land grabIf that’s the case, why did combat with the Soviets go on for long after the peace treaty was signed?
That is because the FACTS do not change with your wishes. Repeating your malarkey, time, after time, after time does not make them right, just old. Therefore, you get the same answers. Why would you get a different answer?Read the thread before bringing up points that have already been addressed several times.
Why do you lie so much? Just to enhance your image as a worthless Troll?The exact same terms we eventually accepted anyway. Are you having a hard time grasping this?
YOU seem to think that "fact" = what you want to believe and nothing else. That is NOT the case. You keep playing Twister to avoid the actual topic of this thread.That is because the FACTS do not change with your wishes. .....
