[MENTION=43831]RKMBrown[/MENTION]
a. "The mandate "requires" we buy insurance." comes from a failure of reading and comprehension skills so prevalent in today's society. Here is a quote taken out of context - "The individual mandate was Congresss solution to these problems. By requiring that individuals purchase health insurance, the mandate prevents cost-shifting by those who would otherwise go without it." - CJ Roberts - The quote are Robert's words, but his words before saying the argument was invalid.
Here too (a), you are falling into rebtard's alternate reality where the mandate is the shared responsibility payment penalty/tax. It is not. The penalty/tax is part of the mandate, the enforcement mechanism.
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Two arguments were ruled invalid: the mandate under the commerce clause, and the mandate under the necessary and proper clause.
CJ Roberts: "Just as the individual mandate cannot be sustained as a law regulating the substantial effects of the failure to purchase health insurance, neither can it be upheld as a necessary and proper component of the insurance reforms. The commerce power thus does not authorize the mandate. Accord, post, at 416 (joint opinion of SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., dissenting)"
"That is not the end of the matter. Because the Commerce Clause does not support the individual mandate, it is necessary to turn to the Governments second argument: that the mandate may be upheld as within Congresss enumerated power to lay and collect Taxes. Art. I, §8, cl."
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"The Governments tax power argument asks us to view the statute differently than we did in considering its commerce power theory. In making its Commerce Clause
argument, the Government defended the mandate as a regulation requiring individuals to purchase health insurance. The Government does not claim that the taxing power allows Congress to issue such a command. Instead, the Government asks us to read the mandate not as ordering individuals to buy insurance, but rather as imposing a
tax on those who do not buy that product.
The text of a statute can sometimes have more than one possible meaning. To take a familiar example, a law that reads no vehicles in the park might, or might not, ban bicycles in the park. And it is well established that if a statute has two possible meanings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so. Justice Story said that 180 years ago: No court ought, unless the terms of an act rendered it unavoidable, to give a construction to it which should involve a violation, however unintentional, of the constitution. Parsons v. Bedford, 3 Pet. 433, 448449 (1830). Justice Holmes made the same point a century later: [T]he rule is settled that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U. S. 142, 148 (1927) (concurring opinion). The most straightforward reading of the mandate is that it commands individuals to purchase insurance."
"After all, it states that individuals shall maintain health insurance. 26 U. S. C.§5000A(a). Congress thought it could enact such a command under the Commerce Clause, and the Government primarily defended the law on that basis. But, for the reasons explained above, the Commerce Clause does not give Congress that power. Under our precedent, it is therefore necessary to ask whether the Governments alternative reading of the statutethat it only imposes a tax on those without insuranceis a reasonable one.
Under the mandate, if an individual does not maintain health insurance, the only consequence is that he must make an additional payment to the IRS when he pays his taxes. See §5000A(b). That, according to the Government, means the mandate can be regarded as establishing a conditionnot owning health insurancethat triggers a taxthe required payment to the IRS. Under that theory, the mandate is not a legal command to buy insurance. Rather, it makes going without insurance just another thing the Government taxes, like buying gasoline or earning income. And if the mandate is in effect just a tax hike on certain taxpayers who do not have health insurance, it may be within Congresss constitutional power to tax.
The question is not whether that is the most natural interpretation of the mandate, but only whether it is a fairly possible one. Crowell v. Benson, 285 U. S. 22, 62 (1932). As we have explained, every reasonable construction must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality. Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. 648,
657 (1895). The Government asks us to interpret the mandate as imposing a tax, if it would otherwise violate the Constitution. Granting the Act the full measure of deference owed to federal statutes, it can be so read, for the reasons set forth below..."
forgot to address (b.)
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b. your words: "However, it does include a fine/fee/tax or whatever you want to call that revenue shit the IRS collects from worker's income. Thus your argument amounts to nothing more than mental masturbation, since as we all know it was always a tax. Oddly a tax taken in the form of fine/penalty when you file and only if you have a rebate and did not buy insurance (rumors say). I'll wait to see it the tax forms before I'll believe much on this matter."
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Nothing odd about a tax taken in the form of fine/penalty, is there?
"since as we all know it was always a tax." - semantics, but in the law it is a penalty, 'it' being the "shared responsibility payment" The court ruling did not change the language of the act, the law.
CJ Roberts: "It is of course true that the Act describes the payment as a penalty, not a tax. But while that label is fatal to the application of the Anti-Injunction Act, supra, at 1213, it does not determine whether the payment may be viewed as an exercise of Congresss taxing power. It is up to Congress whether to apply the Anti-Injunction Act to any particular statute, so it makes sense to be guided by Congresss choice of label on that question. That choice does not, however, control whether an exaction is within Congresss constitutional power to tax.
Our precedent reflects this: In 1922, we decided two challenges to the Child Labor Tax on the same day. In the first, we held that a suit to enjoin collection of the so called tax was barred by the Anti-Injunction Act. George, 259 U. S., at 20. Congress knew that suits to obstruct taxes had to await payment under the Anti-Injunction Act; Congress called the child labor tax a tax; Congress therefore intended the Anti-Injunction Act to apply. In the second case, however, we held that the same exaction, although labeled a tax, was not in fact authorized by Congresss taxing power. Drexel Furniture, 259 U. S., at 38. That constitutional question was not controlled by Congresss choice of label.
We have similarly held that exactions not labeled taxes nonetheless were authorized by Congresss power to tax. In the License Tax Cases, for example, we held that federal...
Dude. Just because I argued you are correct based on (a) and (b) does not mean you have to provide detailed support for my statements but, thx. I guess.
Still he got it wrong about the mandate to buy something, that argument was found unconstitutional.