Derideo_Te
Je Suis Charlie
- Mar 2, 2013
- 20,461
- 7,961
- 360
Everyone who was informed as to why AA was held liable following the ENRON collapse.Arthur Anderson was deregulated? Who knew?No, I asked what deregulation occurred in 2000.
There isn't any. It is a myth propagated by the Left. You are left arguing that an act signed by Clinton in 1999 was somehow responsible for a downturn nearly 10 years later.
It won't wash.
The deregulation of Arthur Anderson occurred in 1995 and it went bust in 2002.
The time required to set up and fund the deregulated Wall St banks and then sell all of those subprime mortgages and then for them to start maturing 5 years later fits perfectly with the 2008 collapse.
Blame the Accountants ? and Deregulation | The Big Picture
The New York attorney general may be bringing a civil fraud lawsuit against Ernst & Young, accusing the accounting firm of helping Lehman mislead investors, according to the WSJ.
The accountants were the pushers to the Streets junkies. They allowed all manner of shenanigans to go on, under their imprimatur of legitimacy. From WorldCom to Tyco to Enron and now to Lehman Brothers, most of these frauds would not have been possible without the loving assistance of large and credible accounting firms.
And they did it for the money. Ernst & Young earned approximately $100 million in fees for its auditing work from 2001 through 2008 for Lehman Brothers.
Some people assumed that the death penalty for Arthur Anderson would have kept the industry in line. But such restraint was not to be. Thanks to yet another piece of radical deregulation, the accounting industry was given carte blanche to run wild. The Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 had created a civil liability out for the accountants. It allowed them to legally become Wall Streets pushers, no longer answerable to Investors who were defrauded due to their accounting audits. It practically decriminalized accounting fraud.
Here is a piece of trivia about this ruinous legislation: Prior to becoming SEC Chair, Christopher Cox was one of the authors of the Securities Litigation Reform Act. When a radical deregulator becomes Wall Streets chief cop, what could possibly go wrong?
Here is what I wrote in Bailout Nation about the Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995:
This legislation was supposed to be a way to eliminate class action lawsuits that were the bane of public companies existence. Buried in the legislation was a little-noticed clause that eliminated joint and several liability for those who contribute to securities fraud. The consequences of the change were significant. It removed liability for fraud from the accountants who audited quarterly statements for public companies.
What do you think happened once accountants were no longer liable? An explosion of accounting fraud! The accounting scandals of the late 1990s and early 2000s were directly attributable to this small legal change. So too was the collapse of Enron, which led to the corporate death penalty for Arthur Andersen. We can probably pin the subsequent enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, which is undoubtedly having all sorts of its own unintended consequences, on that same clause. These all trace back to what the industry itself had requested.
As the saying goes: Be careful what you wish for; you may get it.
We are left to wonder: Who else has questionable accounting . . .?
Sub prime loans are typically 30 year mortgages. They don't mature in 5 years.
The Fuel That Fed The Subprime Meltdown
Teaser Rates and the ARM
With mortgage lenders exporting much of the risk in subprime lending out the door to investors, they were free to come up with interesting strategies to originate loans with their freed up capital. By using teaser rates (special low rates that would last for the first year or two of a mortgage) within adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM), borrowers could be enticed into an initially affordable mortgage in which payments would skyrocket in three, five, or seven years. (To learn more, read ARMed And Dangerous and American Dream Or Mortgage Nightmare?)
As the real estate market pushed to its peaks in 2005 and 2006, teaser rates, ARMs, and the "interest-only" loan (where no principle payments are made for the first few years) were increasingly pushed upon homeowners. As these loans became more common, fewer borrowers questioned the terms and were instead enticed by the prospect of being able to refinance in a few years (at a huge profit, the argument stated), enabling them to make whatever catch-up payments would be necessary. What borrowers didn't take into account in the booming housing market, however, was that any decrease in home value would leave the borrower with an untenable combination of a balloon payment and a much higher mortgage payment.
A market as close to home as real estate becomes impossible to ignore when it's firing on all cylinders. Over the space of five years, home prices in many areas had literally doubled, and just about anyone who hadn't purchased a home or refinanced considered themselves behind in the race to make money in that market. Mortgage lenders knew this, and pushed ever-more aggressively. New homes couldn't be built fast enough, and homebuilders' stocks soared.
The CDO market (secured mainly with subprime debt) ballooned to more than $600 billion in issuance during 2006 alone - more than 10-times the amount issued just a decade earlier. These securities, although illiquid, were picked up eagerly in the secondary markets, which happily parked them into large institutional funds at their market-beating interest rates.
You are talking out of your ass. Like most libs.
Ironic!