Dad2three
Gold Member
- Jun 22, 2014
- 13,013
- 1,614
Well, it's nice to see that evidently everyone agrees that proper, comprehensive, efficient regulation of financial markets is critical.
Yes, the video is right in that the GSE's were under-effectively-regulated, and yes, that played a role. But that's just the beginning, and only part of the Meltdown.
On and on, I know I missed a few. Both ends of the spectrum just love to point the finger at the other, as always.
- The bankers who created, with the help of (I am NOT making this up) physicists, the abominations known as sub-prime CDO's to dangle in front of investors, pure shit securities
- The ratings agencies, obediently slapping AAA ratings (for a fee, of course) on those pure shit securities were also under-effectively-regulated.
- AIG, selling horrific Credit Default Swaps like candy to children without having to worry about pesky reserve requirements, was also under-effectively-regulated.
- Mortgage lenders granting spectacularly stupid 125% no-doc loans on anyone with a fucking pulse.
- Borrowers (yes kids, they were involved in this too) signing on the dotted line for loans they goddamn well knew they couldn't afford
- Borrowers (oops, there they are again) getting loans to pay off bills and then, as if they had no functioning brain matter whatsoever, immediately running up new bills
.
"The ratings agencies, obediently slapping AAA ratings (for a fee, of course) on those pure shit securities were also under-effectively-regulated."
YEP, WHICH BRANCH HAD OVERSIGHT ON THEM AGAIN?
The Two Documents Everyone Should Read to Better Understand the Crisis
Don't ask; don't tell: book profits, "earn" bonuses and closet your losses
The first document everyone should read is by S&P, the largest of the rating agencies. The context of the document is that a professional credit rater has told his superiors that he needs to examine the mortgage loan files to evaluate the risk of a complex financial derivative whose risk and market value depend on the credit quality of the nonprime mortgages "underlying" the derivative. A senior manager sends a blistering reply with this forceful punctuation:
Any request for loan level tapes is TOTALLY UNREASONABLE!!! Most investors don't have it and can't provide it. [W]e MUST produce a credit estimate. It is your responsibility to provide those credit estimates and your responsibility to devise some method for doing so.
Fraud is the principal credit risk of nonprime mortgage lending. It is impossible to detect fraud without reviewing a sample of the loan files.
These two documents are enough to begin to understand:
- the FBI accurately described mortgage fraud as "epidemic"
- nonprime lenders are overwhelmingly responsible for the epidemic
- the fraud was so endemic that it would have been easy to spot if anyone looked
- the lenders, the banks that created nonprime derivatives, the rating agencies, and the buyers all operated on a "don't ask; don't tell" policy
- willful blindness was essential to originate, sell, pool and resell the loans
- willful blindness was the pretext for not posting loss reserves
- both forms of blindness made high (fictional) profits certain when the bubble was expanding rapidly and massive (real) losses certain when it collapsed
- the worse the nonprime loan quality the higher the fees and interest rates, and the faster the growth in nonprime lending and pooling the greater the immediate fictional profits and (eventual) real losses
- the greater the destruction of wealth, the greater the (fictional) profits, bonuses, and stock appreciation
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