CrusaderFrank
Diamond Member
- May 20, 2009
- 146,582
- 69,690
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Its the Dem Party Vote manufacturing Machine in full swing: Keep them dependent on government from cradle to grave and keep them dumb by controlling the educational system.
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Then what non-welfare state should we model ourselves after?
The pre-welfare USA?
Then what non-welfare state should we model ourselves after?
The pre-welfare USA?
If you recreate the conditions that led the American people to desire a 'welfare state' then you recreate the conditions that created the welfare state.
The Communists that have controlled the Democrat Party behind the scenes since FDR have been the biggest proponents of the Welfare State BECAUSE it crushes the human spirit and turns people into government worshiping slaves.
What is the Exit strategy for the "War on Poverty" that we've been fighting since the mid-1960's?
The pre-welfare USA?
If you recreate the conditions that led the American people to desire a 'welfare state' then you recreate the conditions that created the welfare state.
You said model after, not re-create .
I asked about us modelling ourselves after that but that doesn't mean we have to mirror everything.
Then what non-welfare state should we model ourselves after?
2. "... is that the 2008 financial crisis was caused not by Wall Street’s shady lending practices or exotic (and ultimately worthless) financial instruments but by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were forced by the government’s expansive housing policy to make riskier and riskier loans."
Dat's da troooof!
2. "... is that the 2008 financial crisis was caused not by Wall Streets shady lending practices or exotic (and ultimately worthless) financial instruments but by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were forced by the governments expansive housing policy to make riskier and riskier loans."
Dat's da troooof!
The proper question is not: What story is consistent with my general philosophy or worldview?
The proper questions is: What story is consistent with the facts?
Fact One: Fannie and Freddies primary business of subsidizing conventional loans was not a driver of the housing the bubble.
Indeed, conventional loans represented less than a third of all mortgage originations during the peak price acceleration years.
This was a phenomenon of private-label non-conventional loan securitization.
1.1 Peaking in 2006 at a third of all mortgages originated, the volume of Alt-A and subprime mortgages was extraordinarily high
 between 2004 and 2007. In 2005 and 2006, conventional, conforming mortgages accounted for approximately one-third of all
 mortgages originated
1.2 Private-label issuers played a large role in securitizing higher-risk mortgages from early 2004 to mid-2007 while the Enterprises
 continued to guarantee primarily traditional mortgages.
Fact Two: Fannie and Freddie lost market volume during the boom.
That is, during the boom not only did the fraction of loans securitized by Fannie and Freddie fall, but the absolute number fell. At the same time the absolute number of private-label securitizations rose.
There is a simple and obvious reason for this. The development of structured products meant that for many consumers the free market offered a more attractive loan than the government subsidized one.
Fact Three: The major losses to Fannie and Freddie came through their expansion into guaranteeing non-traditional loans, not through their portfolio.
That is, yes like every other financial entity Fannie and Freddie were buying subprime packages in the secondary market. However, these losses were relatively mild.
The Investments and Capital Markets segment accounts for $21 billion, or 9 percent, of capital reduction from the end of 2007 through the second quarter of 2010. Losses in the Investments and Capital Markets segment stemmed from impairments of private-label securities, fair-value losses on securities, and fair-value losses on derivatives (used for hedging interest rate risk).
Fact Four:The key change in the Fannie / Freddie business model was their expansion in the types of loans they willing to guarantee. In particular moving into the Alt-A and Interest-Only categories.
As we can see these loans began to seriously underperform as the economy deteriorated. These loans were not a part of the original crap hidden by structure subprime business. Fannie / Freddie borrowers had on average credit scores above 710 and equity (or down payment) of above 25%.
Read more: Here's Why Fannie And Freddie Are Not At Fault For The Housing Bubble - Business Insider
2. "... is that the 2008 financial crisis was caused not by Wall Street’s shady lending practices or exotic (and ultimately worthless) financial instruments but by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, which were forced by the government’s expansive housing policy to make riskier and riskier loans."
Dat's da troooof!
The proper question is not: What story is consistent with my general philosophy or worldview?
The proper questions is: What story is consistent with the facts?
Fact One: Fannie and Freddie’s primary business of subsidizing conventional loans was not a driver of the housing the bubble.
Indeed, conventional loans represented less than a third of all mortgage originations during the peak price acceleration years.
This was a phenomenon of private-label non-conventional loan securitization.
1.1 Peaking in 2006 at a third of all mortgages originated, the volume of Alt-A and subprime mortgages was extraordinarily high
 between 2004 and 2007. In 2005 and 2006, conventional, conforming mortgages accounted for approximately one-third of all
 mortgages originated
1.2 Private-label issuers played a large role in securitizing higher-risk mortgages from early 2004 to mid-2007 while the Enterprises
 continued to guarantee primarily traditional mortgages.
Fact Two: Fannie and Freddie lost market volume during the boom.
That is, during the boom not only did the fraction of loans securitized by Fannie and Freddie fall, but the absolute number fell. At the same time the absolute number of private-label securitizations rose.
There is a simple and obvious reason for this. The development of structured products meant that for many consumers the free market offered a more attractive loan than the government subsidized one.
Fact Three: The major losses to Fannie and Freddie came through their expansion into guaranteeing non-traditional loans, not through their portfolio.
That is, yes like every other financial entity Fannie and Freddie were buying subprime packages in the secondary market. However, these losses were relatively mild.
The Investments and Capital Markets segment accounts for $21 billion, or 9 percent, of capital reduction from the end of 2007 through the second quarter of 2010. Losses in the Investments and Capital Markets segment stemmed from impairments of private-label securities, fair-value losses on securities, and fair-value losses on derivatives (used for hedging interest rate risk).
Fact Four:The key change in the Fannie / Freddie business model was their expansion in the types of loans they willing to guarantee. In particular moving into the Alt-A and Interest-Only categories.
As we can see these loans began to seriously underperform as the economy deteriorated. These loans were not a part of the original “crap hidden by structure” subprime business. Fannie / Freddie borrowers had on average credit scores above 710 and equity (or down payment) of above 25%.
Read more: Here's Why Fannie And Freddie Are Not At Fault For The Housing Bubble - Business Insider
Hey, pellet....did I forget to ask: was Fannie and Freddie’s provenance constitutional as per Article I, section 8?
The proper question is not: What story is consistent with my general philosophy or worldview?
The proper questions is: What story is consistent with the facts?
Fact One: Fannie and Freddies primary business of subsidizing conventional loans was not a driver of the housing the bubble.
Indeed, conventional loans represented less than a third of all mortgage originations during the peak price acceleration years.
This was a phenomenon of private-label non-conventional loan securitization.
1.1 Peaking in 2006 at a third of all mortgages originated, the volume of Alt-A and subprime mortgages was extraordinarily high
 between 2004 and 2007. In 2005 and 2006, conventional, conforming mortgages accounted for approximately one-third of all
 mortgages originated
1.2 Private-label issuers played a large role in securitizing higher-risk mortgages from early 2004 to mid-2007 while the Enterprises
 continued to guarantee primarily traditional mortgages.
Fact Two: Fannie and Freddie lost market volume during the boom.
That is, during the boom not only did the fraction of loans securitized by Fannie and Freddie fall, but the absolute number fell. At the same time the absolute number of private-label securitizations rose.
There is a simple and obvious reason for this. The development of structured products meant that for many consumers the free market offered a more attractive loan than the government subsidized one.
Fact Three: The major losses to Fannie and Freddie came through their expansion into guaranteeing non-traditional loans, not through their portfolio.
That is, yes like every other financial entity Fannie and Freddie were buying subprime packages in the secondary market. However, these losses were relatively mild.
The Investments and Capital Markets segment accounts for $21 billion, or 9 percent, of capital reduction from the end of 2007 through the second quarter of 2010. Losses in the Investments and Capital Markets segment stemmed from impairments of private-label securities, fair-value losses on securities, and fair-value losses on derivatives (used for hedging interest rate risk).
Fact Four:The key change in the Fannie / Freddie business model was their expansion in the types of loans they willing to guarantee. In particular moving into the Alt-A and Interest-Only categories.
As we can see these loans began to seriously underperform as the economy deteriorated. These loans were not a part of the original crap hidden by structure subprime business. Fannie / Freddie borrowers had on average credit scores above 710 and equity (or down payment) of above 25%.
Read more: Here's Why Fannie And Freddie Are Not At Fault For The Housing Bubble - Business Insider
Hey, pellet....did I forget to ask: was Fannie and Freddies provenance constitutional as per Article I, section 8?
That's all you can parrot there Poly? Your trainer needs to teach you more words for you to mindlessly chirp.
It is not what a lawyer tells me I may do; but what humanity, reason, and justice tell me I ought to do.
Edmund Burke
Justice is itself the great standing policy of civil society; and any eminent departure from it, under any circumstances, lies under the suspicion of being no policy at all.
Edmund Burke
Fannie / Freddie borrowers had on average credit scores above 710 and equity (or down payment) of above 25%.
Okay, somebody explain to me where I'm missing the boat here. The report on which the link in the OP is built is a Conservator's Report, after the housing bubble popped. They ain't talking about data prior to 2008 for the most part, they're talking about what a great job they did after the horses left the barn. There is no way on God's green earth that the F&F average loan for the period of time from the early 90s when the bubble started until it popped was 710 credit score or that they had to put down 25% or thereabouts. BFD, so they finally decided to restrict mortgages to those with a good enough credit history and enough down payment, too bad they didn't do that for the prior 15 years or so when any swingin' dick could get an ARM with nothing but a smile.
What F&F did was open the floodgates for the private sector to follow in. They led the way, maybe not in volume but in policy. I would not say that they are the sole reasons for the housing collapse, there is plenty of blame to go around, beginning in my opinion with Congress and the WH.
Hey, pellet....did I forget to ask: was Fannie and Freddies provenance constitutional as per Article I, section 8?
That's all you can parrot there Poly? Your trainer needs to teach you more words for you to mindlessly chirp.
It is not what a lawyer tells me I may do; but what humanity, reason, and justice tell me I ought to do.
Edmund Burke
Justice is itself the great standing policy of civil society; and any eminent departure from it, under any circumstances, lies under the suspicion of being no policy at all.
Edmund Burke
Fannie / Freddie borrowers had on average credit scores above 710 and equity (or down payment) of above 25%.
That was really, really interesting....
....BTW....was Fannie and Freddies provenance constitutional as per Article I, section 8?
Just wondering.
Since 1979 the average pre-tax income for the bottom 90% of households has decreased by $900, while that of the top 1% increased by over $700,000, as federal taxation became less progressive. From 1992-2007 the top 400 income earners in the U.S. saw their income increase 392% and their average tax rate reduced by 37%. In 2009, the average income of the top 1% was $960,000 with a minimum income of $343,927.
..... During the economic expansion between 2002 and 2007, the income of the top 1% grew 10 times faster than the income of the bottom 90%. In this period 66% of total income gains went to the 1%, who in 2007 had a larger share of total income than at any time since 1928.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Distribution_of_wealth
How wide would the gap between Rich and Poor have to get before the conservative consensus would be, okay, that's good,
we're happy now...
Since 1979 the average pre-tax income for the bottom 90% of households has decreased by $900, while that of the top 1% increased by over $700,000, as federal taxation became less progressive. From 1992-2007 the top 400 income earners in the U.S. saw their income increase 392% and their average tax rate reduced by 37%. In 2009, the average income of the top 1% was $960,000 with a minimum income of $343,927.
..... During the economic expansion between 2002 and 2007, the income of the top 1% grew 10 times faster than the income of the bottom 90%. In this period 66% of total income gains went to the 1%, who in 2007 had a larger share of total income than at any time since 1928.
Distribution of wealth - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
- Since 1979 average pre-tax income for the bottom 90% of households has decreased by $900,
- the top 1% increased by over $700,000,
- 66% of total income gains (2002 and 2007) went to the 1%
[ame=http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q2UppIdlTyQ]Occupy Everything! Do You Hear The People Sing - YouTube[/ame]
1
Again:
"only appreciable decline occurred in the 1990s, a time of
state experimentation with tightening welfare eligibility,"
So....conservatives were right....
The choice in November is clear.
How wide would the gap between Rich and Poor have to get before the conservative consensus would be, okay, that's good,
we're happy now...
While there certainly is a mathematical "1%," due to income mobility, there is no perpetual "1%" in the United States.
It is a hypothetical construct created by the far Left to enamor the imagination of the covetous and the dim-witted.
"More than three-quarters of those working Americans whose incomes were in the bottom 20 percent in 1975 were also in the top 40 percent of income earners at some point by 1991, says Sowell."
Source: Thomas Sowell, "How Media Misuse Income Data To Match Their Preconceptions," Investor's Business Daily, January 12, 2010.
For text:
How Media Misuse Income Data To Match Their Preconceptions - Investors.com