What is the Primary duty of the federal government?

[JakeStarkey]

And, BBG, that has changed. Let's move on.

 

[goldcatt]

That I can agree with.

So why choose Article 4, Section 4 as primary? Why not another clause, if you're going to choose just one?

As I said, Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1 aptly summarizes ( read: enumerates) the proper duty of the federal government per the founding fathers. The founding fathers did not write that article because they were tired and didn't have much left to say. It was a reaffirmation to the states. In essence, the states were to be powerful part of the government, not the feds.

You're right in that it was a reaffirmation to the States, but the conclusion you draw from that is faulty.
Which takes me back to my second point. If Art 4 Sec 4 was meant to symbolize the power of the States, Art 6 Sec 2 says exactly the opposite. We are at an impasse.

 

[goldcatt]

I actually thought JB was on to something when he brought up consent of the governed (before he wandered off to bullshitland). At its heart, Art 4 Sec 4 is paternalistic in nature, is it not? It guarantees the Federal government will mandate, uphold and support a Republican form of government in each of its States regardless of the form of government the State wishes to utilize.

 

[BasicGreatGuy]

And, BBG, that has changed. Let's move on.

So, since things have become bastardized, we should just move on, and allow the bastardized government to grow? That is illogical.

 

[xotoxi]

To give Washington, D.C. a purpose for existence.

 

[BasicGreatGuy]

So why choose Article 4, Section 4 as primary? Why not another clause, if you're going to choose just one?

As I said, Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1 aptly summarizes ( read: enumerates) the proper duty of the federal government per the founding fathers. The founding fathers did not write that article because they were tired and didn't have much left to say. It was a reaffirmation to the states. In essence, the states were to be powerful part of the government, not the feds.

You're right in that it was a reaffirmation to the States, but the conclusion you draw from that is faulty.
Which takes me back to my second point. If Art 4 Sec 4 was meant to symbolize the power of the States, Art 6 Sec 2 says exactly the opposite. We are at an impasse.

"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

I have not stated or implied that the law(s) of the respective states are the supreme law of the land. Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1 does not contradict Article VI, Clause 2 in any way.

 

[goldcatt]

To give Washington, D.C. a purpose for existence.

How do you know some eccentric phallus-obsessed billionaire wouldn't have bought it and put up his own obelisk? The rest would just grow around it like mushrooms.

 

[goldcatt]

As I said, Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1 aptly summarizes ( read: enumerates) the proper duty of the federal government per the founding fathers. The founding fathers did not write that article because they were tired and didn't have much left to say. It was a reaffirmation to the states. In essence, the states were to be powerful part of the government, not the feds.

You're right in that it was a reaffirmation to the States, but the conclusion you draw from that is faulty.
Which takes me back to my second point. If Art 4 Sec 4 was meant to symbolize the power of the States, Art 6 Sec 2 says exactly the opposite. We are at an impasse.

"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

I have not stated or implied that the law(s) of the respective states are the supreme law of the land. Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1 does not contradict Article VI, Clause 2 in any way.

Read individually, are you sure about that?
How can one have both the States in the dominant position and the Federal law overriding that of the States?

 

[PubliusInfinitum]

I tend towards the understanding that "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America;" stands as a fairly strong moral justification for government.

 

[goldcatt]

You're right in that it was a reaffirmation to the States, but the conclusion you draw from that is faulty.
Which takes me back to my second point. If Art 4 Sec 4 was meant to symbolize the power of the States, Art 6 Sec 2 says exactly the opposite. We are at an impasse.

"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

I have not stated or implied that the law(s) of the respective states are the supreme law of the land. Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1 does not contradict Article VI, Clause 2 in any way.

Read individually, are you sure about that?
How can one have both the States in the dominant position and the Federal law overriding that of the States?

There are no internal contradictions in the Constitution. Tensions, yes. Contradictions, no. Which means the interpretation being used for of one of these two clauses is faulty. And it isn't the Supremacy clause.
Sorry BGG, but you're wrong.

 

[goldcatt]

I tend towards the understanding that "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America;" stands as a fairly strong moral justification for government.

That's the mission statement, all right. It may not have the force of law, but it is the prism through which the rest needs to be read.
We sure can have fun quibbling about the details though.

 

[BasicGreatGuy]

"This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."

I have not stated or implied that the law(s) of the respective states are the supreme law of the land. Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1 does not contradict Article VI, Clause 2 in any way.

Read individually, are you sure about that?
How can one have both the States in the dominant position and the Federal law overriding that of the States?

There are no internal contradictions in the Constitution. Tensions, yes. Contradictions, no. Which means the interpretation being used for of one of these two clauses is faulty. And it isn't the Supremacy clause.
Sorry BGG, but you're wrong.

Once again gold, you are reading my posts out of context. I stated that Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1 was an affirmation to the states. You agreed. You are misunderstanding the purpose of the clause, in my opinion. It was an affirmation to the states on two fronts.

1) That the primary duty of defending the Republic against invasion was to the federal government. Under the Articles of Confederation, it was to the respective states to defend themselves. In not so many words, the founding fathers were reaffirming the point and purpose of the Constitution and the consolidation of the states.

2) It reaffirms the position and power of the federal government with specific enumerated powers. The states were to retain their autonomy within the consolidated states such as not expressed in the enumerated powers of the federal.

There is no contradiction with Article 6, Clause 2. One of the reasons that the Articles of Confederation failed, was that there was central head was loosely defined not to mention of such limited and ill-defined power, that it was all but ineffectual. It was in shambles for all intent and purposes, when the Constitution Convention took place.

In that light, Article VI, Clause 2 is nothing more than another affirmation of the proper segregation and unity between the federal and state governments. James Madison makes it very clear in Federalist Papers #39. He states, "The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the national countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government.

But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.

If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.

The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.

PUBLIUS."

Hamilton in Federalist Papers #33 makes the same kind of points.

I have not stated or implied that state constitutions are superior to the Constitution of the United States. That appears to be what you have extrapolated from my posts thus seeing incongruence in my argument and misapplication of the Constitution. Such is not the case.

I have not taken the Constitution out of context. I stand by my posts.

 

[goldcatt]

Read individually, are you sure about that?
How can one have both the States in the dominant position and the Federal law overriding that of the States?

There are no internal contradictions in the Constitution. Tensions, yes. Contradictions, no. Which means the interpretation being used for of one of these two clauses is faulty. And it isn't the Supremacy clause.
Sorry BGG, but you're wrong.

Once again gold, you are reading my posts out of context. I stated that Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1 was an affirmation to the states. You agreed. You are misunderstanding the purpose of the clause, in my opinion. It was an affirmation to the states on two fronts.

1) That the primary duty of defending the Republic against invasion was to the federal government. Under the Articles of Confederation, it was to the respective states to defend themselves. In not so many words, the founding fathers were reaffirming the point and purpose of the Constitution and the consolidation of the states.

2) It reaffirms the position and power of the federal government with specific enumerated powers. The states were to retain their autonomy within the consolidated states such as not expressed in the enumerated powers of the federal.

There is no contradiction with Article 6, Clause 2. One of the reasons that the Articles of Confederation failed, was that there was central head was loosely defined not to mention of such limited and ill-defined power, that it was all but ineffectual. It was in shambles for all intent and purposes, when the Constitution Convention took place.

In that light, Article VI, Clause 2 is nothing more than another affirmation of the proper segregation and unity between the federal and state governments. James Madison makes it very clear in Federalist Papers #39. He states, "The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the national countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government.

But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.

If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.

The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.

PUBLIUS."

Hamilton in Federalist Papers #33 makes the same kind of points.

I have not stated or implied that state constitutions are superior to the Constitution of the United States. That appears to be what you have extrapolated from my posts thus seeing incongruence in my argument and misapplication of the Constitution. Such is not the case.

I have not taken the Constitution out of context. I stand by my posts.

The Federalist papers are interesting, but due to their limited window into the minds of the framers (assuming you are an originalist and base your interpretaion on such things) and stated purpose they are highly suspect as a source.

I am interested in how your specific choice of Art 4 Sec 4 as the primary purpose for Federal government feeds into you point #2 though. Elaborate?

 

[BasicGreatGuy]

There are no internal contradictions in the Constitution. Tensions, yes. Contradictions, no. Which means the interpretation being used for of one of these two clauses is faulty. And it isn't the Supremacy clause.
Sorry BGG, but you're wrong.

Once again gold, you are reading my posts out of context. I stated that Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1 was an affirmation to the states. You agreed. You are misunderstanding the purpose of the clause, in my opinion. It was an affirmation to the states on two fronts.

1) That the primary duty of defending the Republic against invasion was to the federal government. Under the Articles of Confederation, it was to the respective states to defend themselves. In not so many words, the founding fathers were reaffirming the point and purpose of the Constitution and the consolidation of the states.

2) It reaffirms the position and power of the federal government with specific enumerated powers. The states were to retain their autonomy within the consolidated states such as not expressed in the enumerated powers of the federal.

There is no contradiction with Article 6, Clause 2. One of the reasons that the Articles of Confederation failed, was that there was central head was loosely defined not to mention of such limited and ill-defined power, that it was all but ineffectual. It was in shambles for all intent and purposes, when the Constitution Convention took place.

In that light, Article VI, Clause 2 is nothing more than another affirmation of the proper segregation and unity between the federal and state governments. James Madison makes it very clear in Federalist Papers #39. He states, "The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the national countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government.

But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.

If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.

The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.

PUBLIUS."

Hamilton in Federalist Papers #33 makes the same kind of points.

I have not stated or implied that state constitutions are superior to the Constitution of the United States. That appears to be what you have extrapolated from my posts thus seeing incongruence in my argument and misapplication of the Constitution. Such is not the case.

I have not taken the Constitution out of context. I stand by my posts.

The Federalist papers are interesting, but due to their limited window into the minds of the framers (assuming you are an originalist and base your interpretaion on such things) and stated purpose they are highly suspect as a source.

I am interested in how your specific choice of Art 4 Sec 4 as the primary purpose for Federal government feeds into you point #2 though. Elaborate?

I spend time honestly answering your previous post to me, and you come back with a dismissive retort that is no better than saying "I don't think so" in a court of law.

As you well know, when there is perceived ambiguity within the Constitution, one of the principles of Constitutional Law is to look at legislative intent. ( i.e. supporting founding documents that speak directly thereto ). What I posted was in fact a valid tool. You dismissed it. One of the purposes of writing the supporting founding documents was for this very reason. So, for you to say that such work is "suspect," especially when said work has been shown to be historically accurate, is nothing more than being intellectually lazy with me. It is a polite way of brushing me off, without actually offering up a valid retort.

Many of your posts to me in the thread have been dismissive, without substantive retort. You tell me I am wrong and leave it at that. That doesn't cut it. You have yet to actually tear down my premise.

I am not inclined to keep elaborating points I have made or answer questions I am asked, if the replies I put forth are going to be dismissed in such a lackadaisical manner.

 

[goldcatt]

Once again gold, you are reading my posts out of context. I stated that Article IV, Section 4, Clause 1 was an affirmation to the states. You agreed. You are misunderstanding the purpose of the clause, in my opinion. It was an affirmation to the states on two fronts.

1) That the primary duty of defending the Republic against invasion was to the federal government. Under the Articles of Confederation, it was to the respective states to defend themselves. In not so many words, the founding fathers were reaffirming the point and purpose of the Constitution and the consolidation of the states.

2) It reaffirms the position and power of the federal government with specific enumerated powers. The states were to retain their autonomy within the consolidated states such as not expressed in the enumerated powers of the federal.

There is no contradiction with Article 6, Clause 2. One of the reasons that the Articles of Confederation failed, was that there was central head was loosely defined not to mention of such limited and ill-defined power, that it was all but ineffectual. It was in shambles for all intent and purposes, when the Constitution Convention took place.

In that light, Article VI, Clause 2 is nothing more than another affirmation of the proper segregation and unity between the federal and state governments. James Madison makes it very clear in Federalist Papers #39. He states, "The difference between a federal and national government, as it relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation, in their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character; though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded against in their collective and political capacities only. So far the national countenance of the government on this side seems to be disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the government on the people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this relation, a NATIONAL government.

But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things, so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in the national legislature. Among communities united for particular purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy, no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be established under the general government. But this does not change the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made, according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality. Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be established under the general rather than under the local governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be combated.

If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.

The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both. In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly national.

PUBLIUS."

Hamilton in Federalist Papers #33 makes the same kind of points.

I have not stated or implied that state constitutions are superior to the Constitution of the United States. That appears to be what you have extrapolated from my posts thus seeing incongruence in my argument and misapplication of the Constitution. Such is not the case.

I have not taken the Constitution out of context. I stand by my posts.

The Federalist papers are interesting, but due to their limited window into the minds of the framers (assuming you are an originalist and base your interpretaion on such things) and stated purpose they are highly suspect as a source.

I am interested in how your specific choice of Art 4 Sec 4 as the primary purpose for Federal government feeds into you point #2 though. Elaborate?

I spend time honestly answering your previous post to me, and you come back with a dismissive retort that is no better than saying "I don't think so" in a court of law.

As you well know, when there is perceived ambiguity within the Constitution, one of the principles of Constitutional Law is to look at legislative intent. ( i.e. supporting founding documents that speak directly thereto ). What I posted was in fact a valid tool. You dismissed it. One of the purposes of writing the supporting founding documents was for this very reason. So, for you to say that such work is "suspect," especially when said work has been shown to be historically accurate, is nothing more than being intellectually lazy with me. It is a polite way of brushing me off, without actually offering up a valid retort.

Many of your posts to me in the thread have been dismissive, without substantive retort. You tell me I am wrong and leave it at that. That doesn't cut it. You have yet to actually tear down my premise.

I am not inclined to keep elaborating points I have made or answer questions I am asked, if the replies I put forth are going to be dismissed in such a lackadaisical manner.

I'm sorry if it seems to you my responses have been "dismissive" as you term it. I disagree with your assessment, and have put forth my reasons for disagreeing. I have also asked questions where I am trying to understand where you're coming from, since from where I sit several of the connections aren't clear. And yes, played devil's advocate a bit. Perhaps we're both talking past each other, my friend.

 

[JBeukema]

I actually thought JB was on to something when he brought up consent of the governed (before he wandered off to bullshitland). At its heart, Art 4 Sec 4 is paternalistic in nature, is it not? It guarantees the Federal government will mandate, uphold and support a Republican form of government in each of its States regardless of the form of government the State wishes to utilize.

Thereby contradicting the rhetoric of the consent of the governed and mandating an oppressive system which forces itself upon the masses.

As i have said several times now.

 

[JBeukema]

I tend towards the understanding that "We the people of the United States, in order to form a more perfect union, establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America;" stands as a fairly strong moral justification for government.

And when the People decide they don't want it anymore?

 

[RetiredGySgt]

The Government is to do the will of the poeple within the constraints of the Constitution. When or if the people no longer approve of those constraints they can create and pass an amendment or create an entire new Constitution. That is the beauty of the Constitution, JUST because the current crop of political rejects refuse to amendment it does not mean it should not be so effected.

 

[Sidestreamer]

Article IV Section 4, Clause 1: "The United States shall guarantee to every state in this union a republican form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion; and on application of the legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be convened) against domestic violence."

That my friends, is the primary role of government. Not all that hope and change crap. Dude was the closest to the answer.

And how does it get the muscle to do that? How does it ensure domestic tranquility as mentioned in the preamble? How does it enforce the Bill of Rights?

 

[JakeStarkey]

I think Retired and Sidestreamer are spot on. Retired notes the power of amendment, and Sidestreamer infers that Article IV Section 4, Clause 1 is a subset of the Constitution, not the guiding spirit or force of it. The guiding forces in my opinion are the Preamble, Amendment I and Amendment XIV, and, of course, the Supreme Court (Article III) that is given "original jurisdiction" on matters constitutional.