BlindBoo
Diamond Member
- Sep 28, 2010
- 56,638
- 16,608
Well I wish there was never a need to pass such a law.
".... The Court said in both cases that Congress had an impressive legislative record tying racial discrimination in places of public accommodation to interstate commerce. And it flatly rejected the claim that Congress could not ban race discrimination—and enact this kind of “morals” legislation—under the Commerce Clause.
These rulings marked a revolution in the way we think about civil rights enforcement under our Constitution. They mean that Congress, through Title II, can ban any racial discrimination, even purely private racial discrimination, so long as the underlying activity substantially affects interstate commerce. And as we see from these cases, this can be nearly anything. In this way, Title II’s ban is untethered from the constraints on congressional authority under its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, Title II, or other, similar legislation based on the Commerce Clause, like Title VII, need not satisfy the state-actor requirement; indeed, it need not even address only the cramped version of equal protection that the Supreme Court has read into the Fourteenth Amendment. Title II can be broader.
Indeed, the courts have recognized this. Courts have applied Title II liberally, to effectuate the goals of Congress, including the goal to eliminate unfairness, humiliation, and insult of racial discrimination in facilities that serve the general public. As a result, courts have certainly struck private discrimination in hotels and restaurants (such as the Heart of Atlanta Motel and Ollie’s Barbecue), but they have also struck private discrimination in bars, casinos, recreational complexes, buses, and more. Title II’s enforcement mechanism allows individuals to bring a claim, and it allows the U.S. Department of Justice to bring a claim, when there is reason to believe that a person has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination.
In short, these rulings meant that owners of places of public accommodation could no longer discriminate with impunity. They could no longer shield themselves with the state-actor requirement in the Fourteenth Amendment. And they could no longer perpetuate the slowly dying Jim Crow, even through private (not state-sanctioned) discrimination.
But these rulings did more. They set precedent for Congress to use its entire menu of authorities, not just its enforcement power..."
Civil Rights Act of 1964: Enduring and Revolutionary
".... The Court said in both cases that Congress had an impressive legislative record tying racial discrimination in places of public accommodation to interstate commerce. And it flatly rejected the claim that Congress could not ban race discrimination—and enact this kind of “morals” legislation—under the Commerce Clause.
These rulings marked a revolution in the way we think about civil rights enforcement under our Constitution. They mean that Congress, through Title II, can ban any racial discrimination, even purely private racial discrimination, so long as the underlying activity substantially affects interstate commerce. And as we see from these cases, this can be nearly anything. In this way, Title II’s ban is untethered from the constraints on congressional authority under its enforcement power under the Fourteenth Amendment. In other words, Title II, or other, similar legislation based on the Commerce Clause, like Title VII, need not satisfy the state-actor requirement; indeed, it need not even address only the cramped version of equal protection that the Supreme Court has read into the Fourteenth Amendment. Title II can be broader.
Indeed, the courts have recognized this. Courts have applied Title II liberally, to effectuate the goals of Congress, including the goal to eliminate unfairness, humiliation, and insult of racial discrimination in facilities that serve the general public. As a result, courts have certainly struck private discrimination in hotels and restaurants (such as the Heart of Atlanta Motel and Ollie’s Barbecue), but they have also struck private discrimination in bars, casinos, recreational complexes, buses, and more. Title II’s enforcement mechanism allows individuals to bring a claim, and it allows the U.S. Department of Justice to bring a claim, when there is reason to believe that a person has engaged in a pattern or practice of discrimination.
In short, these rulings meant that owners of places of public accommodation could no longer discriminate with impunity. They could no longer shield themselves with the state-actor requirement in the Fourteenth Amendment. And they could no longer perpetuate the slowly dying Jim Crow, even through private (not state-sanctioned) discrimination.
But these rulings did more. They set precedent for Congress to use its entire menu of authorities, not just its enforcement power..."
Civil Rights Act of 1964: Enduring and Revolutionary
