Moonglow
Diamond Member
or anything....I've explained the Hively finding to you on several occasions and you do what you always do: ignore the actual ruling and project your personal wishes instead. It's a fool's errand trying to convince someone as willfully obtuse as you.
And I've posted the actual language of the Hively finding to which you obtusely refuse to accept:
To wit: http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-b...8/C:15-1720:J:Ripple:con:T:fnOp:N:1801805:S:0
Page 35, paragraphs 2 & "D" 3.
"In addition to the inconsistent application of Title VII to gender non-conformity, these sexual orientation cases highlight another inconsistency in courts' applications of Title VII to sex as opposed to race. As the EEOC noted in Baldwin, when applying Title VII's prohibition of race discrimination, courts and the Commission have consistently concluded that the statute prohibits discrimination based on an employee's association with a person of another race, such as interracial marriage or friendship....But although it has been clear that Title VII protects white workers who are discriminated against because they have close associations with African-American partners and vice versa, it has not protected women employees who are discriminated against because of their intimate associations with other women, and men with men..."
Continued pages 39-42
A court would not necessarily need to expand the definition of "sex discrimination" beyond the narrow understanding of "sex" we adopted in Ulane, to conclude that lesbian, gay, and bisexual employees who are terminated for their sexual conduct or their perceived sexual conduct have been discriminated against on the basis of sex...the Supreme Court has opted not to weigh in on the question of whether Title VII's prohibition on sex-based discrimination would extend to protect against sexual orientation discrimination.Even in the watershed case of Obergefell, when the Court declared that "laws excluding same-sex couples from the marriage right impose stigma and injury of the kind prohibited by our basic charter," it made no mention of the stigma and injury that comes from excluding lesbian, gay, and bisexual persons from the workforce or subjecting them to un-remediable harassment and discrimination...the Supreme Court might someday say the same thing about locking gay men and lesbians out of the workforce..But, as we noted earlier, in the same-sex marriage case, the Court was presented with the opportunity to consider the question as one of sex discrimination but declined to do so and thus far has declined to take any opportunity to weigh in on the question of sexual orientation discrimination under Title VII.
This circuit has not remained silent on the matter, but rather, as we have described above, our own precedent holds that Title VII provides no protection from nor redress for discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. We require a compelling reason to overturn circuit precedent...Ordinarily this requires a decision of the Supreme Court or a change in legislation. (7th Circuit, 2016)
The ruling states that gays are not protected under the wording of 'sex' found in Title VII of the Civil Rights Act when it comes to workplace discrimination. Why? Because sexual orientation is not specifically mentioned. You pretend this ruling means gay can't ever be classified as a protected class and/or that it is going to be used to end gay marriage. That is where your personal projections kicks in and has no bearing on the actual ruling.
The opinion of the court even sympathizes with the position of Hively:
"Perhaps the writing is on the wall. It seems unlikely that our society can continue to condone a legal structure in which employees can be fired, harassed, demeaned, singled out for undesirable tasks, paid lower wages, demoted, passed over for promotions, and otherwise discriminated against solely based on who they date, love, or marry. The agency tasked with enforcing Title VII does not condone it, (see Baldwin, 2015 WL 4397641 at **5,10); many of the federal courts to consider the matter have stated that they do not condone it (see, e.g., Vickers, 453 F.3d at 764‐65; Bibby, 260 F.3d at 265; Simonton, 232 F.3d at 35; Higgins, 194 F.3d at 259; Rene, 243 F.3d at 1209, (Hug, J., dissenting); Kay, 142 F. Appʹx at 51; Silva, 2000 WL 525573, at *1); and this court undoubtedly does not condone it (see Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1084). But writing on the wall is not enough. Until the writing comes in the form of a Supreme Court opinion or new legislation, we must adhere to the writing of our prior precedent, and there‐ fore, the decision of the district court is AFFIRMED."
http://media.ca7.uscourts.gov/cgi-b...8/C:15-1720:J:Ripple:con:T:fnOp:N:1801805:S:0
You have this hysterical ability to find a case and pretend it means something totally different. You've done it with Ferber, you've done it with Massey, and, now you're doing it again with Hively. It's just what you do.
It's funny how you think you can have a rational discussion with Sil about gay marriage and gay rights.