The Nanking Massacre and Iris Chang's Book The Rape of Nanking

[mikegriffith1]

I found another “right-wing, pro-Nazi, paranoid reactionary” who severely attacked Truman’s catastrophic handling of China: then-Congressman John F. Kennedy from Massachusetts, who later became the 35th president of the United States, in a speech he gave in 1949 on the loss of China. Here are some excerpts from his great speech:

Over these past few days we have learned the extent of the disasters befalling China and the United States. Our relationship with China since the end of the Second World War has been a tragic one, and it is of the utmost importance that we search out and spotlight those who must bear the responsibility for our present predicament. . . .​

At the Yalta Conference in 1945 a sick Roosevelt, with the advice of General Marshall and other Chiefs of Staff, gave the Kurile Islands as well as the control of various strategic Chinese ports, such as Port Arthur and Darien, to the Soviet Union.​

According to Former Ambassador Bullitt, in Life Magazine in 1948, “Whatever share of the responsibility was Roosevelt’s and whatever share was Marshall’s the vital interest of the United States in the independent integrity of China was sacrificed, and the foundation was laid for the present tragic situation in the Far East”.​

When the armies of Soviet Russia withdrew from Manchuria they left Chinese Communists in control of this area and in possession of great masses of Japanese war material.​

During this period began the great split of the minds of our diplomats over whether to support the Government of Chiang Kai-shek, or force Chiang Kai-shek as the price of our assistance to bring Chinese Communists into his government to form a coalition.​

When Ambassador Patrick Hurley resigned in 1945 he stated, “Professional diplomats continuously advised the Chinese Communists that my efforts in preventing the collapse of the National Government did not represent the policy of the United States. The chief opposition to the accomplishment of our mission came from American career diplomats, the Embassy at Chungking and the Chinese Far Eastern divisions of the State Department.”​

With the troubled situation in China beginning to loom large in the United States, General Marshall was sent at the request of President Truman as Special Emissary to China to effect a compromise and to bring about a coalition government.​

In Ambassador Bullitt’s article in Life, he states and I quote: “In early summer of 1946 in order to force Chiang Kai-shek to take Communists into the Chinese government, General Marshall had the Department of State refuse to give licenses for export of ammunition to China. Thus from the summer of 1946 to February 1948 not a single shell or a single cartridge was delivered to China for use in its American armament. And in the aviation field Marshall likewise blundered, and as a result of his breaking the American government’s contract to deliver to China planes to maintain 8 and 1/3 air groups, for three years no combat or bombing planes were delivered to China – from September 1946 to March 1948. As Marshall himself confessed in February 1948 to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, this “was in effect an embargo on military supplies”.​

In 1948 we appropriated $468,000,000 for China, only a fraction of what we were sending to Europe, and out of this $468,000,000 only $125,000,000 was for military purposes. The end was drawing near; the assistance was too little and too late; and the Nationalist Government was engaged in a death struggle with the on-rushing communist armies. . . .​

Our policy in China has reaped the whirlwind. The continued insistence that aid would not be forthcoming unless a coalition government with the Communists was formed was a crippling blow to the National Government. So concerned were our diplomats and their advisors, the Lattimores and the Fairbanks, with the imperfections of the diplomatic system in China after twenty years of war, and the tales of corruption in high places, that they lost sight of our tremendous stake in a non-communist China.​

There were those who claimed, and still claim, that Chinese communism was not really communism at all but merely an advanced agrarian movement which did not take directions from Moscow.​

Listen to the words of the Bolton report: “Its doctrines follow those of Lenin and Stalin. Its leaders are Moscow-trained (of 35 leading Chinese communist political leaders listed in the report, over half either spent some time or studied in Moscow.) Its policies and actions, its strategy and tactics are communist. The Chinese Communists have followed faithfully every zig zag of the Kremlin’s line for a generation.”​

This is the tragic story of China whose freedom we once fought to preserve. What our young men had saved, our diplomats and our President have frittered away. (Remarks of Representative John F. Kennedy at the Philip J. Durkin Testimonial Dinner, Salem, Massachusetts, January 30, 1949 | JFK Library)​

Wow! Bullseye!

 

[JoeB131]

I found another “right-wing, pro-Nazi, paranoid reactionary” who severely attacked Truman’s catastrophic handling of China: then-Congressman John F. Kennedy from Massachusetts, who later became the 35th president of the United States, in a speech he gave in 1949 on the loss of China. Here are some excerpts from his great speech:

Another white guy telling Asian people their business. Whatever would they do without us White folks.

At the Yalta Conference in 1945 a sick Roosevelt, with the advice of General Marshall and other Chiefs of Staff, gave the Kurile Islands as well as the control of various strategic Chinese ports, such as Port Arthur and Darien, to the Soviet Union.

Wow... like you really think they had a choice? The USSR was in a position to take pretty much whatever they wanted at that point. One of those Bircher myths... that a shattered British Empire and an only -half committed USA were going to stop Stalin from taking anything he wanted.

The reality- We needed the USSR in the Pacific War because it took us nearly 4 years to get within spitting distance of Japan and your Boy Peanut wasn't doing all that much good, either. The Japanese were still kicking his ass in 1944.

In 1948 we appropriated $468,000,000 for China, only a fraction of what we were sending to Europe, and out of this $468,000,000 only $125,000,000 was for military purposes. The end was drawing near; the assistance was too little and too late; and the Nationalist Government was engaged in a death struggle with the on-rushing communist armies. .

Yes, we didn't want to give Peanut more opportunities to steal.

https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/17535654.2017.1391006

During the War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression from 1937 to 1945, corruption among all ranks of Guomindang officials intensified and spread widely. The Nationalist Party and its leader, Jiang Jieshi, recognized the importance of political reform, social control, and winning popular support during the war and attempted to establish strong governance. Corruption, however, severely harmed the Nationalist Party and derailed its original plan to “build the nation through the war.” As a result of the Guomindang’s ineffective control, corruption harmed the Party’s capacity to govern and was a key factor in its loss of mainland China soon after World War II. The Guomindang won the war but lost out politically.

Listen to the words of the Bolton report: “Its doctrines follow those of Lenin and Stalin. Its leaders are Moscow-trained (of 35 leading Chinese communist political leaders listed in the report, over half either spent some time or studied in Moscow.) Its policies and actions, its strategy and tactics are communist. The Chinese Communists have followed faithfully every zig zag of the Kremlin’s line for a generation.”
This is the tragic story of China whose freedom we once fought to preserve. What our young men had saved, our diplomats and our President have frittered away.

Wow... it kind of shows that we haven't learned a fucking thing.. like when we decided to "Liberate" the Middle East and then were all surprised when the Jihadists came to power after we toppled various thug dictators.

Here's what we should have learned in China that we hadn't learned in Vietnam or Iraq... you can't win their hearts and minds, if the people you are propping up wouldn't last a day if you left. Unlike Germany and Japan, which were great post-war success stories, we tried to find people who were compliant and more interested in us than their own people.

And that is why they failed.

 

[Unkotare]

...

Another white guy telling Asian people their business. ...

You can stop repeating that fallacy anytime now.

 

[JoeB131]

You can stop repeating that fallacy anytime now.

It's still true.

The reality is, who won the Chinese civil war is the business of Chinese, not Americans...

the biggest lie of the 20th century is "Who lost China". It was never ours to win or lose.

 

[Unkotare]

You can stop repeating that fallacy anytime now.

It's still true. .......

No, it's a transparent attempt at changing the focus of the discussion because you know that you are too ignorant of History to craft a well-reasoned position.

 

[JoeB131]

No, it's a transparent attempt at changing the focus of the discussion because you know that you are too ignorant of History to craft a well-reasoned position.

I've crafted a very well-reasoned position... it's just not one that you like...

The Commies won because- wait for it - the Nationalists were incompetent western stooges.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Below are excerpts from a report on the Chinese Communists prepared by the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division in August 1945 and published in 1952 by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in its report on the loss of China:

Hmmmm... 1952. You mean when we were at the Height of McCarthyism Crazy and all seeing Communists under our beds? When people were all trying to save their careers by screaming, "We didn't screw this up?"

Hmm, I guess you didn't notice that the Military Intelligence Division's report was written in August 1945. Truman's cronies had the report suppressed. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee published it as part of the committee's report on the loss of China. Do you only read every fourth or fifth word of replies?

So your response to all the massive evidence that government committees documented about the role of Communist agents and sympathizers in the loss of China--your response is just going to be to fall back on the liberal talking point about "McCarthyism" and the "paranoid 1950s"? Hmm, interesting. Are you ever going to address the evidence that was presented, which included the Venona decrypts and former Communists who defected and identified such FDR-Truman officials as Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, John Stewart Service, Owen Lattimore as Soviet agents or sympathizers, etc., etc.?

As I've documented, the Chinese Communists won because Truman and Marshall repeatedly sabotaged the Nationalists and saved the Communists from defeat when they were facing annihilation by the Nationalists. For all of their corruption and incompetence, the Nationalists were better than the Communists. China would have been far better off under Nationalist rule or under split Nationalist-Japanese rule than under Communist rule.

Anyway, mainly for the sake of others, let's deal with your repeated nonsense about Japan's presence and intervention in Manchuria and China. Let's take a look at what the League of Nations' Lytton Commission had to say about Japan's involvement in China and Manchuria as of 1931.

After describing the dominance of war lords in a large area of China, the Lytton Commission discussed the Communist state that existed in China as of 1931, the fact that Japan had suffered more than any other foreign nation from the lawless conditions that prevailed over most of China, and the fact that Japan was not the only nation that was not prepared to relinquish her treaty-granted special powers and privileges until law and order and stability had been established in China:

Communism in China not only means, as in most countries other than the U.S.S.R., either a political doctrine held by certain members of existing parties, or the organization of a special party to compete for power with other political parties. It has become an actual rival of the National Government. It possesses its own law, army, and government, and its own territorial sphere of action. For this state of affairs there is no parallel in any other country. . . .

So far as Japan is China’s nearest neighbor and largest customer, she has suffered more than any other Power from the lawless conditions described in this chapter. Over two-thirds of the foreign residents in China are Japanese, and the number of Koreans in Manchuria is estimated at about 800,000. She has more nationals, therefore, than any other Power, who would suffer if they were made amenable to Chinese law, justice, and taxation under present conditions.

Japan felt it impossible to satisfy Chinese aspirations so long as satisfactory safeguards to take the place of her Treaty rights could not be hoped for. Her interests in China, and more especially in Manchuria, began to be more prominently asserted as those of the other major Powers receded into the background. Japan’s anxiety to safeguard the life and property of her subjects in China caused her to intervene repeatedly in times of civil war or of local disturbances. . . .

This issue, however, though affecting Japan to a greater extent than other Powers, is not a Sino-Japanese issue alone. China demands immediately the surrender of certain exceptional powers and privileges because they are felt to be derogatory to her national dignity and sovereignty. The foreign Powers have hesitated to meet these wishes as long as conditions in China did not ensure adequate protection of their nationals, whose interests depend on the security afforded by the enjoyment of special Treaty rights. (pp. 22-23)

The Lytton Commission also provided a useful review of the history of Manchuria and the involvement of foreign powers there, including the relations between China and Manchuria and the wars between the Nationalists and Manchuria’s war lord. The commission’s review is sanitized and incomplete, but it contains enough factual information to be useful. Here is an excerpt from it:

Manchuria, so largely dependent on cooperation, was destined, for reasons already indicated, to become a region of conflict: at first between Russian and Japan, later between China and her two powerful neighbors. . . . Exceptional treaty rights were acquired in the first instance by Russia at the expense of China. Those which concerned South Manchuria were transferred to Japan. The use of these privileges so acquired became more and more instrumental in furthering the economic development of South Manchuria. (p. 24)

Although Marshal Chang Tso-lin and the Kuomintang had been allies in the wars against Win Pei-fu, the former himself did not accept the doctrines of the Kuomintang. He did not approve of the constitution as desired by Dr. Sun [the first Nationalist leader]. . . .

In 1928, he [Chang Tso-lin] suffered defeat at the hands of the Kuomintang Army in their Northern Expedition referred to in Chapter I, and was advised by Japan to withdraw his armies into Manchuria before it was too late. The declared object of Japan was to save Manchuria from the evils of civil war which would have resulted from the entry of a defeated army pursued by its victors. . . .

After the death of Marshal Chang Tso-lin, his son, Chang Hsueh-liang, became the ruler of Manchuria. He shared many of the national aspirations of the younger generation, and desired to stop civil warfare and assist the Kuomintang in its policy of unification. As Japan had already experience with the policy and tendencies of the Kuomintang, she did not welcome the prospect of such influence penetrating into Manchuria. The young Marshal was advised accordingly. (p. 29)

But the Young Marshal decided to become an ally of the Nationalists (the Kuomintang) in 1928. The Lytton Commission, to its credit, noted that his union with the Kuomintang was only partial and purely voluntary, and that the Manchurian government routinely ignored any Nationalist law or policy that it didn’t like. (Indeed, later on, the Young Marshal betrayed Chiang to the Communists and allowed them to capture him.) Said the commission,

As regards domestic affairs, the Manchurian authorities had retained all the power they wanted, and they had no objection to following administrative rules and methods adopted by the Central Government so long as the essentials of power were not affected. (p. 31)

But after the Young Marshal entered into his tenuous, nominal union with the Kuomintang in 1928, Nationalist operatives flooded Manchuria with anti-Japanese propaganda and began various measures to persecute Japanese citizens and subjects (Koreans) living in Manchuria, such as pressuring Chinese landlords in Manchuria to raise rents on Japanese tenants and even to refuse to renew their rental contracts. Said the commission,

However, after the union, Manchuria was opened to well-organized and systematic Kuomintang propaganda. In its official party publications and numerous affiliated organs, it never ceased to insist on the primary importance of the recovery of lost sovereign rights, the abolition of unequal treaties, and the wickedness of imperialism. . . . They [the Nationalists] stimulated and intensified the nationalist sentiment and carried on anti-Japanese agitation. Pressure was brought to bear on Chinese house-owners and landlords to raise the rents of Japanese and Korean tenants, or to refuse renewal of rent contracts. . . . Korean settlers were subjected to systematic persecution. Various orders and instructions of an anti-Japanese nature were issued. Cases of friction accumulated and dangerous tension developed. (p. 30)

Keep in mind that at the time, Korea was part of Japan. With the Japan-Korea Treaty of 1910, and with the consent of England and America, Korea became a territory of Japan. So “Koreans” were Japanese subjects, many of whom considered themselves Japanese and aspired to attain full Japanese citizenship.

Also, note that this Nationalist persecution of Japanese citizens and subjects in Manchuria occurred years before a single Japanese soldier entered China without treaty authorization. The only Japanese soldiers in China at this time were there by internationally recognized treaty right to protect Japanese holdings, citizens, and subjects living in China, especially in Shanghai. America, England, Germany, and France likewise had contingents of troops in China to protect their interests and citizens there.

The Lytton Commission, again to its credit, provided a fairly decent explanation of Japan’s fear of Russian Communist (Soviet) intervention in Manchuria and China and of why Manchuria was historically and strategically important to Japan:

The Russian Revolution of 1917, followed by the declarations of the Soviet Government of July 25th, 1919, and of October 27th, 1920. regarding its policy towards the Chinese people and, later, by the Sino-Soviet Agreements of May 31st, 1924, and September 20, 1924, shattered the basis of Russo-Japanese understanding and co-operation in Manchuria. This fundamental reversal of policy radically changed the relations of the three Powers in the Far East. Moreover, the Allied intervention (1918–1920). with its aftermath of friction between the Japanese and Soviet forces in Siberia (1920–1922), had accentuated the change in the relations between Japan and Russia. The attitude of the Soviet Government gave a strong impetus to China's nationalistic aspirations. As the Soviet Government and the Third international had adopted a policy opposed to all imperialist Powers which maintained relations with China on the basis of the existing treaties, it seemed probable that they would support China in the struggle for the recovery of sovereign rights. This development revived all the old anxieties and suspicions of Japan towards her Russian neighbor.

This country. with which she had once been at war, had, during the years which followed that war. become. a friend and ally. Now this relationship was changed. and the possibility of a danger from across the North-Manchurian border again became a matter of concern to Japan. The likelihood of an alliance between the Communist doctrines in the North and the anti-Japanese propaganda of the Kuomintang in the South made the desire to impose between the two a Manchuria which should be free from both increasingly felt in Japan. Japanese misgivings have been still further increased in the last few years by the predominant influence acquired by the U.S.S.R. in Outer Mongolia and the growth of Communism in China. (pp. 36-37)

Japanese interests in Manchuria differ both in character and degree from those of any other foreign country. Deep in the mind of every Japanese is the memory of their country's great struggle with Russia in 1901–05, fought on the plains of Manchuria, at Mukden and Liaoyang, along the line of the South Manchuria Railway, at the Yalu River, and in the Liaotung Peninsula. To the Japanese the war with Russia will ever be remembered as a life-and-death struggle fought in self-defense against the menace of Russian encroachments. The facts that a hundred thousand Japanese soldiers died in this war and that two billon gold yen were expended have created in Japanese minds a determination that these sacrifices shall not have been made in vain.

Japanese interest in Manchuria, however, began ten years before that war. The war with China, in 1894–95, principally over Korea, was largely fought at Port Arthur and on the plains of Manchuria; and the Treaty of Peace signed at Shimonoseki ceded to Japan in full sovereignty the Liaotung Peninsula. To the Japanese, the fact that Russia. France and Germany forced them to renounce this cession does not affect their conviction that Japan obtained this part of Manchuria as the result of a successful war and thereby acquired a moral right to it which still exists.

Manchuria has been frequently referred to as the "life-line" of Japan. Manchuria adjoins Korea, now Japanese territory. The vision of a China, united, strong and hostile, a nation of four hundred millions, dominant in Manchuria and in Eastern Asia, is disturbing to many Japanese. But to the greater number, when they speak of menace to their national existence and of the necessity for self-defense, they have in mind Russia rather than China. Fundamental, therefore, among the interests of Japan in Manchuria is the strategic importance of this territory.

There are those in Japan who think that she should entrench herself firmly in Manchuria against the possibility of attack from the U.S.S.R. They have an ever-present anxiety lest Korean malcontents in league with Russian Communists in the nearby Maritime Province might in future invite, or co-operate with, some new military advance from the North. They regard Manchuria as a buffer region against both the U.S.S.R, and the rest of China. Especially in the minds of Japanese military men, the right claimed, under agreements with Russia and China, to station a few thousand railway guards along the South Manchuria Railway is small recompense for the enormous sacrifices of their country in the Russo-Japanese War, and a meagre security against the possibility of attack from that direction. (p. 39)

Until the events of September 1931, the various Japanese Cabinets, since 1905, appeared to have the same general aims in Manchuria, but they differed as to the policies best suited to achieve these aims. They also differed somewhat as to the extent of the responsibility which Japan should assume for the maintenance of peace and order.

The general aims for which they worked in Manchuria were to maintain and develop Japan's vested interests, to foster the expansion of Japanese enterprise, and to obtain adequate protection for Japanese lives and property. In the policies adopted for realizing these aims there was one cardinal feature which may be said to have been common to them all. This feature has been the tendency to regard Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia as distinct from the rest of China. It resulted naturally from the Japanese conception of their country's "special position" in Manchuria. Whatever differences may have been observable between the specific policies advocated by the various Cabinets in Japan—as, for example, between the so-called "friendship policy" of Baron Shidehara and the so-called "positive policy" of the late General Baron Tanaka—they have always had this feature in common. (p. 40)

The Lytton Commission acknowledged that Japan was concerned that the fighting between the Nationalists and Manchuria’s war lord would spill over into Manchuria and that the Japanese, understandably enough, wanted to avoid this:

In the spring of 1928, when the Nationalist armies of China were marching on Peking in an effort to drive out the forces of [Manchuria’s war lord] Chang Tso-lin, the Japanese Government, under the premiership of Baron Tanaka, issued a declaration that, on account of her "special position" in Manchuria, Japan would maintain peace and order in that region. When it seemed possible that the Nationalist armies might carry the civil war north of the Great Wall, the Japanese Government, on May 28th, sent to the leading Chinese generals a communication which said:

"The Japanese Government attaches the utmost importance to the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria, and is prepared to do all it can to prevent the occurrence of any such state of affairs as may disturb that peace and order, or constitute the probable cause of such a disturbance.

"In these circumstances, should disturbances develop further in the direction of Peking and Tientsin, and the situation become so menacing as to threaten the peace and order of Manchuria, Japan may possibly be constrained to take appropriate effective steps for the maintenance of peace and order in Manchuria."

At the same time, Baron Tanaka issued a more definite statement, that the Japanese Government would prevent "defeated troops or those in pursuit of them" from entering Manchuria. (pp. 41-42)

These frequent clashes between the Nationalists and the Manchurians and the instability and tensions caused by Nationalist anti-Japanese activities in Manchuria were the reason that the Japanese decided that they needed to establish a state in Manchuria and that they needed a buffer zone between Manchuria and China.

 

[JoeB131]

Hmm, I guess you didn't notice that the Military Intelligence Division's report was written in August 1945. Truman's cronies had the report suppressed. The Senate Internal Security Subcommittee published it as part of the committee's report on the loss of China. Do you only read every fourth or fifth word of replies?

So your response to all the massive evidence that government committees documented about the role of Communist agents and sympathizers in the loss of China--your response is just going to be to fall back on the liberal talking point about "McCarthyism" and the "paranoid 1950s"? Hmm, interesting. Are you ever going to address the evidence that was presented, which included the Venona decrypts and former Communists who defected and identified such FDR-Truman officials as Alger Hiss, Harry Dexter White, John Stewart Service, Owen Lattimore as Soviet agents or sympathizers, etc., etc.?

Yawn... so what? Here's the delusion we had after WWII.... We had (and still have) an inflated opinion of our role in winning it. In reality, we were the last major power in, and we took the least casualties. We were just the only country that had an intact infrastructure when it was over.

So imagine our surprise when those nasty Communists in Russia and China who did MOST OF THE HEAVY LIFTING in the war started insisting on enjoying the fruits of victory, those dirty little commies... Then we all went into this McCarthy Paranoia of asking "Who Lost China?" (It was never ours to lose, the Chinese people CHOSE the Communists.)

Imagine our surprise when all those people of color who were sick and tried of living under the thumbs of Europeans decided they had enough of that shit, and if the Communists would help them, they were all buddy-buddy with the communists...

As I've documented, the Chinese Communists won because Truman and Marshall repeatedly sabotaged the Nationalists and saved the Communists from defeat when they were facing annihilation by the Nationalists. For all of their corruption and incompetence, the Nationalists were better than the Communists. China would have been far better off under Nationalist rule or under split Nationalist-Japanese rule than under Communist rule.

No, the Communist won because the Nationalists were just as corrupt and incompetent as they were in keeping the Japanese from invading the country. The difference was that most of the people who weren't thrilled with the Japanese abusing them weren't going to get behind Peanut and his gang of crooks.

 

[JoeB131]

Also, note that this Nationalist persecution of Japanese citizens and subjects in Manchuria occurred years before a single Japanese soldier entered China without treaty authorization. The only Japanese soldiers in China at this time were there by internationally recognized treaty right to protect Japanese holdings, citizens, and subjects living in China, especially in Shanghai. America, England, Germany, and France likewise had contingents of troops in China to protect their interests and citizens there.

The Lytton Commission, again to its credit, provided a fairly decent explanation of Japan’s fear of Russian Communist (Soviet) intervention in Manchuria and China and of why Manchuria was historically and strategically important to Japan:

Here's what you do when another country oppresses your people when they visit.

YOU DON'T GO THERE!!!

Like, as an American, it would really suck for me to go to Iran. True, I personally had nothing to do with all the shit the USA did in Iran that they are still pissed about 40 years later... But here's my solution.

I won't go to Iran.

If Manchuria and Shanghai sucked for Japanese people, STAY THE FUCK IN JAPAN!!!

 

[whitehall]

James Bradley's remarkable book "Flyboys" gives a good overview about the political chaos in Japan prior to WW2. The Japanese victory over the Russians early in the 20th century gave the Japanese a false sense of confidence in their religious superiority. The emperor was a puppet for the insanity of the militaristic Bushido thugs who rose in power and the stage was set for Japanese expansion into China and the Korean peninsula.

 

[Unkotare]

...

Like, as an American, it would really suck for me to go to Iran.....

You should.

 

[JoeB131]

You should.

Naw, man, I think you and every other right wing thug who wants to "free" Iran's oil... I mean People should go over there. You should form your own little liberation brigade.

You know, instead of sending some poor kid looking for a college education.

 

[mikegriffith1]

In his widely acclaimed and classic book How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1963), Dr. Anthony Kubek discussed Japan’s entirely valid and reasonable concerns about Soviet influence and subversion in China and Manchuria. Dr. Kubek’s book received praise from many quarters, including Dr. David Rowe of Yale University, former Ambassador to China Patrick Hurley, and Robert Morris, a former chief counsel for the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee. Below are excerpts from Dr. Kubek’s discussion on Japan’s justified fear of Soviet subversion in Asia—they are from chapter 1, which is titled “War in the Pacific: A Major Soviet Objective”:

Dr. Kubek also noted that FDR and Hull's demand that Japan immediately pull her troops out of China would have left the door open for further Russian intervention and subversion. He also noted that although FDR screamed against Japan for sending troops into China, he said nothing against the Soviet Union for annexing Sinkiang and a chunk of Outer Mongolia:

 

[JoeB131]

In his widely acclaimed and classic book How the Far East Was Lost: American Policy and the Creation of Communist China, 1941-1949 (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1963), Dr. Anthony Kubek discussed Japan’s entirely valid and reasonable concerns about Soviet influence and subversion in China and Manchuria.

Yup,more White people rationalizing imperialism. What a big surprise.

Uh, to the point. Our "Danger zone" in the Carribean was just an attempt for us to impose imperialismon the region. We were in the wrong- it's why we are hated in so much of the region today.... Japan was in the wrong for what it did in China, which is why THEY are still hated today.

The whine by this White Person was that those dirty stinking commies were distributing literature telling them that, hey, maybe not sucking western dick was the way to go. HOW DARE THEY!!!!!

Dr. Kubek also noted that FDR and Hull's demand that Japan immediately pull her troops out of China would have left the door open for further Russian intervention and subversion. He also noted that although FDR screamed against Japan for sending troops into China, he said nothing against the Soviet Union for annexing Sinkiang and a chunk of Outer Mongolia:

Uh, guy, Outer Mongolia established her independence from the rotting corpse of Qing China in 1911. They established the Mongolian People's Republic in 1928. What was FDR supposed to do, scream, "I'm very upset about this thing that happened in the middle of a desert 10 years before I got here!"

So were the Japs looking for Commies in the Philippines, Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, Burma, and all the other countries they pillaged and raped?

 

[mikegriffith1]

Here is part of Dr. Kubek's discussion on the role that Soviet/Communist agents and sympathizers played in getting the American government to reject Japan's peace offer. These excerpts come from Chapter 1: War in the Pacific: A Major Soviet Objective:

 

[JoeB131]

Axis Silly strikes again.

Here is part of Dr. Kubek's discussion on the role that Soviet/Communist agents and sympathizers played in getting the American government to reject Japan's peace offer. These excerpts come from Chapter 1: War in the Pacific: A Major Soviet Objective:

Oh, no, not the notorious, "FDR knew Pearl Harbor Was Going to Happen" bullshit. I put it up there with the kind of nuts who think 9/11 was an inside job.



One more time.

Japan had no business being in China. Japan was the aggressor. Japan was engaging in a campaign of genocide.

FDR had every right to demand they knock it the fuck off.

 

[gipper]

Axis Silly strikes again.

Here is part of Dr. Kubek's discussion on the role that Soviet/Communist agents and sympathizers played in getting the American government to reject Japan's peace offer. These excerpts come from Chapter 1: War in the Pacific: A Major Soviet Objective:

Oh, no, not the notorious, "FDR knew Pearl Harbor Was Going to Happen" bullshit. I put it up there with the kind of nuts who think 9/11 was an inside job.



One more time.

Japan had no business being in China. Japan was the aggressor. Japan was engaging in a campaign of genocide.

FDR had every right to demand they knock it the fuck off.

Would it be okay if Trump lied us into war? Was it okay when W did it?

Telling them to knock it off, is not even close to what FDR did to the Japanese. You lack an education.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Oh, no, not the notorious, "FDR knew Pearl Harbor Was Going to Happen" bullcrap. I put it up there with the kind of nuts who think 9/11 was an inside job.

As others have told you, you lack education. The evidence that FDR knew Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked has been documented by scholars from all across the spectrum, from John Toland and Victor George to George Morgenstern and Kevin O'Connell. I take it you haven't heard about the Hoover-Ladd memos?

One more time. Japan had no business being in China. Japan was the aggressor. Japan was engaging in a campaign of genocide.

One more time: I've debunked these myths with quotations and citations from recognized scholars, but you just keep repeating them. I've documented that the Nationalists attacked first, and that they did so after the Japanese had made another peace offer. I've documented that the Japanese holdings in China before the war started were internationally recognized as legal. I've documented that the Japanese offered to withdraw from the vast majority of China in exchange for a small buffer zone between China and their state in Manchuria. You just keep ignoring these facts and repeating your Chinese Communist-FDR myths.

FDR had every right to demand they knock it off.

Phew! First of all, he did a lot more than just "demand" that they "knock it off." He imposed draconian sanctions that every nation in the world would regard as tantamount to a declaration of war and a clear threat to national survival.

And what "right" did he have to demand that Japan leave China? Why didn't he demand that the Soviets withdraw from Mongolia and Sinkiang? Why did he offer to end the sanctions if Japan would withdraw from China and Indochina and then present Japan with ultimatums that he knew they would reject after they had agreed to the very withdrawal that he said would be enough to end the sanctions?

By the way, historian David M. Kennedy, whom no one would accuse of "revisionism," in his 1998 review of Chang's book, tacitly admitted that China started the war:

For his part, Chiang, under pressure from his generals and the Communists, ravened for the chance to come to grips with the Japanese aggressor in a decisive showdown. Soon foiled, however, in his attempt to engage the main body of Japanese troops near Beijing, Chiang sought to shift the arena of combat to the south by replaying the scenario of 1932. His minions menaced the 30,000 Japanese residents of Shanghai, hoping to draw Japanese forces out of the north and into the great valley of the Yangtze, Chiang's main political base and supposedly most secure military stronghold.

The lure worked. Tokyo turned its eyes southward, and the Japanese commander Matsui Iwane began the investment of Shanghai on August 23. (The Horror)​

As I've documented from some of the recognized best books on the war, Chiang Kaishek picked a fight with the Japanese because he believed his Nazi-trained armies could easily defeat them, but it turned out that he bit off more than he could chew and ended up losing to the Japanese most of the territory he controlled before the war.

Dr. Kennedy wrote his review before anyone knew that most of the photos in Chang's book had nothing to do with the Nanking Massacre. Yet, even so, he rejected her claim that the massacre compared to the Holocaust, and he pointed out problems with the book that other reviewers have since magnified.

Finally, I am still waiting on you to provide a single reputable, non-Chinese Communist source that supports your laughable claim that the Chinese Communists fought the Japanese as much as or more than the Nationalists did. This Chinese Communist propaganda was debunked decades ago, including by two Senate subcommittees.

I'm also still waiting for you to provide a single reputable, non-Communist source that supports your obscene claim that Mao brought economic prosperity to China after he took over. That's not just absurd; it's obscene. Mao killed millions with his bungling agricultural policies, and he killed tens of millions in cruel mass murders to consolidate his power.

 

[JoeB131]

Would it be okay if Trump lied us into war? Was it okay when W did it?

Telling them to knock it off, is not even close to what FDR did to the Japanese. You lack an education.

Again, I have a degree in history from an actual university, what do you have?

He imposed sanctions - AFTER the League of Nations condemned Japan's invasion of Manchuria. This is exactly what you are supposed to do when a country breaks international norms. Japan decided to invade and take everyone's holdings in the region.

s others have told you, you lack education. The evidence that FDR knew Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked has been documented by scholars from all across the spectrum, from John Toland and Victor George to George Morgenstern and Kevin O'Connell. I take it you haven't heard about the Hoover-Ladd memos?

More Pro-Axis nuts... Toland wrote a glowing biography of Hitler... Only a fucking nut thinks it was an inside job.

One more time: I've debunked these myths with quotations and citations from recognized scholars, but you just keep repeating them. I've documented that the Nationalists attacked first, and that they did so after the Japanese had made another peace offer.

Look, you miserable little Nazi fascist fuckwad, If China had attacked JAPAN, then Japan would be justified. China attacked Japanese squatters in their territory. They didn't belong there. They were invaders.

Phew! First of all, he did a lot more than just "demand" that they "knock it off." He imposed draconian sanctions that every nation in the world would regard as tantamount to a declaration of war and a clear threat to national survival.

And what "right" did he have to demand that Japan leave China?

That their actions had been condemned in the League of Nations.... and violated international norms.

As I've documented from some of the recognized best books on the war, Chiang Kaishek picked a fight with the Japanese because he believed his Nazi-trained armies could easily defeat them, but it turned out that he bit off more than he could chew and ended up losing to the Japanese most of the territory he controlled before the war.

Yes, Peanut was a real piece of shit, but he still had a legitimate point about not wanting the Japanese to pillage and rape their country. And when the war was over, the people said, "Fuck this twat, we're going with the Communists".

Dr. Kennedy wrote his review before anyone knew that most of the photos in Chang's book had nothing to do with the Nanking Massacre. Yet, even so, he rejected her claim that the massacre compared to the Holocaust, and he pointed out problems with the book that other reviewers have since magnified.

Yeah.

"Silly little Asian Girl... how dare you compare your suffering to the suffering of white people."

22 million Chinese died in World War II. Most of them civilians.

 

[gipper]

Would it be okay if Trump lied us into war? Was it okay when W did it?

Telling them to knock it off, is not even close to what FDR did to the Japanese. You lack an education.

Again, I have a degree in history from an actual university, what do you have?

He imposed sanctions - AFTER the League of Nations condemned Japan's invasion of Manchuria. This is exactly what you are supposed to do when a country breaks international norms. Japan decided to invade and take everyone's holdings in the region.

s others have told you, you lack education. The evidence that FDR knew Pearl Harbor was going to be attacked has been documented by scholars from all across the spectrum, from John Toland and Victor George to George Morgenstern and Kevin O'Connell. I take it you haven't heard about the Hoover-Ladd memos?

More Pro-Axis nuts... Toland wrote a glowing biography of Hitler... Only a fucking nut thinks it was an inside job.

One more time: I've debunked these myths with quotations and citations from recognized scholars, but you just keep repeating them. I've documented that the Nationalists attacked first, and that they did so after the Japanese had made another peace offer.

Look, you miserable little Nazi fascist fuckwad, If China had attacked JAPAN, then Japan would be justified. China attacked Japanese squatters in their territory. They didn't belong there. They were invaders.

Phew! First of all, he did a lot more than just "demand" that they "knock it off." He imposed draconian sanctions that every nation in the world would regard as tantamount to a declaration of war and a clear threat to national survival.

And what "right" did he have to demand that Japan leave China?

That their actions had been condemned in the League of Nations.... and violated international norms.

As I've documented from some of the recognized best books on the war, Chiang Kaishek picked a fight with the Japanese because he believed his Nazi-trained armies could easily defeat them, but it turned out that he bit off more than he could chew and ended up losing to the Japanese most of the territory he controlled before the war.

Yes, Peanut was a real piece of shit, but he still had a legitimate point about not wanting the Japanese to pillage and rape their country. And when the war was over, the people said, "Fuck this twat, we're going with the Communists".

Dr. Kennedy wrote his review before anyone knew that most of the photos in Chang's book had nothing to do with the Nanking Massacre. Yet, even so, he rejected her claim that the massacre compared to the Holocaust, and he pointed out problems with the book that other reviewers have since magnified.

Yeah.

"Silly little Asian Girl... how dare you compare your suffering to the suffering of white people."

22 million Chinese died in World War II. Most of them civilians.

FDR did much more than what you list. Get educated.