More than 99.9% of peer reviewed studies show that humans are the primary cause of global warming

Cartoons are not evidence.
/——-/ Hey dummy, the last time there was “coke” in the White House. GEEEZE
1689186966756.png
 
Wonderful essay. Unfortunately, no cause for alarm or higher taxes.
From IPCC's AR6, WGII, "Summary for Policy Makers" [Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability] https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_SummaryForPolicymakers.pdf

B: Observed and Projected Impacts and Risks
Since AR5, the knowledge base on observed and projected impacts and risks generated by climate hazards, exposure and vulnerability has increased with impacts attributed to climate change and key risks identified across the report. Impacts and risks are expressed in terms of their damages, harms, economic, and non-economic losses. Risks from observed vulnerabilities and responses to climate change are highlighted. Risks are projected for the near-term (2021–2040), the mid (2041–2060) and long term (2081–2100), at different global warming levels and for pathways that overshoot 1.5°C global warming level for multiple decades27. Complex risks result from multiple climate hazards occurring concurrently, and from multiple risks interacting, compounding overall risk and resulting in risks transmitting through interconnected systems and across regions.

Risks in the near term (2021–2040)
B.3
Global warming, reaching 1.5°C in the near-term, would cause unavoidable increases in multiple climate hazards and present multiple risks to ecosystems and humans (very high confidence). The level of risk will depend on concurrent nearterm trends in vulnerability, exposure, level of socioeconomic development and adaptation (high confidence). Near-term actions that limit global warming to close to 1.5°C would substantially reduce projected losses and damages related to climate change in human systems and ecosystems, compared to higher warming levels, but cannot eliminate them all (very high confidence).
B.3.1 Near-term warming and increased frequency, severity and duration of extreme events will place many terrestrial, freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems at high or very high risks of biodiversity loss (medium to very high confidence, depending on ecosystem). Near-term risks for biodiversity loss are moderate to high in forest ecosystems (medium confidence), kelp and seagrass ecosystems (high to very high confidence), and high to very high in Arctic sea-ice and terrestrial ecosystems (high confidence) and warm-water coral reefs (very high confidence). Continued and accelerating sea level rise will encroach on coastal settlements and infrastructure (high confidence) and commit low-lying coastal ecosystems to submergence and loss (medium confidence). If trends in urbanisation in exposed areas continue, this will exacerbate the impacts, with more challenges where energy, water and other services are constrained (medium confidence). The number of people at risk from climate change and associated loss of biodiversity will progressively increase (medium confidence). Violent conflict and, separately, migration patterns, in the near-term will be driven by socioeconomic conditions and governance more than by climate change (medium confidence).
B.3.2 In the near term, climate-associated risks to natural and human systems depend more strongly on changes in their vulnerability and exposure than on differences in climate hazards between emissions scenarios (high confidence). Regional differences exist, and risks are highest where species and people exist close to their upper thermal limits, along coastlines, in close association with ice or seasonal rivers (high confidence). Risks are also high where multiple non-climate drivers persist or where vulnerability is otherwise elevated (high confidence). Many of these risks are unavoidable in the near-term, irrespective of emissions scenario (high confidence). Several risks can be moderated with adaptation (high confidence).
B.3.3 Levels of risk for all Reasons for Concern (RFC) are assessed to become high to very high at lower global warming levels than in AR5 (high confidence). Between 1.2°C and 4.5°C global warming level very high risks emerge in all five RFCs compared to just two RFCs in AR5 (high confidence). Two of these transitions from high to very high risk are associated with near-term warming: risks to unique and threatened systems at a median value of 1.5 [1.2 to 2.0] °C (high confidence) and risks associated with extreme weather events at a median value of 2.0 [1.8 to 2.5] °C (medium confidence). Some key risks contributing to the RFCs are projected to lead to widespread, pervasive, and potentially irreversible impacts at global warming levels of 1.5–2°C if exposure and vulnerability are high and adaptation is low (medium confidence). Near-term actions that limit global warming to close to 1.5°C would substantially reduce projected losses and damages related to climate change in human systems and ecosystems, compared to higher warming levels, but cannot eliminate them all (very high confidence).

Mid to Long-term Risks (2041–2100)
B.4
Beyond 2040 and depending on the level of global warming, climate change will lead to numerous risks to natural and human systems (high confidence). For 127 identified key risks, assessed mid- and long-term impacts are up to multiple times higher than currently observed (high confidence). The magnitude and rate of climate change and associated risks depend strongly on near-term mitigation and adaptation actions, and projected adverse impacts and related losses and damages escalate with every increment of global warming (very high confidence).
B.4.1 Biodiversity loss and degradation, damages to and transformation of ecosystems are already key risks for every region due to past global warming and will continue to escalate with every increment of global warming (very high confidence). In terrestrial ecosystems, 3 to 14% of species assessed will likely face very high risk of extinction34 at global warming levels of 1.5°C, increasing up to 3 to 18% at 2°C, 3 to 29% at 3°C, 3 to 39% at 4°C, and 3 to 48% at 5°C. In ocean and coastal ecosystems, risk of biodiversity loss ranges between moderate and very high by 1.5°C global warming level and is moderate to very high by 2°C but with more ecosystems at high and very high risk (high confidence), and increases to high to very high across most ocean and coastal ecosystems by 3°C (medium to high confidence, depending on ecosystem). Very high extinction risk for endemic species in biodiversity hotspots is projected to at least double from 2% between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming levels and to increase at least tenfold if warming rises from 1.5°C to 3°C (medium confidence).
B.4.2 Risks in physical water availability and water-related hazards will continue to increase by the mid- to long-term in all assessed regions, with greater risk at higher global warming levels (high confidence). At approximately 2°C global warming, snowmelt water availability for irrigation is projected to decline in some snowmelt dependent river basins by up to 20%, and global glacier mass loss of 18 ± 13% is projected to diminish water availability for agriculture, hydropower, and human settlements in the mid- to long-term, with these changes projected to double with 4°C global warming (medium confidence). In Small Islands, groundwater availability is threatened by climate change (high confidence). Changes to streamflow magnitude, timing and associated extremes are projected to adversely impact freshwater ecosystems in many watersheds by the mid- to long-term across all assessed scenarios (medium confidence). Projected increases in direct flood damages are higher by 1.4 to 2 times at 2°C and 2.5 to 3.9 times at 3°C compared to 1.5°C global warming without adaptation (medium confidence). At global warming of 4°C, approximately 10% of the global land area is projected to face increases in both extreme high and low river flows in the same location, with implications for planning for all water use sectors (medium confidence). Challenges for water management will be exacerbated in the near, mid and long term, depending on the magnitude, rate and regional details of future climate change and will be particularly challenging for regions with constrained resources for water management (high confidence).
B.4.3 Climate change will increasingly put pressure on food production and access, especially in vulnerable regions, undermining food security and nutrition (high confidence). Increases in frequency, intensity and severity of droughts, floods and heatwaves, and continued sea level rise will increase risks to food security (high confidence) in vulnerable regions from moderate to high between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming level, with no or low levels of adaptation (medium confidence). At 2°C or higher global warming level in the mid-term, food security risks due to climate change will be more severe, leading to malnutrition and micro-nutrient deficiencies, concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Central and South America and Small Islands (high confidence). Global warming will progressively weaken soil health and ecosystem services such as pollination, increase pressure from pests and diseases, and reduce marine animal biomass, undermining food productivity in many regions on land and in the ocean (medium confidence). At 3°C or higher global warming level in the long term, areas exposed to climate-related hazards will expand substantially compared with 2°C or lower global warming level (high confidence), exacerbating regional disparity in food security risks (high confidence).
 
From IPCC's AR6, WGII, "Summary for Policy Makers" [Climate Change 2022: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability] https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg2/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGII_SummaryForPolicymakers.pdf

B: Observed and Projected Impacts and Risks
Since AR5, the knowledge base on observed and projected impacts and risks generated by climate hazards, exposure and vulnerability has increased with impacts attributed to climate change and key risks identified across the report. Impacts and risks are expressed in terms of their damages, harms, economic, and non-economic losses. Risks from observed vulnerabilities and responses to climate change are highlighted. Risks are projected for the near-term (2021–2040), the mid (2041–2060) and long term (2081–2100), at different global warming levels and for pathways that overshoot 1.5°C global warming level for multiple decades27. Complex risks result from multiple climate hazards occurring concurrently, and from multiple risks interacting, compounding overall risk and resulting in risks transmitting through interconnected systems and across regions.

Risks in the near term (2021–2040)
B.3
Global warming, reaching 1.5°C in the near-term, would cause unavoidable increases in multiple climate hazards and present multiple risks to ecosystems and humans (very high confidence). The level of risk will depend on concurrent nearterm trends in vulnerability, exposure, level of socioeconomic development and adaptation (high confidence). Near-term actions that limit global warming to close to 1.5°C would substantially reduce projected losses and damages related to climate change in human systems and ecosystems, compared to higher warming levels, but cannot eliminate them all (very high confidence).
B.3.1 Near-term warming and increased frequency, severity and duration of extreme events will place many terrestrial, freshwater, coastal and marine ecosystems at high or very high risks of biodiversity loss (medium to very high confidence, depending on ecosystem). Near-term risks for biodiversity loss are moderate to high in forest ecosystems (medium confidence), kelp and seagrass ecosystems (high to very high confidence), and high to very high in Arctic sea-ice and terrestrial ecosystems (high confidence) and warm-water coral reefs (very high confidence). Continued and accelerating sea level rise will encroach on coastal settlements and infrastructure (high confidence) and commit low-lying coastal ecosystems to submergence and loss (medium confidence). If trends in urbanisation in exposed areas continue, this will exacerbate the impacts, with more challenges where energy, water and other services are constrained (medium confidence). The number of people at risk from climate change and associated loss of biodiversity will progressively increase (medium confidence). Violent conflict and, separately, migration patterns, in the near-term will be driven by socioeconomic conditions and governance more than by climate change (medium confidence).
B.3.2 In the near term, climate-associated risks to natural and human systems depend more strongly on changes in their vulnerability and exposure than on differences in climate hazards between emissions scenarios (high confidence). Regional differences exist, and risks are highest where species and people exist close to their upper thermal limits, along coastlines, in close association with ice or seasonal rivers (high confidence). Risks are also high where multiple non-climate drivers persist or where vulnerability is otherwise elevated (high confidence). Many of these risks are unavoidable in the near-term, irrespective of emissions scenario (high confidence). Several risks can be moderated with adaptation (high confidence).
B.3.3 Levels of risk for all Reasons for Concern (RFC) are assessed to become high to very high at lower global warming levels than in AR5 (high confidence). Between 1.2°C and 4.5°C global warming level very high risks emerge in all five RFCs compared to just two RFCs in AR5 (high confidence). Two of these transitions from high to very high risk are associated with near-term warming: risks to unique and threatened systems at a median value of 1.5 [1.2 to 2.0] °C (high confidence) and risks associated with extreme weather events at a median value of 2.0 [1.8 to 2.5] °C (medium confidence). Some key risks contributing to the RFCs are projected to lead to widespread, pervasive, and potentially irreversible impacts at global warming levels of 1.5–2°C if exposure and vulnerability are high and adaptation is low (medium confidence). Near-term actions that limit global warming to close to 1.5°C would substantially reduce projected losses and damages related to climate change in human systems and ecosystems, compared to higher warming levels, but cannot eliminate them all (very high confidence).

Mid to Long-term Risks (2041–2100)
B.4
Beyond 2040 and depending on the level of global warming, climate change will lead to numerous risks to natural and human systems (high confidence). For 127 identified key risks, assessed mid- and long-term impacts are up to multiple times higher than currently observed (high confidence). The magnitude and rate of climate change and associated risks depend strongly on near-term mitigation and adaptation actions, and projected adverse impacts and related losses and damages escalate with every increment of global warming (very high confidence).
B.4.1 Biodiversity loss and degradation, damages to and transformation of ecosystems are already key risks for every region due to past global warming and will continue to escalate with every increment of global warming (very high confidence). In terrestrial ecosystems, 3 to 14% of species assessed will likely face very high risk of extinction34 at global warming levels of 1.5°C, increasing up to 3 to 18% at 2°C, 3 to 29% at 3°C, 3 to 39% at 4°C, and 3 to 48% at 5°C. In ocean and coastal ecosystems, risk of biodiversity loss ranges between moderate and very high by 1.5°C global warming level and is moderate to very high by 2°C but with more ecosystems at high and very high risk (high confidence), and increases to high to very high across most ocean and coastal ecosystems by 3°C (medium to high confidence, depending on ecosystem). Very high extinction risk for endemic species in biodiversity hotspots is projected to at least double from 2% between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming levels and to increase at least tenfold if warming rises from 1.5°C to 3°C (medium confidence).
B.4.2 Risks in physical water availability and water-related hazards will continue to increase by the mid- to long-term in all assessed regions, with greater risk at higher global warming levels (high confidence). At approximately 2°C global warming, snowmelt water availability for irrigation is projected to decline in some snowmelt dependent river basins by up to 20%, and global glacier mass loss of 18 ± 13% is projected to diminish water availability for agriculture, hydropower, and human settlements in the mid- to long-term, with these changes projected to double with 4°C global warming (medium confidence). In Small Islands, groundwater availability is threatened by climate change (high confidence). Changes to streamflow magnitude, timing and associated extremes are projected to adversely impact freshwater ecosystems in many watersheds by the mid- to long-term across all assessed scenarios (medium confidence). Projected increases in direct flood damages are higher by 1.4 to 2 times at 2°C and 2.5 to 3.9 times at 3°C compared to 1.5°C global warming without adaptation (medium confidence). At global warming of 4°C, approximately 10% of the global land area is projected to face increases in both extreme high and low river flows in the same location, with implications for planning for all water use sectors (medium confidence). Challenges for water management will be exacerbated in the near, mid and long term, depending on the magnitude, rate and regional details of future climate change and will be particularly challenging for regions with constrained resources for water management (high confidence).
B.4.3 Climate change will increasingly put pressure on food production and access, especially in vulnerable regions, undermining food security and nutrition (high confidence). Increases in frequency, intensity and severity of droughts, floods and heatwaves, and continued sea level rise will increase risks to food security (high confidence) in vulnerable regions from moderate to high between 1.5°C and 2°C global warming level, with no or low levels of adaptation (medium confidence). At 2°C or higher global warming level in the mid-term, food security risks due to climate change will be more severe, leading to malnutrition and micro-nutrient deficiencies, concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Central and South America and Small Islands (high confidence). Global warming will progressively weaken soil health and ecosystem services such as pollination, increase pressure from pests and diseases, and reduce marine animal biomass, undermining food productivity in many regions on land and in the ocean (medium confidence). At 3°C or higher global warming level in the long term, areas exposed to climate-related hazards will expand substantially compared with 2°C or lower global warming level (high confidence), exacerbating regional disparity in food security risks (high confidence).
 
An ice age is a climate change. The article is not saying that humans caused all climate change. It is saying that there is an overwhelming consensus among published climate scientists that humans are primarily responsible for the warming observed since the Industrial Revolution.

Yeah.....this is a lie been discussed over amd over how the "scientists" are not climate scientists and they dont agree on the topic
 

AND


Abstract​

While controls over the Earth's climate system have undergone rigorous hypothesis-testing since the 1800s, questions over the scientific consensus of the role of human activities in modern climate change continue to arise in public settings. We update previous efforts to quantify the scientific consensus on climate change by searching the recent literature for papers sceptical of anthropogenic-caused global warming. From a dataset of 88125 climate-related papers published since 2012, when this question was last addressed comprehensively, we examine a randomized subset of 3000 such publications. We also use a second sample-weighted approach that was specifically biased with keywords to help identify any sceptical peer-reviewed papers in the whole dataset. We identify four sceptical papers out of the sub-set of 3000, as evidenced by abstracts that were rated as implicitly or explicitly sceptical of human-caused global warming. In our sample utilizing pre-identified sceptical keywords we found 28 papers that were implicitly or explicitly sceptical. We conclude with high statistical confidence that the scientific consensus on human-caused contemporary climate change—expressed as a proportion of the total publications—exceeds 99% in the peer reviewed scientific literature.



The consensus means something. For all practical purposes, there is no longer ANY scientific debate on the primary cause of global warming.

And the chinese flu vaccines will stop the spread, and masks work...

Do you hqve any more left wing lies to grab power that you want us to believe?

At one point the 99% conensus was the sun travelled around the earth....howd that turn out?
 

AND


Abstract​

While controls over the Earth's climate system have undergone rigorous hypothesis-testing since the 1800s, questions over the scientific consensus of the role of human activities in modern climate change continue to arise in public settings. We update previous efforts to quantify the scientific consensus on climate change by searching the recent literature for papers sceptical of anthropogenic-caused global warming. From a dataset of 88125 climate-related papers published since 2012, when this question was last addressed comprehensively, we examine a randomized subset of 3000 such publications. We also use a second sample-weighted approach that was specifically biased with keywords to help identify any sceptical peer-reviewed papers in the whole dataset. We identify four sceptical papers out of the sub-set of 3000, as evidenced by abstracts that were rated as implicitly or explicitly sceptical of human-caused global warming. In our sample utilizing pre-identified sceptical keywords we found 28 papers that were implicitly or explicitly sceptical. We conclude with high statistical confidence that the scientific consensus on human-caused contemporary climate change—expressed as a proportion of the total publications—exceeds 99% in the peer reviewed scientific literature.



The consensus means something. For all practical purposes, there is no longer ANY scientific debate on the primary cause of global warming.

And if a scientist does object......they will lose their positions and livlihood...

So just obey and give is your money and your freedom
 

AND


Abstract​

While controls over the Earth's climate system have undergone rigorous hypothesis-testing since the 1800s, questions over the scientific consensus of the role of human activities in modern climate change continue to arise in public settings. We update previous efforts to quantify the scientific consensus on climate change by searching the recent literature for papers sceptical of anthropogenic-caused global warming. From a dataset of 88125 climate-related papers published since 2012, when this question was last addressed comprehensively, we examine a randomized subset of 3000 such publications. We also use a second sample-weighted approach that was specifically biased with keywords to help identify any sceptical peer-reviewed papers in the whole dataset. We identify four sceptical papers out of the sub-set of 3000, as evidenced by abstracts that were rated as implicitly or explicitly sceptical of human-caused global warming. In our sample utilizing pre-identified sceptical keywords we found 28 papers that were implicitly or explicitly sceptical. We conclude with high statistical confidence that the scientific consensus on human-caused contemporary climate change—expressed as a proportion of the total publications—exceeds 99% in the peer reviewed scientific literature.



The consensus means something. For all practical purposes, there is no longer ANY scientific debate on the primary cause of global warming.
When will you lying bastards stop?
 

AND


Abstract​

While controls over the Earth's climate system have undergone rigorous hypothesis-testing since the 1800s, questions over the scientific consensus of the role of human activities in modern climate change continue to arise in public settings. We update previous efforts to quantify the scientific consensus on climate change by searching the recent literature for papers sceptical of anthropogenic-caused global warming. From a dataset of 88125 climate-related papers published since 2012, when this question was last addressed comprehensively, we examine a randomized subset of 3000 such publications. We also use a second sample-weighted approach that was specifically biased with keywords to help identify any sceptical peer-reviewed papers in the whole dataset. We identify four sceptical papers out of the sub-set of 3000, as evidenced by abstracts that were rated as implicitly or explicitly sceptical of human-caused global warming. In our sample utilizing pre-identified sceptical keywords we found 28 papers that were implicitly or explicitly sceptical. We conclude with high statistical confidence that the scientific consensus on human-caused contemporary climate change—expressed as a proportion of the total publications—exceeds 99% in the peer reviewed scientific literature.



The consensus means something. For all practical purposes, there is no longer ANY scientific debate on the primary cause of global warming.


Sell this crap to biden voters....

The Blacklist

Consider the case of an Italian scientific conference last year that had to be canceled, not because of the pandemic, but because participants withdrew en masse after an Italian newspaper whipped up crusade over one of the papers to be presented—a paper that expressed skepticism about the size of the human role in global warming. Rumors swirled that one of its authors was a “denier,” and everyone stampeded toward the exits. (See another report on an academic conference that got a similar reception.) This is “cancel culture” in climate science.

Or consider a recent book by Obama-administration official Steve Koonin—former undersecretary of science for the Department of Energy—which questioned some of the conclusions of the established view. In letter to Scientific American signed by a dozen other scientists, he was promptly denounced as a “crank” and a “disinformation peddler,” with plenty of insinuations that he must be bought and paid for by Big Oil.

I think we’re starting to get an idea of how we got that “consensus.”

You may have noticed that two of the links above are from the blog of Judith Curry, a former chair of the School of Earth and Atmospheric Sciences at the Georgia Institute of Technology. She was forced out of her position and eventually out of academia altogether after being added to a blacklist of “climate misinformers” with the open goal to “make her [and the others on the list] unhireable in academia.”


 

AND


Abstract​

While controls over the Earth's climate system have undergone rigorous hypothesis-testing since the 1800s, questions over the scientific consensus of the role of human activities in modern climate change continue to arise in public settings. We update previous efforts to quantify the scientific consensus on climate change by searching the recent literature for papers sceptical of anthropogenic-caused global warming. From a dataset of 88125 climate-related papers published since 2012, when this question was last addressed comprehensively, we examine a randomized subset of 3000 such publications. We also use a second sample-weighted approach that was specifically biased with keywords to help identify any sceptical peer-reviewed papers in the whole dataset. We identify four sceptical papers out of the sub-set of 3000, as evidenced by abstracts that were rated as implicitly or explicitly sceptical of human-caused global warming. In our sample utilizing pre-identified sceptical keywords we found 28 papers that were implicitly or explicitly sceptical. We conclude with high statistical confidence that the scientific consensus on human-caused contemporary climate change—expressed as a proportion of the total publications—exceeds 99% in the peer reviewed scientific literature.



The consensus means something. For all practical purposes, there is no longer ANY scientific debate on the primary cause of global warming.


You guys no longer even say "how high?" when the leftists say jump......you just start manically hopping....

One of the most comprehensive reviews5 ever performed of surveys of the scientific consensus on climate change concluded:

  • The articles and surveys most commonly cited as showing support for a ‘scientific consensus’ in favor of the catastrophic man-made global warming hypothesis are without exception methodologically flawed and often deliberately misleading.
  • There is no survey or study showing ‘consensus’ on the most important scientific issues in the climate change debate.
  • Extensive survey data show deep disagreement among scientists on scientific issues that must be resolved before the man-made global warming hypothesis can be validated. Many prominent experts and probably most working scientists disagree with the claims made by the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

 
You guys no longer even say "how high?" when the leftists say jump......you just start manically hopping....

One of the most comprehensive reviews5 ever performed of surveys of the scientific consensus on climate change concluded:

  • The articles and surveys most commonly cited as showing support for a ‘scientific consensus’ in favor of the catastrophic man-made global warming hypothesis are without exception methodologically flawed and often deliberately misleading.
  • There is no survey or study showing ‘consensus’ on the most important scientific issues in the climate change debate.
  • Extensive survey data show deep disagreement among scientists on scientific issues that must be resolved before the man-made global warming hypothesis can be validated. Many prominent experts and probably most working scientists disagree with the claims made by the United Nations’ Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).

One of the most comprehensive reviews ever performed? Did you see their reference sources?

Legates et al 2015 published by Global Warming Policy Foundation
Tol 2013 Summary of the Flaws in Cook, published by Tol on his personal blog
Strenger et al 2015, " Climate Science Survey, Questions and Responses" by PBL Nederland (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency)
John McLean, 2008 article, published by The Science and Public Policy Institute
Idso, Carter and Singer, 2015, "Why Scientists Disagree About Global Warming" a book published by the Heartland Institute
Four articles, authors not identified, from WattsUpWithThat.com

WUWT, GWPF, The Science and Public Policy Institute and the Heartland Institute are all avowed enemies of anthropogenic global warming and have the scientific standing of that guy on the corner with the big wooden cross.
 
One of the most comprehensive reviews ever performed? Did you see their reference sources?

Legates et al 2015 published by Global Warming Policy Foundation
Tol 2013 Summary of the Flaws in Cook, published by Tol on his personal blog
Strenger et al 2015, " Climate Science Survey, Questions and Responses" by PBL Nederland (Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency)
John McLean, 2008 article, published by The Science and Public Policy Institute
Idso, Carter and Singer, 2015, "Why Scientists Disagree About Global Warming" a book published by the Heartland Institute
Four articles, authors not identified, from WattsUpWithThat.com

WUWT, GWPF, The Science and Public Policy Institute and the Heartland Institute are all avowed enemies of anthropogenic global warming and have the scientific standing of that guy on the corner with the big wooden cross.
Scientists come to opposite conclusions about the causes of recent climate change depending on which datasets they consider. For instance, the panels on the left lead to the conclusion that global temperature changes since the mid-19th century have been mostly due to human-caused emissions, especially carbon dioxide (CO2), i.e., the conclusion reached by the UN IPCC reports. In contrast, the panels on the right lead to the exact opposite conclusion, i.e., that the global temperature changes since the mid-19th century have been mostly due to natural cycles, chiefly long-term changes in the energy emitted by the Sun.



1632186412722.png



Both sets of panels are based on published scientific data, but each uses different datasets and assumptions. On the left, it is assumed that the available temperature records are unaffected by the urban heat island problem, and so all stations are used, whether urban or rural. On the right, only rural stations are used. Meanwhile, on the left, solar output is modeled using the low variability dataset that has been chosen for the IPCC’s upcoming (in 2021/2022) 6th Assessment Reports. This implies zero contribution from natural factors to the long-term warming. On the right, solar output is modeled using a high variability dataset used by the team in charge of NASA’s ACRIM sun-monitoring satellites. This implies that most, if not all, of the long-term temperature changes are due to natural factors.

Here is the link to the full paper.
ShieldSquare Captcha
 
Scientists come to opposite conclusions about the causes of recent climate change depending on which datasets they consider. For instance, the panels on the left lead to the conclusion that global temperature changes since the mid-19th century have been mostly due to human-caused emissions, especially carbon dioxide (CO2), i.e., the conclusion reached by the UN IPCC reports. In contrast, the panels on the right lead to the exact opposite conclusion, i.e., that the global temperature changes since the mid-19th century have been mostly due to natural cycles, chiefly long-term changes in the energy emitted by the Sun.



1632186412722.png



Both sets of panels are based on published scientific data, but each uses different datasets and assumptions. On the left, it is assumed that the available temperature records are unaffected by the urban heat island problem, and so all stations are used, whether urban or rural. On the right, only rural stations are used. Meanwhile, on the left, solar output is modeled using the low variability dataset that has been chosen for the IPCC’s upcoming (in 2021/2022) 6th Assessment Reports. This implies zero contribution from natural factors to the long-term warming. On the right, solar output is modeled using a high variability dataset used by the team in charge of NASA’s ACRIM sun-monitoring satellites. This implies that most, if not all, of the long-term temperature changes are due to natural factors.

Here is the link to the full paper.
ShieldSquare Captcha
The scientists whose studies were assessed by the IPCC examined all manner of data - a great deal more than you've got here - and they almost all come to the same conclusion: global warming taking place, it is a threat and its primary cause is the greenhouse effect acting on human CO2 emissions. Your repeated-ad-nauseum claim is worthless bullshit.
 
The scientists whose studies were assessed by the IPCC examined all manner of data - a great deal more than you've got here - and they almost all come to the same conclusion: global warming taking place, it is a threat and its primary cause is the greenhouse effect acting on human CO2 emissions. Your repeated-ad-nauseum claim is worthless bullshit.
/——-/
1689646564384.png
 
The scientists whose studies were assessed by the IPCC examined all manner of data - a great deal more than you've got here - and they almost all come to the same conclusion: global warming taking place, it is a threat and its primary cause is the greenhouse effect acting on human CO2 emissions. Your repeated-ad-nauseum claim is worthless bullshit.
All depends on the datasets they use. Or didn't you read the paper?
 
All depends on the datasets they use. Or didn't you read the paper?
Which SPECIFIC dataset do you believe every scientist on the planet is using and which SPECIFIC dataset do you think they OUGHT to be using?

Please tell us again how they've failed to notice UHI.
 
Which SPECIFIC dataset do you believe every scientist on the planet is using and which SPECIFIC dataset do you think they OUGHT to be using?

Please tell us again how they've failed to notice UHI.
How many times do I have to explain this to you? I'm guessing this is about the 12th time. The models the IPCC relies upon include the UHI effect and use the low variability solar output dataset. Excluding urban temperature readings and using the high variability solar output dataset yields an opposite conclusion.

It was explained very concisely in post #274. This is from a published paper which has yet to be refuted. No one - not even you - has ever said, "that's not true the IPCC relies on models that use the high variability solar output dataset and they get the same answer." You have also never said, "the IPCC has excluded the urban station readings and still get the same answer." The reason you - or anyone else - has never said those things is because the published paper is correct when they said the models the IPCC relies upon include urban temperature station data and use the high variability solar output dataset.
 
How many times do I have to explain this to you? I'm guessing this is about the 12th time. The models the IPCC relies upon include the UHI effect and use the low variability solar output dataset. Excluding urban temperature readings and using the high variability solar output dataset yields an opposite conclusion.

It was explained very concisely in post #274. This is from a published paper which has yet to be refuted. No one - not even you - has ever said, "that's not true the IPCC relies on models that use the high variability solar output dataset and they get the same answer." You have also never said, "the IPCC has excluded the urban station readings and still get the same answer." The reason you - or anyone else - has never said those things is because the published paper is correct when they said the models the IPCC relies upon include urban temperature station data and use the high variability solar output dataset.
NASA Can you explain the urban heat island effect?
While urban areas are warmer than surrounding rural areas, the urban heat island effect has had little to no effect on our warming world because scientists have accounted for it in their measurements.

Urban heat islands are not a newly-discovered phenomenon. Using simple mercury thermometers, weather-watchers have noticed for some two centuries that cities tend to be warmer than surrounding rural areas.

Likewise, researchers have long noticed that the magnitude of heat islands can vary significantly between cities. However, they are able to filter out those effects from the long-term trends. Overall, the urban heat island effect has not contributed very much to our warming world. Other human activities, primarily the burning of fossil fuels, are the main culprit.

NOAA https://www.noaa.gov/news-release/n...-inequities-in-14-states-1-international-city
This summer, NOAA and citizen scientists will map the hottest parts of 18 communities in 14 states across the country and in one international city. Identifying these hotspots, called urban heat islands, helps local decision-makers take actions to reduce the health impacts of extreme heat, which often target the most vulnerable.

Now in its seventh year, the NOAA Urban Heat Island (UHI) mapping campaign addresses extreme heat, the number one weather-related cause of death in the U.S. for the last three decades. Urban heat islands — areas with few trees and more pavement that absorbs heat — can be up to 20 degrees fahrenheit hotter than nearby neighborhoods with more trees, grass and less black asphalt.

“The burden of heat is not shared equally in our urban areas,” said NOAA Administrator Rick Spinrad. “Gathering this type of environmental intelligence helps communities measure their hottest places so they can develop strategies to reduce the dangerous effects of heat. Community by community, we’re working to create a Climate-Ready Nation that is resilient in a changing world.”

Hadley https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/77484/1/Published_Version.pdf
ABSTRACT: In the UnitedKingdom, where 90% of residents are projected to live in urban areas by 2050, projecting changes in urban heat islands (UHIs) is essential to municipal adaptation. Increased summer temperatures are linked to increased mortality. Using the new regional U.K. Climate Projections, UKCP 18 - regional, weestimatethe 1981–2079 trends in summer urban and rural near-surface air temperatures and in UHI intensities during day and at night in the 10 most populous built-up areas in England. Summer temperatures increase by 0.458–0.818C per decade under RCP8.5, depending on the time of day and location. Nighttime temperatures increase more in urban than rural areas, enhancing the nighttime UHI by 0.018–0.058C per decade in all cities. When these upward UHI signals emerge from 2008–18 variability, positive
summer nighttime UHI intensities of up to 1.88C are projected in most cities. However, we can prevent most of these upward nighttime UHI signals from emerging by stabilizing climate to the Paris Agreement target of 28 C above pre industrial levels. In contrast, daytime UHI intensities decrease in nine cities ,atrates between 20.0048 and 20.058C per decade ,indicating a trend toward a reduced daytime UHI effect. These changes reflect different feedbacks over urban and rural areas and are specific to UKCP18-regional. Future research is important to better understand the drivers of these UHI intensity changes.
 

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