Obama actually did lose Iraq, Graham explains the negotiations.

[Bfgrn]

That's sort of one opinion against about 3 or 4. His opinion is that American troops wouldnt have prevented ISIS anyway, something unknowable.

Well you right wing turds have 20/20 hindsight...and you somehow believe Obama could have forced the Iraqi Parliament to to waive its own laws.

So let's cut to the chase...should Obama have agreed to leaving our troops in Iraq without immunity?

Yes, or no?

Actually 2 US SecDefs under Obama said that.
Did you support Obama pulling all troops out unilaterally? Yes or no?

2 US SecDefs under Obama said WHAT?

I absolutely support Obama pulling out ALL our troops without immunity.

Now, answer my question...

 

[The Rabbi]

That's sort of one opinion against about 3 or 4. His opinion is that American troops wouldnt have prevented ISIS anyway, something unknowable.

Well you right wing turds have 20/20 hindsight...and you somehow believe Obama could have forced the Iraqi Parliament to to waive its own laws.

So let's cut to the chase...should Obama have agreed to leaving our troops in Iraq without immunity?

Yes, or no?

Actually 2 US SecDefs under Obama said that.
Did you support Obama pulling all troops out unilaterally? Yes or no?

2 US SecDefs under Obama said WHAT?

I absolutely support Obama pulling out ALL our troops without immunity.

Now, answer my question...

Said he went helter skelter out of Iraq despite the best advice to stay there and he could have negotiated a deal on it.
So you support the rise of ISIS and instability in the Middle East.
This is why you are dismissed.

 

[CrusaderFrank]

Does Hewitt or Graham tell you that they would be willing to do what Obama wouldn't do? Leave American troops in Iraq without immunity to Iraqi prosecution?

Condi was able to negotiate that, why couldn't Obama?

Was it because Obama switched sides and wanted to leave the middle East open to his brothers in Jihad?

 

[Bfgrn]

That's sort of one opinion against about 3 or 4. His opinion is that American troops wouldnt have prevented ISIS anyway, something unknowable.

Well you right wing turds have 20/20 hindsight...and you somehow believe Obama could have forced the Iraqi Parliament to to waive its own laws.

So let's cut to the chase...should Obama have agreed to leaving our troops in Iraq without immunity?

Yes, or no?

Actually 2 US SecDefs under Obama said that.
Did you support Obama pulling all troops out unilaterally? Yes or no?

2 US SecDefs under Obama said WHAT?

I absolutely support Obama pulling out ALL our troops without immunity.

Now, answer my question...

Said he went helter skelter out of Iraq despite the best advice to stay there and he could have negotiated a deal on it.
So you support the rise of ISIS and instability in the Middle East.
This is why you are dismissed.

Should Obama have agreed to leaving our troops in Iraq without immunity?

Yes, or no?

 

[Bfgrn]

Does Hewitt or Graham tell you that they would be willing to do what Obama wouldn't do? Leave American troops in Iraq without immunity to Iraqi prosecution?

Condi was able to negotiate that, why couldn't Obama?

Was it because Obama switched sides and wanted to leave the middle East open to his brothers in Jihad?

Should Obama have agreed to leaving our troops in Iraq without immunity?

Yes, or no?

 

[Bfgrn]

Colin H. Kahl is an associate professor in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and a senior fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. From February 2009 to December 2011, he was the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East.


Critics have launched a two-pronged attack on the administration’s Iraq policy: They blame Obama for being unwilling or unable to reach a deal with Baghdad to leave U.S. troops in Iraq beyond the Dec. 31, 2011 deadline for withdrawal established by the Bush administration; and they assert that such a residual presence would have proved decisive in heading off the current calamity. Neither criticism withstands much scrutiny.

Here are the facts.

As the senior Pentagon official responsible for Iraq policy during the first three years of the Obama administration, I had a front-row seat for the internal deliberations over how to end the war. Through the first half of 2011, there was a vigorous debate within the administration about whether U.S. forces should remain in Iraq beyond December, and if so, in what numbers and with what missions. Ultimately, at great political risk, President Obama approved negotiations with the Iraqi government to allow a force of around 5,000 American troops to stay in Iraq to provide counterterrorism support and air cover and to train the Iraqi army. But, as commander in chief, he was unwilling to strand U.S. forces in a hostile, anti-American environment without the legal protections and immunities required to ensure soldiers didn’t end up in Iraqi jails. These protections, which are common in nearly every country where U.S. forces operate, were guaranteed under the 2008 status of forces agreement negotiated by the Bush administration; Obama simply demanded that they continue under any follow-on accord.

Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, told U.S. negotiators that he was willing to sign an executive memorandum of understanding that included these legal protections. But for any agreement to be binding under the Iraqi constitution, it had to be approved by the Iraqi parliament. This was the judgment of every senior administration lawyer and Maliki’s own legal adviser, and no senior U.S. military commander made the case that we should leave forces behind without these protections. Even Sen. John McCain, perhaps the administration’s harshest Iraq critic, admitted in a December 2011 speech discussing the withdrawal that the president’s demand for binding legal immunities “was a matter of vital importance.” Moreover, because the 2008 security agreement had been approved by the Iraqi parliament, it seemed both unrealistic and politically unsustainable to apply a lower standard this time around.

Unfortunately, Iraqi domestic politics made it impossible to reach a deal. Iraqi public opinion surveys consistently showed that the U.S. military presence was deeply unpopular (only in Iraqi Kurdistan did a majority of people want American G.I.s to stay). Maliki was willing to consider going to parliament to approve a follow-on agreement, but he was not willing to stick his neck out. Other political factions would have to support the move, and the support wasn’t there. The Sadrists, a populist Shia movement that was now a major bloc in the parliament, were dead set against U.S. troops remaining. Ayad Allawi and Sunni politicians aligned with the Iraqiyya coalition supported a continued U.S. presence, but they knew that most of their Sunni constituents did not. They also wanted to condition their support on Maliki agreeing to additional political concessions. The Kurds were more active in their advocacy for a follow-on agreement, but they could not convince others to go along. So when Iraq’s major political bloc leaders met in early October 2011 in an all-night session, they agreed on the need for continued U.S. “trainers” but said they were unwilling to seek immunities for these troops through the parliament. The die was thus cast. Obama and Maliki spoke on Oct. 21 and agreed that U.S. forces would depart as scheduled by the end of the year.

Some critics assert that the administration was unwilling to offer enough forces to make it worth the Iraqis’ while. But it is not clear Maliki wanted that many troops. Indeed, he was conscious of the extreme unpopularity of a continued U.S. presence among his Shia base, and he had no interest in a sizable U.S. contingent along the Arab-Kurd divide, which is what all of our military’s troop options above the 10,000-man threshold assumed. These disputed boundary areas include Kirkuk as well as parts of Nineveh province north of Mosul and portions of Diyala province—precisely where jihadists are making inroads today.


Read more: No Obama Didn t Lose Iraq - Colin H. Kahl - POLITICO Magazine

 

[The Rabbi]

Colin H. Kahl is an associate professor in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and a senior fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. From February 2009 to December 2011, he was the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East.


Critics have launched a two-pronged attack on the administration’s Iraq policy: They blame Obama for being unwilling or unable to reach a deal with Baghdad to leave U.S. troops in Iraq beyond the Dec. 31, 2011 deadline for withdrawal established by the Bush administration; and they assert that such a residual presence would have proved decisive in heading off the current calamity. Neither criticism withstands much scrutiny.

Here are the facts.

As the senior Pentagon official responsible for Iraq policy during the first three years of the Obama administration, I had a front-row seat for the internal deliberations over how to end the war. Through the first half of 2011, there was a vigorous debate within the administration about whether U.S. forces should remain in Iraq beyond December, and if so, in what numbers and with what missions. Ultimately, at great political risk, President Obama approved negotiations with the Iraqi government to allow a force of around 5,000 American troops to stay in Iraq to provide counterterrorism support and air cover and to train the Iraqi army. But, as commander in chief, he was unwilling to strand U.S. forces in a hostile, anti-American environment without the legal protections and immunities required to ensure soldiers didn’t end up in Iraqi jails. These protections, which are common in nearly every country where U.S. forces operate, were guaranteed under the 2008 status of forces agreement negotiated by the Bush administration; Obama simply demanded that they continue under any follow-on accord.

Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, told U.S. negotiators that he was willing to sign an executive memorandum of understanding that included these legal protections. But for any agreement to be binding under the Iraqi constitution, it had to be approved by the Iraqi parliament. This was the judgment of every senior administration lawyer and Maliki’s own legal adviser, and no senior U.S. military commander made the case that we should leave forces behind without these protections. Even Sen. John McCain, perhaps the administration’s harshest Iraq critic, admitted in a December 2011 speech discussing the withdrawal that the president’s demand for binding legal immunities “was a matter of vital importance.” Moreover, because the 2008 security agreement had been approved by the Iraqi parliament, it seemed both unrealistic and politically unsustainable to apply a lower standard this time around.

Unfortunately, Iraqi domestic politics made it impossible to reach a deal. Iraqi public opinion surveys consistently showed that the U.S. military presence was deeply unpopular (only in Iraqi Kurdistan did a majority of people want American G.I.s to stay). Maliki was willing to consider going to parliament to approve a follow-on agreement, but he was not willing to stick his neck out. Other political factions would have to support the move, and the support wasn’t there. The Sadrists, a populist Shia movement that was now a major bloc in the parliament, were dead set against U.S. troops remaining. Ayad Allawi and Sunni politicians aligned with the Iraqiyya coalition supported a continued U.S. presence, but they knew that most of their Sunni constituents did not. They also wanted to condition their support on Maliki agreeing to additional political concessions. The Kurds were more active in their advocacy for a follow-on agreement, but they could not convince others to go along. So when Iraq’s major political bloc leaders met in early October 2011 in an all-night session, they agreed on the need for continued U.S. “trainers” but said they were unwilling to seek immunities for these troops through the parliament. The die was thus cast. Obama and Maliki spoke on Oct. 21 and agreed that U.S. forces would depart as scheduled by the end of the year.

Some critics assert that the administration was unwilling to offer enough forces to make it worth the Iraqis’ while. But it is not clear Maliki wanted that many troops. Indeed, he was conscious of the extreme unpopularity of a continued U.S. presence among his Shia base, and he had no interest in a sizable U.S. contingent along the Arab-Kurd divide, which is what all of our military’s troop options above the 10,000-man threshold assumed. These disputed boundary areas include Kirkuk as well as parts of Nineveh province north of Mosul and portions of Diyala province—precisely where jihadists are making inroads today.


Read more: No Obama Didn t Lose Iraq - Colin H. Kahl - POLITICO Magazine

Yes you managed to find a suck-up to make your case. Looks like he isnt reliable at all. Ulterior motives and all that.
Vice President Biden Announces Dr. Colin Kahl as New National Security Advisor whitehouse.gov

 

[rdean]

You right wing turds hate democracy...here is what democracy looks like in Iraq...the people spoke...

September 27, 2006 The Iraqi Public on US Presence and the Future of Iraq

Key findings are:

VIEWS OF THE US PRESENCE

1. Views of US-led Forces in Iraq
Seven in ten Iraqis want US-led forces to commit to withdraw within a year. An overwhelming majority believes that the US military presence in Iraq is provoking more conflict than it is preventing. More broadly, most feel the US is having a predominantly negative influence in Iraq and have little or no confidence in the US military. If the US made a commitment to withdraw, a majority believes that this would strengthen the Iraqi government. Majorities believe that the withdrawal of US troops would lead to a reduction in the amount of inter-ethnic violence and improvement in the day-to-day security of Iraqis. A modest majority, including a large majority of Shia, now believes that in the near future Iraqi security forces will be strong enough to deal with their security challenges without foreign forces. There is little interest in replacing US-led forces with an international peacekeeping force.

2. Attacks on US-led Forces
Support for attacks on US-led forces has grown to a majority position—now six in ten. Support appears to be related to widespread perception, held by all ethnic groups, that the US government plans to have permanent military bases in Iraq and would not withdraw its forces from Iraq even if the Iraqi government asked it to. If the US were to commit to withdraw, more than half of those who approve of attacks on US troops say that their support for attacks would diminish.

3. Views of Al Qaeda
Growing approval for attacks on US-led forces has not been accompanied by any significant support for al Qaeda. Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden are rejected by overwhelming majorities of Shias and Kurds and large majorities of Sunnis.

4. Non-military Forms of US Involvement
Majorities still approve of the US training Iraqi security forces and helping with community development, though most of these feel the US is doing a poor job. However, a modest majority now disapproves of the US being involved in mediating between ethnic groups. Were the US to agree to a timetable for the withdrawal of its forces Iraqis say their support for nonmilitary forms of US involvement in Iraq would increase.

This is the Constitution Republicans helped write:

Article 2:

First: Islam is the official religion of the State and it is a fundamental source of legislation:

A. No law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be established.

 

[rdean]

Does Hewitt or Graham tell you that they would be willing to do what Obama wouldn't do? Leave American troops in Iraq without immunity to Iraqi prosecution?

Condi was able to negotiate that, why couldn't Obama?

Was it because Obama switched sides and wanted to leave the middle East open to his brothers in Jihad?

Condi didn't negotiate jack shit. We invaded. Duh! What is wrong with you people? You can't just make shit up. Well, I guess you can, but why bother?

 

[Bfgrn]

Colin H. Kahl is an associate professor in Georgetown University’s Security Studies Program and a senior fellow and Director of the Middle East Security Program at the Center for a New American Security. From February 2009 to December 2011, he was the U.S. deputy assistant secretary of defense for the Middle East.


Critics have launched a two-pronged attack on the administration’s Iraq policy: They blame Obama for being unwilling or unable to reach a deal with Baghdad to leave U.S. troops in Iraq beyond the Dec. 31, 2011 deadline for withdrawal established by the Bush administration; and they assert that such a residual presence would have proved decisive in heading off the current calamity. Neither criticism withstands much scrutiny.

Here are the facts.

As the senior Pentagon official responsible for Iraq policy during the first three years of the Obama administration, I had a front-row seat for the internal deliberations over how to end the war. Through the first half of 2011, there was a vigorous debate within the administration about whether U.S. forces should remain in Iraq beyond December, and if so, in what numbers and with what missions. Ultimately, at great political risk, President Obama approved negotiations with the Iraqi government to allow a force of around 5,000 American troops to stay in Iraq to provide counterterrorism support and air cover and to train the Iraqi army. But, as commander in chief, he was unwilling to strand U.S. forces in a hostile, anti-American environment without the legal protections and immunities required to ensure soldiers didn’t end up in Iraqi jails. These protections, which are common in nearly every country where U.S. forces operate, were guaranteed under the 2008 status of forces agreement negotiated by the Bush administration; Obama simply demanded that they continue under any follow-on accord.

Iraq’s prime minister, Nuri al-Maliki, told U.S. negotiators that he was willing to sign an executive memorandum of understanding that included these legal protections. But for any agreement to be binding under the Iraqi constitution, it had to be approved by the Iraqi parliament. This was the judgment of every senior administration lawyer and Maliki’s own legal adviser, and no senior U.S. military commander made the case that we should leave forces behind without these protections. Even Sen. John McCain, perhaps the administration’s harshest Iraq critic, admitted in a December 2011 speech discussing the withdrawal that the president’s demand for binding legal immunities “was a matter of vital importance.” Moreover, because the 2008 security agreement had been approved by the Iraqi parliament, it seemed both unrealistic and politically unsustainable to apply a lower standard this time around.

Unfortunately, Iraqi domestic politics made it impossible to reach a deal. Iraqi public opinion surveys consistently showed that the U.S. military presence was deeply unpopular (only in Iraqi Kurdistan did a majority of people want American G.I.s to stay). Maliki was willing to consider going to parliament to approve a follow-on agreement, but he was not willing to stick his neck out. Other political factions would have to support the move, and the support wasn’t there. The Sadrists, a populist Shia movement that was now a major bloc in the parliament, were dead set against U.S. troops remaining. Ayad Allawi and Sunni politicians aligned with the Iraqiyya coalition supported a continued U.S. presence, but they knew that most of their Sunni constituents did not. They also wanted to condition their support on Maliki agreeing to additional political concessions. The Kurds were more active in their advocacy for a follow-on agreement, but they could not convince others to go along. So when Iraq’s major political bloc leaders met in early October 2011 in an all-night session, they agreed on the need for continued U.S. “trainers” but said they were unwilling to seek immunities for these troops through the parliament. The die was thus cast. Obama and Maliki spoke on Oct. 21 and agreed that U.S. forces would depart as scheduled by the end of the year.

Some critics assert that the administration was unwilling to offer enough forces to make it worth the Iraqis’ while. But it is not clear Maliki wanted that many troops. Indeed, he was conscious of the extreme unpopularity of a continued U.S. presence among his Shia base, and he had no interest in a sizable U.S. contingent along the Arab-Kurd divide, which is what all of our military’s troop options above the 10,000-man threshold assumed. These disputed boundary areas include Kirkuk as well as parts of Nineveh province north of Mosul and portions of Diyala province—precisely where jihadists are making inroads today.


Read more: No Obama Didn t Lose Iraq - Colin H. Kahl - POLITICO Magazine

Yes you managed to find a suck-up to make your case. Looks like he isnt reliable at all. Ulterior motives and all that.
Vice President Biden Announces Dr. Colin Kahl as New National Security Advisor whitehouse.gov

Three strikes...you're out...

So, by default, YOU would leave our troops in Iraq without immunity...In a nation where 80% of the citizens wanted us out. In nation where powerful clerics have urged their followers to take up arms against Americans.

You are part of the cancer in this country who see our soldiers as pawns.... you are right wing scum

 

[idb]

Senator Lindsey Graham explains how Obama lost Iraq by refusing to keep troops in Iraq. The myth that it was Bush's fault is exactly that, a myth. graham and McCain were part of the group sent over to negotiate the status of forces agreement and he explained how it went with Hugh Hewitt, Lawyer, law professor, author and radio host....

Who Lost Iraq Power Line


Lindsey Graham: I think it was our fault. The president got the answer he wanted when it comes to troop levels. He wanted zero. He got zero. He promised to end the War in Iraq. He actually lost the War in Iraq.

But this is something that most people don’t know. I want to make sure you understand. Secretary Clinton called me to go over to Iraq to talk to all the parties to see if we can find a way to achieve a residual force to be left behind. I went with Senator McCain and Senator Lieberman. We met with Mr. Allawi who’s is the Aratia party leader, the former prime minister. He is a Shia, but it was a Sunni coalition. We flew up to meet with President Barzani – not president – but Barzani, the head of the Kurds. … Then we met with Maliki.

So we had Ambassador Jeffrey – U.S. Ambassador to Iraq and Gen. Austin, the commander of Iraq forces at the time in the meeting with me, Maliki, and McCain. I asked Prime Minister Maliki, “Would you accept troops?” He says, “If other will, I will.” Then he turned to me and said, “How many troops are you talking about?” I turned to Gen. Austin and then Ambassador Jeffrey – “What’s the answer to the prime minister’s question?” Gen. Dreyfuss says, “We’re still working on the number.” The number went from 18,000 recommended by Austin down to 3,000 coming out of the White House.

General Dempsey answered Senator McCain’s question and my question as to how the numbers went down – “What is because the Iraqis suggest too many?” He said, “No, the cascading numbers came from the White House.” I was there. They were all ready to accept a residual force. But when you get below 3,000, it was a joke. And we got the answer we wanted. I was on the ground. I asked the question. I heard the answer from Gen. Austin – the White House hasn’t made up their mind, yet.

FYI - We NEVER had intentions to win in Iraq, Viet Nam, or Afghanistan. We do NOT fight war as war, rather we fight political and diplomatic wars.

Actually, we won the war...then Iran fed supplies, trained military forces and money to the terrorists to keep Iraq from becoming peaceful...you know, the country obama wants to give the bomb to....and the democrats started undermining the effort from the beginning....a 5th column at home and iran over there kept us from creating the peace we needed.

I totally disagree. In Iraq, after sacrificing almost 6,000 American lives, multi-$Billions spent, devastating a country, and then tucking our tails between our legs and running back home, what was accomplished that would remotely point to a victory? And, in Viet Nam, we sacrificed almost 60,000 American lives, spent multi-$Billions, then picked up our marbles and quit the game, ran back home, and didn't accomplish anything. The same in Afghanistan. All three encounters turned out to be both political and diplomatic wars, with no victory for our soldiers.

The country was stable...obama pulled the troops before the job was done and didn't deal with iran sending troops, money and supplies to the terrorists, and now he wants to give them the bomb. obama picked up the marbles before the game was over.......

You do realize that World War 2 ended in 1945 and that we still have troops in Germany, and Japan...right, and the Korean war was over in the 50s and we still have troops in South Korea........and obama pulled our troops out as soon as he got into office.....and you blame Bush for losing Iraq.....you guys really need to think before you post.

If Iraq was so stable...why did it fall to pieces after the invaders left?

Are you suggesting that Obama should have started a war with Iran while he had troops stationed in Iraq?

Are you suggesting that the only reason that Germany and Japan are...what?...'stable?', 'not invading other countries?', 'peaceful?'...is because there are US troops posted there?

 

[Bfgrn]

This is the Constitution Republicans helped write:

Article 2:

First: Islam is the official religion of the State and it is a fundamental source of legislation:

A. No law that contradicts the established provisions of Islam may be established.

Here is an article from the National Review...one of the oldest and most influential conservative magazines in the United States...they are NOT Obama fans...

Don’t Blame Iraq on Obama Alone

Some Republicans are indulging in revisionist history

Still, it was not Obama who agreed to the withdrawal schedule. It was President Bush. And it was not Obama who turned Iraq into an Islamic-supremacist state seething with anti-American and anti-Semitic hatred. Long before Obama came to power, Iraq was an Islamist country, rife with Sunni and Shiite militants who agreed on little else besides their devotion to sharia and their abhorrence of the West.

In late 2008, several weeks before Obama entered the Oval Office, I wrote here about the status of forces agreement (SOFA) the Bush administration was then entering into with the ingrate Shiite government of Nouri al-Maliki. Even then, Iraq was pulling ever closer to the terrorist regime in Iran while American troops continued fighting to protect Maliki’s fledgling government from al-Qaeda jihadists — jihadists that the insidious mullahs were also supplying with money, training, and IEDs.

In the SOFA, the Bush administration agreed to strict withdrawal deadlines that invited al-Qaeda to catch its breath, wait out the United States, then resume the jihad as Americans were leaving — the better to make it look to the world like they were chasing us out. All American combat operations were to cease in mid 2009; and, at the end of 2011, all American forces would pull out of Iraq. The 2008 SOFA is the basis for the American withdrawal that Obama so anxiously consummated. It is what promised a resumption of Islam’s eternal, internecine bloodletting between Sunnis and Shiites that now has Iraq on the verge of collapse.

To listen to Republicans and those who foolishly repeat their revisionist history, you would think Obama inherited the Iraq so delusionally envisioned by Islamic-democracy-project devotees: a free, pluralistic democracy that would be a reliable counterterrorism ally and a thorn in totalitarian Iran’s side. In reality, Iraq remains an incorrigible sharia society in which the persecution of religious minorities and homosexuals is routine. Far from democratizing the country in any cultural sense, Bush officials fortified these tendencies by encouraging Iraq’s adoption of a constitution that enshrined Islam as the state religion and sharia as a primary source of law. Under American occupation, Iraq continued to shun diplomatic relations with Israel and to cheer the “resistance” waged by Hamas and Hezbollah. It sought closer ties with Tehran, a desire the Bush administration indulged on the fantasy rationale that Iran had a strong interest in a stable Iraq — even as everyone knew Iran was fueling anti-American terrorism in Iraq by both Shiite and Sunni jihadist cells.

Why did President Bush agree to the SOFA on his way out of office (under the pressure of a December 31, 2008, expiration of the U.N. mandate approving U.S. military operations there)? Because it was the best deal he could get in an Islamist country that despises America.

Beginning in 2003, fatwas calling for violent jihad against American forces in Iraq were issued by influential sharia jurists, including Sheikh Yusuf Qaradawi and Sheikh Abdulla bin Bayyah (who are now Obama administration consultants). Because our government eschews the study of Islamic-supremacist ideology, most Americans remain unaware that these fatwas represented a mainstream interpretation of sharia in the Muslim Middle East: If Western forces occupy Islamic territory, and especially if they are peddling concepts like Western democracy, they must be driven out — even if, in their own minds, they are do-gooders trying to make life better for Muslims.

The Iraqi mindset was obvious in public polling: In 2008, four in ten Iraqis continued to see Americans as legitimate terror targets — and the figure had recently hovered close to six in ten. Fully 80 percent of Iraqis said they wanted Americans to vacate their country. In the one vestige of Iraqi democracy about which the Bush administration could brag, the nation’s holding of popular elections, candidates competed with each other over who could most strenuously condemn the United States and demand that our troops leave yesterday.

Read more at: Don t Blame Iraq on Obama Alone National Review Online

 

[CrusaderFrank]

Does Hewitt or Graham tell you that they would be willing to do what Obama wouldn't do? Leave American troops in Iraq without immunity to Iraqi prosecution?

Condi was able to negotiate that, why couldn't Obama?

Was it because Obama switched sides and wanted to leave the middle East open to his brothers in Jihad?

Condi didn't negotiate jack shit. We invaded. Duh! What is wrong with you people? You can't just make shit up. Well, I guess you can, but why bother?

Condi got the Iraqis to agree to giving our soldiers immunity, why couldn't Obama do that?

 

[CrusaderFrank]

#ObamaSwitchedSides

^ The Iraq Obama Inherited

^ Iraq after Obama Switched side to support his brothers in Jihad. I don;t necessarily blame Obama, he was just following orders from Val Jarrett

 

[idb]

Does Hewitt or Graham tell you that they would be willing to do what Obama wouldn't do? Leave American troops in Iraq without immunity to Iraqi prosecution?

Condi was able to negotiate that, why couldn't Obama?

Was it because Obama switched sides and wanted to leave the middle East open to his brothers in Jihad?

Condi didn't negotiate jack shit. We invaded. Duh! What is wrong with you people? You can't just make shit up. Well, I guess you can, but why bother?

Condi got the Iraqis to agree to giving our soldiers immunity, why couldn't Obama do that?

Abu Ghraib might be just one reason.

 

[CrusaderFrank]

Does Hewitt or Graham tell you that they would be willing to do what Obama wouldn't do? Leave American troops in Iraq without immunity to Iraqi prosecution?

Condi was able to negotiate that, why couldn't Obama?

Was it because Obama switched sides and wanted to leave the middle East open to his brothers in Jihad?

Condi didn't negotiate jack shit. We invaded. Duh! What is wrong with you people? You can't just make shit up. Well, I guess you can, but why bother?

Condi got the Iraqis to agree to giving our soldiers immunity, why couldn't Obama do that?

Abu Ghraib might be just one reason.

For what, for Obama switching sides? Nah

Wait did you meant that Obama decided to switch sides after Abu Grahib? Nah

 

[idb]

Does Hewitt or Graham tell you that they would be willing to do what Obama wouldn't do? Leave American troops in Iraq without immunity to Iraqi prosecution?

Condi was able to negotiate that, why couldn't Obama?

Was it because Obama switched sides and wanted to leave the middle East open to his brothers in Jihad?

Condi didn't negotiate jack shit. We invaded. Duh! What is wrong with you people? You can't just make shit up. Well, I guess you can, but why bother?

Condi got the Iraqis to agree to giving our soldiers immunity, why couldn't Obama do that?

Abu Ghraib might be just one reason.

For what, for Obama switching sides? Nah

Wait did you meant that Obama decided to switch sides after Abu Grahib? Nah

You asked why Obama couldn't get an agreement.
An agreement involves two or more parties.

You could have Googled that if you weren't sure, you know.

 

[CrusaderFrank]

Condi was able to negotiate that, why couldn't Obama?

Was it because Obama switched sides and wanted to leave the middle East open to his brothers in Jihad?

Condi didn't negotiate jack shit. We invaded. Duh! What is wrong with you people? You can't just make shit up. Well, I guess you can, but why bother?

Condi got the Iraqis to agree to giving our soldiers immunity, why couldn't Obama do that?

Abu Ghraib might be just one reason.

For what, for Obama switching sides? Nah

Wait did you meant that Obama decided to switch sides after Abu Grahib? Nah

You asked why Obama couldn't get an agreement.
An agreement involves two or more parties.

You could have Googled that if you weren't sure, you know.

He couldn't get an agreement only because he didn't want one, he wanted to leave Iraq open for his brothers in Jihad

 

[Bfgrn]

Condi didn't negotiate jack shit. We invaded. Duh! What is wrong with you people? You can't just make shit up. Well, I guess you can, but why bother?

Condi got the Iraqis to agree to giving our soldiers immunity, why couldn't Obama do that?

Abu Ghraib might be just one reason.

For what, for Obama switching sides? Nah

Wait did you meant that Obama decided to switch sides after Abu Grahib? Nah

You asked why Obama couldn't get an agreement.
An agreement involves two or more parties.

You could have Googled that if you weren't sure, you know.

He couldn't get an agreement only because he didn't want one, he wanted to leave Iraq open for his brothers in Jihad

You are such an asshole Frank. If anyone "switched sides" it was Bush...

Far from democratizing the country in any cultural sense, Bush officials fortified these tendencies by encouraging Iraq’s adoption of a constitution that enshrined Islam as the state religion and sharia as a primary source of law.

 

[CrusaderFrank]

Condi got the Iraqis to agree to giving our soldiers immunity, why couldn't Obama do that?

Abu Ghraib might be just one reason.

For what, for Obama switching sides? Nah

Wait did you meant that Obama decided to switch sides after Abu Grahib? Nah

You asked why Obama couldn't get an agreement.
An agreement involves two or more parties.

You could have Googled that if you weren't sure, you know.

He couldn't get an agreement only because he didn't want one, he wanted to leave Iraq open for his brothers in Jihad

You are such an asshole Frank. If anyone "switched sides" it was Bush...

Far from democratizing the country in any cultural sense, Bush officials fortified these tendencies by encouraging Iraq’s adoption of a constitution that enshrined Islam as the state religion and sharia as a primary source of law.

Obama switched sides to support his Muslim brothers in Jihad. He should be charged as an accessory in the murder of Chris Stevens