Official Thread for Denial of GreenHouse Effect and Radiative Physics.

[Crick]

Oh ... then how else do you model surface temperature ... I 'm afraid your middle school definition of temperature doesn't fit adult understanding of the science involved ...

The only thing I'm commenting on with that is you.

We shine a light on an opaque surface and the surface warms up ... that's as far as your understanding goes ... this is the "warmness" in your definition of temperature ... that's all children need to know ... "the stove burner is HOT, don't touch" ...

Your affinity for lying about those with whom you disagree is exceptional

We use SB to quantify this system ... HOW MUCH does the surface warm up? ... and that's why we use the kinetic energy definition of temperature

Stupid ... you don't know what light is? ...

You think Physics 101 is a one trick pony because you never passed that class ... all you saw was F = m dv/dt and ran away crying ...

The question here is whether or not your knowledge of thermodynamics exceeds that of the thousands of PhDs that conduct climate studies these days. They have all come to a very uniform conclusion: global warming is taking place and its primary cause is human GHG emissions. If you disagree, you need to take it up with them. You let us know when you convince them of their errors.

ETA: Triviality is judged first by existing error ... we measure global temperatures to the nearest degree Celsius ... thus a degree Celsius temperature rise is the bare minimum that can be truthfully said ... if you show up 287 seconds early, and your date is 1 second late ... is that a deal breaker? ... I say no, he's on time ... a single second, or a single degree, is trivial ...

That is incorrect as I and others have demonstrated here before. Do you want the embarrassment?

 

[ReinyDays]

visually, there isn't one graph that both items go together. No where.

"Proof-by-Graph" isn't scientific ... we look for "Cause-and-Effect" ...

For the cause of greedy Americans driving F-150's, we have the effect of Hamas affording to torture innocent Palestinians ... follow the money ...

 

[jc456]

"Proof-by-Graph" isn't scientific ... we look for "Cause-and-Effect" ...

For the cause of greedy Americans driving F-150's, we have the effect of Hamas affording to torture innocent Palestinians ... follow the money ...

The graph is the read out of the science cause and effect captured. It allows me to say to crick correlation doesn’t fit

 

[ReinyDays]

The graph is the read out of the science cause and effect captured. It allows me to say to crick correlation doesn’t fit

Right ... there is no correlation if there's cause and effect ... according to Chick's definition in the link she provided ... she doesn't read these things so she's not aware these links are disproving her claims ... silly girl ...

 

[jc456]

Incorrect. Temperature and co2 doesn't work like that. Doubling co2 doesn't double the temperature.

Crick thinks they are correlated. Which they aren't. His initial premise is wrong. Everything afterward will therefore end up being wrong.

 

[Crick]

Summary for Policymakers

A. Current Status and Trends

Observed Warming and its Causes

A.1 Human activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming, with global surface temperature reaching 1.1°C above 1850-1900 in 2011-2020. Global greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase, with unequal historical and ongoing contributions arising from unsustainable energy use, land use and land-use change, lifestyles and patterns of consumption and production across regions, between and within countries, and among individuals (high confidence). {2.1, Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2}

A.1.1 Global surface temperature was 1.09 [0.95 to 1.20]°C5 higher in 2011–2020 than 1850–19006, with larger increases over land (1.59 [1.34 to 1.83]°C) than over the ocean (0.88 [0.68 to 1.01]°C). Global surface temperature in the first two decades of the 21st century (2001–2020) was 0.99 [0.84 to 1.10]°C higher than 1850–1900. Global surface temperature has increased faster since 1970 than in any other 50-year period over at least the last 2000 years (high confidence). {2.1.1, Figure 2.1}

A.1.2 The likely range of total human-caused global surface temperature increase from 1850–1900 to 2010–20197 is 0.8°C to 1.3°C, with a best estimate of 1.07°C. Over this period, it is likely that well-mixed greenhouse gases (GHGs) contributed a warming of 1.0°C to 2.0°C8, and other human drivers (principally aerosols) contributed a cooling of 0.0°C to 0.8°C, natural (solar and volcanic) drivers changed global surface temperature by –0.1°C to +0.1°C, and internal variability changed it by –0.2°C to +0.2°C. {2.1.1, Figure 2.1}

A.1.3 Observed increases in well-mixed GHG concentrations since around 1750 are unequivocally caused by GHG emissions from human activities over this period. Historical cumulative net CO2 emissions from 1850 to 2019 were 2400 ± 240 GtCO2 of which more than half (58%) occurred between 1850 and 1989, and about 42% occurred between 1990 and 2019 (high confidence). In 2019, atmospheric CO2 concentrations (410 parts per million) were higher than at any time in at least 2 million years (high confidence), and concentrations of methane (1866 parts per billion) and nitrous oxide (332 parts per billion) were higher than at any time in at least 800,000 years (very high confidence). {2.1.1, Figure 2.1}

A.1.4 Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions have been estimated to be 59 ± 6.6 GtCO2-eq9 in 2019, about 12% (6.5 GtCO2-eq) higher than in 2010 and 54% (21 GtCO2-eq) higher than in 1990, with the largest share and growth in gross GHG emissions occurring in CO2 from fossil fuels combustion and industrial processes (CO2-FFI) followed by methane, whereas the highest relative growth occurred in fluorinated gases (F-gases), starting from low levels in 1990. Average annual GHG emissions during 2010–2019 were higher than in any previous decade on record, while the rate of growth between 2010 and 2019 (1.3% yr-1) was lower than that between 2000 and 2009 (2.1% yr-1). In 2019, approximately 79% of global GHG 5 Ranges given throughout the SPM represent very likely ranges (5–95% range) unless otherwise stated. 6 The estimated increase in global surface temperature since AR5 is principally due to further warming since 2003–2012 (0.19 [0.16 to 0.22] °C). Additionally, methodological advances and new datasets have provided a more complete spatial representation of changes in surface temperature, including in the Arctic. These and other improvements have also increased the estimate of global surface temperature change by approximately 0.1°C, but this increase does not represent additional physical warming since AR5. 7 The period distinction with A.1.1 arises because the attribution studies consider this slightly earlier period. The observed warming to 2010–2019 is 1.06 [0.88 to 1.21]°C. 8 Contributions from emissions to the 2010–2019 warming relative to 1850–1900 assessed from radiative forcing studies are: CO2 0.8 [0.5 to 1.2]°C; methane 0.5 [0.3 to 0.8]°C; nitrous oxide 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C and fluorinated gases 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C. {2.1.1} 9 GHG emission metrics are used to express emissions of different greenhouse gases in a common unit. Aggregated GHG emissions in this report are stated in CO2equivalents (CO2-eq) using the Global Warming Potential with a time horizon of 100 years (GWP100) with values based on the contribution of Working Group I to the AR6. The AR6 WGI and WGIII reports contain updated emission metric values, evaluations of different metrics with regard to mitigation objectives, and assess new approaches to aggregating gases. The choice of metric depends on the purpose of the analysis and all GHG emission metrics have limitations and uncertainties, given that they simplify the complexity of the physical climate system and its response to past and future GHG emissions. {2.1.1}5 Summary for Policymakers Summary for Policymakers emissions came from the sectors of energy, industry, transport, and buildings together and 22%10 from agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU). Emissions reductions in CO2-FFI due to improvements in energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy, have been less than emissions increases from rising global activity levels in industry, energy supply, transport, agriculture and buildings. (high confidence) {2.1.1}

A.1.5 Historical contributions of CO2 emissions vary substantially across regions in terms of total magnitude, but also in terms of contributions to CO2-FFI and net CO2 emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (CO2-LULUCF). In 2019, around 35% of the global population live in countries emitting more than 9 tCO2-eq per capita11 (excluding CO2-LULUCF) while 41% live in countries emitting less than 3 tCO2-eq per capita; of the latter a substantial share lacks access to modern energy services. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have much lower per capita emissions (1.7 tCO2-eq and 4.6 tCO2-eq, respectively) than the global average (6.9 tCO2-eq), excluding CO2-LULUCF. The 10% of households with the highest per capita emissions contribute 34–45% of global consumption-based household GHG emissions, while the bottom 50% contribute 13–15%. (high confidence) {2.1.1, Figure 2.2}

Observed Changes and Impacts

A.2 Widespread and rapid changes in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere and biosphere have occurred. Human-caused climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe. This has led to widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages to nature and people (high confidence). Vulnerable communities who have historically contributed the least to current climate change are disproportionately affected (high confidence). {2.1, Table 2.1, Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.1 It is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land. Global mean sea level increased by 0.20 [0.15 to 0.25] m between 1901 and 2018. The average rate of sea level rise was 1.3 [0.6 to 2.1] mm yr-1 between 1901 and 1971, increasing to 1.9 [0.8 to 2.9] mm yr-1 between 1971 and 2006, and further increasing to 3.7 [3.2 to 4.2] mm yr-1 between 2006 and 2018 (high confidence). Human influence was very likely the main driver of these increases since at least 1971. Evidence of observed changes in extremes such as heatwaves, heavy precipitation, droughts, and tropical cyclones, and, in particular, their attribution to human influence, has further strengthened since AR5. Human influence has likely increased the chance of compound extreme events since the 1950s, including increases in the frequency of concurrent heatwaves and droughts (high confidence). {2.1.2, Table 2.1, Figure 2.3, Figure 3.4} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.2 Approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts that are highly vulnerable to climate change. Human and ecosystem vulnerability are interdependent. Regions and people with considerable development constraints have high vulnerability to climatic hazards. Increasing weather and climate extreme events have exposed millions of people to acute food insecurity12 and reduced water security, with the largest adverse impacts observed in many locations and/or communities in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, LDCs, Small Islands and the Arctic, and globally for Indigenous Peoples, small-scale food producers and low-income households. Between 2010 and 2020, human mortality from floods, droughts and storms was 15 times higher in highly vulnerable regions, compared to regions with very low vulnerability. (high confidence) {2.1.2, 4.4} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.3 Climate change has caused substantial damages, and increasingly irreversible losses, in terrestrial, freshwater, cryospheric, and coastal and open ocean ecosystems (high confidence). Hundreds of local losses of species have been driven by increases in the magnitude of heat extremes (high confidence) with mass mortality events recorded on land and in the ocean (very high confidence). Impacts on some ecosystems are approaching irreversibility such as the impacts of hydrological changes resulting from the retreat of glaciers, or the changes in some mountain (medium confidence) and Arctic ecosystems driven by permafrost thaw (high confidence). {2.1.2, Figure 2.3} (Figure SPM.1) 10 GHG emission levels are rounded to two significant digits; as a consequence, small differences in sums due to rounding may occur. {2.1.1} 11 Territorial emissions. 12 Acute food insecurity can occur at any time with a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as a result of shocks risking determinants of food security and nutrition, and is used to assess the need for humanitarian action. {2.1}6 Summary for Policymakers Summary for Policymakers

A.2.4 Climate change has reduced food security and affected water security, hindering efforts to meet Sustainable Development Goals (high confidence). Although overall agricultural productivity has increased, climate change has slowed this growth over the past 50 years globally (medium confidence), with related negative impacts mainly in mid- and low latitude regions but positive impacts in some high latitude regions (high confidence). Ocean warming and ocean acidification have adversely affected food production from fisheries and shellfish aquaculture in some oceanic regions (high confidence). Roughly half of the world’s population currently experience severe water scarcity for at least part of the year due to a combination of climatic and non-climatic drivers (medium confidence). {2.1.2, Figure 2.3} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.5 In all regions increases in extreme heat events have resulted in human mortality and morbidity (very high confidence). The occurrence of climate-related food-borne and water-borne diseases (very high confidence) and the incidence of vector-borne diseases (high confidence) have increased. In assessed regions, some mental health challenges are associated with increasing temperatures (high confidence), trauma from extreme events (very high confidence), and loss of livelihoods and culture (high confidence). Climate and weather extremes are increasingly driving displacement in Africa, Asia, North America (high confidence), and Central and South America (medium confidence), with small island states in the Caribbean and South Pacific being disproportionately affected relative to their small population size (high confidence). {2.1.2, Figure 2.3} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.6 Climate change has caused widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages13 to nature and people that are unequally distributed across systems, regions and sectors. Economic damages from climate change have been detected in climate-exposed sectors, such as agriculture, forestry, fishery, energy, and tourism. Individual livelihoods have been affected through, for example, destruction of homes and infrastructure, and loss of property and income, human health and food security, with adverse effects on gender and social equity. (high confidence) {2.1.2} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.7 In urban areas, observed climate change has caused adverse impacts on human health, livelihoods and key infrastructure. Hot extremes have intensified in cities. Urban infrastructure, including transportation, water, sanitation and energy systems have been compromised by extreme and slow-onset events14, with resulting economic losses, disruptions of services and negative impacts to well-being. Observed adverse impacts are concentrated amongst economically and socially marginalised urban residents. (high confidence) {2.1.2}

https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf Pg 4

5 Ranges given throughout the SPM represent very likely ranges (5–95% range) unless otherwise stated.

6 The estimated increase in global surface temperature since AR5 is principally due to further warming since 2003–2012 (0.19 [0.16 to 0.22] °C). Additionally, methodological advances and new datasets have provided a more complete spatial representation of changes in surface temperature, including in the Arctic. These and other improvements have also increased the estimate of global surface temperature change by approximately 0.1°C, but this increase does not represent additional physical warming since AR5.

7 The period distinction with A.1.1 arises because the attribution studies consider this slightly earlier period. The observed warming to 2010–2019 is 1.06 [0.88 to 1.21]°C.

8 Contributions from emissions to the 2010–2019 warming relative to 1850–1900 assessed from radiative forcing studies are: CO2 0.8 [0.5 to 1.2]°C; methane 0.5 [0.3 to 0.8]°C; nitrous oxide 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C and fluorinated gases 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C. {2.1.1}

9 GHG emission metrics are used to express emissions of different greenhouse gases in a common unit. Aggregated GHG emissions in this report are stated in CO2equivalents (CO2-eq) using the Global Warming Potential with a time horizon of 100 years (GWP100) with values based on the contribution of Working Group I to the AR6. The AR6 WGI and WGIII reports contain updated emission metric values, evaluations of different metrics with regard to mitigation objectives, and assess new approaches to aggregating gases. The choice of metric depends on the purpose of the analysis and all GHG emission metrics have limitations and uncertainties, given that they simplify the complexity of the physical climate system and its response to past and future GHG emissions. {2.1.1}

10 GHG emission levels are rounded to two significant digits; as a consequence, small differences in sums due to rounding may occur. {2.1.1}

11 Territorial emissions.

12 Acute food insecurity can occur at any time with a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as a result of shocks risking determinants of food security and nutrition, and is used to assess the need for humanitarian action. {2.1}

13 In this report, the term ‘losses and damages’ refers to adverse observed impacts and/or projected risks and can be economic and/or non-economic (see Annex I: Glossary). 14 Slow-onset events are described among the climatic-impact drivers of the AR6 WGI and refer to the risks and impacts associated with e.g., increasing temperature means, desertification, decreasing precipitation, loss of biodiversity, land and forest degradation, glacial retreat and related impacts, ocean acidification, sea level rise and salinization. {2.1.2}

Core Writing Team:
Hoesung Lee (Chair), Katherine Calvin (USA), Dipak Dasgupta (India/USA), Gerhard Krinner (France/Germany), Aditi Mukherji (India), Peter Thorne (Ireland/United Kingdom), Christopher Trisos (South Africa), José Romero (Switzerland), Paulina Aldunce (Chile), Ko Barrett (USA), Gabriel Blanco (Argentina), William W. L. Cheung (Canada), Sarah L. Connors (France/United Kingdom), Fatima Denton (The Gambia), Aïda Diongue-Niang (Senegal), David Dodman (Jamaica/United Kingdom/Netherlands), Matthias Garschagen (Germany), Oliver Geden (Germany), Bronwyn Hayward (New Zealand), Christopher Jones (United Kingdom), Frank Jotzo (Australia), Thelma Krug (Brazil), Rodel Lasco (Philippines), June-Yi Lee (Republic of Korea), Valérie Masson-Delmotte (France), Malte Meinshausen (Australia/Germany), Katja Mintenbeck (Germany), Abdalah Mokssit (Morocco), Friederike E. L. Otto (United Kingdom/Germany), Minal Pathak (India), Anna Pirani (Italy), Elvira Poloczanska (United Kingdom/Australia), Hans-Otto Pörtner (Germany), Aromar Revi (India), Debra C. Roberts (South Africa), Joyashree Roy (India/Thailand), Alex C. Ruane (USA), Jim Skea (United Kingdom), Priyadarshi R. Shukla (India), Raphael Slade (United Kingdom), Aimée Slangen (The Netherlands), Youba Sokona (Mali), Anna A. Sörensson (Argentina), Melinda Tignor (USA/Germany), Detlef van Vuuren (The Netherlands), Yi-Ming Wei (China), Harald Winkler (South Africa), Panmao Zhai (China), Zinta Zommers (Latvia)

Review Editors

Paola Arias (Colombia), Mercedes Bustamante (Brazil), Ismail Elgizouli (Sudan), Gregory Flato (Canada), Mark Howden (Australia), Carlos Méndez (Venezuela), Joy Jacqueline Pereira (Malaysia), Ramón Pichs-Madruga (Cuba), Steven K Rose (USA), Yamina Saheb (Algeria/France), Roberto Sánchez Rodríguez (Mexico), Diana Ürge-Vorsatz (Hungary), Cunde Xiao (China), Noureddine Yassaa (Algeria)

Contributing Authors

Andrés Alegría (Germany/Honduras), Kyle Armour (USA), Birgit Bednar-Friedl (Austria), Kornelis Blok (The Netherlands), Guéladio Cissé (Switzerland/Mauritania/France), Frank Dentener (EU/Netherlands), Siri Eriksen (Norway), Erich Fischer (Switzerland), Gregory Garner (USA), Céline Guivarch (France), Marjolijn Haasnoot (The Netherlands), Gerrit Hansen (Germany), Mathias Hauser (Switzerland), Ed Hawkins (UK), Tim Hermans (The Netherlands), Robert Kopp (USA), Noëmie Leprince-Ringuet (France), Jared Lewis (Australia/New Zealand), Debora Ley (Mexico/Guatemala), Chloé Ludden (Germany/France), Leila Niamir (Iran/The Netherlands/Austria), Zebedee Nicholls (Australia), Shreya Some (India/Thailand), Sophie Szopa (France), Blair Trewin (Australia), Kaj-Ivar van der Wijst (The Netherlands), Gundula Winter (The Netherlands/Germany), Maximilian Witting (Germany)

Scientific Steering Committee

Hoesung Lee (Chair, IPCC), Amjad Abdulla (Maldives), Edvin Aldrian (Indonesia), Ko Barrett (United States of America), Eduardo Calvo (Peru), Carlo Carraro (Italy), Diriba Korecha Dadi (Ethiopia), Fatima Driouech (Morocco), Andreas Fischlin (Switzerland), Jan Fuglestvedt (Norway), Thelma Krug (Brazil), Nagmeldin G.E. Mahmoud (Sudan), Valérie Masson-Delmotte (France), Carlos Méndez (Venezuela), Joy Jacqueline Pereira (Malaysia), Ramón Pichs-Madruga (Cuba), Hans-Otto Pörtner (Germany), Andy Reisinger (New Zealand), Debra C. Roberts (South Africa), Sergey Semenov (Russian Federation), Priyadarshi Shukla (India), Jim Skea (United Kingdom), Youba Sokona (Mali), Kiyoto Tanabe (Japan), Muhammad Irfan Tariq (Pakistan), Diana Ürge-Vorsatz (Hungary), Carolina Vera (Argentina), Pius Yanda (United Republic of Tanzania), Noureddine Yassaa (Algeria), Taha M. Zatari (Saudi Arabia), Panmao Zhai (China)

 

[jc456]

A.1 Human activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming,

Unequivocally, and yet they can't show it. Where's the data? You keep posting this fking nonsense like it means something and it doesn't. It's all been debunked and we've all given you the information in many separate threads. Yet you keep master bating this nonsense. Get a new schtick or site. This is a fail.

 

[Crick]

Summary for Policymakers

A. Current Status and Trends

Observed Warming and its Causes

A.1 Human activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming, with global surface temperature reaching 1.1°C above 1850-1900 in 2011-2020. Global greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase, with unequal historical and ongoing contributions arising from unsustainable energy use, land use and land-use change, lifestyles and patterns of consumption and production across regions, between and within countries, and among individuals (high confidence). {2.1, Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2}

A.1.1 Global surface temperature was 1.09 [0.95 to 1.20]°C5 higher in 2011–2020 than 1850–19006, with larger increases over land (1.59 [1.34 to 1.83]°C) than over the ocean (0.88 [0.68 to 1.01]°C). Global surface temperature in the first two decades of the 21st century (2001–2020) was 0.99 [0.84 to 1.10]°C higher than 1850–1900. Global surface temperature has increased faster since 1970 than in any other 50-year period over at least the last 2000 years (high confidence). {2.1.1, Figure 2.1}

A.1.2 The likely range of total human-caused global surface temperature increase from 1850–1900 to 2010–20197 is 0.8°C to 1.3°C, with a best estimate of 1.07°C. Over this period, it is likely that well-mixed greenhouse gases (GHGs) contributed a warming of 1.0°C to 2.0°C8, and other human drivers (principally aerosols) contributed a cooling of 0.0°C to 0.8°C, natural (solar and volcanic) drivers changed global surface temperature by –0.1°C to +0.1°C, and internal variability changed it by –0.2°C to +0.2°C. {2.1.1, Figure 2.1}

A.1.3 Observed increases in well-mixed GHG concentrations since around 1750 are unequivocally caused by GHG emissions from human activities over this period. Historical cumulative net CO2 emissions from 1850 to 2019 were 2400 ± 240 GtCO2 of which more than half (58%) occurred between 1850 and 1989, and about 42% occurred between 1990 and 2019 (high confidence). In 2019, atmospheric CO2 concentrations (410 parts per million) were higher than at any time in at least 2 million years (high confidence), and concentrations of methane (1866 parts per billion) and nitrous oxide (332 parts per billion) were higher than at any time in at least 800,000 years (very high confidence). {2.1.1, Figure 2.1}

A.1.4 Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions have been estimated to be 59 ± 6.6 GtCO2-eq9 in 2019, about 12% (6.5 GtCO2-eq) higher than in 2010 and 54% (21 GtCO2-eq) higher than in 1990, with the largest share and growth in gross GHG emissions occurring in CO2 from fossil fuels combustion and industrial processes (CO2-FFI) followed by methane, whereas the highest relative growth occurred in fluorinated gases (F-gases), starting from low levels in 1990. Average annual GHG emissions during 2010–2019 were higher than in any previous decade on record, while the rate of growth between 2010 and 2019 (1.3% yr-1) was lower than that between 2000 and 2009 (2.1% yr-1). In 2019, approximately 79% of global GHG 5 Ranges given throughout the SPM represent very likely ranges (5–95% range) unless otherwise stated. 6 The estimated increase in global surface temperature since AR5 is principally due to further warming since 2003–2012 (0.19 [0.16 to 0.22] °C). Additionally, methodological advances and new datasets have provided a more complete spatial representation of changes in surface temperature, including in the Arctic. These and other improvements have also increased the estimate of global surface temperature change by approximately 0.1°C, but this increase does not represent additional physical warming since AR5. 7 The period distinction with A.1.1 arises because the attribution studies consider this slightly earlier period. The observed warming to 2010–2019 is 1.06 [0.88 to 1.21]°C. 8 Contributions from emissions to the 2010–2019 warming relative to 1850–1900 assessed from radiative forcing studies are: CO2 0.8 [0.5 to 1.2]°C; methane 0.5 [0.3 to 0.8]°C; nitrous oxide 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C and fluorinated gases 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C. {2.1.1} 9 GHG emission metrics are used to express emissions of different greenhouse gases in a common unit. Aggregated GHG emissions in this report are stated in CO2equivalents (CO2-eq) using the Global Warming Potential with a time horizon of 100 years (GWP100) with values based on the contribution of Working Group I to the AR6. The AR6 WGI and WGIII reports contain updated emission metric values, evaluations of different metrics with regard to mitigation objectives, and assess new approaches to aggregating gases. The choice of metric depends on the purpose of the analysis and all GHG emission metrics have limitations and uncertainties, given that they simplify the complexity of the physical climate system and its response to past and future GHG emissions. {2.1.1}5 Summary for Policymakers Summary for Policymakers emissions came from the sectors of energy, industry, transport, and buildings together and 22%10 from agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU). Emissions reductions in CO2-FFI due to improvements in energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy, have been less than emissions increases from rising global activity levels in industry, energy supply, transport, agriculture and buildings. (high confidence) {2.1.1}

A.1.5 Historical contributions of CO2 emissions vary substantially across regions in terms of total magnitude, but also in terms of contributions to CO2-FFI and net CO2 emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (CO2-LULUCF). In 2019, around 35% of the global population live in countries emitting more than 9 tCO2-eq per capita11 (excluding CO2-LULUCF) while 41% live in countries emitting less than 3 tCO2-eq per capita; of the latter a substantial share lacks access to modern energy services. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have much lower per capita emissions (1.7 tCO2-eq and 4.6 tCO2-eq, respectively) than the global average (6.9 tCO2-eq), excluding CO2-LULUCF. The 10% of households with the highest per capita emissions contribute 34–45% of global consumption-based household GHG emissions, while the bottom 50% contribute 13–15%. (high confidence) {2.1.1, Figure 2.2}

Observed Changes and Impacts

A.2 Widespread and rapid changes in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere and biosphere have occurred. Human-caused climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe. This has led to widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages to nature and people (high confidence). Vulnerable communities who have historically contributed the least to current climate change are disproportionately affected (high confidence). {2.1, Table 2.1, Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.1 It is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land. Global mean sea level increased by 0.20 [0.15 to 0.25] m between 1901 and 2018. The average rate of sea level rise was 1.3 [0.6 to 2.1] mm yr-1 between 1901 and 1971, increasing to 1.9 [0.8 to 2.9] mm yr-1 between 1971 and 2006, and further increasing to 3.7 [3.2 to 4.2] mm yr-1 between 2006 and 2018 (high confidence). Human influence was very likely the main driver of these increases since at least 1971. Evidence of observed changes in extremes such as heatwaves, heavy precipitation, droughts, and tropical cyclones, and, in particular, their attribution to human influence, has further strengthened since AR5. Human influence has likely increased the chance of compound extreme events since the 1950s, including increases in the frequency of concurrent heatwaves and droughts (high confidence). {2.1.2, Table 2.1, Figure 2.3, Figure 3.4} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.2 Approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts that are highly vulnerable to climate change. Human and ecosystem vulnerability are interdependent. Regions and people with considerable development constraints have high vulnerability to climatic hazards. Increasing weather and climate extreme events have exposed millions of people to acute food insecurity12 and reduced water security, with the largest adverse impacts observed in many locations and/or communities in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, LDCs, Small Islands and the Arctic, and globally for Indigenous Peoples, small-scale food producers and low-income households. Between 2010 and 2020, human mortality from floods, droughts and storms was 15 times higher in highly vulnerable regions, compared to regions with very low vulnerability. (high confidence) {2.1.2, 4.4} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.3 Climate change has caused substantial damages, and increasingly irreversible losses, in terrestrial, freshwater, cryospheric, and coastal and open ocean ecosystems (high confidence). Hundreds of local losses of species have been driven by increases in the magnitude of heat extremes (high confidence) with mass mortality events recorded on land and in the ocean (very high confidence). Impacts on some ecosystems are approaching irreversibility such as the impacts of hydrological changes resulting from the retreat of glaciers, or the changes in some mountain (medium confidence) and Arctic ecosystems driven by permafrost thaw (high confidence). {2.1.2, Figure 2.3} (Figure SPM.1) 10 GHG emission levels are rounded to two significant digits; as a consequence, small differences in sums due to rounding may occur. {2.1.1} 11 Territorial emissions. 12 Acute food insecurity can occur at any time with a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as a result of shocks risking determinants of food security and nutrition, and is used to assess the need for humanitarian action. {2.1}6 Summary for Policymakers Summary for Policymakers

A.2.4 Climate change has reduced food security and affected water security, hindering efforts to meet Sustainable Development Goals (high confidence). Although overall agricultural productivity has increased, climate change has slowed this growth over the past 50 years globally (medium confidence), with related negative impacts mainly in mid- and low latitude regions but positive impacts in some high latitude regions (high confidence). Ocean warming and ocean acidification have adversely affected food production from fisheries and shellfish aquaculture in some oceanic regions (high confidence). Roughly half of the world’s population currently experience severe water scarcity for at least part of the year due to a combination of climatic and non-climatic drivers (medium confidence). {2.1.2, Figure 2.3} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.5 In all regions increases in extreme heat events have resulted in human mortality and morbidity (very high confidence). The occurrence of climate-related food-borne and water-borne diseases (very high confidence) and the incidence of vector-borne diseases (high confidence) have increased. In assessed regions, some mental health challenges are associated with increasing temperatures (high confidence), trauma from extreme events (very high confidence), and loss of livelihoods and culture (high confidence). Climate and weather extremes are increasingly driving displacement in Africa, Asia, North America (high confidence), and Central and South America (medium confidence), with small island states in the Caribbean and South Pacific being disproportionately affected relative to their small population size (high confidence). {2.1.2, Figure 2.3} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.6 Climate change has caused widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages13 to nature and people that are unequally distributed across systems, regions and sectors. Economic damages from climate change have been detected in climate-exposed sectors, such as agriculture, forestry, fishery, energy, and tourism. Individual livelihoods have been affected through, for example, destruction of homes and infrastructure, and loss of property and income, human health and food security, with adverse effects on gender and social equity. (high confidence) {2.1.2} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.7 In urban areas, observed climate change has caused adverse impacts on human health, livelihoods and key infrastructure. Hot extremes have intensified in cities. Urban infrastructure, including transportation, water, sanitation and energy systems have been compromised by extreme and slow-onset events14, with resulting economic losses, disruptions of services and negative impacts to well-being. Observed adverse impacts are concentrated amongst economically and socially marginalised urban residents. (high confidence) {2.1.2}

https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf Pg 4

5 Ranges given throughout the SPM represent very likely ranges (5–95% range) unless otherwise stated.

6 The estimated increase in global surface temperature since AR5 is principally due to further warming since 2003–2012 (0.19 [0.16 to 0.22] °C). Additionally, methodological advances and new datasets have provided a more complete spatial representation of changes in surface temperature, including in the Arctic. These and other improvements have also increased the estimate of global surface temperature change by approximately 0.1°C, but this increase does not represent additional physical warming since AR5.

7 The period distinction with A.1.1 arises because the attribution studies consider this slightly earlier period. The observed warming to 2010–2019 is 1.06 [0.88 to 1.21]°C.

8 Contributions from emissions to the 2010–2019 warming relative to 1850–1900 assessed from radiative forcing studies are: CO2 0.8 [0.5 to 1.2]°C; methane 0.5 [0.3 to 0.8]°C; nitrous oxide 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C and fluorinated gases 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C. {2.1.1}

9 GHG emission metrics are used to express emissions of different greenhouse gases in a common unit. Aggregated GHG emissions in this report are stated in CO2equivalents (CO2-eq) using the Global Warming Potential with a time horizon of 100 years (GWP100) with values based on the contribution of Working Group I to the AR6. The AR6 WGI and WGIII reports contain updated emission metric values, evaluations of different metrics with regard to mitigation objectives, and assess new approaches to aggregating gases. The choice of metric depends on the purpose of the analysis and all GHG emission metrics have limitations and uncertainties, given that they simplify the complexity of the physical climate system and its response to past and future GHG emissions. {2.1.1}

10 GHG emission levels are rounded to two significant digits; as a consequence, small differences in sums due to rounding may occur. {2.1.1}

11 Territorial emissions.

12 Acute food insecurity can occur at any time with a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as a result of shocks risking determinants of food security and nutrition, and is used to assess the need for humanitarian action. {2.1}

13 In this report, the term ‘losses and damages’ refers to adverse observed impacts and/or projected risks and can be economic and/or non-economic (see Annex I: Glossary). 14 Slow-onset events are described among the climatic-impact drivers of the AR6 WGI and refer to the risks and impacts associated with e.g., increasing temperature means, desertification, decreasing precipitation, loss of biodiversity, land and forest degradation, glacial retreat and related impacts, ocean acidification, sea level rise and salinization. {2.1.2}

Core Writing Team:
Hoesung Lee (Chair), Katherine Calvin (USA), Dipak Dasgupta (India/USA), Gerhard Krinner (France/Germany), Aditi Mukherji (India), Peter Thorne (Ireland/United Kingdom), Christopher Trisos (South Africa), José Romero (Switzerland), Paulina Aldunce (Chile), Ko Barrett (USA), Gabriel Blanco (Argentina), William W. L. Cheung (Canada), Sarah L. Connors (France/United Kingdom), Fatima Denton (The Gambia), Aïda Diongue-Niang (Senegal), David Dodman (Jamaica/United Kingdom/Netherlands), Matthias Garschagen (Germany), Oliver Geden (Germany), Bronwyn Hayward (New Zealand), Christopher Jones (United Kingdom), Frank Jotzo (Australia), Thelma Krug (Brazil), Rodel Lasco (Philippines), June-Yi Lee (Republic of Korea), Valérie Masson-Delmotte (France), Malte Meinshausen (Australia/Germany), Katja Mintenbeck (Germany), Abdalah Mokssit (Morocco), Friederike E. L. Otto (United Kingdom/Germany), Minal Pathak (India), Anna Pirani (Italy), Elvira Poloczanska (United Kingdom/Australia), Hans-Otto Pörtner (Germany), Aromar Revi (India), Debra C. Roberts (South Africa), Joyashree Roy (India/Thailand), Alex C. Ruane (USA), Jim Skea (United Kingdom), Priyadarshi R. Shukla (India), Raphael Slade (United Kingdom), Aimée Slangen (The Netherlands), Youba Sokona (Mali), Anna A. Sörensson (Argentina), Melinda Tignor (USA/Germany), Detlef van Vuuren (The Netherlands), Yi-Ming Wei (China), Harald Winkler (South Africa), Panmao Zhai (China), Zinta Zommers (Latvia)

Review Editors

Paola Arias (Colombia), Mercedes Bustamante (Brazil), Ismail Elgizouli (Sudan), Gregory Flato (Canada), Mark Howden (Australia), Carlos Méndez (Venezuela), Joy Jacqueline Pereira (Malaysia), Ramón Pichs-Madruga (Cuba), Steven K Rose (USA), Yamina Saheb (Algeria/France), Roberto Sánchez Rodríguez (Mexico), Diana Ürge-Vorsatz (Hungary), Cunde Xiao (China), Noureddine Yassaa (Algeria)

Contributing Authors

Andrés Alegría (Germany/Honduras), Kyle Armour (USA), Birgit Bednar-Friedl (Austria), Kornelis Blok (The Netherlands), Guéladio Cissé (Switzerland/Mauritania/France), Frank Dentener (EU/Netherlands), Siri Eriksen (Norway), Erich Fischer (Switzerland), Gregory Garner (USA), Céline Guivarch (France), Marjolijn Haasnoot (The Netherlands), Gerrit Hansen (Germany), Mathias Hauser (Switzerland), Ed Hawkins (UK), Tim Hermans (The Netherlands), Robert Kopp (USA), Noëmie Leprince-Ringuet (France), Jared Lewis (Australia/New Zealand), Debora Ley (Mexico/Guatemala), Chloé Ludden (Germany/France), Leila Niamir (Iran/The Netherlands/Austria), Zebedee Nicholls (Australia), Shreya Some (India/Thailand), Sophie Szopa (France), Blair Trewin (Australia), Kaj-Ivar van der Wijst (The Netherlands), Gundula Winter (The Netherlands/Germany), Maximilian Witting (Germany)

Scientific Steering Committee

Hoesung Lee (Chair, IPCC), Amjad Abdulla (Maldives), Edvin Aldrian (Indonesia), Ko Barrett (United States of America), Eduardo Calvo (Peru), Carlo Carraro (Italy), Diriba Korecha Dadi (Ethiopia), Fatima Driouech (Morocco), Andreas Fischlin (Switzerland), Jan Fuglestvedt (Norway), Thelma Krug (Brazil), Nagmeldin G.E. Mahmoud (Sudan), Valérie Masson-Delmotte (France), Carlos Méndez (Venezuela), Joy Jacqueline Pereira (Malaysia), Ramón Pichs-Madruga (Cuba), Hans-Otto Pörtner (Germany), Andy Reisinger (New Zealand), Debra C. Roberts (South Africa), Sergey Semenov (Russian Federation), Priyadarshi Shukla (India), Jim Skea (United Kingdom), Youba Sokona (Mali), Kiyoto Tanabe (Japan), Muhammad Irfan Tariq (Pakistan), Diana Ürge-Vorsatz (Hungary), Carolina Vera (Argentina), Pius Yanda (United Republic of Tanzania), Noureddine Yassaa (Algeria), Taha M. Zatari (Saudi Arabia), Panmao Zhai (China)

This is the first two sections in the introduction of the Summary for Policy Makers (SPM), a section of IPCC Working Group I's "The Physical Science Basis". I post it here for several reasons. Mistatements and outright lies about the positions and statement of the IPCC are rife in this forum. Having their actual statements will hopefully correct some of them. Additionally, the large number of authors and origins involved in the production of this document demonstrate a few points: a massive amount of expertise, the unlikelihood that there is any political agenda in play, the unlikelihood of a conspiracy to lie and the unlikelihood that among this many well-educated individuals there would not be differences of opinion being taken into account in the document's conclusions.

I included the footnotes for thoroughness and to give some small sampling of the tranparency that is a hallmark of the IPCC's Assessment Reports.

 

[ReinyDays]

Summary for Policymakers

A. Current Status and Trends

Observed Warming and its Causes

A.1 Human activities, principally through emissions of greenhouse gases, have unequivocally caused global warming, with global surface temperature reaching 1.1°C above 1850-1900 in 2011-2020. Global greenhouse gas emissions have continued to increase, with unequal historical and ongoing contributions arising from unsustainable energy use, land use and land-use change, lifestyles and patterns of consumption and production across regions, between and within countries, and among individuals (high confidence). {2.1, Figure 2.1, Figure 2.2}

A.1.1 Global surface temperature was 1.09 [0.95 to 1.20]°C5 higher in 2011–2020 than 1850–19006, with larger increases over land (1.59 [1.34 to 1.83]°C) than over the ocean (0.88 [0.68 to 1.01]°C). Global surface temperature in the first two decades of the 21st century (2001–2020) was 0.99 [0.84 to 1.10]°C higher than 1850–1900. Global surface temperature has increased faster since 1970 than in any other 50-year period over at least the last 2000 years (high confidence). {2.1.1, Figure 2.1}

A.1.2 The likely range of total human-caused global surface temperature increase from 1850–1900 to 2010–20197 is 0.8°C to 1.3°C, with a best estimate of 1.07°C. Over this period, it is likely that well-mixed greenhouse gases (GHGs) contributed a warming of 1.0°C to 2.0°C8, and other human drivers (principally aerosols) contributed a cooling of 0.0°C to 0.8°C, natural (solar and volcanic) drivers changed global surface temperature by –0.1°C to +0.1°C, and internal variability changed it by –0.2°C to +0.2°C. {2.1.1, Figure 2.1}

A.1.3 Observed increases in well-mixed GHG concentrations since around 1750 are unequivocally caused by GHG emissions from human activities over this period. Historical cumulative net CO2 emissions from 1850 to 2019 were 2400 ± 240 GtCO2 of which more than half (58%) occurred between 1850 and 1989, and about 42% occurred between 1990 and 2019 (high confidence). In 2019, atmospheric CO2 concentrations (410 parts per million) were higher than at any time in at least 2 million years (high confidence), and concentrations of methane (1866 parts per billion) and nitrous oxide (332 parts per billion) were higher than at any time in at least 800,000 years (very high confidence). {2.1.1, Figure 2.1}

A.1.4 Global net anthropogenic GHG emissions have been estimated to be 59 ± 6.6 GtCO2-eq9 in 2019, about 12% (6.5 GtCO2-eq) higher than in 2010 and 54% (21 GtCO2-eq) higher than in 1990, with the largest share and growth in gross GHG emissions occurring in CO2 from fossil fuels combustion and industrial processes (CO2-FFI) followed by methane, whereas the highest relative growth occurred in fluorinated gases (F-gases), starting from low levels in 1990. Average annual GHG emissions during 2010–2019 were higher than in any previous decade on record, while the rate of growth between 2010 and 2019 (1.3% yr-1) was lower than that between 2000 and 2009 (2.1% yr-1). In 2019, approximately 79% of global GHG 5 Ranges given throughout the SPM represent very likely ranges (5–95% range) unless otherwise stated. 6 The estimated increase in global surface temperature since AR5 is principally due to further warming since 2003–2012 (0.19 [0.16 to 0.22] °C). Additionally, methodological advances and new datasets have provided a more complete spatial representation of changes in surface temperature, including in the Arctic. These and other improvements have also increased the estimate of global surface temperature change by approximately 0.1°C, but this increase does not represent additional physical warming since AR5. 7 The period distinction with A.1.1 arises because the attribution studies consider this slightly earlier period. The observed warming to 2010–2019 is 1.06 [0.88 to 1.21]°C. 8 Contributions from emissions to the 2010–2019 warming relative to 1850–1900 assessed from radiative forcing studies are: CO2 0.8 [0.5 to 1.2]°C; methane 0.5 [0.3 to 0.8]°C; nitrous oxide 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C and fluorinated gases 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C. {2.1.1} 9 GHG emission metrics are used to express emissions of different greenhouse gases in a common unit. Aggregated GHG emissions in this report are stated in CO2equivalents (CO2-eq) using the Global Warming Potential with a time horizon of 100 years (GWP100) with values based on the contribution of Working Group I to the AR6. The AR6 WGI and WGIII reports contain updated emission metric values, evaluations of different metrics with regard to mitigation objectives, and assess new approaches to aggregating gases. The choice of metric depends on the purpose of the analysis and all GHG emission metrics have limitations and uncertainties, given that they simplify the complexity of the physical climate system and its response to past and future GHG emissions. {2.1.1}5 Summary for Policymakers Summary for Policymakers emissions came from the sectors of energy, industry, transport, and buildings together and 22%10 from agriculture, forestry and other land use (AFOLU). Emissions reductions in CO2-FFI due to improvements in energy intensity of GDP and carbon intensity of energy, have been less than emissions increases from rising global activity levels in industry, energy supply, transport, agriculture and buildings. (high confidence) {2.1.1}

A.1.5 Historical contributions of CO2 emissions vary substantially across regions in terms of total magnitude, but also in terms of contributions to CO2-FFI and net CO2 emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (CO2-LULUCF). In 2019, around 35% of the global population live in countries emitting more than 9 tCO2-eq per capita11 (excluding CO2-LULUCF) while 41% live in countries emitting less than 3 tCO2-eq per capita; of the latter a substantial share lacks access to modern energy services. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) have much lower per capita emissions (1.7 tCO2-eq and 4.6 tCO2-eq, respectively) than the global average (6.9 tCO2-eq), excluding CO2-LULUCF. The 10% of households with the highest per capita emissions contribute 34–45% of global consumption-based household GHG emissions, while the bottom 50% contribute 13–15%. (high confidence) {2.1.1, Figure 2.2}

Observed Changes and Impacts

A.2 Widespread and rapid changes in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere and biosphere have occurred. Human-caused climate change is already affecting many weather and climate extremes in every region across the globe. This has led to widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages to nature and people (high confidence). Vulnerable communities who have historically contributed the least to current climate change are disproportionately affected (high confidence). {2.1, Table 2.1, Figure 2.2, Figure 2.3} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.1 It is unequivocal that human influence has warmed the atmosphere, ocean and land. Global mean sea level increased by 0.20 [0.15 to 0.25] m between 1901 and 2018. The average rate of sea level rise was 1.3 [0.6 to 2.1] mm yr-1 between 1901 and 1971, increasing to 1.9 [0.8 to 2.9] mm yr-1 between 1971 and 2006, and further increasing to 3.7 [3.2 to 4.2] mm yr-1 between 2006 and 2018 (high confidence). Human influence was very likely the main driver of these increases since at least 1971. Evidence of observed changes in extremes such as heatwaves, heavy precipitation, droughts, and tropical cyclones, and, in particular, their attribution to human influence, has further strengthened since AR5. Human influence has likely increased the chance of compound extreme events since the 1950s, including increases in the frequency of concurrent heatwaves and droughts (high confidence). {2.1.2, Table 2.1, Figure 2.3, Figure 3.4} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.2 Approximately 3.3 to 3.6 billion people live in contexts that are highly vulnerable to climate change. Human and ecosystem vulnerability are interdependent. Regions and people with considerable development constraints have high vulnerability to climatic hazards. Increasing weather and climate extreme events have exposed millions of people to acute food insecurity12 and reduced water security, with the largest adverse impacts observed in many locations and/or communities in Africa, Asia, Central and South America, LDCs, Small Islands and the Arctic, and globally for Indigenous Peoples, small-scale food producers and low-income households. Between 2010 and 2020, human mortality from floods, droughts and storms was 15 times higher in highly vulnerable regions, compared to regions with very low vulnerability. (high confidence) {2.1.2, 4.4} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.3 Climate change has caused substantial damages, and increasingly irreversible losses, in terrestrial, freshwater, cryospheric, and coastal and open ocean ecosystems (high confidence). Hundreds of local losses of species have been driven by increases in the magnitude of heat extremes (high confidence) with mass mortality events recorded on land and in the ocean (very high confidence). Impacts on some ecosystems are approaching irreversibility such as the impacts of hydrological changes resulting from the retreat of glaciers, or the changes in some mountain (medium confidence) and Arctic ecosystems driven by permafrost thaw (high confidence). {2.1.2, Figure 2.3} (Figure SPM.1) 10 GHG emission levels are rounded to two significant digits; as a consequence, small differences in sums due to rounding may occur. {2.1.1} 11 Territorial emissions. 12 Acute food insecurity can occur at any time with a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as a result of shocks risking determinants of food security and nutrition, and is used to assess the need for humanitarian action. {2.1}6 Summary for Policymakers Summary for Policymakers

A.2.4 Climate change has reduced food security and affected water security, hindering efforts to meet Sustainable Development Goals (high confidence). Although overall agricultural productivity has increased, climate change has slowed this growth over the past 50 years globally (medium confidence), with related negative impacts mainly in mid- and low latitude regions but positive impacts in some high latitude regions (high confidence). Ocean warming and ocean acidification have adversely affected food production from fisheries and shellfish aquaculture in some oceanic regions (high confidence). Roughly half of the world’s population currently experience severe water scarcity for at least part of the year due to a combination of climatic and non-climatic drivers (medium confidence). {2.1.2, Figure 2.3} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.5 In all regions increases in extreme heat events have resulted in human mortality and morbidity (very high confidence). The occurrence of climate-related food-borne and water-borne diseases (very high confidence) and the incidence of vector-borne diseases (high confidence) have increased. In assessed regions, some mental health challenges are associated with increasing temperatures (high confidence), trauma from extreme events (very high confidence), and loss of livelihoods and culture (high confidence). Climate and weather extremes are increasingly driving displacement in Africa, Asia, North America (high confidence), and Central and South America (medium confidence), with small island states in the Caribbean and South Pacific being disproportionately affected relative to their small population size (high confidence). {2.1.2, Figure 2.3} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.6 Climate change has caused widespread adverse impacts and related losses and damages13 to nature and people that are unequally distributed across systems, regions and sectors. Economic damages from climate change have been detected in climate-exposed sectors, such as agriculture, forestry, fishery, energy, and tourism. Individual livelihoods have been affected through, for example, destruction of homes and infrastructure, and loss of property and income, human health and food security, with adverse effects on gender and social equity. (high confidence) {2.1.2} (Figure SPM.1)

A.2.7 In urban areas, observed climate change has caused adverse impacts on human health, livelihoods and key infrastructure. Hot extremes have intensified in cities. Urban infrastructure, including transportation, water, sanitation and energy systems have been compromised by extreme and slow-onset events14, with resulting economic losses, disruptions of services and negative impacts to well-being. Observed adverse impacts are concentrated amongst economically and socially marginalised urban residents. (high confidence) {2.1.2}

https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/syr/downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_SYR_SPM.pdf Pg 4

5 Ranges given throughout the SPM represent very likely ranges (5–95% range) unless otherwise stated.

6 The estimated increase in global surface temperature since AR5 is principally due to further warming since 2003–2012 (0.19 [0.16 to 0.22] °C). Additionally, methodological advances and new datasets have provided a more complete spatial representation of changes in surface temperature, including in the Arctic. These and other improvements have also increased the estimate of global surface temperature change by approximately 0.1°C, but this increase does not represent additional physical warming since AR5.

7 The period distinction with A.1.1 arises because the attribution studies consider this slightly earlier period. The observed warming to 2010–2019 is 1.06 [0.88 to 1.21]°C.

8 Contributions from emissions to the 2010–2019 warming relative to 1850–1900 assessed from radiative forcing studies are: CO2 0.8 [0.5 to 1.2]°C; methane 0.5 [0.3 to 0.8]°C; nitrous oxide 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C and fluorinated gases 0.1 [0.0 to 0.2]°C. {2.1.1}

9 GHG emission metrics are used to express emissions of different greenhouse gases in a common unit. Aggregated GHG emissions in this report are stated in CO2equivalents (CO2-eq) using the Global Warming Potential with a time horizon of 100 years (GWP100) with values based on the contribution of Working Group I to the AR6. The AR6 WGI and WGIII reports contain updated emission metric values, evaluations of different metrics with regard to mitigation objectives, and assess new approaches to aggregating gases. The choice of metric depends on the purpose of the analysis and all GHG emission metrics have limitations and uncertainties, given that they simplify the complexity of the physical climate system and its response to past and future GHG emissions. {2.1.1}

10 GHG emission levels are rounded to two significant digits; as a consequence, small differences in sums due to rounding may occur. {2.1.1}

11 Territorial emissions.

12 Acute food insecurity can occur at any time with a severity that threatens lives, livelihoods or both, regardless of the causes, context or duration, as a result of shocks risking determinants of food security and nutrition, and is used to assess the need for humanitarian action. {2.1}

13 In this report, the term ‘losses and damages’ refers to adverse observed impacts and/or projected risks and can be economic and/or non-economic (see Annex I: Glossary). 14 Slow-onset events are described among the climatic-impact drivers of the AR6 WGI and refer to the risks and impacts associated with e.g., increasing temperature means, desertification, decreasing precipitation, loss of biodiversity, land and forest degradation, glacial retreat and related impacts, ocean acidification, sea level rise and salinization. {2.1.2}

Core Writing Team:
Hoesung Lee (Chair), Katherine Calvin (USA), Dipak Dasgupta (India/USA), Gerhard Krinner (France/Germany), Aditi Mukherji (India), Peter Thorne (Ireland/United Kingdom), Christopher Trisos (South Africa), José Romero (Switzerland), Paulina Aldunce (Chile), Ko Barrett (USA), Gabriel Blanco (Argentina), William W. L. Cheung (Canada), Sarah L. Connors (France/United Kingdom), Fatima Denton (The Gambia), Aïda Diongue-Niang (Senegal), David Dodman (Jamaica/United Kingdom/Netherlands), Matthias Garschagen (Germany), Oliver Geden (Germany), Bronwyn Hayward (New Zealand), Christopher Jones (United Kingdom), Frank Jotzo (Australia), Thelma Krug (Brazil), Rodel Lasco (Philippines), June-Yi Lee (Republic of Korea), Valérie Masson-Delmotte (France), Malte Meinshausen (Australia/Germany), Katja Mintenbeck (Germany), Abdalah Mokssit (Morocco), Friederike E. L. Otto (United Kingdom/Germany), Minal Pathak (India), Anna Pirani (Italy), Elvira Poloczanska (United Kingdom/Australia), Hans-Otto Pörtner (Germany), Aromar Revi (India), Debra C. Roberts (South Africa), Joyashree Roy (India/Thailand), Alex C. Ruane (USA), Jim Skea (United Kingdom), Priyadarshi R. Shukla (India), Raphael Slade (United Kingdom), Aimée Slangen (The Netherlands), Youba Sokona (Mali), Anna A. Sörensson (Argentina), Melinda Tignor (USA/Germany), Detlef van Vuuren (The Netherlands), Yi-Ming Wei (China), Harald Winkler (South Africa), Panmao Zhai (China), Zinta Zommers (Latvia)

Review Editors

Paola Arias (Colombia), Mercedes Bustamante (Brazil), Ismail Elgizouli (Sudan), Gregory Flato (Canada), Mark Howden (Australia), Carlos Méndez (Venezuela), Joy Jacqueline Pereira (Malaysia), Ramón Pichs-Madruga (Cuba), Steven K Rose (USA), Yamina Saheb (Algeria/France), Roberto Sánchez Rodríguez (Mexico), Diana Ürge-Vorsatz (Hungary), Cunde Xiao (China), Noureddine Yassaa (Algeria)

Contributing Authors

Andrés Alegría (Germany/Honduras), Kyle Armour (USA), Birgit Bednar-Friedl (Austria), Kornelis Blok (The Netherlands), Guéladio Cissé (Switzerland/Mauritania/France), Frank Dentener (EU/Netherlands), Siri Eriksen (Norway), Erich Fischer (Switzerland), Gregory Garner (USA), Céline Guivarch (France), Marjolijn Haasnoot (The Netherlands), Gerrit Hansen (Germany), Mathias Hauser (Switzerland), Ed Hawkins (UK), Tim Hermans (The Netherlands), Robert Kopp (USA), Noëmie Leprince-Ringuet (France), Jared Lewis (Australia/New Zealand), Debora Ley (Mexico/Guatemala), Chloé Ludden (Germany/France), Leila Niamir (Iran/The Netherlands/Austria), Zebedee Nicholls (Australia), Shreya Some (India/Thailand), Sophie Szopa (France), Blair Trewin (Australia), Kaj-Ivar van der Wijst (The Netherlands), Gundula Winter (The Netherlands/Germany), Maximilian Witting (Germany)

Scientific Steering Committee

Hoesung Lee (Chair, IPCC), Amjad Abdulla (Maldives), Edvin Aldrian (Indonesia), Ko Barrett (United States of America), Eduardo Calvo (Peru), Carlo Carraro (Italy), Diriba Korecha Dadi (Ethiopia), Fatima Driouech (Morocco), Andreas Fischlin (Switzerland), Jan Fuglestvedt (Norway), Thelma Krug (Brazil), Nagmeldin G.E. Mahmoud (Sudan), Valérie Masson-Delmotte (France), Carlos Méndez (Venezuela), Joy Jacqueline Pereira (Malaysia), Ramón Pichs-Madruga (Cuba), Hans-Otto Pörtner (Germany), Andy Reisinger (New Zealand), Debra C. Roberts (South Africa), Sergey Semenov (Russian Federation), Priyadarshi Shukla (India), Jim Skea (United Kingdom), Youba Sokona (Mali), Kiyoto Tanabe (Japan), Muhammad Irfan Tariq (Pakistan), Diana Ürge-Vorsatz (Hungary), Carolina Vera (Argentina), Pius Yanda (United Republic of Tanzania), Noureddine Yassaa (Algeria), Taha M. Zatari (Saudi Arabia), Panmao Zhai (China)

... and where are the opposing views published? ... this is fine for uneducated policymakers, like Donald Trump or Vladimer Putin ... you should post this in politics ... the above isn't peer-reviewed, so it's NOT scientific ... just one group's opinion ...

See how the authors are identified by country, and not scientific institute ... STUPID BITCH ...

 

[jc456]

... and where are the opposing views published? ... this is fine for uneducated policymakers, like Donald Trump or Vladimer Putin ... you should post this in politics ... the above isn't peer-reviewed, so it's NOT scientific ... just one group's opinion ...

See how the authors are identified by country, and not scientific institute ... STUPID BITCH ...

I’ve stated that at least four times to her.

 

[Crick]

... and where are the opposing views published?

I can take any published scientific study and ask you the same thing. There is no requirement that opposing views be published, simply that they not be censored SOLELY because they are in opposition.

... this is fine for uneducated policymakers, like Donald Trump or Vladimer Putin

That is to whom it is aimed.

... you should post this in politics ...

If there were a significant amount of science knowledge in this forum, that might be a better place for it and I would be working with the Technical Summary instead. But here we have people who think Whales cause global warming by eating "photoplankton" and they need the Reader's Digest version.

the above isn't peer-reviewed, so it's NOT scientific ... just one group's opinion ...

The amount of effort you put into pretending to know science while simultaneously demonstrating that you don't is a sight to behold.

See how the authors are identified by country, and not scientific institute ...

Try to remember who they're all working for here: the UN. Their credentials are available and I guarantee you that every one of them is wa-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-y smarter and wa-a-a-a-a-a-a-a-y more educated than are you.

 

[ReinyDays]

I’ve stated that at least four times to her.

Lies for the sake of lying ... just look at the thread title and you know she's lying ...

 

[Crick]

Lies for the sake of lying ... just look at the thread title and you know she's lying ...

The thread title belongs to FlaCalTenn. Are you accusing him of lying?

 

[jc456]

The thread title belongs to FlaCalTenn. Are you accusing him of lying?

We know you are

 

[Crick]

We know you are

When are you moving up to 4th grade?

 

[jc456]

When are you moving up to 4th grade?

That was back in 1965

 

[Crick]

That was back in 1965

Then, I'm sorry, but it didn't take.

At all.

 

[Crick]

The thread title belongs to FlaCalTenn. Are you accusing him of lying?

Are you accusing him of lying?

 

[jc456]

Then, I'm sorry, but it didn't take.

At all.

47 year career would say otherwise

 

[Crick]

47 year career would say otherwise

Post 2354 says I'm spot on.