0311
Diamond Member
No it wasn't.
In the American Press it seldom front page news. We both know how most of White America felt about China at the time.
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No it wasn't.
The Japanese Invasion of Manchuria was largely ignore by the U.S. Press. ...
When judging 20th-century Imperial Japan, one must understand that there were two main factions: the militarists and the non-militarists. Many of the militarists were as bad as the worst Stalinists and Nazis. Some of the militarists, such as Anami and Ishiwara, though bad, opposed violence against the government and occasionally sought to reign in the more radical militarists.
Virtually all of the non-militarists wanted to end the war in China on fair terms and wanted peace with the U.S. There was a range of moderation among the non-militarists, just as there was a range of militarism among the militarists. But nearly all non-militarists thought the war in China was a mistake, were willing to withdraw Japanese troops from virtually all of China (except for a temporary and small buffer zone between China and Japan's Manchurian state, Manchukuo), wanted to extend full citizenship to Korean subjects, and wanted good relations with the U.S.
The non-militarists probably constituted at least 75% of the population, but the militarists largely controlled the military and could usually intimidate or threaten the government into going along with their plans and policies.
Both the militarists and the non-militarists were fiercely anti-communist and pro-capitalist.
FDR and his ilk acted as though the militarists were Japan and represented all Japanese. They endorsed the erroneous view that nearly all Japanese were militarists. We see these same attitudes expressed in this thread.
Even some of the militarists did not want war with the U.S. As mentioned, virtually all of the non-militarists, including the emperor and most of the civilian members of the cabinet, did not want war with the U.S. This is why Konoye proposed very reasonable peace terms to FDR (and, surprisingly enough, Tojo did not weaken or withdraw any of those terms when he became prime minister).
Our ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, warned FDR and Cordell Hull (SecState) that Konoye was offering the best peace terms he dared to offer, and that he risked assassination if he offered better terms. By any objective standard, Konoye's terms were reasonable and could have led to the end of the war in China and could have avoided Pearl Harbor. But FDR ignored Grew's sound advice and spurned all of Japan's peace offers, which enabled the militarists to get approval to attack Pearl Harbor.
Most of Japan's leaders did not want war with the U.S., and the vast majority of the Japanese people agreed with them. But FDR, determined to drag America into WWII, played right into the hands of the militarists and sabotaged the non-militarists by imposing draconian sanctions on Japan and rejecting all of Japan's peace offers. It is a matter of historical fact that FDR viewed provoking Japan to war as the best means to get the U.S. into WWII.