The Nanking Massacre and Iris Chang's Book The Rape of Nanking

[JoeB131]

Axis Silly and Tokyo Pose strike again...

The guy is just comical. In an earlier reply he said Japan's "invasion" led to the widespread rule of warlords, but in a reply today he shows a map that proves that China was already largely governed by warlords before the Japanese established a state in Manchuria.

You do realize the Japanese (and others) were fucking with China's internal politics before the Puppet State of Manchuko was established, right? Do I have to go over the Opium Wars and the Unequal Treaties and the Boxer Rebellion all over again?

He does seem to be a Communist. He talks like some Chinese Communists I've encountered online. A favorite tactic of Communists is to accuse anyone who disagrees with them of being fascists, and JoeB131, as we've seen, has been brazen about this for the last week or so.

Well, I call you a fascist because you keep apologizing for them. I mean, according to you, FDR and Harry Truman were "Communists".

The guy's just a lying jerk. He keeps pretending that all the Axis nations were like Nazi Germany, and he's resorted to making the sick and bizarre claim that I'm pro-Hitler/pro-Nazi because I contend that we should have made Japan our ally, that we should not have rescued the Soviet Union, and that we should not have expelled Japan from Korea, Vietnam, and Manchuria.

Um, yeah... you keep apologizing for their genocidal rampage across Asia... but the Japanese were cool and all those other people they brutalized, including the Filipinos, were just wrong.

You know he's very far left when he claims that the highly respected and scholarly Heritage Foundation

Nobody respects the Heritage Foundation... not even Republicans.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Let's revisit some facts to refute the stream of nonsense that JoeB131 keeps posting:

* No, the Communists were not going to defeat the Nationalists anyway, i.e., if Truman and Marshall had not back-stabbed the Nationalists. Quite the opposite. The claim that the Nationalists were doomed to lose to the Communists has long been a Communist talking point, and it is baseless.

When Truman and Marshall cut off aid to Chiang and imposed a ceasefire, Chiang had already forced the Communists to abandon the key areas of Jiangsu, Shandong, Henan, and Shanxi, and was about to take Ralgan, the Red Army's major center near Peiping. This is a matter of history that one can find in hundreds of history books (except, of course, in Chinese Communists history books, which seem to be JoeB131's main source of information). As historian Anne Carroll points out,

There is no question that Chiang was winning the majority of battles fought before the arms embargo, that he continued to win in the fall of 1946 before the full effects of the arms cut- off would have been felt, and that he won almost no battles after that. (Who Lost China? | EWTN)​

See also:

RESISTANCE WARS -- Political, Social, Cultural, Historical Analysis Of China
CIVIL WARS-- Political, Social, Cultural, Historical Analysis Of China
CIVIL WARS-- Political, Social, Cultural, Historical Analysis Of China​

I might add that not only did Truman and Marshall cut off aid to the Nationalists at a crucial time, but Truman's secretary of the treasury, Harry Dexter White, who we now know was a Communist agent, devalued Chinese Nationalist currency and delayed a crucial congressionally approved loan to the Nationalists.

Archive | April 17, 2000 | Founder of IMF/World Bank/WTO - Traitor
https://fee.org/media/16500/1953-12.pdf
The Communist Agent Who Caused Pearl Harbor — and Global Economic Havoc
Did Soviet Agents Help Plan Pearl Harbor?

* No, the Communists did not do as much as the Nationalists did to defeat the Japanese. (Actually, in terms of the China theater, the Nationalists never "defeated" the Japanese. When the Japanese surrendered to the U.S., they still held most of the Chinese territory they had taken from the Nationalists before Pearl Harbor.)

I'm still waiting for JoeB131 to find me one non-Communist book that says that the Communists did as much as the Nationalists in fighting the Japanese in China. Indeed, JoeB131 said that the Communists might have done even more than the Nationalists. Yeah, let's see him find one non-Communist book that supports such fiction.

* Apparently JoeB131 has never heard of the Long March. Before Chiang decided to start the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, he had forced the Communists to flee to northwestern China. The massive Communist retreat is known as the Long March. It was not just one march, but several, but it has come to be known as the Long March. The Communists had to retreat because they recognized that Chiang was about to annihilate them.

* Before Chiang began attacking Japanese positions in Shanghai in 1937, Japan had substantial legal, treaty-recognized holdings in China, just as did the British, the Americans, the Germans, and the French. The Japanese citizens living in China constituted the largest group of foreigners in China, even more than the British.

* The Japanese moved into Manchuria to counter Soviet attempts to gain control of the region. The Soviets had already gained control of Mongolia, which bordered Manchuria, and anti-Communist Japan had every reason in the world to view this as a threat.

Even some major Western newspapers were willing to admit that Japanese rule in Manchuria was an improvement over Chinese warlord rule. In October 1931, the London Times stated that in Manchuria the Japanese “had created a flourishing oasis in a howling desert of Chinese misrule” (Peter Harmsen, Storm Clouds Over the Pacific, 1931-1941, Casemate Publishers, 2018, Kindle Edition, loc. 793).

The Japanese invested substantial sums of money to develop Manchuria. While most of the Nationalist- and Communist-controlled areas in China suffered from poor or no economic growth, Manchuria became one of the most prosperous areas on the continent, thanks to the capitalist, pro-private property Japanese.

The Japanese did a good enough job improving the conditions in Manchuria that even FDR's secretary of state, Cordell Hull, was willing to let Japan keep Manchuria.

* One would think that this would go without saying, but since JoeB131 has actually made the astonishing, bizarre claim that China was better off under the Communists than under the Nationalists, we need to point out that history clearly shows that China would have been far, far better off under the Nationalists than under the Communists.

While Red China suffered from Marxist-induced famines and Mao's horrific purges, which combined to kill at least 30 million people, Nationalist China on Taiwan became one of the greatest economic success stories of the 20th century. While Red China suffered from Mao's brutal totalitarian government, Taiwan enjoyed freedom of religion, freedom to travel, freedom of the press (as long as you didn't promote Communism), freedom of speech (again, as long as you didn't promote Communism), freedom of association, a valid judiciary system, and economic prosperity.

Chiang was no angel, but he was not nearly as bad as Mao, not even close.

Why Taiwan Grew Rich While the Mainland Starved | José Niño

https://www.nyulawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/NYULawReview-75-2-Carolan.pdf

Judgment of history - Taiwan Today

 

[JoeB131]

Axis Silly Strikes again!

Let's revisit some facts to refute the stream of nonsense that JoeB131 keeps posting:

* No, the Communists were not going to defeat the Nationalists anyway, i.e., if Truman and Marshall had not back-stabbed the Nationalists. Quite the opposite. The claim that the Nationalists were doomed to lose to the Communists has long been a Communist talking point, and it is baseless.

Um, except they DID lose... They lost badly. Mostly because Peanut was more interested in enriching himself than actually running his army properly.

How much of the American taxpayers hard earned dollars - we had already maxed out the national debt and raised taxes to pay for world war II - should we have dumped into a corrupt regime?

The real tragedy of China was after the REpublicans and the Birchers spent the 50's screaming "Who Lost China", it became the policy of both parties to prop up any asshole in the world who wasn't a communist. The Communists are mostly gone now, but everyone remembers the assholes America propped up, which is why we are hated in so much of the world now.

* Before Chiang began attacking Japanese positions in Shanghai in 1937, Japan had substantial legal, treaty-recognized holdings in China, just as did the British, the Americans, the Germans, and the French. The Japanese citizens living in China constituted the largest group of foreigners in China, even more than the British.

Holy fucking shit... DO YOU NOT GET WHY THIS IS WHY PEOPLE SUPPORTED THE COMMUNISTS. Going back to my wallet analogy, the fact was, Peanut was still sucking the dicks the the Qing agreed to suck, even though this was why people supported Sun Yat Sen overthrowing the Qing to start with.

Your whole thread is to claim the KMT was corrupt and incompetent when rationalizing what the Japanese did to China, but then to totally praise the KMT corruption and incompetence when the resisted Communism... Seriously, what Bircher Hole did you crawl out of?

* One would think that this would go without saying, but since JoeB131 has actually made the astonishing, bizarre claim that China was better off under the Communists than under the Nationalists, we need to point out that history clearly shows that China would have been far, far better off under the Nationalists than under the Communists.

While Red China suffered from Marxist-induced famines and Mao's horrific purges, which combined to kill at least 30 million people,

There were a billion people they didn't kill, and their standard of living improved under the Communists. And they didn't have to suck any foreign dick. But at least you are being honest enough to admit most of the 30 million were do to famines and not purges. There were famines all over the world during that time period. There was a famine in the 1940's in India that killed 10 million people, which probably further inflamed Indian desires to be rid of the British.

Nationalist China on Taiwan became one of the greatest economic success stories of the 20th century.

You mean after the US Taxpayer poured billions of dollars into it trying to keep Peanut's UN vote? Yes, we did a very good job "saving" Asia from Communism by pouring shitloads of money into Japan, Taiwan and South Korea... and they promptly thanked us by stealing millions of American manufacturing jobs. So, um, yah, us?

Something to contemplate while driving past the shuttered factories while wearing your MAGA hat.

 

[Unkotare]

Did some stupid son of a bitch actually claim that standard of living in China improved under communist rule? How fucking absurdly ignorant can you get? Starving to death by the millions, and if not dead living in brutally enforced poverty is nobodies idea of an improved standard of living. It wasn’t until that idiot mao was out of the way that China embarked on economic reform according to Deng’s plan and the country began to claw its way out of crushing and near universal poverty. Some people are just too fucking stupid to be believed.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Your whole thread is to claim the KMT was corrupt and incompetent when rationalizing what the Japanese did to China, but then to totally praise the KMT corruption and incompetence when the resisted Communism....

No, it's just that you are either incapable of thinking beyond a grade-school level or you simply refuse to deal honestly with the subject, or both. I've already answered your idiotic posturing on this matter several times, but you keep ignoring my explanations and repeating your drivel.

Mostly for the sake of others reading the thread, below are excerpts on Truman and Marshall’s China betrayal from John T. Flynn’s famous book While You Slept: Our Tragedy in Asia and Who Made It. As some may know, Flynn began his career as a liberal journalist for the New Republic. In fact, he strongly supported FDR in the 1932 election. However, as he saw the bitter fruits of liberalism, the huge expansion of the welfare state, and the liberal sellout to Communism, he changed his mind and became a traditional conservative along the Robert Taft and Dwight Eisenhower mold. Here is some of what Flynn wrote about Truman and Marshall’s betrayal of China to the Communists:

When the Japanese were defeated, there was no longer a "common enemy" visible to the American people. All talk about "unity in China" to fight that enemy was meaningless. But there was another enemy—Russia. Unity in China after 1945 meant that the Chinese government would unite with the agents of the enemy. It meant China must stop fighting her enemy, surrender to him and share with his Chinese satellite agents the control of China.

It was not a case of two political parties uniting. The party of Mao Tse-tung was not a political party. Chiang was not unwilling for unity against the Japanese. He made offer after offer to the Communists to unite. But he insisted that they must come into his government not as a separate government but as loyal Chinese until the war was won. They insisted that they would come in only as a separate government and would march into Chiang's government with their own revolutionary armies intact. When Chiang effected a coalition in 1937, this is exactly what they did. When the Japanese invaded in 1937, the Communist armies utilized the Japanese invasion to infiltrate whatever parts of China were most exposed.

The plan was simplicity itself. If Russia could put over the fraudulent "unity" plan, what would happen when Japan was driven from China? Then Manchuria would be cleared and Russian Siberia would be on the Chinese borders with swift access to Manchuria and other parts of China. At this point, the Communists would have little trouble. They would have a foothold inside the government which they would be interested in disrupting and paralyzing and they would have an army intact, with Russia just across the border capable of reinforcing them with leadership and ammunition. They could then do in China what they did in Yugoslavia, in Poland, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and other places.

As of 1943, the government's position was difficult. Japan occupied Manchuria at the extreme North and the entire coast line from there down as far as Canton. The most productive parts of China were held by the enemy. The Chinese Communists held a small group of provinces in the north. The government occupied the rest of China. Russia could send in no help from the north because she was completely occupied with her own war against Germany. . . .

In China at Chungking was a little junta of State Department officials and correspondents—almost all passionately committed to the cause of the Communists, though these officials and correspondents were not all Communists. Some were; most of the others were just shallow scribblers and bureaucrats captivated by the vision of that vague thing— the Brave New World. The feud between Stilwell and Chiang, centering on the Burma enterprise, raged with shocking violence on Stilwell's part, and his headquarters became the meeting place of all the disruptive State Department and journalistic elements. Stillwell's disgraceful behavior led ultimately to his withdrawal in October 1944. . . .

Unlike our correspondents and State Department strategists, Chiang took the view that he was fighting two wars—that the Communists were not and could not be made into allies. . . .

All during the war the Communists were using whatever energy and power they had to infiltrate into whatever areas of China were most weakly held by the Japanese. They did much of this because while the Japanese armies held the whole coastline of China—a vast stretch of territory—the most the Japanese could police were the railroad lines together with the big towns and cities. In between the railroad lines the Communists were able to penetrate a little at a time, settling in the villages and farm lands. Chiang, after Wedemeyer's arrival, used what military resources he possessed to deal with both his enemies—the Japanese and the Communists. In the case of the Japanese, he was struggling to retake territory. In the case of the Communists he sought to bottle them up where they were—a perfectly logical course, provided you recognize what these Communists were. They were enemies of the government of China. . . .

It is sufficient to note that when the Japanese withdrew from China, Chiang Kaishek's army was far more numerous and occupied a far larger part of China than the Communists. Yet, by December 1949, after four years of war upon Chiang by the Communists, supported by Russia and our State Department, Chiang and his government were driven out of the Chinese mainland into Formosa, and communism swallowed the whole mainland of China and half of Korea. At the root of so many of the worst blunders in China was the decision of our government to force what it called "unity in China." We have already seen that this slogan was invented by the Soviet leaders in 1943 when they saw that German defeat was inevitable and they turned their attention to their suspended plans in Asia.

The Japanese occupied Manchuria and the entire Chinese coast. Chiang Kai-shek had a very large army, though poorly equipped. The Chinese Communists occupied just a few provinces in the north. Russia was then interested in checking further Japanese seizures in China. She was also interested in inserting her Communist leaders and armies into the Nationalist government.

Those who are familiar with the history of Communist strategy and tactics know that the Communists have developed a highly effective method by which small, compact minorities can disrupt majority action. Chiang Kai-shek had been in this struggle against the Communists for years. He knew what we in America now know. We suffered a brief period of unity with a very small number of Communists in this country during the war. There is no one now—apparently not even Henry Wallace, their prize dupe—who has any illusions on that score any more. We who wanted Chiang Kai-shek to put the Communists in his government are now putting our American Communists in jail.

In spite of all this, Chiang Kai-shek was at all times willing, under the pressure we applied, to permit the Chinese Communists to come into the government as a political party, enjoying such influence as their numbers entitled them to have. But the Chinese Communists were never willing to come in as a political party, standing on their numerical strength. They wanted to march in intact and with their army intact. They did not want to unite with the government. They wanted to invade it. . . .

As a part of the whole Red program the most unrestrained abuse was hurled at Chiang Kai-shek in our newspapers, in our magazines, in those books and radio programs to which we referred in an earlier part of this book. Of course the Nationalist government had its defects. China is an old country, with no experience in representative government. It was painfully and disastrously emerging from its old feudal ways. There were selfish interests and extreme reactionary interests as well as extremely radical and visionary interests. Chiang sat at the center of all these contending elements seeking with an almost incredible patience to establish order in a republican government while all the time he was being opposed by a military force.

This was civil war, of course. General Marshall and our State Department demanded that Chiang end the civil war by surrendering to the rebels and bringing their army intact into his government. As we look at it now, that was the most monstrously crazy idea that ever entered the mind of a sane statesman. How does a government end a civil war? It can be done only by abdicating or by crushing the rebels. But Chiang was forbidden to attempt to crush the rebels by force on pain of being disarmed. General Marshall insisted that Chiang could trust the Communists. He now says he knew all along they were Communists. But he stated more than once to Americans in China that the charge was ridiculous— they were only "agrarian reformers." But Chiang knew, as everyone knows who was familiar with the strange, twisted morals of Communist associations, that they could not be trusted. . . .

Yet, during the struggle we found our Communist sympathizers— writers, journalists, and some statesmen and State Department officials—regaling us with stories of the wonderful things the Communists were doing while calling on Chiang to do the same and, above all, to lower taxes, while we threatened that if the government dared to oppose the rebels with arms we would cut off their aid. After the Chinese Republican government had been defeated— thanks to the State Department and General Marshall— and driven out of China, our State Department began to see some light. The so-called "agrarian reformers" had now become real Communists and, according to Secretary Acheson, "the Soviet government's largest and most important satellite." (pp. 152-156, 158-161)


​

 

[JoeB131]

Did some stupid son of a bitch actually claim that standard of living in China improved under communist rule? How fucking absurdly ignorant can you get? Starving to death by the millions, and if not dead living in brutally enforced poverty is nobodies idea of an improved standard of living. It wasn’t until that idiot mao was out of the way that China embarked on economic reform according to Deng’s plan and the country began to claw its way out of crushing and near universal poverty. Some people are just too fucking stupid to be believed.

People were starving to death under Peanut
People were starving to death under the Qing.

They're starving now... which is why so many of them are trying to sneak into this country to work at the Happy Ending Massage Parlor.

 

[JoeB131]

No, it's just that you are either incapable of thinking beyond a grade-school level or you simply refuse to deal honestly with the subject, or both. I've already answered your idiotic posturing on this matter several times, but you keep ignoring my explanations and repeating your drivel.

Naw, I keep mocking your fascist apologizing.

The Japanese were a bunch of genocidal rat bastards in WWII, and more of them should have found themselves at the business ends of ropes at the end of the war.

Peanut was an incompetent boob.... that's why he lost. People looked at the corrupt KMT Bureaucrat living large on American Aid while they slaved away in the rice paddies and they said "Yeah, give me some of that sweet, sweet communism."

Mostly for the sake of others reading the thread, below are excerpts on Truman and Marshall’s China betrayal from John T. Flynn’s famous book While You Slept: Our Tragedy in Asia and Who Made It.

OOOOH, look another white person telling Asians their business. How patronizing.

Here's a great start for understanding history. It isn't all about 'us".

We who wanted Chiang Kai-shek to put the Communists in his government are now putting our American Communists in jail.

Um, yeah. You do realize that putting Communists in jail in the 1950's was a bad thing, right? Funny you guys are just horrified that we temporarily relocated some Japanese Americans out of a war zone for a year, but man, you are totally down with locking someone up or ruining their career because they attended a Commie Poetry Reading in College.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Below are excerpts from a report on the Chinese Communists prepared by the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division in August 1945 and published in 1952 by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in its report on the loss of China: “The Chinese Communist Movement, 5 July 1945,” Hearings Before the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee, Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952, Appendix II.

Hey, JoeB131, were the Military Intelligence Division and the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee “fascists” too?

The Communists Fought the Japanese “Far Less” Than Did the Nationalists

Contrary to the widely advertised reports of their sympathizers, the Chinese Communists have, however, fought the Japanese far less than have the National Government troops. (p. 2307)

The Communists Were Less Democratic Than the Nationalists. In Fact, the Communists Suppressed All Opposition Groups, While Chiang Compromised with Opposition Groups. The Chinese Communists’ Version of “Democracy” Was Patterned after “Soviet Democracy”

While the Chinese Communists call their present political system “democracy,” the “democracy which they sponsor is in fact “Soviet democracy” on the pattern of the U.S.S.R rather than democracy in the Anglo-American sense. It is a “democracy” more rigidly controlled by the Chinese Communist Party than is the so-called “one-party dictatorship” of the Chunking Government controlled by the Kuomintang. This is indicated by the fact that Chiang Kaishek rules by maintaining a measure of balance between the various factions within the Kuomintang and by making concessions to the non-Communist opposition groups outside the Kuomintang in Chunking-controlled China. . . . On the other hand, while minority parties which wholeheartedly accept Communist leadership are tolerated in Communist-controlled China, real opposition parties and groups are summarily suppressed as “traitors.” If the Communists’ charge of Kuomintang intolerance is true, it is also true that the Communists will be still more intolerant if they ever obtain supreme power in China. (pp. 2306-2307)

The Chinese Communists Followed Soviet Policy and Were Part of the International Communist Movement

The Chinese Communist movement is part of the international Communist movement. Its military strategy, diplomatic orientation, and propaganda polices follow those of the Soviet Union. They are adapted to fit the Chinese environment, but all high policy is derived from international Communist policy which in turn depends on Soviet Russia. Throughout their history the Chinese Communists have loyally supported and followed the policies of Soviet Russia and have accepted the whole content of “Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism.” (p. 2306)

The Nationalists Waged War Against the Communists When They Realized that the Communists Were Trying to Take Over China at the Behest of the Soviets. The Nationalists Were About to Defeat the Communists in 1936 But the Communists Were Saved by the “United Front” Arrangement. The Communists Did Not Honor the United Front Agreement. As a Result, the Nationalists Ended Up Having to Fight Both the Communists and the Japanese to Protect Their Bases During the Pacific War

During the period of the Soviet-Russian-Kuomintang entente cordiale, 1923-1927, the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists cooperated. The Chinese Communists promised to support the revolutionary, national democratic program of the Kuomintang. They broke this promise. It soon became evident to the Kuomintang leaders that the Chinese Communists, urged on by Soviet Russia, were aspiring to turn the revolution into a class war in order to gain supreme control over China. In 1927 the Kuomintang therefore turned against the Chinese Communists and Soviet Russia.

The ensuing civil war, 1927-1937, between the armies of the two Chinese parties was accompanied by the bloody excesses characteristic of all class wars. By 1936 the Kuomintang had almost defeated the Chinese Red Army. The latter was saved by the Kuomintang’s acceptance of the idea of a “united front” with the Communists in defense of China against Japan. The united front idea had been developed in Moscow. . . .

Under the terms of the united front understanding in China, the Chinese Communists pledged themselves, as of 1937, to cease subversive activities against the Government, to abolish their separate government and administration, and to integrate the Chinese Red Army with the Government’s Central Army.

The Chinese Communists did not fulfill this promise. Soon after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the Government assigned to the Communists certain defense zones. The Communists, however, refused to stay within their assigned zones. While the Kuomintang armies, in obedience to the Chinese High Command, kept within their assigned defense zones, the Communist armies insisted on being granted entry into any Kuomintang zone that they desired to enter. Whenever the Kuomintang troops refused to admit the Communist troops into their defense sectors and to share with them their exceedingly limited resources, they were called “traitors” by the Communists. When the National Government refused to grant the Communists permission to establish in Kuomintang areas their own separate civil administrations, called “united front governments,” which flouted the national authority of Chungking and accepted orders only from the Communist capital (Yenan), the Communists accused the Kuomintang of being “anti-democratic” and the Kuomintang troops of being “experts in dissension.” Such tactics inevitably led to clashes with Kuomintang troops. The latter fought in self-defense against both the Communists and the Japanese for the protection of their bases. (pp. 2306-2307)

NOTE: Perhaps understandably, given who was in the White House when the report was written, the report does not mention that FDR pressured Chiang to accept the “united front” arrangement under the guise of achieving unity to defeat Japan. Given the treacherous conduct of the Communists during the “united front” arrangement during the war, one can readily understand why Chiang was aghast when Truman and Marshall insisted that he form a coalition government with the Communists after Japan surrendered.

A Coalition Government with the Communists Would Only “Serve the Interests of the Communists”

Chiang Kaishek has proposed a National Assembly, which is to convene on 12 November 1945, as the only possible means for a peaceful solution of the Kuomintang-Communist problem and for the re-establishment of unity in China. He insists, however, that no unity can be achieved so long as there are several independent partisan armies in China. He therefore demands that the Communists fulfill their pledge of 1937 to subordinate their army to the National Government.

The Communists refuse to comply with this demand. They have boycotted the National Assembly and insist that the “coalition government” is the only solution of the inter-party problem in China. The plan for a coalition government might be workable if the Communists would accept a clear demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas. But throughout the war, the Kuomintang has vainly tried to obtain an agreement with the Communists for a demarcation of defense areas, and there is no indication that the Communists would accept any demarcation of Kuomintang and Communist areas if a coalition government were to be established.

In view of this, the coalition government, were it to be established without the Communists being committed to a specific demarcation of their areas, would only serve the interests of the Communists in that their present areas would obtain legal status by consent of the Kuomintang and other parties, while leaving the Kuomintang part of the country open to further Communist infiltration through legal or illegal means. (pp. 2307-2308)

NOTE: Wow! We can see why this report was suppressed for several years! The Truman White House did not want America to learn that they were warned that their demand that Chiang form a coalition government with the Communists would only help the Communists.

The Soviet Union Waged a Propaganda War Against the Nationalists and Pushed the Idea of a Coalition Government in China

Present relations between Chungking [the Nationalist government] and Moscow are cool. The Soviet press is strongly denouncing the “reactionaries” in the Kuomintang and is openly sponsoring the plan of the Chinese Communists for a coalition government. (p. 2308)

 

[JoeB131]

Below are excerpts from a report on the Chinese Communists prepared by the War Department’s Military Intelligence Division in August 1945 and published in 1952 by the Senate Internal Security Subcommittee in its report on the loss of China:

Hmmmm... 1952. You mean when we were at the Height of McCarthyism Crazy and all seeing Communists under our beds?

When people were all trying to save their careers by screaming , "We didn't fuck this up?"

One more time, when your biggest ally refers to you as "Cash my Check" and "Peanut", they really don't respect you.

Vinegar Joe and the Generalissimo

By late 1942, Chiang was still hesitant to ask Roosevelt to replace Stilwell. Meanwhile, Stilwell criticized Chiang and his commanders for sending their best troops to the northwest provinces to contain communist military expansion instead of fighting the Japanese. He repeatedly asked that Chiang supply more young men for the Chinese Expeditionary Army (CEA) being trained to liberate Burma.

But the issue that brought Stilwell and Chiang’s relationship to an impasse was Stilwell’s lobbying U.S. officials to block Chiang’s efforts to expand General Claire Lee Chennault’s air force to fight the Japanese. In late 1942 Chiang had agreed with Chennault that greater airpower could disrupt Japanese supply routes and depots in Burma and protect the CEA’s advance into upper Burma. But Stilwell criticized this strategy, arguing that “Chiang Kai-shek’s army was not able to safeguard the airports [in China].”

In early 1943 Stilwell was supplying Chiang with more U.S. lend-lease aid in exchange for more Chinese troops to help liberate Burma. Meanwhile, Stilwell kept demanding that Chiang replace his incompetent generals. Chiang, however, did not share Stilwell’s enthusiasm for liberating only upper Burma; he wanted the Japanese driven out of Burma entirely so that more military and economic aid could flow into China. Chiang also wanted more U.S. airpower to help his Chinese ground troops counterattack the Japanese in eastern China. Meanwhile, Chiang—worried about Stilwell’s military strategy for recovering Burma—conceded to President Roosevelt that an advance into Burma, even if limited to upper Burma, “would be a major blow” to the Japanese but also expressed his hope that all of Burma could be recovered by combined land and sea operations. Even if the British could not muster naval support, Chiang told Roosevelt, it would be better to “wait a few months longer, or even until the monsoon season ends next autumn before launching a large offensive.” Chiang worried that “another failure in Burma would be a disaster for China so grave that the results cannot be predicted.”

But the crisis continued. Between July and October 1944 Stilwell repeatedly informed General Marshall of Chiang’s intransigence about cooperating with the Communists in the fight against Japan. Marshall finally sought President Roosevelt’s approval to ask Chiang to give Stilwell the authority to control Chiang’s military forces. On learning this, Chiang finally asked Roosevelt to recall Stilwell.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Did some stupid son of a bitch actually claim that standard of living in China improved under communist rule? How absurdly ignorant can you get? Starving to death by the millions, and if not dead living in brutally enforced poverty is nobodies idea of an improved standard of living. It wasn’t until that idiot mao was out of the way that China embarked on economic reform according to Deng’s plan and the country began to claw its way out of crushing and near universal poverty. Some people are just too stupid to be believed.

Yes, it is amazing how he has revealed his pro-Communist leanings in his last several replies. As I've said, I've never seen any modern radical liberal defend Mao and the Chinese Communists the way JoeB131 is defending them. His attacks on the Nationalists are carbon copies of the attacks on them made by Chinese Communists and American Communists.

I wonder if understands that his signature gives the impression that he's some kind of conservative. When he began to reply to me, I baffled by his rhetoric and arguments because I assumed, based on his signature, that he was a conservative.

He uses the standard Communist tactic of labeling his opponents as fascists, pro-Nazi, pro-Hitler, etc.

I think he knows better, but he doesn't care. No one can really believe that all the scholars who argue that the Japanese case regarding China has merit are fascists, pro-Hitler/pro-Nazi. That's sort of like arguing that if you approve of the American bombing of Japanese cities, you are pro-Soviet/pro-Stalin and approve of the Soviet brutalization of Eastern Europe, the Soviet gulags, the Soviet anti-Semitic pogroms, and the Soviets' murder of hundreds of thousands of German and Japanese POWs.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Did some stupid son of a bitch actually claim that standard of living in China improved under communist rule? How absurdly ignorant can you get? Starving to death by the millions, and if not dead living in brutally enforced poverty is nobodies idea of an improved standard of living. It wasn’t until that idiot Mao was out of the way that China embarked on economic reform according to Deng’s plan and the country began to claw its way out of crushing and near universal poverty. Some people are just too stupid to be believed.

Yes, it is remarkable how he has revealed his pro-Communist colors in his last several replies. As I've said, I have never seen modern non-Communist ultra-liberals willing to defend Mao and the Chinese Communists the way JoeB131 has done. His attacks on the Nationalists, including his defense of Stilwell, repeat the attacks on the Nationalists found in Chinese Communist and American Communist propaganda.

I wonder if he understands that his signature gives people the impression that he's a conservative. When he began replying to me, I was baffled by his rhetoric because I assumed, based on his signature, that he was a conservative. But now I can see he is not just liberal but radically liberal and pro-Communist.

Like other radical liberals, if you cite facts that contradict his arguments, he immediately resorts to calling you a fascist and a Hiter/Nazi supporter. I guess he didn't notice that some of the sources I cited on Mao's mass murder were liberal sources.

I think he knows better, but he doesn't care. No one can be so ignorant as to really believe that all the scholars who have argued that there is merit to the Japanese case regarding China are pro-Nazi/pro-Hitler. That's sort of like saying if you approve of the American bombing of Japanese cities, you are therefore pro-Soviet/pro-Stalin and approve of the Soviets' rape and brutalization of Eastern Europe, the Soviet gulags, and the Soviets' murder of hundreds of thousands of German and Japanese POWs.

 

[JoeB131]

Yes, it is amazing how he has revealed his pro-Communist leanings in his last several replies. As I've said, I've never seen any modern radical liberal defend Mao and the Chinese Communists the way JoeB131 is defending them. His attacks on the Nationalists are carbon copies of the attacks on them made by Chinese Communists and American Communists.

That they were corrupt fascists? They were corrupt fascists...

Sorry to break this to you.

I wonder if understands that his signature gives the impression that he's some kind of conservative. When he began to reply to me, I baffled by his rhetoric and arguments because I assumed, based on his signature, that he was a conservative.

How would you get that? How is "Impeach Trump" a conservative view? What kind of bizarre thinking to you go through to get there.

I'm not liberal or conservative. I'm a pragmatist.

think he knows better, but he doesn't care. No one can really believe that all the scholars who argue that the Japanese case regarding China has merit are fascists, pro-Hitler/pro-Nazi.

Uh, no, guy, I really think that the Japanese Apologists are fascists. THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR WHAT JAPAN DID IN WWII.

hat's sort of like arguing that if you approve of the American bombing of Japanese cities, you are pro-Soviet/pro-Stalin and approve of the Soviet brutalization of Eastern Europe, the Soviet gulags, the Soviet anti-Semitic pogroms, and the Soviets' murder of hundreds of thousands of German and Japanese POWs.

Guy, the John Birch Society Called. They want their propaganda back.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Below is a small excerpt on the FDR-Truman China betrayal from President Herbert Hoover's book Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover's Secret History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath (Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press, 2011, edited by historian George Nash). I trust not even JoeB131 will claim that Herbert Hoover was a right-wing extremist.

 

[JoeB131]

Axis Silly Strikes again, with his new fascist Pinup boy, Chiang Kai Shek.... A fascist so fucking incompetent the Axis didn't want him as a member. Let that sink in.

Below is a small excerpt on the FDR-Truman China betrayal from President Herbert Hoover's book Freedom Betrayed: Herbert Hoover's Secret History of the Second World War and Its Aftermath (Stanford University: Hoover Institution Press, 2011, edited by historian George Nash). I trust not even JoeB131 will claim that Herbert Hoover was a right-wing extremist.

Herbert Hoover who brought us the Worst Depression in human history, THAT Herbert Hoover.

Herbert Hoover who was part of the Republican Cabal of the 1920's that advocated disarmament and isolationism, leaving us woefully unprepared for World War II?

THAT Herbert Hoover?

Okay, one more time... Chiang Kai-Shek was incompetent, corrupt and inept. That's why the Communists won... not because we didn't pump enough money into his corrupt, incompetent regime, which we did plenty of and a lot of it got stolen.

The people just got fed up with his shit, which is why millions of them flocked to the red banner.

You are like one of those people who look at the Little Big Horn and ask, "Why did Custer Lose" without thinking of the most obvious answer, "The Indians won!"

 

[Unkotare]

Commie Joe’s complete ignorance about History, and shameless fangirl attitude toward every communist dictator in History (including the wannabe fdr) is painfully obvious.

 

[mikegriffith1]

If you want to know what a snake Stilwell was, read General Claire Chennault’s book The Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1949). Chennault served in China with Stilwell and saw firsthand the disastrous results of Stilwell’s treachery and military incompetence. Chennault spends many pages in his book detailing how Stilwell sought to sabotage the Nationalist cause and how Stilwell’s military blundering costs thousands of lives. But, for now, I’d like to quote part of Chennault’s account of how Truman and Marshall saved the Communists from defeat and enabled them to ultimately take over China:

Stripped to its essentials, here is what the Marshall mission did to China. It forced a truce to the Chinese civil war at a time when the Central Government forces were winning. When the Generalissimo naturally balked at endorsing a policy that meant military disaster for his forces, Marshall applied pressure in the Stilwell manner by shutting off the flow of all American military aid to China including war surplus bought and paid for by the Chinese. This aims embargo lasted for nearly a year. He also summarily scuttled a Sino-American agreement made in September 1945 whereby the United States agreed to supply China with planes and equipment for an eight and one-third group air force including four-engine bombers. Marshall also extracted a promise from the Generalissimo not to use the Chinese Air Force already in China against the Communists on the grounds that this would constitute “offensive action.” Restricting the Chinese Air Force deprived the Generalissimo of his most potent weapon. It was also implied that discussions regarding a $500,000,000 loan to China could not be resumed until a truce was effected in the civil war. Marshall did not know then that the most effective Washington opposition to the Chinese loan was coming from Henry Wallace, a man whose position on Russia has since become quite clear.​

The truce sponsored and pushed by Marshall, with all the diplomatic resources of the United States at his disposal, forced the Generalissimo to halt his anti-Communist offensive at a time when it was on the verge of wiping out large bodies of Chinese Communist troops. Some fifty truce teams each were dispatched to trouble spots all over China. Each was headed by an elderly American colonel specially picked for his white hair to impress the Chinese. Here are some specific examples of what they accomplished.​

North of Hankow some 200,000 government troops had surrounded 70,000 Communist troops and were beginning a methodical job of extermination. The Communists appealed to Marshall on the basis of his truce proposal, and arrangements were made for the fighting to cease while the Communists marched out of the trap and on to Shantung Province, where a large Communist offensive began about a year later. On the East River near Canton some 100,000 Communist troops were trapped by government forces. The truce teams effected their release and allowed the Communists to march unmolested to Bias Bay where they boarded junks and sailed to Shantung.​

The worst fiasco was at Kalgan Pass. This gap in the North China Mountains is a historic gateway between China and Manchuria. At the end of the war there were no organized Communists in Manchuria.​

Chinese Communists flocked from their base in northwest China through die Kalgan Pass to join the Russian troops in Manchuria. When the Chinese government troops occupied Manchuria they found the great industrial centers stripped bare of machinery and the tremendous arsenals of the famed Japanese Kwantung Army empty. There was no trace of either the Kwantung Army or its equipment.​

Early in 1946 a government offensive captured Kalgan and sealed off the pass, trapping nearly a million Chinese Communists in northwest China who were moving toward Manchuria. The Communists complained that they were merely returning to their prewar homes in Manchuria. Marshall made strenuous efforts to get die Generalissimo to open the Kalgan Pass for these Communists. Eventually the Generalissimo yielded, withdrew his troops in June 1946, and the Communist horde poured into Manchuria. The Communists then broke the truce by fortifying Kalgan Pass. A year later Chinese government armies had to fight a bloody campaign to recapture the pass they voluntarily evacuated under the truce.​

In January 1947 the mystery of what happened to the Japanese Kwantung Army equipment was solved. The poorly armed Chinese Communists who marched north the year before now swarmed south from Manchuria armed with Japanese rifles, machine guns, mortars, tanks, and artillery. They even had Japanese aircraft but no gas or pilots to operate them. The Russians had simply turned over the Japanese equipment to the Chinese Communists and thus endowed them with a rich military legacy.​

Conservative estimates of the Japanese military stockpile in Manchuria seized by the Russians appraise it as sufficient materiel to supply a million men for ten years of fitting. By using Japanese munitions the Russians avoided the necessity of investing their own resources and are able to claim that no Russian arms were sent to China. . . .​

It was these troops who marched under a safe-conduct of the American-sponsored truce through Kalgan Pass and returned with Japanese arms that won the decisive battles in Manchuria in the summer of 1947. They were opposed by the government’s American-trained divisions. While the Communists were being rearmed by the Russians, the government divisions had their supplies cut off by what Marshall freely admits was a ten-month embargo on American military supplies to China. Since these Chinese divisions had been equipped in the spring and summer of 1945 their arms, ammunition, and trucks badly needed replacement. Two years of hard campaigning had worn their rifle barrels smooth, exhausted their ammunition, and battered the trucks they relied on for transport and supply. All of their equipment was American and without American replacements, spare parts, and ammunition, it was virtually useless.​

It did not take long for the well-armed Communists to chew up the government divisions armed only with the worn remnants of two-year-old American equipment and minus an effective air force. The Chinese armies that Stilwell and Wedemeyer trained in India and West China perished early in 1947 on the frozen Manchurian plains. The stage was set for the final mop up of Manchuria in the summer of 1948 and the Communist offensive into North China. . . .​

Marshall also sought, as part of his orders, to force the Generalissimo into a variety of political changes including formation of a coalition government with Communists in the cabinet.​

At the time of the Marshall mission the Chinese Communists terms for entering the Chinese National government were one third of the cabinet members including the War Minister, retention of a Communist army of forty-eight divisions, and the governorships of all provinces where the Communist troops then claimed occupation of a majority of the area. The fate of Czechoslovakia has since proved how fatal this would have been to the existing government of China. Inclusion of Communists in a coalition front is a standard preliminary tactical maneuver in a Communist seizure of power. It is a technique that may well be attempted again in China if the Communists feel that an attempt to gain complete military victory may cost more than they can afford.​

The Generalissimo had been dealing with Communists inside and outside the Chinese government for more than twenty years. He spent part of his education in Moscow's Communist academies. He thoroughly understood the Communist motives and techniques and knew that a Communist minority in a coalition government would actually result in complete Communist domination of China. (pp. xiii-xv)​

Incidentally, Chennault, as have many other authors, debunks the idea that Stalin would have intervened to keep the Communists from losing. Stalin was afraid that openly helping the Maoists would provoke a military confrontation with United States. He knew that the virulently anti-Soviet Douglas MacArthur was in Japan, and, of course, he knew that the U.S. had nukes. In fact, Stalin was so afraid of provoking an American military response that he actually tried to get Mao to stop at the Yangtze River after Mao had smashed Nationalists forces in Manchuria and was routing Nationalist forces that were north of the Yangtze (see also Jonathan Fenby, Chiang Kai Shek: China's Generalissimo and the Nation He Lost, New York: Carroll & Graf, 2004, pp. 453-458, 481-491).

 

[JoeB131]

Commie Joe’s complete ignorance about History, and shameless fangirl attitude toward every communist dictator in History (including the wannabe fdr) is painfully obvious.

Oh, Tokyo Pose... you miss the point entirely. I'm glad we didn't start World War III to save Peanut from his own incompetence.

If you want to know what a snake Stilwell was, read General Claire Chennault’s book The Way of a Fighter: The Memoirs of Claire Lee Chennault (New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons, 1949). Chennault served in China with Stilwell and saw firsthand the disastrous results of Stilwell’s treachery and military incompetence.

Wasn't this the same guy whose Chinese Wife that got us into Vietnam?


Okay, here's some fun facts...

A year before the U.S. officially entered the war, Chennault developed an ambitious plan for a sneak attack on Japanese bases. His Flying Tigers would use American bombers and American pilots, all with Chinese markings. He made the fantastic claim that a handful of fliers and planes could win the war single handed. The U.S. Army was opposed to this scheme and raised obstacles, noting that being able to reach Japan depended on Chiang Kai-shek's troops being able to build and protect airfields and bases close enough to Japan, which they doubted he could do. They also had little confidence in Chennault.[19]

Despite the military advice, American civilian leaders were captivated by the idea of China winning the war with Japan swiftly with only a few American men and planes. It was adopted by top civilian officials including Treasury Secretary Morgenthau and President Roosevelt himself.[Note 2] However, the American attack never took place: The Nationalist Chinese had not built and secured any runways or bases close enough to reach Japan, just as the military had warned. The bombers and crews arrived after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, and were used for the war in Burma, as they lacked the range to reach Japan from secure bases in China.[20][21][22]


Chennault believed that the Fourteenth Air Force, operating out of bases in China, could attack Japanese forces in concert with Nationalist troops. For his part, Stilwell wanted air assets diverted to his command to support the opening of a ground supply route through northern Burma to China. This route would provide supplies and new equipment for a greatly expanded Nationalist force of twenty to thirty modernized divisions.

Chiang Kai-shek favored Chennault's plans, since he was suspicious of British colonial interests in Burma, and he was unprepared – and unwilling – to begin major offensive operations against the Japanese, preferring to save his troops for the eventual civil war.[28] He was also concerned about alliances with semi-independent generals supporting the Nationalist government, and was concerned that a major loss of military forces would enable his Communist Chinese adversaries to gain the upper hand.[citation needed]

The sharply differing assessments held by Stillwell and Chennault came out in a meeting in 1943 with President Roosevelt, who asked both commanders for their opinion of Chiang.[29] Stillwell stated: "He's a vacillating, tricky, undependable old scoundrel who never keeps his word".[29] Chennault by contrast told Roosevelt: "Sir, I think the Generalissimo is one of the two or three greatest military and political leaders in the world today. He has never broken a commitment or promise to me".[29] Chennault was supported in his disputes by Soong Mei-ling, Chiang's politically powerful wife, who was one of the richest women in 1930s China,[30] and unlike her husband, was fluent in English.[31]

 

[JoeB131]

Here's more about Peanut's Pimp, Claire Chennault...

For an example, Chennault opened up a brothel in Guilin for his pilots, recruiting English-speaking prostitutes from Hong Kong who fled to the inland of China to escape the Japanese, arguing that his men needed sex and it was better to have his "boys" visit a brothel that was regularly inspected to reduce venereal diseases.[31] Chennault felt his men were going to visit brothels, regardless of what the rules said, and it was better to have them visit a brothel whose women were inspected for venereal diseases than one that was not, under the grounds that a man in the hospital for a venereal disease was one less man who could participate in the war. Stilwell was enraged when he heard about Chennault's brothel and promptly had it shut down, saying it was disgraceful that an officer of the United States Army Air Force would open such an establishment.[31]

Keep in mind, the main reason why the Communists won... Chinese were sick and tired of - literally - sucking western dick.

 

[mikegriffith1]

Below are some excerpts from The Amerasia Papers: A Clue to the Catastrophe of China, Volume I, a report prepared in 1970 by the Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws of the Committee on the Judiciary United States Senate (U.S. Government Printing Office, January 26, 1970).

Before the Sino-Japanese War, the Nationalists Routed the Communists and Forced Them to Flee Northward in the Long March; the United Front Arrangement Saved the Communists

Chiang Kai-shek's program of anti-Communism reached a climax in October, 1933, with the opening of the Generalissimo's fifth campaign of suppression and extermination. A rebellion in Fukien held up the march briefly, 'but by the end of the year some 300,000 Nationalist troops were converging upon the principal Communist strongholds in Kiangsi and causing panic among Chairman Mao's generals and aides. This time the guerilla tactics which the Communists had used to such effect in the previous campaigns were insufficient; the gradual tightening of the Kuomintang ring around their little capital could not be averted. In January, 1934, the Second All-China Congress of the Soviets convened nervously at Juichin, and evacuation to a new base was discussed. Then, as good supplies ran low and the Nationalist pincers began to close, Mao and Chou Enlai turned in desperation to their Soviet masters for advice. Late in the summer the instruction came from Moscow: pull out of Kiangsi province and seek safety somewhere, as far away as Outer Mongolia if necessary. Accordingly, the "Long March" of the Red army began in October, 1934 — exactly a year after the beginning of Chiang's fifth campaign. . . .

The "Long March," which lasted a full year and took the Red army 6,000 miles from South China to the Great Wall in the extreme north west, is epic in the annals of Communism. On many days the distance traveled was forty miles; some days it was even more. Nationalist forces were usually in hot pursuit, often using planes as was the case during the spectacular escape of the Reds on the old iron bridge over the Tatu River. Casualties in action, and deaths by starvation or exhaustion or disease, cost the Chinese Communists more than three-fourths of their effective strength; by October of 1935 Mao's fighters were reduced to less than 25,000. The one best way to rebuild in numbers, of course, was to reiterate the concept of a "united front" of the Chinese proletariat against Japan — and this is precisely what was done in the summer of 1935 while Mao's decimated columns were resting in western Szechuan. . . .

For the eight years that it lasted, the Pacific war was a pleasing spectacle to the Marxist masters of Moscow. What side happened to 'be winning at a given moment was never so significant as a central, an integral, and a most important fact — the sample fact that the war was going on. The cause of international Communism was beautifully served by the very existence of a struggle which, by forcing coexistence in China under the banner of a United Front against external aggression, gave Mao Tse-tung's followers the opportunity to sow their seed in China's ravaged soil. The first phase of Communist-Kuomintang cooperation, ending with the purge of 1927, had been all too brief to suit Soviet Russia: serious trouble in the Pacific at that time might have averted the disastrous "extermination" campaigns of the following decade. Now that a second phase of coexistence had begun, the war which brought it about should be extended as far as possible. By perpetuating the Pacific War, the Kremlin would be providing precious time for Communism to grow and spread on the mainland of Asia. . . .

The Communist Claim that the Chinese Communists Fought the Japanese as Much as the Nationalists Did Is Recognized as the “Sheerest Nonsense”

The departure of Communist leaders for Yenan late in 1938, scarcely a year after the creation of the United Front, sharply illustrated an important fact. It revealed their policy to be indeed more a "front," i.e., a cover, for their subversive activities than a sincere, single-minded effort to resist the Japanese penetration. In later years Mao Tse-tung often fondly reminisced on the valiant exertions of his followers in the face of the Japanese onslaught. His idyllic interpretation of the Communists in the front lines of defense is recognized today as the sheerest nonsense. In the early stages of the war the Communists not only avoided direct confrontation but were so invisible, as a matter of fact, that Japanese generals did not take them seriously. The result was that Chiang Kai-shek's armies, not the Communist armies, were the target and received the punishment. Even so sympathetic a writer as Theodore H. White, in his Thunder Out of China, has admitted that Mao Tse-tung's troops fought only "when they had an opportunity to surprise a very small group of the enemy," and that "during the significant campaigns it was the weary soldiers of the Central Government who took the shock, gnawed at the enemy, and died”. . . .

Starting in 1939, Far from Sharing the Burden Against the Japanese, Communist Troops Began to Attack Nationalist Troops

The myth of the United Front could not be sustained indefinitely under such conditions. As the Communist forces grew, the areas under Communist control became larger. Soon the Communists began to abandon the pretense of cooperation with the National Government and to engage in active harassment of its troops. They now adopted the tactic of attacking and absorbing government units which were fighting desperately against the Japanese or had been isolated in the rear of the enemy. From the spring of 1939 to the end of 1940, many Nationalist troops were treacherously ambushed by the Communists at the same time that they were contesting the Japanese. Such conduct could hardly be tolerated in time of peace; it was intolerable when the whole nation was supposed to be fighting against foreign aggression. . . .

The American Communist Party and Its Allies Waged a Large-Scale Smear Campaign Against the Nationalists

ln the United States the American Communist Party and its fellow-travelers began vociferously to denounce the Kuomintang while at the same time singing the praises of Mao Tse-tung's "agrarian reformers" in muted tones. It was far easier to paint a black picture of the Chinese Nationalists as inefficient and corrupt than to peddle the Chinese brand of Communism outright to the people of the United States; hence the greater effort was made to downgrade Generalissimo Chiang than to upgrade Chairman Mao. A barrage of anti-Chiang books, pamphlets, and magazine articles from the pens of the "old China hands" was soon conditioning the American people and their elected leaders for the coming of Communism to China. Many Americans — and, tragically, most of the leaders of the party in power — fell victim to the Sovietized but carefully disguised propaganda produced by these "experts" under the auspices of such research organizations as the Institute of Pacific Relations. No hoax in recent history has been more complete and convincing than that which deluded the American people at large into a belief that Mao's followers were fighting the Japanese valiantly and almost alone, that they had been abandoned by a selfish and deceitful Chiang, and that they could abandoned by a selfish and deceitful Chiang, and that they could "easily be enlightened by American concepts of democracy and representative government."

General Marshall’s Arms Embargo and Truces Saved the Communists and Turned the Tide Against the Nationalists

General Marshall brought his peace-branch to China at a tune when Chiang Kai-shek's forces were pushing hard to extend the sovereignty of the National Government into Manchuria. When he went home, Chiang's armies were going the other way. He had placed a year's embargo on American military supplies to the Nationalist government while Mao Tse-tung's forces were receiving from Soviet Russia tons of captured Japanese equipment and unlimited quantities of American material which the Russians were supposed to use against Japan; and he had arranged a series of truces in the contested areas, particularly the northern provinces, while urging Chiang to agree to » coalition government with the Communists. In so doing, the American President's representative was simply providing Mao Tse-tung with the precious time to mount an offensive. Professor Vinacke has summarized the situation in these words:

The truce itself, as far as it was actually enforced, proved to have been of advantage to the Communists rather than to the Kuomintang when full-scale civil war broke out in the first half of 1947, following recognition of the failure of American mediation efforts. When the truce began, the National Government armies had the initiative and were on the offensive. The activity of the truce terms in applying the terms of the agreement prevented the Nationalist armies from attaining their objectives and from wiping out large bodies of Communist troops. The period of the truce gave the Communists the necessary time to recover, and in their turn to assume the offensive. ​

General Claire L. Chennault, by far the most experienced "China hand" in the United States Army, is more direct in his criticism of the Marshall mission. Its net result, according to General Chennault, is summarized in this sober epitaph: "The trend of a gradually stronger central government was reversed, and the military balance shifted again in favor of the Chinese Communists." (pp. 9-10, 13, 17, 18-19, 21, 31-32)

 

[JoeB131]

General Claire L. Chennault, by far the most experienced "China hand" in the United States Army, is more direct in his criticism of the Marshall mission. Its net result, according to General Chennault, is summarized in this sober epitaph: "The trend of a gradually stronger central government was reversed, and the military balance shifted again in favor of the Chinese Communists."

Again, this would be the same guy who opened a whorehouse of Chinese women for his white pilots...

More white people telling Asian people their business.

End of the day, how much material both sides were getting was kind of irrelevant... it was their willingness to fight. Mao's guys were willing to fight to liberate China from foreigners... Peanut's forces... they pretty much dropped their guns and ran.