Kimura
VIP Member
Going back to Ricardo, the distinguishing feature of rents is that the owner of the resource (in Ricardo's writing the feudal owner of agricultural land which is rented to tenant farmers and is passed on through inheritance) does not create the resource nor improve it. In the Ricardian world, improvements to land made by the owner such as agricultural buildings, fencing, land-clearing, or manuring were considered capital. The only decision the rentier class makes in production is to either extract a rent for allowing the use of the resource they control or to withhold it for (usually) speculative reasons. There is no sense in Ricardian theory in which rents are "earned". This analysis is continued in neo-classical theory and broadened to include many other situations other than land, such as patents, branding, "trade secrets", and location.
Note that there is nothing "leftist" about this, rent-seeking behavior like monopolies is roundly condemned by classical economists from Adam Smith through David Ricardo and Thomas Malthus to Alfred Marshall and Irving Fisher. I cannot think of a mainstream economist of the last three centuries (until 1980) who seriously defended monopoly power and rent-seeking behavior. Before the eighties, it used to be a primary part of the conservative economic canon.
In the fifties and sixties there was a theoretical alternative to neo-Ricardian rent theory; the theory of "excess profits". In economic texts of the period, the point was made that in a purely competitive economy the real rate of profit would tend to zero as new entrants into the market would force profits down. As this was not observed, some explanation was required and theories emerged that there had to be a return to "risk-taking" or "managerial ability" or "entrepreneurship". These "factors" would give rise to "excess profits". This fell by the wayside as no one was ever able to really quantify these, and eventually analysis of risk, imperfect information, and good old neo-Ricardian rent-seeking turned out to be much more fruitful.
Finally, the observed behavior of businesses is that they do not single-mindedly "maximize profit" nearly as much as they attempt to achieve anticipated profitability with minimum risk. The best way to do this is to achieve a degree of monopoly or monopsony power. This is equivalent to creating rent-producing assets and there is a huge overlap in the two approaches. Today I think that rent-seeking behavior and monopoly /monopsony power/collusion amount to the same thing.
Very well said, I couldn't agree more. I sort of went off into a economic rent tangent without laying the historical framework like you just did. As you pointed out, rent extraction was a central thesis in the classical economics of David Ricardo, as well as Adam Smith, culminating with Karl Marx.
While we can formulate moral arguments against economic rent all day long, I do see overall rent-seeking as extremely inefficient and it functions as a drag on productive capacity, innovation, and investment. The end result is always massive inequality which inevitability is an economic drag, and leads to the accumulation of political power.
If these things are left unaddressed, especially rent-seeking behavior, capitalism becomes utterly incompatible with democracy and we end up with corporatism.
In terms of capitalism, both renting-seeking and economic rent distort price discovery in competitive markets. It tends to favor special interests since they can extract rents; therefore, they'll also extract privileges. The creates two problems: artificial scarcity and artificial market power.
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