Justices Reject Campaign Finance Limits

Person hood is still unrelated to Speech. It has no bearing. It is a tangent.

I'm sorry you still don't get it. Only people enjoy individual protected rights under the Constitution. Not plants, not animals, not objects tangible or intangible.

Actually, Intense is right. Corporate personhood is relatively tangential to this particular case. None of the justices' opinions in this case, including the dissenting ones, hinged upon the issue of corporate personhood. It was whether compelling state interests (not having our political system entirely controlled by corporations) overrode the free speech exercised by corporations. Based on precedent, corporate personhood and money as speech were just granted for this case, they weren't the element in dispute. I'll always tend toward the free speech side and take an absolutist approach to the First Amendment.

That's why I prefaced that comment with "Beyond that," Corporate personhood has a lot of other negative ramifications. Group entities should not be treated as individuals as they are because they essentially have all of the benefits of an individual, but none of the responsibilities. Each individual comprising a group entity can exercise their same rights without the group taking on the role of an specially protected individual.
 
Person hood is still unrelated to Speech. It has no bearing. It is a tangent.

I'm sorry you still don't get it. Only people enjoy individual protected rights under the Constitution. Not plants, not animals, not objects tangible or intangible.

You are wrong. Life and Liberty, and Property are All Protected Goldcatt. The part of the Constitution You are stuck on is separate from the First Amendment. Study the Federalist Papers on Free Speech and on Corporations too. Without Free Speech, how do Organizations defend against Attack? You are mixing issues. You are condoning Censorship, which is exactly what this case was about. Your Law was Arbitrary and unfair. No Equal Playing field. One Side couldn't shut up, the other couldn't respond. That is wrong at every level.

Corporations need commercial speech to function in their role as fictitious entities pursuing commerical purposes. As I posted previously in this thread, all that had to be done was slightly redefine corporate speech rather than take such a radical departure and I would have been fine with it.

Corporations in every State have the right to sue and be sued, which is exactly how one defends himself against false attack. It's called defamation.

This case is not about censorship or free speech - it should never have been. Why? Because nonhumans have no right to free speech that can be censored or infringed!

I have posted several times that McCain-Feingold was a bad law, you haven't been paying attention. However, the completely radical sweeping way this Court decided to overturn it has horrendous implications for both the human inhabitants of the political arena and the health of the corporate entity itself.
 
I'm not one to say all corporations are evil a la Michael Mooron. But there needs to be a balance on the amount of influence they have, especially in the political process. More importantly, you can't possibly tell me that opening the floodgates to more foreign influence on OUR political system is a good thing. Yes they already have it but it will get much worse.

Also this whole "protecting the 1st amendment" argument is a failure. You know full well that corporations like today did not exist when the 1st amendment was created. It needs to be adjusted for changes in society, this being one of them.
 
Last edited:
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 08–205. Argued March 24, 2009—Reargued September 9, 2009––Decided January 21, 2010

Here is a small bit, feel free to check out the link fully.

(a) Although the First Amendment provides that “Congress shallmake no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” §441b’s prohibitionon corporate independent expenditures is an outright ban on speech, backed by criminal sanctions. It is a ban notwithstanding the factthat a PAC created by a corporation can still speak, for a PAC is aseparate association from the corporation. Because speech is an es-sential mechanism of democracy—it is the means to hold officials ac-countable to the people—political speech must prevail against lawsthat would suppress it by design or inadvertence. Laws burdening such speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Gov-ernment to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” WRTL, 551 U. S., at 464. This language provides a sufficient framework for protecting the interests in this case. Premised on mistrust of governmentalpower, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor cer-tain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speak-ers, which may be a means to control content. The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain
4
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Syllabus
preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in thepolitical speech context, the Government may impose restrictions oncertain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead to this con-clusion. Pp. 20–25.
(b)
The Court has recognized that the First Amendment appliesto corporations, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 778, n. 14, and extended this protection to the context of politicalspeech, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 428–429. Address-ing challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Buckley Court upheld limits on direct contributions to candidates, 18
U.
S. C. §608(b), recognizing a governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. 424 U. S., at 25–26. However, the Court in-validated §608(e)’s expenditure ban, which applied to individuals,corporations, and unions, because it “fail[ed] to serve any substantialgovernmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of cor-ruption in the electoral process,” id., at 47–48. While Buckley did not consider a separate ban on corporate and union independent expendi-tures found in §610, had that provision been challenged in Buckley’s wake, it could not have been squared with the precedent’s reasoning and analysis. The Buckley Court did not invoke the overbreadth doc-trine to suggest that §608(e)’s expenditure ban would have been con-stitutional had it applied to corporations and unions but not indi-viduals. Notwithstanding this precedent, Congress soon recodified §610’s corporate and union expenditure ban at 2 U. S. C. §441b, the provision at issue. Less than two years after Buckley, Bellotti reaf-firmed the First Amendment principle that the Government lacks thepower to restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity. 435 U.S., at 784–785. Thus the law stood until Austin up-held a corporate independent expenditure restriction, bypassing Buckley and Bellotti by recognizing a new governmental interest inpreventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-tions of [corporate] wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to thepublic’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 494 U. S., at
660. Pp. 25–32.
(c)
This Court is confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line forbidding speech restrictions based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line permitting them. Neither Austin’s antidistortion rationale nor the Government’s other justifica-tions support §441b’s restrictions. Pp. 32–47.
(1)
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for engaging in politicalspeech, but Austin’s antidistortion rationale would permit the Gov-ernment to ban political speech because the speaker is an associationwith a corporate form. Political speech is “indispensable to decision-
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 5
Syllabus
making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speechcomes from a corporation.” Bellotti, supra, at 777 (footnote omitted). This protection is inconsistent with Austin’s rationale, which is meant to prevent corporations from obtaining “ ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace’ ” by using “ ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace.’ ” 494 U. S., at 659. First Amendment protec-tions do not depend on the speaker’s “financial ability to engage in public discussion.” Buckley, supra, at 49. These conclusions were re-affirmed when the Court invalidated a BCRA provision that in-creased the cap on contributions to one candidate if the opponent made certain expenditures from personal funds. Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. ___, ___. Distinguishing wealthy indi-viduals from corporations based on the latter’s special advantages of, e.g., limited liability, does not suffice to allow laws prohibiting speech. It is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes that corporate funds may “have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” Austin, supra, at 660. All speakers, in-cluding individuals and the media, use money amassed from the eco-nomic marketplace to fund their speech, and the First Amendment protects the resulting speech. Under the antidistortion rationale, Congress could also ban political speech of media corporations. Al-though currently exempt from §441b, they accumulate wealth withthe help of their corporate form, may have aggregations of wealth,and may express views “hav[ing] little or no correlation to the public’ssupport” for those views. Differential treatment of media corpora-tions and other corporations cannot be squared with the First Amendment, and there is no support for the view that the Amend-ment’s original meaning would permit suppressing media corpora-tions’ political speech. Austin interferes with the “open marketplace”of ideas protected by the First Amendment. New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208.

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf

The bolded portion, central to the majority's rationale, is EXACTLY why corporate personhood is central to this decision.

According to this decision, a corporation (or union) is itself a person, since only a person can be a citizen. Read your Fourteenth Amendment and the definition of citizenship. You've been had.
 
I'm sorry you still don't get it. Only people enjoy individual protected rights under the Constitution. Not plants, not animals, not objects tangible or intangible.

You are wrong. Life and Liberty, and Property are All Protected Goldcatt. The part of the Constitution You are stuck on is separate from the First Amendment. Study the Federalist Papers on Free Speech and on Corporations too. Without Free Speech, how do Organizations defend against Attack? You are mixing issues. You are condoning Censorship, which is exactly what this case was about. Your Law was Arbitrary and unfair. No Equal Playing field. One Side couldn't shut up, the other couldn't respond. That is wrong at every level.

Corporations need commercial speech to function in their role as fictitious entities pursuing commerical purposes. As I posted previously in this thread, all that had to be done was slightly redefine corporate speech rather than take such a radical departure and I would have been fine with it.

Corporations in every State have the right to sue and be sued, which is exactly how one defends himself against false attack. It's called defamation.

This case is not about censorship or free speech - it should never have been. Why? Because nonhumans have no right to free speech that can be censored or infringed!

I have posted several times that McCain-Feingold was a bad law, you haven't been paying attention. However, the completely radical sweeping way this Court decided to overturn it has horrendous implications for both the human inhabitants of the political arena and the health of the corporate entity itself.

The Corporations have been standing up to the waves of Obama Attacks real well. LOL. Hopefully the Ruling will give them some dancing room.

Corporations are nothing without the People behind Them, and They are Human. You might consider that. The People that Hate Our way of Life, have no regard having Their way, Loot and obstruct at every turn. I look forward to the return of Voice and Integrity with it.
 
You are wrong. Life and Liberty, and Property are All Protected Goldcatt. The part of the Constitution You are stuck on is separate from the First Amendment. Study the Federalist Papers on Free Speech and on Corporations too. Without Free Speech, how do Organizations defend against Attack? You are mixing issues. You are condoning Censorship, which is exactly what this case was about. Your Law was Arbitrary and unfair. No Equal Playing field. One Side couldn't shut up, the other couldn't respond. That is wrong at every level.

Corporations need commercial speech to function in their role as fictitious entities pursuing commerical purposes. As I posted previously in this thread, all that had to be done was slightly redefine corporate speech rather than take such a radical departure and I would have been fine with it.

Corporations in every State have the right to sue and be sued, which is exactly how one defends himself against false attack. It's called defamation.

This case is not about censorship or free speech - it should never have been. Why? Because nonhumans have no right to free speech that can be censored or infringed!

I have posted several times that McCain-Feingold was a bad law, you haven't been paying attention. However, the completely radical sweeping way this Court decided to overturn it has horrendous implications for both the human inhabitants of the political arena and the health of the corporate entity itself.

The Corporations have been standing up to the waves of Obama Attacks real well. LOL. Hopefully the Ruling will give them some dancing room.

Corporations are nothing without the People behind Them, and They are Human. You might consider that. The People that Hate Our way of Life, have no regard having Their way, Loot and obstruct at every turn. I look forward to the return of Voice and Integrity with it.

Corporations are human?

And yet, it was corporations who were against:

weekends
paid vacations
40 hour work week
health care benefits
Workman's comp
child labor laws
minimum wage
pensions

Do you miss the good old days?

And now, foreign corporations can flood our politics with money to change the outcome of elections. Want more jobs moving overseas? Good, because you will get to see it real soon.
 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 08–205. Argued March 24, 2009—Reargued September 9, 2009––Decided January 21, 2010

Here is a small bit, feel free to check out the link fully.

(a) Although the First Amendment provides that “Congress shallmake no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” §441b’s prohibitionon corporate independent expenditures is an outright ban on speech, backed by criminal sanctions. It is a ban notwithstanding the factthat a PAC created by a corporation can still speak, for a PAC is aseparate association from the corporation. Because speech is an es-sential mechanism of democracy—it is the means to hold officials ac-countable to the people—political speech must prevail against lawsthat would suppress it by design or inadvertence. Laws burdening such speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Gov-ernment to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” WRTL, 551 U. S., at 464. This language provides a sufficient framework for protecting the interests in this case. Premised on mistrust of governmentalpower, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor cer-tain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speak-ers, which may be a means to control content. The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain
4
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Syllabus
preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in thepolitical speech context, the Government may impose restrictions oncertain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead to this con-clusion. Pp. 20–25.
(b)
The Court has recognized that the First Amendment appliesto corporations, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 778, n. 14, and extended this protection to the context of politicalspeech, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 428–429. Address-ing challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Buckley Court upheld limits on direct contributions to candidates, 18
U.
S. C. §608(b), recognizing a governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. 424 U. S., at 25–26. However, the Court in-validated §608(e)’s expenditure ban, which applied to individuals,corporations, and unions, because it “fail[ed] to serve any substantialgovernmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of cor-ruption in the electoral process,” id., at 47–48. While Buckley did not consider a separate ban on corporate and union independent expendi-tures found in §610, had that provision been challenged in Buckley’s wake, it could not have been squared with the precedent’s reasoning and analysis. The Buckley Court did not invoke the overbreadth doc-trine to suggest that §608(e)’s expenditure ban would have been con-stitutional had it applied to corporations and unions but not indi-viduals. Notwithstanding this precedent, Congress soon recodified §610’s corporate and union expenditure ban at 2 U. S. C. §441b, the provision at issue. Less than two years after Buckley, Bellotti reaf-firmed the First Amendment principle that the Government lacks thepower to restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity. 435 U.S., at 784–785. Thus the law stood until Austin up-held a corporate independent expenditure restriction, bypassing Buckley and Bellotti by recognizing a new governmental interest inpreventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-tions of [corporate] wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to thepublic’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 494 U. S., at
660. Pp. 25–32.
(c)
This Court is confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line forbidding speech restrictions based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line permitting them. Neither Austin’s antidistortion rationale nor the Government’s other justifica-tions support §441b’s restrictions. Pp. 32–47.
(1)
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for engaging in politicalspeech, but Austin’s antidistortion rationale would permit the Gov-ernment to ban political speech because the speaker is an associationwith a corporate form. Political speech is “indispensable to decision-
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 5
Syllabus
making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speechcomes from a corporation.” Bellotti, supra, at 777 (footnote omitted). This protection is inconsistent with Austin’s rationale, which is meant to prevent corporations from obtaining “ ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace’ ” by using “ ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace.’ ” 494 U. S., at 659. First Amendment protec-tions do not depend on the speaker’s “financial ability to engage in public discussion.” Buckley, supra, at 49. These conclusions were re-affirmed when the Court invalidated a BCRA provision that in-creased the cap on contributions to one candidate if the opponent made certain expenditures from personal funds. Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. ___, ___. Distinguishing wealthy indi-viduals from corporations based on the latter’s special advantages of, e.g., limited liability, does not suffice to allow laws prohibiting speech. It is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes that corporate funds may “have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” Austin, supra, at 660. All speakers, in-cluding individuals and the media, use money amassed from the eco-nomic marketplace to fund their speech, and the First Amendment protects the resulting speech. Under the antidistortion rationale, Congress could also ban political speech of media corporations. Al-though currently exempt from §441b, they accumulate wealth withthe help of their corporate form, may have aggregations of wealth,and may express views “hav[ing] little or no correlation to the public’ssupport” for those views. Differential treatment of media corpora-tions and other corporations cannot be squared with the First Amendment, and there is no support for the view that the Amend-ment’s original meaning would permit suppressing media corpora-tions’ political speech. Austin interferes with the “open marketplace”of ideas protected by the First Amendment. New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208.

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf

The bolded
portion, central to the majority's rationale, is EXACTLY why corporate personhood is central to this decision.

According to this decision, a corporation (or union) is itself a person, since only a person can be a citizen. Read your Fourteenth Amendment and the definition of citizenship. You've been had.

Let's take an excerpt of the part you highlighted.

" * * * prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens * * * *"

Citizens OR associations of citizens.

Among other things a corporation is an association of people.

To deny a corporation free speech is to deny that association of people free speech.

Nobody has "been had."

YOU have merely been quite wrong in how you've analyzed this whole issue.

Central to the decision by its own terms and by absolutely valid logic is that Congress violated the Constitution in its effort to abridge free speech.

Setting aside a "law" that facially violated the First Amendment was the only valid option open to the Court.
 
You are wrong. Life and Liberty, and Property are All Protected Goldcatt. The part of the Constitution You are stuck on is separate from the First Amendment. Study the Federalist Papers on Free Speech and on Corporations too. Without Free Speech, how do Organizations defend against Attack? You are mixing issues. You are condoning Censorship, which is exactly what this case was about. Your Law was Arbitrary and unfair. No Equal Playing field. One Side couldn't shut up, the other couldn't respond. That is wrong at every level.

Corporations need commercial speech to function in their role as fictitious entities pursuing commerical purposes. As I posted previously in this thread, all that had to be done was slightly redefine corporate speech rather than take such a radical departure and I would have been fine with it.

Corporations in every State have the right to sue and be sued, which is exactly how one defends himself against false attack. It's called defamation.

This case is not about censorship or free speech - it should never have been. Why? Because nonhumans have no right to free speech that can be censored or infringed!

I have posted several times that McCain-Feingold was a bad law, you haven't been paying attention. However, the completely radical sweeping way this Court decided to overturn it has horrendous implications for both the human inhabitants of the political arena and the health of the corporate entity itself.

The Corporations have been standing up to the waves of Obama Attacks real well. LOL. Hopefully the Ruling will give them some dancing room.

Corporations are nothing without the People behind Them, and They are Human. You might consider that. The People that Hate Our way of Life, have no regard having Their way, Loot and obstruct at every turn. I look forward to the return of Voice and Integrity with it.

This is a Constitutional ruling, not an anti-Obama partisan pissing match, Intense.

Corporations are not human, they are tools created and used by humans. And also by law and definition they are completely separate from the individuals who own or are employed by them. They have to be. If those individuals attempt to mingle the individual and the corporate, they lose the benefit of incorporating.

In order to serve their purpose (which is a damned good one, as I have stated previously many times) they must be afforded the commercial rights needed to function and so in that narrow and artificial sense they are hybrids - but only on paper and in legal theory.

Why is this so difficult to understand?
 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 08–205. Argued March 24, 2009—Reargued September 9, 2009––Decided January 21, 2010

Here is a small bit, feel free to check out the link fully.

(a) Although the First Amendment provides that “Congress shallmake no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” §441b’s prohibitionon corporate independent expenditures is an outright ban on speech, backed by criminal sanctions. It is a ban notwithstanding the factthat a PAC created by a corporation can still speak, for a PAC is aseparate association from the corporation. Because speech is an es-sential mechanism of democracy—it is the means to hold officials ac-countable to the people—political speech must prevail against lawsthat would suppress it by design or inadvertence. Laws burdening such speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Gov-ernment to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” WRTL, 551 U. S., at 464. This language provides a sufficient framework for protecting the interests in this case. Premised on mistrust of governmentalpower, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor cer-tain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speak-ers, which may be a means to control content. The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain
4
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Syllabus
preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in thepolitical speech context, the Government may impose restrictions oncertain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead to this con-clusion. Pp. 20–25.
(b)
The Court has recognized that the First Amendment appliesto corporations, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 778, n. 14, and extended this protection to the context of politicalspeech, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 428–429. Address-ing challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Buckley Court upheld limits on direct contributions to candidates, 18
U.
S. C. §608(b), recognizing a governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. 424 U. S., at 25–26. However, the Court in-validated §608(e)’s expenditure ban, which applied to individuals,corporations, and unions, because it “fail[ed] to serve any substantialgovernmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of cor-ruption in the electoral process,” id., at 47–48. While Buckley did not consider a separate ban on corporate and union independent expendi-tures found in §610, had that provision been challenged in Buckley’s wake, it could not have been squared with the precedent’s reasoning and analysis. The Buckley Court did not invoke the overbreadth doc-trine to suggest that §608(e)’s expenditure ban would have been con-stitutional had it applied to corporations and unions but not indi-viduals. Notwithstanding this precedent, Congress soon recodified §610’s corporate and union expenditure ban at 2 U. S. C. §441b, the provision at issue. Less than two years after Buckley, Bellotti reaf-firmed the First Amendment principle that the Government lacks thepower to restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity. 435 U.S., at 784–785. Thus the law stood until Austin up-held a corporate independent expenditure restriction, bypassing Buckley and Bellotti by recognizing a new governmental interest inpreventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-tions of [corporate] wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to thepublic’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 494 U. S., at
660. Pp. 25–32.
(c)
This Court is confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line forbidding speech restrictions based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line permitting them. Neither Austin’s antidistortion rationale nor the Government’s other justifica-tions support §441b’s restrictions. Pp. 32–47.
(1)
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for engaging in politicalspeech, but Austin’s antidistortion rationale would permit the Gov-ernment to ban political speech because the speaker is an associationwith a corporate form. Political speech is “indispensable to decision-
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 5
Syllabus
making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speechcomes from a corporation.” Bellotti, supra, at 777 (footnote omitted). This protection is inconsistent with Austin’s rationale, which is meant to prevent corporations from obtaining “ ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace’ ” by using “ ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace.’ ” 494 U. S., at 659. First Amendment protec-tions do not depend on the speaker’s “financial ability to engage in public discussion.” Buckley, supra, at 49. These conclusions were re-affirmed when the Court invalidated a BCRA provision that in-creased the cap on contributions to one candidate if the opponent made certain expenditures from personal funds. Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. ___, ___. Distinguishing wealthy indi-viduals from corporations based on the latter’s special advantages of, e.g., limited liability, does not suffice to allow laws prohibiting speech. It is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes that corporate funds may “have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” Austin, supra, at 660. All speakers, in-cluding individuals and the media, use money amassed from the eco-nomic marketplace to fund their speech, and the First Amendment protects the resulting speech. Under the antidistortion rationale, Congress could also ban political speech of media corporations. Al-though currently exempt from §441b, they accumulate wealth withthe help of their corporate form, may have aggregations of wealth,and may express views “hav[ing] little or no correlation to the public’ssupport” for those views. Differential treatment of media corpora-tions and other corporations cannot be squared with the First Amendment, and there is no support for the view that the Amend-ment’s original meaning would permit suppressing media corpora-tions’ political speech. Austin interferes with the “open marketplace”of ideas protected by the First Amendment. New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208.

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf

The bolded
portion, central to the majority's rationale, is EXACTLY why corporate personhood is central to this decision.

According to this decision, a corporation (or union) is itself a person, since only a person can be a citizen. Read your Fourteenth Amendment and the definition of citizenship. You've been had.

Let's take an excerpt of the part you highlighted.

" * * * prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens * * * *"

Citizens OR associations of citizens.

Among other things a corporation is an association of people.

To deny a corporation free speech is to deny that association of people free speech.

Nobody has "been had."

YOU have merely been quite wrong in how you've analyzed this whole issue.

Central to the decision by its own terms and by absolutely valid logic is that Congress violated the Constitution in its effort to abridge free speech.

Setting aside a "law" that facially violated the First Amendment was the only valid option open to the Court.

A chess club is an association of people. A corporation (or union) is an entity separate from the people. Which is why I wonder what a Constitutional ruling stating it is nothing more than an association will do to the corporate entity as we know it.
 

The bolded
portion, central to the majority's rationale, is EXACTLY why corporate personhood is central to this decision.

According to this decision, a corporation (or union) is itself a person, since only a person can be a citizen. Read your Fourteenth Amendment and the definition of citizenship. You've been had.

Let's take an excerpt of the part you highlighted.

" * * * prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens * * * *"

Citizens OR associations of citizens.

Among other things a corporation is an association of people.

To deny a corporation free speech is to deny that association of people free speech.

Nobody has "been had."

YOU have merely been quite wrong in how you've analyzed this whole issue.

Central to the decision by its own terms and by absolutely valid logic is that Congress violated the Constitution in its effort to abridge free speech.

Setting aside a "law" that facially violated the First Amendment was the only valid option open to the Court.

A chess club is an association of people. A corporation (or union) is an entity separate from the people. Which is why I wonder what a Constitutional ruling stating it is nothing more than an association will do to the corporate entity as we know it.

Chess clubs are oftentimes incorporated. A club exists as an ENTITY in its own right, of course, therefore. But that does not alter the fact that it is still an association of people.

The NRA is an association of people, too. I wouldn't recommend arguing that the GROUP loses any free speech rights because a group is not an individual citizen or person.

Furthermore, the decision did NOT say (as you incorrectly claim) that a corporation is "nothing more than an association." A corporation IS an association of people, of course. It is also an entity in its own right created, pursuant to laws, for specific purposes.

If I can say "the SCOTUS decision was 100% accurate and merits wide and full support!" as a mere individual, then it is just as plain that I can join with others in any kind of association and we can collectively assert our political viewpoint.
 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
Syllabus
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
No. 08–205. Argued March 24, 2009—Reargued September 9, 2009––Decided January 21, 2010

Here is a small bit, feel free to check out the link fully.

(a) Although the First Amendment provides that “Congress shallmake no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech,” §441b’s prohibitionon corporate independent expenditures is an outright ban on speech, backed by criminal sanctions. It is a ban notwithstanding the factthat a PAC created by a corporation can still speak, for a PAC is aseparate association from the corporation. Because speech is an es-sential mechanism of democracy—it is the means to hold officials ac-countable to the people—political speech must prevail against lawsthat would suppress it by design or inadvertence. Laws burdening such speech are subject to strict scrutiny, which requires the Gov-ernment to prove that the restriction “furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.” WRTL, 551 U. S., at 464. This language provides a sufficient framework for protecting the interests in this case. Premised on mistrust of governmentalpower, the First Amendment stands against attempts to disfavor cer-tain subjects or viewpoints or to distinguish among different speak-ers, which may be a means to control content. The Government may also commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain
4
CITIZENS UNITED v. FEDERAL ELECTION COMM’N
Syllabus
preferred speakers. There is no basis for the proposition that, in thepolitical speech context, the Government may impose restrictions oncertain disfavored speakers. Both history and logic lead to this con-clusion. Pp. 20–25.
(b)
The Court has recognized that the First Amendment appliesto corporations, e.g., First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U. S. 765, 778, n. 14, and extended this protection to the context of politicalspeech, see, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U. S. 415, 428–429. Address-ing challenges to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, the Buckley Court upheld limits on direct contributions to candidates, 18
U.
S. C. §608(b), recognizing a governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption. 424 U. S., at 25–26. However, the Court in-validated §608(e)’s expenditure ban, which applied to individuals,corporations, and unions, because it “fail[ed] to serve any substantialgovernmental interest in stemming the reality or appearance of cor-ruption in the electoral process,” id., at 47–48. While Buckley did not consider a separate ban on corporate and union independent expendi-tures found in §610, had that provision been challenged in Buckley’s wake, it could not have been squared with the precedent’s reasoning and analysis. The Buckley Court did not invoke the overbreadth doc-trine to suggest that §608(e)’s expenditure ban would have been con-stitutional had it applied to corporations and unions but not indi-viduals. Notwithstanding this precedent, Congress soon recodified §610’s corporate and union expenditure ban at 2 U. S. C. §441b, the provision at issue. Less than two years after Buckley, Bellotti reaf-firmed the First Amendment principle that the Government lacks thepower to restrict political speech based on the speaker’s corporate identity. 435 U.S., at 784–785. Thus the law stood until Austin up-held a corporate independent expenditure restriction, bypassing Buckley and Bellotti by recognizing a new governmental interest inpreventing “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggrega-tions of [corporate] wealth . . . that have little or no correlation to thepublic’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” 494 U. S., at
660. Pp. 25–32.
(c)
This Court is confronted with conflicting lines of precedent: a pre-Austin line forbidding speech restrictions based on the speaker’s corporate identity and a post-Austin line permitting them. Neither Austin’s antidistortion rationale nor the Government’s other justifica-tions support §441b’s restrictions. Pp. 32–47.
(1)
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens, for engaging in politicalspeech, but Austin’s antidistortion rationale would permit the Gov-ernment to ban political speech because the speaker is an associationwith a corporate form. Political speech is “indispensable to decision-
Cite as: 558 U. S. ____ (2010) 5
Syllabus
making in a democracy, and this is no less true because the speechcomes from a corporation.” Bellotti, supra, at 777 (footnote omitted). This protection is inconsistent with Austin’s rationale, which is meant to prevent corporations from obtaining “ ‘an unfair advantage in the political marketplace’ ” by using “ ‘resources amassed in the economic marketplace.’ ” 494 U. S., at 659. First Amendment protec-tions do not depend on the speaker’s “financial ability to engage in public discussion.” Buckley, supra, at 49. These conclusions were re-affirmed when the Court invalidated a BCRA provision that in-creased the cap on contributions to one candidate if the opponent made certain expenditures from personal funds. Davis v. Federal Election Comm’n, 554 U. S. ___, ___. Distinguishing wealthy indi-viduals from corporations based on the latter’s special advantages of, e.g., limited liability, does not suffice to allow laws prohibiting speech. It is irrelevant for First Amendment purposes that corporate funds may “have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.” Austin, supra, at 660. All speakers, in-cluding individuals and the media, use money amassed from the eco-nomic marketplace to fund their speech, and the First Amendment protects the resulting speech. Under the antidistortion rationale, Congress could also ban political speech of media corporations. Al-though currently exempt from §441b, they accumulate wealth withthe help of their corporate form, may have aggregations of wealth,and may express views “hav[ing] little or no correlation to the public’ssupport” for those views. Differential treatment of media corpora-tions and other corporations cannot be squared with the First Amendment, and there is no support for the view that the Amend-ment’s original meaning would permit suppressing media corpora-tions’ political speech. Austin interferes with the “open marketplace”of ideas protected by the First Amendment. New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U. S. 196, 208.

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/09pdf/08-205.pdf

The bolded
portion, central to the majority's rationale, is EXACTLY why corporate personhood is central to this decision.

According to this decision, a corporation (or union) is itself a person, since only a person can be a citizen. Read your Fourteenth Amendment and the definition of citizenship. You've been had.

Let's take an excerpt of the part you highlighted.

" * * * prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens * * * *"

Citizens OR associations of citizens.

Among other things a corporation is an association of people.

To deny a corporation free speech is to deny that association of people free speech.

Nobody has "been had."

YOU have merely been quite wrong in how you've analyzed this whole issue.

Central to the decision by its own terms and by absolutely valid logic is that Congress violated the Constitution in its effort to abridge free speech.

Setting aside a "law" that facially violated the First Amendment was the only valid option open to the Court.

So by your reasoning the USSC ought to strike down the law against a Criminal Conspiracy, after all, it too is an association of people guaranteed free speech.
 

The bolded
portion, central to the majority's rationale, is EXACTLY why corporate personhood is central to this decision.

According to this decision, a corporation (or union) is itself a person, since only a person can be a citizen. Read your Fourteenth Amendment and the definition of citizenship. You've been had.

Let's take an excerpt of the part you highlighted.

" * * * prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens * * * *"

Citizens OR associations of citizens.

Among other things a corporation is an association of people.

To deny a corporation free speech is to deny that association of people free speech.

Nobody has "been had."

YOU have merely been quite wrong in how you've analyzed this whole issue.

Central to the decision by its own terms and by absolutely valid logic is that Congress violated the Constitution in its effort to abridge free speech.

Setting aside a "law" that facially violated the First Amendment was the only valid option open to the Court.

So by your reasoning the USSC ought to strike down the law against a Criminal Conspiracy, after all, it too is an association of people guaranteed free speech.

Your assertion is stupid since you made the false claim "by [my] reasoning."

You cannot speak for me. You can barely speak at all you're so retarded.

No, idiot. A criminal association has no right to freely speak about plotting to commit a criminal act.

A corporation, in exercising free speech, is not plotting to commit a crime.

Some folks (I deem them to be slow studies) take the unsupportable position that the First Amendment guarantee of Freedom of Speech is an "absolute." It isn't. It never was. Good God in heaven you libs are tedious.

You have no right to shout fire in a crowded theater unless there really is a fire or you reasonably and honestly believe there is a fire.

You have no right to share military intelligence secrets with the nation's enemies, either.

And, no, of course you may not plot and conspire to overthrow this Government by force and violence, you moron.

And if Exxon were to attempt to make THAT the "speech" they tried to offer, their right to free speech wouldn't extend that far in THEIR case, either.

But if I want choose to advocate that the AGW Faither's theory is bullshit and that legislation based on that imbecility is a bad idea, then yes, Exxon SHOULD have the right to say as much, too.
 
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Let's take an excerpt of the part you highlighted.

" * * * prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens * * * *"

Citizens OR associations of citizens.

Among other things a corporation is an association of people.

To deny a corporation free speech is to deny that association of people free speech.

Nobody has "been had."

YOU have merely been quite wrong in how you've analyzed this whole issue.

Central to the decision by its own terms and by absolutely valid logic is that Congress violated the Constitution in its effort to abridge free speech.

Setting aside a "law" that facially violated the First Amendment was the only valid option open to the Court.

So by your reasoning the USSC ought to strike down the law against a Criminal Conspiracy, after all, it too is an association of people guaranteed free speech.

Your assertion is stupid since you made the false claim "by [my] reasoning."

You cannot speak for me. You can barely speak at all you're so retarded.

No, idiot. A criminal association has no right to freely speak about plotting to commit a criminal act.

A corporation, in exercising free speech, is not plotting to commit a crime.

Some folks (I deem them to be slow studies) take the unsupportable position that the First Amendment guarantee of Freedom of Speech is an "absolute." It isn't. It never was. Good God in heaven you libs are tedious.

You have no right to shout fire in a crowded theater unless there really is a fire or you reasonably and honestly believe there is a fire.

You have no right to share military intelligence secrets with the nation's enemies, either.

And, no, of course you may not plot and conspire to overthrow this Government by force and violence, you moron.

And if Exxon were to attempt to make THAT the "speech" they tried to offer, their right to free speech wouldn't extend that far in THEIR case, either.

But if I want choose to advocate that the AGW Faither's theory is bullshit and that legislation based on that imbecility is a bad idea, then yes, Exxon SHOULD have the right to say as much, too.

You're too funny. I'm not sure if you need an enema or a valium - I suspect both. I would dissect your post if inclined to root out your profane insults to discover if you made a valid point, if I felt your were worth it. You're not, and I suspect you've gotten that reaction from others throughout your miserly life.
 
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The Corporations have been standing up to the waves of Obama Attacks real well. LOL. Hopefully the Ruling will give them some dancing room.

Corporations are nothing without the People behind Them, and They are Human. You might consider that. The People that Hate Our way of Life, have no regard having Their way, Loot and obstruct at every turn. I look forward to the return of Voice and Integrity with it.

Though I agreed with your assertion that whether corporations are individuals was not the central point this case hinged upon and what the courts were considering, I have to say that you may want to look into taking grammar and English writing courses. The random capitalization of Attacks, Ruling, Them, They, Human, People, Hate, Our, Life, Their, Look, Voice, and Integrity indicates someone with a poor grasp of both and diminishes the impact of your writing.

Among other things a corporation is an association of people.

To deny a corporation free speech is to deny that association of people free speech.

No it isn't. Each individual, as individuals, can and would still be able to express their free speech as individuals without giving the group they comprise, a non-human entity, a special set of protections afforded individuals.

If 50 people and I form the Orange Grower's Association for Greater Subsidies, we can each write, say, pay to support, petition, and otherwise express our views freely without treating the Association as though it were its own person.
 
Corporations need commercial speech to function in their role as fictitious entities pursuing commerical purposes. As I posted previously in this thread, all that had to be done was slightly redefine corporate speech rather than take such a radical departure and I would have been fine with it.

Corporations in every State have the right to sue and be sued, which is exactly how one defends himself against false attack. It's called defamation.

This case is not about censorship or free speech - it should never have been. Why? Because nonhumans have no right to free speech that can be censored or infringed!

I have posted several times that McCain-Feingold was a bad law, you haven't been paying attention. However, the completely radical sweeping way this Court decided to overturn it has horrendous implications for both the human inhabitants of the political arena and the health of the corporate entity itself.

The Corporations have been standing up to the waves of Obama Attacks real well. LOL. Hopefully the Ruling will give them some dancing room.

Corporations are nothing without the People behind Them, and They are Human. You might consider that. The People that Hate Our way of Life, have no regard having Their way, Loot and obstruct at every turn. I look forward to the return of Voice and Integrity with it.

Corporations are human?

And yet, it was corporations who were against:

weekends
paid vacations
40 hour work week
health care benefits
Workman's comp
child labor laws
minimum wage
pensions

Do you miss the good old days?

And now, foreign corporations can flood our politics with money to change the outcome of elections. Want more jobs moving overseas? Good, because you will get to see it real soon.
If we prevented people who held stupid ideas from participating in the political process, there wouldn't be enough democrats eligible to vote, let alone hold office.
 
Among other things a corporation is an association of people.

To deny a corporation free speech is to deny that association of people free speech.

No it isn't. Each individual, as individuals, can and would still be able to express their free speech as individuals without giving the group they comprise, a non-human entity, a special set of protections afforded individuals.

If 50 people and I form the Orange Grower's Association for Greater Subsidies, we can each write, say, pay to support, petition, and otherwise express our views freely without treating the Association as though it were its own person.

If 5 people form an association, they have 5 voices individually but a 6th --GROUP voice -- when they speak by and through the association.

Ergo, your denial of my assertion is silly.

Stifle the group, stifle free speech.

Libs detest free speech when it is the speech of their opponents.

By what conceivable claim of right or authority can the government stifle the speech I want to speak through my association?
 

The bolded
portion, central to the majority's rationale, is EXACTLY why corporate personhood is central to this decision.

According to this decision, a corporation (or union) is itself a person, since only a person can be a citizen. Read your Fourteenth Amendment and the definition of citizenship. You've been had.

Let's take an excerpt of the part you highlighted.

" * * * prohibits Congress from fining or jailing citizens, or associations of citizens * * * *"

Citizens OR associations of citizens.

Among other things a corporation is an association of people.

To deny a corporation free speech is to deny that association of people free speech.

Nobody has "been had."

YOU have merely been quite wrong in how you've analyzed this whole issue.

Central to the decision by its own terms and by absolutely valid logic is that Congress violated the Constitution in its effort to abridge free speech.

Setting aside a "law" that facially violated the First Amendment was the only valid option open to the Court.

So by your reasoning the USSC ought to strike down the law against a Criminal Conspiracy, after all, it too is an association of people guaranteed free speech.

Are You Suggesting this as a Permanent Resolution, or only As Long as Criminal Chicago Crime Family Politics is Influencing and Occupying The White House?LOL

You All keep Tripping over the First Amendment . Huh....


Hmmmm.... Criminal Conspiracy in Relation to The Protection of The First Amendment? Like People would go out Publicly, in front of Witnesses to plan and Conspire? Hmmm... Are They That Stupid? Are They Relatives or just Peers? Hmmm....

I think it would make it easier on the Authorities, don't You, why wouldn't They just be at the crime scene waiting on You? The Prosecution would have a pretty easy job corroborating and getting a conviction on the heavier charges, don't You think? Do You really want to go there?
 
First Amendment - Religion and Expression


Amendment Text | Annotations

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.

Annotations


Religion
An Overview
Scholarly Commentary
Court Tests Applied to Legislation Affecting Religion
Government Neutrality in Religious Disputes
Establishment of Religion
Financial Assistance to Church-Related Institutions
Governmental Encouragement of Religion in Public Schools: Released Time
Governmental Encouragement of Religion in Public Schools: Prayers and Bible Reading
Governmental Encouragement of Religion in Public Schools: Curriculum Restriction
Access of Religious Groups to Public Property
Tax Exemptions of Religious Property
Exemption of Religious Organizations from Generally Applicable Laws
Sunday Closing Laws
Conscientious Objection
Regulation of Religious Solicitation
Religion in Governmental Observances
Religious Displays on Government Property
Miscellaneous
Free Exercise of Religion
The Belief-Conduct Distinction
The Mormon Cases
The Jehovah's Witnesses Cases
Free Exercise Exemption from General Governmental Requirements
Religious Test Oaths
Religious Disqualification
Freedom of Expression--Speech and Press
Adoption and Common Law Background
Freedom of Expression: The Philosophical Basis
Freedom of Expression: Is There a Difference Between Speech and Press
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint
Injunctions and the Press in Fair Trial Cases
Obscenity and Prior Restraint
Subsequent Punishment: Clear and Present Danger and Other Tests
Clear and Present Danger
The Adoption of Clear and Present Danger
Contempt of Court and Clear and Present Danger
Clear and Present Danger Revised: Dennis
Balancing
The ''Absolutist'' View of the First Amendment, with a Note on ''Preferred Position''
Of Other Tests and Standards: Vagueness, Overbreadth, Least Restrictive Means, and Others
Is There a Present Test?
Freedom of Belief
Flag Salute Cases
Imposition of Consequences for Holding Certain Beliefs
Right of Association
Political Association
Conflict Between Organization and Members
Maintenance of National Security and the First Amendment
Punishment of Advocacy
Compelled Registration of Communist Party
Punishment for Membership in an Organization Which Engages in Proscribed Advocacy
Disabilities Attaching to Membership in Proscribed Organizations
Employment Restrictions and Loyalty Oaths
Legislative Investigations and the First Amendment
Interference With War Effort
Suppression of Communist Propaganda in the Mails
Exclusion of Certain Aliens as a First Amendment Problem
Particular Government Regulations Which Restrict Expression
Government as Employer: Political and Other Outside Activities
Government as Employer: Free Expression Generally
Government as Educator
Government as Regulator of the Electoral Process: Elections
Government as Regulator of the Electoral Process: Lobbying
Government as Regulator of Labor Relations
Government as Investigator: Journalist's Privilege
Government and the Conduct of Trials
Government as Administrator of Prisons
Government and Power of the Purse
Governmental Regulation of Communications Industries
Commercial Speech
Taxation
Labor Relations
Antitrust Laws
Radio and Television
Governmentally Compelled Right of Reply to Newspapers
Regulation of Cable Television
Government Restraint of Content of Expression
Seditious Speech and Seditious Libel
Fighting Words and Other Threats to the Peace
Group Libel, Hate Speech
Defamation
Invasion of Privacy
Emotional Distress Tort Actions
''Right of Publicity'' Tort Actions
Publication of Legally Confidential Information
Obscenity
Child Pornography
Nonobscene But Sexually Explicit and Indecent Expression
Speech Plus--The Constitutional Law of Leafleting, Picketing, and Demonstrating
The Public Forum
Quasi-Public Places
Picketing and Boycotts by Labor Unions
Public Issue Picketing and Parading
Leafleting, Handbilling, and the Like
Sound Trucks, Noise
Door-to-Door Solicitation
The Problem of ''Symbolic Speech ''
Rights of Assembly and Petition
Background and Development
The Cruikshank Case
The Hague Case



FindLaw: U.S. Constitution: First Amendment
 
Person hood is still unrelated to Speech. It has no bearing. It is a tangent.

I'm sorry you still don't get it. Only people enjoy individual protected rights under the Constitution. Not plants, not animals, not objects tangible or intangible.

Incorrect.

Since we have a right to freedom of association (part and parcel of our freedom of speech conjoined with our freedom to peacably assemble and our right to petition the government for redress of grievances), it follows inexorably that these rights pertain not just to individuals, but to associations, like corporations.

For example, if the government decided that it really liked Microsoft, could it just take over Microsoft?

Would it require a derivative lawsuit by the shareholders against the government to try to prevent it? Or could Microsoft bring suit in its own name?

The correct answer is Microsoft could bring suit in its own name. The RIGHTS they would be seeking to vindicate would include their right to the enjoyment of their own property. Their right to bring suit (one nominally associated with "personhood") has LONG been recognized and there exist no legitimate and valid reasons to disturb that powerful legal fiction.

Corporations may sue and be sued, they may own property and sell it; they may enter into contracts; they may do a wide array of things exactly as any human being could to utilize those other rights. Why on Earth would it be a good idea to deny them their right to speech?

I am shocked to have to inform some libs of this, but maybe they do need the reminder.

If you deny THEM the right to speak, you deny us all (collectively as well as individually) of our right to HEAR what they might have to offer.
 
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:eusa_think:




Congress shall make no law ... ; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.






In 1975, Congress created the Federal Election Commission (FEC) to administer and enforce the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA) - the statute that governs the financing of federal elections. The duties of the FEC, which is an independent regulatory agency, are to disclose campaign finance information, to enforce the provisions of the law such as the limits and prohibitions on contributions, and to oversee the public funding of Presidential elections.

The Commission is made up of six members, who are appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Each member serves a six-year term, and two seats are subject to appointment every two years. By law, no more than three Commissioners can be members of the same political party, and at least four votes are required for any official Commission action. This structure was created to encourage nonpartisan decisions. The Chairmanship of the Commission rotates among the members each year, with no member serving as Chairman more than once during his or her term.
About the FEC


Does this mean the FEC itself is unconstitutional? :eusa_eh:

I think not.








a⋅bridge
/əˈbrɪdʒ/ Show Spelled Pronunciation [uh-brij]

–verb (used with object), a⋅bridged, a⋅bridg⋅ing.

1. to shorten by omissions while retaining the basic contents: to abridge a reference book.
2. to reduce or lessen in duration, scope, authority, etc.; diminish; curtail: to abridge a visit; to abridge one's freedom.
3. to deprive; cut off.




Doesn't the elimination of legal regulation of campaigns effectively cut off and limit the speech of those who can't financially afford equal access to "speak" publicly???

The law existed to protect us from such abridgment.

With this ruling, the financial powers that be can now legally diminish, curtail, and reduce in scope the authority of the people.
 
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